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2. *Des Pensées de Pascal, par* M. VICTOR COUSIN. *Nouvelle Edition. Revue et augmentée. Ouvrage autorisé par le Conseil de l'Instruction Publique.* 1 vol. 8vo. Paris: 1845.

'PASCAL'S THOUGHTS,' says Professor Vinet, of Lausanne, 'can no longer be found in our literature.' The work has suffered such eclipse as might befal a star which, after a long period of glory, should suddenly be lost from the heavens; or, more properly, it is like one of those Crustacea which retire for a time, to develop a new shell more commensurate with the augmenting bulk of the animal. In the pages of Cousin and Fougère the work comes out anew, in the genuine form in which it was penned by the great Geometer of the seventeenth century, at once emancipated from the caprice of the Duke de Roannez, and the fears of Port-Royal, from the piety of Arnauld, and the profaneness of Condorcet.

Were not the work so speedily restored to us, we might grudge the antiquarian diligence which had robbed us of one of our most valued classics. So soon as M. Cousin had published his 'Memoir' respecting the original manuscripts, when he had noticed the daring way in which they had been tampered with, and the necessity of a new edition, it was essential that the pious diligence of M. Fougère should restore our ancient associate.

At the first report of this literary adventure, we were ready to exclaim with the Roman poet—

> 'Pol me occidistis, amici,
> Non servastis, ait: cui sic extorta voluptas,
> Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error.'

But we must do M. Fougère the justice to say that he has fairly accomplished the task which his title-page indicates him to have undertaken. M. Cousin, indeed, seems to suppose that he could have done the work himself much better. We must admit that he has effected not a little by his republication of 'Descartes,' as well as by his 'Fragments de Philosophie Cartésienne,' towards the revival of the earlier and better school of French philosophers. He had apparently booked Pascal for his own property; and for any one else to venture on his correction, is a sort of literary piracy. He is like Johnson, of whom Sir Joshua Reynolds remarks, that he would allow none else to bestow blame or praise on David Garrick. In consequence he never mentions Fougère's name throughout his book, and loses the opportunity of correcting various errors in the text of Pascal, rather than acknowledge his obligations to another hand. This leads to an amusing sort of warfare between the two editors of Pascal. Neither ventures on a direct attack: Fougère affects to be peaceable, and Cousin to be dignified. But a kind of aside grumbling goes on between them continually. They are like a cross husband and wife, who feel it indecorous to scold openly, but make remarks to the company for one another's benefit. The gentleman wonders why the dinner is always cold at his house, and the lady does not know why it is that some people are never satisfied with their servants. This sort of sparring runs through the volumes. Cousin had communicated his original report to the French Academy on the necessity of a new edition of 'Pascal's Thoughts' during the spring and summer of 1842. He published it at the conclusion of the same year. Together with a full exposure of the incorrectness of the existing editions, he supplied a few specimens of an exacter method. To the whole he prefixed an 'Avant Propos,' in which he ventured to arraign Pascal as a philosophical sceptic. Every one knows M. Cousin's character and merits: though, unhappily, but little taught in that truest philosophy which has its centre in the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Cross, he has yet done much towards the triumph of a purer Platonism over the degrading sensualism of the æra of the Revolution. His long residence in Germany, and his intimate acquaintance with its writers, have contributed to make him loathe the frivolous profaneness of the school of Voltaire. But his attack on Pascal was not likely to be endured by those who can truly sympathize with the principles of that great thinker. We shall have occasion to show its injustice, while at the same time we must admit the existence of an occasional expression which may be fairly censured. And we are not surprised at the complaints which, whether they express Fougère's sentiments or not, are put forth in his work as the view naturally adopted by those who hold to the ancient Jansenist School of Theology.

M. Fougère published his edition of the 'Thoughts, Fragments, and Letters of Pascal,' in the summer of 1844; and at the end of the same year Cousin appears again with a second edition of his former work. These two editions it is, which maintain the petty war of which we have been speaking. Thus, for instance, Cousin tells us in an article in the 'Revue des Deux Mondes' of September 1843, that Pascal was 'en possession d'un assez belle fortune,' which leads Fougère to the incidental remark, 'Pascal n'était pas riche.' (Introd. p. 61.) For this Fougère cites the unquestionable authority of his sister, Madame Perier; and by way of completing his victory, he accounts for the carriage-and-four, in which Cousin tells us that Pascal took his usual drives, (Cousin, p. 391,) by observing that it doubtless belonged to his friend the Duke de Roannez, and that for the simple mathematician to have possessed such a vehicle would have been contrary to the etiquette of the period.

For this insinuation of ignorance respecting the usages of society in the age of Louis Quatorze, Cousin must needs have his revenge. He finds it in a discussion suggested by a curious fragment first discovered by himself amidst the manuscripts of the King's Library at Paris, and published by him in the 'Revue des Deux Mondes.' The title, 'A Discourse on the Passions of Love,' would not lead us perhaps to trace it to Pascal, but the style and thoughts are singularly in his manner, and the Essay is directly ascribed to him in the Index to the Royal Manuscripts. This circumstance might perhaps abate the air of triumph with which the discovery is paraded by Cousin, (p. 383, 449,) and at which Fougère not unnaturally makes himself a little merry, (vol. i. p. 105.) He says truly enough, that since this manuscript is preserved in a volume of Jansenist publications, since it was preserved in the collection where the papers of Pascal were deposited, and is twice referred to by name in the Index of the Library, it was scarcely possible for any one to overlook it. It seems however to have been overlooked by all collectors before the time of Cousin; and yet it may have been seen by those who thought it would add little to the value of Pascal's works. For, in truth, it has no great charms, either for those who are not ashamed to admire Ovid's 'Art of Love,' or for those who are able to value Plato's 'Symposium.' For the young it is too philosophical, yet not serious enough for the aged: such however as it is, a curious controversy has been raised by it. Cousin thinks that it shows Pascal to have been aiming at an earthly bride, and would trace this Essay to the occasion. Who might the lady be? Mademoiselle de Roannez, the sister of his friend the duke, suggests Fougère. (Introd. p. 65.) This gives Cousin his opportunity of retaliating for the imputation of unacquaintance with the manners of the seventeenth century. 'As to 'marriage, it is absolutely impossible and perfectly useless to 'conjecture what person Pascal had in view. He might aspire to 'the most honourable connexions. But it displays excessive 'ignorance of the age of Louis XIV. to suppose that his expectations could ever have been turned to Mademoiselle de 'Roannez, the sister of a duke and peer, and subsequently the 'Duchess of La Feuillade.'—*Cousin*, p. 434.

Our readers would be little profited by these literary recriminations, and we shall not enter, therefore, into the grounds on which Cousin laments that 'the intentions of Dom John Guerrier of the order of St. Benedict,' in the preservation of the Pascal papers, 'were not accomplished,' (Cousin, p. 13,) while Fougère takes care to tell us of the success of Guerrier's care. (Int. p. 47.) Neither is it of much moment that Cousin refers the publication of some Thoughts on Geography to Bossut (p. 35), which Fougère, though not usually disposed to stand up for the Savans of the Encyclopœdia, vindicates for the earlier edition of Condorcet. (Introd. p. 28; and vol. i. p. 122.) So much we may say in general, that the work of Fougère is evidently the most full and accurate, and appears to be a complete collection of all Pascal's Remains, by one who feels real value for his memory. Perhaps he may be accused of too servile an attachment to the letter of the manuscript. Pascal's papers appear to have been preserved *in extenso*, and Fougère has published even the single words, by which an incompleted paragraph was about to be commenced. There is some reason, therefore, in the charge which is made by Cousin, though he seems unwilling to mention the work against which he designs it. 'I had intended,' he says, 'at one time to 'give a large number of new "Thoughts." On consideration, I 'abandoned the design. The remains of a great man ought not 'to be superstitiously adored. Reason and taste must choose 'among fragments which sometimes are admirable, and some'times in their actual state wholly uninteresting. A *fac simile* 'is not the edition, at once intelligent and faithful, which I had 'desired. and which I still desiderate.'[1]

We should certainly wish for an edition of the 'Thoughts' in a concentrated form, in which the order, arrangement, and accuracy of Fougère's edition should be combined with a somewhat more sparing supply of the original materials. We find no fault with the edifice which he has built for Pascal, but could be content to have the ground swept of the bricks and half bricks which he has left around it.

M. Cousin's work consists of an essay on the necessity of republishing the 'Thoughts,' with a few examples of the mode of doing it. The larger part is in reality taken up in maintaining that hostile attitude in which the author of the 'Thoughts' is throughout regarded. The authorizing of such a work, under its present title, shows not a little partiality in the 'Council of Public Instruction,' unless it be done with a view of discouraging Pascal's work.

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[1] Cousin's Avant Propos, p. 3.

Opposed as Cousin is to the school of Condorcet and Voltaire, we should hardly have expected to meet with the following sentiments—sentiments rather to be expected in those notes, in which, in their editions of Pascal they have insulted religion as well as their author.

After stating that Pascal's work was suited to such gloomy characters as Byron or his creation 'Manfred,' he adds, 'In the 'present day Pascal's thoughts are, perhaps, more dangerous 'than useful. They disseminate aversion for philosophy much 'more than taste for religion: they rack the soul rather than 'enlighten or calm it; and the faith which they inspire, being 'engendered by fear rather than by love, is unquiet, and agitated 'like that of their sublime but unfortunate author.'[1]

We shall return to the ground of Cousin's objections: meanwhile we must observe the services which he has rendered to this work, and give a few extracts illustrative of the manner in which its vigour had hitherto been mutilated. We take up the second volume of one of the most common editions of Pascal, that of Renouard, Paris, 1812. Under the head of 'Pensées Diverses sur la Religion,' Art. xvii. § 81, p. 190, we meet the following true, but not very forcible observation:—

'La piété chrétienne anéantit le *moi* humain, et la civilité humaine le cache et le supprime.'

But how different is the effect of this passage, when, in the Port-Royal Logic, in which it originally occurs, it supplies an example that the usage of society, in its choice of words, is in truth only a shadow of that real refinement of which Christianity is the parent; that the good Christian is in truth the best gen'tleman; when we read, in short, that 'the late M. Pascal, 'than whom no one was more skilled in true rhetoric, carried 'this rule so far as to say that a good man ought to avoid speaking 'of himself, and even using the words *I* and *me*; he was accus'tomed to say on this subject, "que *la piété chrétienne* anéantit le '*moi* humain, et que *la civilité humaine le cache et le supprime.*"'[2]

'Tantum series juncturaque pollet.'

We will take two other instances in the passages which immediately follow in the edition of Renouard. In number 84, p. 191, we meet the following remarks:—

'I love poverty, because Jesus Christ loved it; I love

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[1] Cousin, p. 163.

[2] Id. p. 46.

'wealth, because it gives the means of assisting the wretched. 'I observe fidelity towards all the world. I render no ill return 'to those who injure me... I attempt to be always true, faithful, 'and sincere towards all men. Whether alone or in company, 'I have always before me the prospect of God, who must judge 'my actions, and to whom they are all devoted. Such are my 'sentiments, and I every day bless my Redeemer who has implanted them in my heart; and who, from a man full of weak'ness, of misery, and of concupiscence, of pride, and of ambition, 'has made a man exempt from all these evils, through the power 'of that grace to which every thing is due, when in myself I was 'nothing but misery and horror.'

'This precious thought,' says Cousin, 'Bossut has inserted 'in his supplement, and in consequence succeeding editions have 'placed it in the midst of the other thoughts, as if Pascal had 'ever dreamt of entertaining posterity with a description of him'self.'[1] Its purpose, of course, becomes quite different, when we learn that it was not written with any view to be seen by others, but as a kind of moral confession of faith, in order to guide the dispositions of his own mind.

The same may be said of the statement, 'Sickness is the natural condition of Christians.'[2] The whole force of this remark arises from its growth out of his own deep fund of patience. Such a statement were little if made by a man in the hours of health. But there is a touching force in it, when we read: 'His friends were afflicted at his extreme sufferings.' But he said to them, according to his sister's narrative, 'Do not lament me; sickness is the natural condition of Christians.'[3]

These examples are sufficient to show that Cousin's suggestions have brought out with vastly augmented power the meaning of many passages in this book, and we might also observe that they have exhibited many parts of the work with greatly augmented accuracy. In numberless places the sense of the original had either been distorted or lost. But it may be asked, how came 'Pascal's Thoughts' to have been so ill edited? A question which must lead us to a few words respecting the history of their author.

Blaize Pascal was born at Clermont in Auvergne, A. D. 1623. Like one of those stars which a little precede the morning, he rose in time to shine in the forefront of the eminent men who form the glory of the Augustan age of French literature. He was four years senior to Bossuet, and therefore had ended his short life before the Eagle of Meaux had completed the middle of his course. The same, therefore, was his precedence of Madame de Sévigné, whose graceful pen has so well preserved the private history of her generation. She was born, like Bossuet, A. D. 1627. Racine comes some twelve years later, A. D. 1639, the year after the birth of Louis XIV. This priority, not less than his native genius, has made Pascal one of the founders of French literature. His classic style is universally admitted to have been one of the great means of fixing a language, which had not the advantage, like the English and German tongues, of being early enshrined in the hallowed simplicity of the vernacular Scriptures, and to him, after Montaigne and Descartes, and far more than to either of them, do his countrymen look back as the standard of prose composition. Even the flippant Voltaire could not deny that 'Pascal a été géomètre et éloquent!'

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[1] Ed. Renouard, vol. ii. p. 191, 17, § 85. [2] Cousin, p. 46. [3] Ibid.

The talents of Pascal gave early promise. It is scarce needful to remind our readers that at twelve years old he had advanced by the road of original discovery as far as the Thirty-second Proposition of Euclid. At sixteen he wrote on Conics. A singular story of his being bewitched, so as to be unable to bear the sight of water, or to see his father and mother together, is told about his earlier childhood. For this we must refer the curious reader to Cousin's volume.[1] When he was only eight years old, his father, Stephen Pascal, had abandoned a high judicial situation at Clermont that he might be able to do more justice in Paris to the education of his extraordinary son. He brought with him his two other children, Gilberte, afterwards Madame Perier, and Jacqueline, so well known as the Sœur de St. Euphémie at Port-Royal. It was the time when Richelieu was ruling France with that iron sway by which the disuniting effect of the religious wars was slowly remedied. By the gradual consolidation of the executive power, by the reformation and improvement of the clergy, and especially by the selection of good prelates, Cardinal Richelieu commenced that career of reaction against the Huguenots, which won back to the French Church a third part of its children. The Edict of Nantes would never have been revoked if the Mole had not been raised against la Rochelle, nor would Bossuet have ventured to encounter Claude if Dubois had been the tutor of Louis instead of Péréfixe. But the Cardinal's yoke was harsh as well as salutary: Stephen Pascal, suspected of opposing some unfair regulations connected with the Exchange, was forced to fly again into Auvergne, and it was only through the address and talents of his children, who pleased the great Cardinal by their elegant performance in a private mask or recitation, that he was allowed to return, and subsequently gained an appointment at Rouen. Thither Blaize accompanied him, and the nature of his employments led to the formation of a calculating machine of wonderful skill, in which the young mathematician is said to have expended an amount of thought and labour, prejudicial to the still more curious machinery of his own frame.

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[1] Cousin, p. 428.

While the troubles of the Fronde were agitating Paris, Blaize Pascal lived at Rouen, so far as we see, their uninterested spectator, except as they gave occasion to an accidental phrase in his works, and impressed him with a deeper hatred of political agitation. To the very year of the Fronde, Fougère would refer the remarkable fragment on the conversion of a sinner, which, from internal evidence, we should almost have assigned to a later date. In no part of his works does this great writer draw a more vivid picture of the vanity of earthly things, and of the need of some higher object to satisfy the immortal spirit. Take, for instance, the passage where he says that the awakened soul, when sensible of that awful solitude into which it must pass from this state of being, 'commence à considérer comme un néant tout ce qui doit retourner dans le néant, 'le ciel, la terre, son esprit, son corps, ses parents, ses amis, ses 'ennemis, les biens, la pauvreté, la disgrâce, la prospérité, 'l'honneur, l'ignominie, l'estime, le mépris, l'autorité, l'indigence, 'la santé, la maladie, et la vie même. Enfin tout ce qui doit moins 'durer que son âme est incapable de satisfaire le désir de cette 'âme, qui recherche sérieusement à s'établir dans une félicité 'aussi durable qu'elle même.'[1]

If Fougère is right in the date which he assigns to this essay, Pascal was now experiencing the very process which he describes. At the risk of offending some of our friends of the old school of English orthodoxy, we must say that he was passing through the state which is very properly called by Romish writers 'his first conversion.' We know not why this word should be confined to the admission of men from heathenism, and we are sure that the proscription of a term so simple and significant, does more to injure the theology of our Church than any other circumstance whatsoever. Vast numbers of Low Church people might be induced to believe in that cardinal doctrine of the gospel, Baptismal Regeneration, if they were not told that to do so was fatal to the reality of conversion. The real heretics on this subject, who understand what they say and are prepared to maintain, in opposition to the Church, that children may be properly brought up without having received the gift of God's grace, when they were grafted in infancy into the Lord's body, are comparatively few. They must either be ultra-Calvinists or Pelagians, and begin commonly the first to end as the second. But what gives them weight is, that they have been allowed to appropriate the term *conversion* to their own purposes. Now why should not such a word be used, as it constantly is by the Romanists, when a young person, who, though well educated, has shown little signs of a regenerate heart, is awakened to greater seriousness. Such was the case with Pascal. He was especially affected by the writings of Arnauld, and of that great founder of the religious movement in France, the Abbé de Saint Cyran.[1] His father's death however, a few years later, A.D. 1651, and the infirm state of his own health, which made absolute relaxation essential, brought him, after a time, into the fashionable scenes of Paris, where, though not dissipated, his earnestness of mind appears to have been relaxed. At this time he is said to have thought of marriage, and of some civil employment. But about four years after his father's death, A.D. 1654, at the very period when the splendour of the new reign was in its commencement, (Louis being that year consecrated and declared of age,) his religious feelings were again aroused to the highest pitch, by his memorable preservation at Neuilli. Driving out along the side of the Seine with a carriage and four, according to his custom—Fougère suggests that it was the carriage of his friend the Duke of Roannez—the leaders took fright and plunged down a precipice. His own life was saved, as though by miracle, through the breaking of the harness. The effect of this incident was, no doubt, greatly to agitate a shattered frame; and Voltaire would willingly attribute the deep state of religious earnestness, in which he passed the remainder of his days, to derangement. 'Don't forget to say,' he wrote to Condorcet 'that from the time of the accident at Neuilli, Pascal was deranged.' The idea was worthy of an author, who having first mentioned that Madame de Sévigné thought that Racine, as compared with Corneille, 'n'ira pas loin;' and likewise that she thought persons would weary of the newly-invented beverage, coffee, afterwards confounded the two statements together on his own authority, and invented what La Harpe and others have repeated, that Madame de Sévigné thought the world would get as tired of Racine as of coffee. But what makes Voltaire's statement singularly absurd as applied to Pascal, is that this deranged man was not only the discoverer of the singular properties of the cycloid, but also, the author of the 'Provincial Letters.' We shall say nothing on either of these subjects, except that the 'Provincial Letters' commenced A.D. 1656, two years after the accident at Neuilli; and that it was during a night of great suffering, two years later, that he cheated the time by those philosophical thoughts which are associated with his most brilliant mathematical discoveries. Nothing illustrates more the peculiar power of his genius than that his discoveries were usually the accidental result of some circumstance, which afforded food for the activity of his mind. Thus his researches on the doctrine of Chances, which he was the first to explain, resulted from his observation of games of chance—the common amusement of fashionable life, when he was thrown, after his father's death, upon the world of Paris. In examining the weight of the air, by comparing it with that of mercury at various heights, both on the Puy de Dôme in Auvergne and on the tower of St. Jacques at Paris, he followed an idea suggested by Torricelli; but the experiments which led to the invention of the barometer were wholly his own. In them he showed a power of applying the Baconian test to nature, which proved him to be as great a master of practical as of pure mathematics.

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[1] Pascal, Fougère, vol. i. p. 85.

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[1] Fougère, Introd. p. 79.

These, however, were only the recreations of a great mind which felt, if ever it was felt by man, that, compared with the salvation of the soul, every thing else is a grand impertinence. He withdrew himself more and more from the pursuit of what has been called, with an amusing assumption, *useful knowledge*, and gave up his mind to the preparation of a work in illustration and defence of religion. To this the four years of sickness which closed his life were especially devoted. He lived eight years after that second conversion, as it has been called, to which the accident at Neuilli contributed, and died A.D. 1662. We are far from admitting that the shock of that event made him a thoughtful from being a careless man; on the contrary, it is sufficiently apparent that nothing more disgusted him with the world than the unmeaning frivolity which formed the delight of Paris; but it was impossible that so deep a spirit should not be intensely moved by near intercourse with so solemn a thing as death. For, in truth, it is only to light and careless minds that death can be otherwise than awful. It has been well said, respecting the frigid pleasantries with which, according to Adam Smith's account, Hume amused himself on his death-bed, 'the last moments of the dying philosopher might be expected 'to be serious.' And though Pascal was not, like the Scotch infidel, hopeless of a futurity, yet the valley of the shadow of death is an entrance into an awful and mysterious being, which even the Christian may well approach with a sobered and chastened spirit. We are not prepared, therefore, to allow the existence of any 'false impressions,' to speak technically, even though Pascal is said to have fancied during his later years that a gulph was ever open beside him. There is no symptom, that, like our unhappy Cowper, his sense of the uncertainty of life was not tempered by the continual hope of God's mercy through Christ our Lord. Cousin has quoted a striking, we may say awful fragment, 'La silence éternelle de ces espaces infinis 'm'effraie,' (p. 175.) But there is no indication that these words express the whole of his own feelings. He may have been indicating his view of the eternal state, abstracted from the hopes of revelation; or, as in the preface to his 'Apologie du Christianisme' (Fougère, vol. ii. p. 9), he may have been describing the proper feelings of an unbeliever. All that we read of his last hours tells of tenderness, humility, and love. He had been carried, it seems, to the house of his sister Madame Perier, Rue Neuve St. Etienne. In a little room in the court on the ground floor we may fancy such incidents as those which are recorded of him, that he desired to have some poor persons brought in to share in the attentions which he himself received, that he might not appropriate more than his due of the alleviations of sickness. We can fancy also his repeating the whole of the cxixth Psalm, which he is said,—(the same thing is recorded of our own lay-saint Wilberforce),—to have committed to memory. Here, too, we may imagine the words, with which he had accompanied his liberal distribution of alms, 'I have 'observed that however poor men are, they leave something at 'their death.' To survivors it is interesting to gather up the fragments of that feast of love and faith, with which God has spread the table of his saints—to themselves, doubtless, the feelings are natural which are expressed in Pascal's epitaph, 'Optasset ille quidem præ paupertatis et humilitatis studio, etiam 'his sepulchri honoribus carere, mortuusque etiamnum latere, 'qui vivus semper latere voluerat.'

Pascal's feelings might not unnaturally have led him to desire that his papers, as well as his person, should be forgotten. For the great benefit which they have conferred upon the Christian world, we are indebted apparently to the care of his friends, and particularly of his sister Madame Perier. The 'Apology for Christianity,' as M. Fougère not very felicitously calls it, (his nephew speaks of it as a work 'sur la religion,' or 'contre les Athées,') had been thought over and digested in his own mind, but his bodily weakness had prevented him from doing more than writing or dictating a few passages illustrative of its main arguments. The only connected account of its purpose and arrangement had been given in a conversation of some hours in length, in which he had detailed his intentions to a party of his friends. This conversation is described in the preface to the original edition of the 'Thoughts,'—a preface commonly attributed to the Abbé Perier, his younger nephew, but which is shown by a letter published by Fougère to have been composed by the elder nephew, Stephen Perier.[1] When the Periers found themselves in possession of a variety of loose papers, which had as yet received no arrangement, they called in the advice of various friends, of whom the leaders of Port-Royal were the chief. But besides Nicole and Arnauld, the Duke de Roannez, whose admiration for Pascal had been so unbounded, that he could not bear him out of his sight, together with the capricious Lomenie de Brienne, were associated with Stephen Perier in the arrangement and preparation of the manuscripts. Madame Perier's reverence for her brother made her as fearful of any alteration in what he had written, as Augustus could be of the insertion of new lines in the Æneid, and her feelings were responded to by her son.[2] But the circumstances of the time interfered with this intention. The Jansenists were averse to any step which should interfere with that truce with their opponents, which had been brought about under the auspices of Clement IX. In Pascal's fragments were many which reflected on the Jesuits. These therefore they curtailed in the most unsparing manner. But not contented with this, they altered innumerable passages, in which the force and meaning of the original suffered by their interference. A long list of such cases is given by Cousin in his 2d Report, p. 72, &c. This work he produces authority for attributing mainly to the Duke of Roannez.[3] We shall not trouble the reader with all the particulars which these volumes contain respecting the licensing of the work, nor with the delay of Madame Perier's[4] life of her brother, because it would have been needful, yet unsafe, to correct the false report that in his last days he had expressed himself hostile to Jansenism; but come at once to the fact that the 'Pensées de Pascal' were published A.D. 1670, eight years after the death of their author. This first edition was followed by others, which were not more faithful to the original text, but contained a few additional passages. Among these must be distinguished the editions of Cordorcet,[5] A.D. 1776, and of Voltaire, A.D. 1778, which, however, were remarkable only for the infidel notes by which, leaving the text unimproved, they attempted to weaken Pascal's arguments. In the following year the 'Pensées' were greatly enlarged by the Abbé Bossut, who published a collected edition of Pascal's works. The Abbé, however, though trusted by Pascal's relations with various documents which were now published for the first time, does not appear to have troubled himself to verify the text of the original editions. It was not a time when the text of authors was so rigorously tested as at present. And it has been reserved for Cousin to bring out various circumstances, which show that the Abbé's arrangements have rather prejudiced than benefited the work he edited.

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[1] Fougère, i. 402. [2] Ibid. Introd. p. 18.

[3] Cousin, p. 83; Fougère, Introd. p. 18. [4] Fougère, Introd. pp. 19, 24.

[5] A form of self-dedication, and an account of some peculiar feelings of religious persons, were first published by Condorcet, under the title of the 'Amulette.'

The subsequent editions have so commonly imitated that of Bossut, that in speaking of its arrangement we are noticing what has been adopted up to the present time. This arrangement is altogether objectionable. The 'Pensées de Pascal' have been separated, as may be seen by the index at the end of any ordinary copy, into two parts; the first containing those thoughts which have reference to philosophy, morals, and the belles-lettres; the second relating immediately to religion. This distinction is faulty both in what it separates and in what it leaves united. Whatever Pascal had noted down during the last years of his life in preparation for his great work, whether philosophical or moral in its subject matter, had immediate reference to a religious end. Yet these fragments Bossut has arbitrarily separated. Again, amidst the religious observations which were associated in their author's mind by their reference to a single and substantive work, he has introduced casual and desultory sayings drawn from various periods of Pascal's life. For this last course indeed there was not wanting precedent in the original edition which was published by our author's friends.[1]

In the first part of the 'Thoughts,' which in the ordinary duodecimo editions comprises the first volume, there are found twelve articles, of which the three first, 'on Authority in Philosophy,' 'on Geometry,' 'on the Art of Persuading,' were essays composed indeed by Pascal, but written at an earlier period, and wholly unconnected with his projected work on religion.[2] Fougère has found the proper title of the first of these essays, and published it in his first volume, under the name of a preface to an intended work on the notion of a vacuum.[3] Instead of referring, therefore, to Pascal's Thoughts on religion, it was obviously connected with the experiments which he had made several years before on the nature of air. As these are the three first of the twelve articles, so the two last were never penned by Pascal at all, but were notes which had been taken at different times of his conversation. One was a conversation with the Duke de Roannez, on the condition of the great; the other 'on Epictetus and Montaigne,' in its true state is one of the most interesting relics of Pascal which remains, and none probably has suffered more by Bossut's alterations. When

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[1] Cousin, p. 24.

[2] Id. p. 34.

[3] Fougère, i. 91.

Pascal renewed his relations with Port-Royal, on what is called by Cousin 'his second conversion,' he was introduced, it is said, by M. Singlin, whom he chose as his confessor and director, 'to 'Arnauld, as a person who would be able to cope with him in 'knowledge of other sciences, and to De Saci, as one who 'would teach him to despise them.'[1] Not that this end was to be answered by undervaluing what was good in profane learning; it was De Saci's habit to draw men out on the topics with which they were peculiarly familiar, and then, through his own more comprehensive view of the real 'prima philosophia,' to discover to them the true plan and proportion of the subjects of earthly knowledge. This course he was able to pursue even when Pascal was his pupil. The good Father had been so richly nourished by the study of the profoundest mind in the ancient Church, that even the deep thoughts which he found in his new disciple were familiar to him. 'Whatever 'Pascal said to him which was good, he had seen before, he said, 'in St. Augustin.'[2]

The conversation with De Saci turned peculiarly on Epictetus and Montaigne, and surely the new convert showed not only that he had no occasion to learn contempt for the world, its views, and judgments, but that he had rightly grasped the secret of its emptiness. For he was not leaving it merely through weariness, but because he had found that which was able to satisfy. The insertion of this dialogue would certainly be far from unsuitable in any collection of Pascal's Thoughts, because, as we shall notice presently, it is intimately associated with their purpose and tendency. But as exhibited by Bossut in the form of extracts, not only are its forcible expressions mutilated, but the vigour and life of the dialogue has altogether evaporated. It should be given as it was published in the memoirs of Fontaine, the secretary of De Saci, by whom it was noted down.[3]

We have seen thus, that of twelve articles in the first part of Bossut's edition of 'The Thoughts,' five, and those the most important, do not belong to them.[4]

Those which remain are in like manner mixed indiscriminately, mutilated, and altered.

We shall say no more on this subject, but state only the new arrangement, which has been adopted by Fougère. His work consists of two volumes, of which the first contains the various fragments and treatises which refer to earlier periods of Pascal's life, but have been inserted in former collections of his 'Thoughts,' such as his letters, his prayers, his notes respecting the Jesuits and Jansenists, respecting the Pope and Church of Rome, the notes of his conversation, and the newly-discovered fragment, 'Sur les Passions de l'Amour.' The letters are given with greater entireness than in former editions, and some interesting miscellaneous matter is appended.

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[1] Fougère, i. 349. [2] Ibid. [3] Cousin, p. 29. [4] Ibid. p. 38.

The second volume is appropriated to what may be designated more exactly as Pascal's Thoughts, or as Fougère not very happily terms it, 'Fragments d'une Apologie du Christianisme.' When Justin Martyr adopted a similar tone, the faith which he professed was under the ban of the established laws of the empire. Surely King George III. was right when he thought that a different tone should be taken by those who unfold a system on which has been built the civilization of Christendom, and to which every nation in Europe refers as supplying the consecrating principle of its laws.

The fragments which make up this volume have been arranged by Fougère under the following titles, which he has found among Pascal's papers. 'A general preface—the misery 'of man without God, or the corruption of nature—the tendency to diversions—circumstances which mislead us in the 'pursuit of truth—the want of consistency in man's nature—'the greatness and misery of man.' These form the first part of the volume. The second is what naturally follows to complete the outline of his work,—'A preface to the second part,—faith 'the true source of knowledge,—characteristics of true religion, '—means of arriving at faith,—the Jews,—miracles,—typical 'teaching,—prophecies,—on Jesus Christ,—on the Christian 'faith.'

The volume is preceded by an interesting portrait of Pascal, engraved from the only one taken during his life-time, and which has recently been discovered. As a work of art it does not bear comparison with the portrait of him executed by Anesnel, the brother of the well-known commentator, after his death. Yet the hand which sketched it adds interest to the work. Among the Jansenist partizans none was more distinguished than the celebrated lawyer Domat. A few years ago, on the death of Domat's last descendant, was found the copy of the Pandects, which is stated within to have been that used in the composition of his great work, 'The Natural Order of Civil Laws;' and in the inside cover, attested likewise by the signature of his son, is found a design in crayons, which is described as the 'portrait of M. Pascal, made by my father.'

It is in this second volume of Fougère's work that we meet the most interesting portions, as well of what Bossut had published under the head of 'Religious Remarks,'as of those which he had included under 'Morals' and 'Philosophy.' The preface is what had been inserted by Bossut, as the second article of his second part, and entitled, 'Necessity of Studying Religion.'

In the third chapter of Fougère's second volume, under the head of the 'Inconsistency of Man's Nature,' are found those striking observations on man's weakness and ignorance, but with infinitely augmented force and beauty, which occur in the fourth article of Bossut's first part.[1]

In the fourth chapter, on the 'Grandeur and Misery of Man,' occurs the contrast between the Pyrrhonists and Dogmatists, which is the first article in Bossut's second part, and probably the favourite passage in the volume.

We must cite the conclusion of this passage as restored by Cousin; though in truth few had escaped with so little mutilation.

> 'Quelle chimère est-ce donc que l'homme? Quelle nouveauté, quel monstre, quel chaos, quel sujet de contradiction, quel prodige! Juge de toutes choses, imbécile ver de terre, dépositaire du vrai, cloaque[2] d'incertitude et d'erreur, gloire et rebut de l'univers. Qui démêlera cet embrouillement? La nature confond les pyrrhoniens, et la raison confond les dogmatiques. Qui deviendrez-vous donc, ô homme, qui cherchez quelle est votre véritable condition par votre raison naturelle? Vous ne pouvez fuir une de ces sectes, ni subsister dans aucune.
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> 'Connaissez donc, superbe, quel paradoxe vous êtes à vous-même; humiliez-vous, raison impuissante; taisez-vous, nature imbécile; apprenez que l'homme passe infiniment l'homme,[3] et entendez de votre maître votre condition véritable que vous ignorez. Ecoutez Dieu.'—*Fougère*, vol. ii. p. 104.

Under the head of 'Means of arriving at Faith,' in the latter part of Fougère's second volume, occurs a well-known passage, in which Pascal refers apparently to that doctrine of chances, which he had been the first to methodize, and which he applies to the case of religious faith. He heads it with the title, 'Infini—Rien,' which is omitted in the old version, in the third article of Bossut's second part. The commencement of the argument, as well as several of the most important portions of it, had been lost, till restored by Cousin.[4]

> 'Parlons maintenant selon les lumières naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu, il est infiniment incompréhensible. Puisque, n'ayant ni parties ni bornes, il n'a nul rapport à nous; *nous sommes donc incapables de connaître, ni ce qu'il est,*

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[1] Fougère, vol. ii. p. 72.

[2] In the original manuscript copy, from which the earliest edition was printed, Fougère says that the word *amas* is substituted in Arnauld's handwriting for *cloaque;* an alteration which has been retained in all subsequent editions. Cousin imagined the alteration to have been made by the Duke of Roannez (p. 176).

[3] This expression seems to be explained by a various reading which Pascal has erased: 'Apprenons donc de la vérité incréée et incarnée notre véritable nature.'

[4] These two passages, 'Infini—Rien,' and that on the 'Inconsistency of Man's Nature,' 'Disproportion de l'homme,' are given by Cousin, in an appendix, as a specimen of his proposed restoration.

ni s'il est.[1] Cela étant, qui osera entreprendre de resoudre cette question? Ce n'est pas nous, qui n'avons aucun rapport à lui.

'Qui blâmera donc les Chrétiens de ne pouvoir rendre raison de leur créance, eux qui professent une religion dont ils ne peuvent rendre raison? Ils déclarent, en l'exposant au monde, que c'est une sottise, *stultitiam*, et puis vous vous plaignez de ce qu'ils ne la prouvent pas! S'ils la prouvaient, ils ne tiendraient pas parole: c'est en manquant de preuves qu'ils ne manquent pas de sens. Oui; mais encore que cela excuse ceux qui l'offrent telle, et que cela les ôte du blâme de la produire sans raison, cela n'excuse pas ceux qui la reçoivent.

'Examinons donc ce point, et disons: Dieu est, ou il n'est pas. Mais de quel côté pencherons-nous? la raison n'y peut rien déterminer. Il y a un chaos infini qui nous sépare. Il se joue un jeu *à l'extrémité* de cette distance infinie où il arrivera croix ou pile.[2] Que gagerez-vous? par raison, vous ne pouvez faire ni l'un ni l'autre; par raison, vous ne pouvez défendre nul des deux.

'Ne blâmez donc pas de fausseté ceux qui ont pris un choix: car vous n'en savez rien. Non; mais je les blâmerai d'avoir fait, non ce choix, mais un choix; car encore que celui qui prend croix et l'autre (pile) soient en pareille faute, ils sont tous deux en faute; le juste est de ne point parier.

'Oui, mais il faut parier, cela n'est pas volontaire; vous êtes embarqué; lequel prendrez-vous donc: voyons, puisqu'il faut choisir; voyons ce qui vous intéresse le moins. Vous avez deux choses à perdre, le vrai et le bien; et deux choses à degager: votre raison et votre volonté, votre connaissance et votre béatitude; et votre nature a deux choses à fuir, l'envie et la misère. Votre raison n'est pas plus blessée, puisqu'il faut nécessairement choisir, en choisissant l'un que l'autre. Voilà un point vidé, mais votre béatitude.

'Pesons le gain et la perte; en prenant croix que Dieu est, estimons ces deux cas; si vous gagnez, vous gagnez tout; si vous perdez, vous ne perdez rien. Gagez donc qu'il est, sans hésiter. Cela est admirable. Oui, il faut gager, mais je gage peut-être trop. Voyons, puisqu'il y a pareil hasard de gain et de perte, si vous n'aviez qu'à gagner deux vies pour une, vous pourriez encore gager; mais s'il y en avait trois à gagner, il faudrait jouer (puisque vous êtes dans la nécessité de jouer), et vous seriez imprudent, lorsque vous êtes forcé à jouer, de ne pas hasarder votre vie pour en gagner trois à un jeu, où il y a pareil hasard de perte et de gain. Mais il y a une éternité de vie et de bonheur; et cela étant, quand il y aurait une infinité de hasards dont un seul serait pour vous, vous auriez encore raison de gager un pour avoir deux; et vous agiriez de mauvais sens, étant obligé à jouer, de refuser de jouer une vie contre trois à un jeu où d'une infinité de hasards il y en a un pour vous, s'il y avait une infinité de vie infiniment heureuse à gagner. Mais il y a ici une infinité de vie, infiniment heureuse à gagner, un hasard de gain contre un nombre infini de hasards de perte, et ce que vous jouez est fini. Cela est tout parti;[3] partout où est l'infini et où il n'y a pas infinité de hasards de perte contre celui de gain, il n'y a point à balancer, il faut tout donner; et ainsi quand on est forcé à jouer, il faut renoncer à la raison pour garder la vie plutôt que de la hasarder pour le gain infini aussi prêt à arriver que la perte du néant.

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[1] This passage does not occur in the original edition of the 'Thoughts,' published by Pascal's friends; it was first drawn from the manuscript by Desmolets.

[2] 'Crux in monetis dicitur pars illa in qua crux representatur, Pila vero pars aversa, et si forte nulla sit in alterutra parte crux insculpta, tum pars illa in qua Principis effigies extat, *Crux* appellatur, retentâ semper aversæ parti *Pilæ* nomenclaturâ.'—*Ducange.* The words answer, therefore, exactly to *Head or Tail.* The most probable derivation for *Pila* is that given by Ducange, that among the Franks the ancient pieces of money had on their reverse some sacred building with pillars (piles)—the cross being upon their front.

[3] 'C'est à dire, conforme à la règle de tout parti, de tout jeu.'

'Car il ne sert de rien de dire qu'il est incertain si on gagnera, et qu'il est certain qu'on hasarde, et que l'infinie distance qui est entre la certitude qu'on s'expose et l'incertitude de ce qu'on gagnera égale le bien fini qu'on expose certainement à l'infini qui est incertain. Cela n'est pas ainsi; tout joueur hasarde avec certitude pour gagner avec incertitude. Et néanmoins il hasarde certainement le fini pour gagner incertainement le fini, sans pécher contre la raison. Il n'y a pas infinité de distance entre cette certitude de ce qu'on s'expose et l'incertitude du gain; cela est faux. Il y a à la vérité infinité entre la certitude de gagner et la certitude de perdre; mais l'incertitude de gagner est proportionnée à la certitude de ce qu'on hasarde, selon la proportion des hasards de gain et de perte; et de là vient que s'il y a autant de hasards d'un côté que de l'autre, le parti est à jouer égal contre égal; et alors la certitude de ce qu'on s'expose est égale à l'incertitude du faire: tant s'en faut qu'elle en soit infiniment distante! Et ainsi notre proposition est dans une force infinie, quand il y a le fini à hasarder à un jeu où il y a pareils hasards de gain que de perte, et l'infini à gagner. Cela est demonstratif; et si les hommes sont capables de quelque vérité, celle-là l'est.

'Je le confesse, je l'avoue, mais encore n'y a-t-il pas moyen de voir le dessous du jeu?[1] Oui, l'Ecriture, et le reste, &c.

'Oui, mais j'ai les mains liées et la bouche muette; on me force à parier, et je ne suis pas en liberté; on ne me relâche pas, et je suis fait d'une telle sorte, que je ne puis croire. Que voulez-vous donc que je fasse?

'Il est vrai, mais apprenez au moins votre impuissance à croire, puisque la raison vous y porte, et que, néanmoins, vous ne le pouvez. Travaillez donc, non pas à vous convaincre par l'augmentation des preuves de Dieu, mais par la diminution de votre passions. Vous voulez aller à la foi, et vous n'en savez pas le chemin; vous voulez vous guérir de l'infidélité, et vous en demandez les remèdes. Apprenez (les) de ceux qui ont été liés[2] comme vous, et qui parient maintenant tout leur bien. Ce sont gens qui savent un chemin que vous voudriez suivre, et guéris d'un mal dont vous voulez guérir. *Suivez la manière par où ils ont commencé; c'est en faisant tout comme s'ils croyaient, en prenant de l'eau bénite, en faisant dire des messes, &c. Naturellement même cela vous fera croire et vous abêtira. Mais c'est ce que je crains. Et pourquoi? qu'avez-vous à perdre?*[3]

'Mais pour vous montrer que cela y mène, c'est que cela diminue les passions qui sont vos grands obstacles, &c.

'O! ce discours me transport, me ravit, &c. Si ce discours vous plait et vous semble fort, sachez qu'il est fait par un homme qui s'est mis à genoux auparavant et après, pour prier cet Etre infini et sans parties, auquel il soumet tout le sien, de se soumettre aussi le vôtre pour votre propre bien et pour sa gloire, et qu'ainsi la force s'accorde avec cette bassesse.'—*Cousin*, pp. 258—272; *Fougère*, pp. 165—169.

On this passage are founded some of the objections which are made by Cousin against our author. But before we notice them we must mention on what grounds we receive the text as delivered to us by him and Fougère. They profess to have been

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[1] To see the under side of the cards, *i. e.* learn the secret.

[2] Cousin retains the word *tels* in this place, which is a mistake of the earliest copy; Fougère has retained the original.

[3] For this passage some very common-place observations had been substituted in the original edition. For the word *abêtira*, see below, p. 38.

the first who have encountered the vast labour of decyphering the original manuscript, preserved in the king's library at Paris, and consisting of detached fragments, pasted into a volume. Most of them are in Pascal's own handwriting, others were committed to writing by his friends or servants. The grand difficulty of the examination is that Pascal's handwriting is full of abbreviations, ill-formed, and nearly unintelligible.[1] This has been an impediment for which the 'short journey to the Rue de Richelieu' has not compensated.[2] At the same time M. Victor Cousin must not suppose that his eyes have been the first by which this manuscript has been perused. A note by the well-informed bookseller Renouard, shows that the assertion which he makes in the Preface to his edition of 1812, of referring to the original document, was not wholly groundless. (Vol. II. p. 22.) He had verified the fact that the words 'ni s'il est,' which had been omitted in earlier editions, and had been first restored to the text by Condorcet, occurred in page 4 of the manuscript of Pascal. This important document, which consists of a large folio book of 491 pages,[3] had been given by the Abbé Perier, the author's younger nephew, to the Abbey of St. Germain des Prés, whence it passed into the king's collection.[4]

But the manuscript authorities respecting Pascal do not stop here. A copy of the original had been made at the time with great fidelity, with a view apparently of aiding the revision of the work. It contains manuscript notes by Nicole, Arnauld, and Stephen Perier. On the death of the Abbé Perier it passed to his sister Margaret. A family named Guerrier was associated to that of Pascal and Perier by opinions, neighbourhood, and probably relationship; and to two members of it, a Dominican named Jean Guerrier, and his nephew the Oratorian Peter Guerrier, Margaret Perier committed this first transcript of the 'Thoughts,' and a second copy which had been made from it. Both of these copies are in the king's library, and are of great moment in aiding the decypherers of the original manuscript.

But besides these copies Margaret Perier had inherited a large collection of papers, comprising not only the letters of Pascal himself and of his near relations, but of Arnauld, Saci, Nicole, and Duguet.[5] These papers had been deposited by Margaret Perier with the Fathers of the Oratory at Clermont, and in the destruction of all records during the revolution, they are supposed to have been lost. But it came to M. Fougère's ears that some papers of the Pascal family were possessed by an aged inhabitant of their native town. He determined immediately on making a personal investigation. The result has been to introduce us to one of the last relics of an interesting phase of French history. In a gorge of the mountains of Auvergne, where the Dean of Westminster, we have no doubt, has often speculated on the singular construction of its extinct volcanoes, Fougère found a curious witness to that inward fire of Jansenism, by which the Gallican Church was alternately scorched and illuminated. 'M. Bellaigue de Rabanesse,' formerly a judge in the neighbouring town of Clermont, 'inhabited a village at the foot of the mountains. He was a man above eighty, and at first received us with reserve; but his confidence grew with conversation, and it was complete when he found that I had written an 'Eloge de Gerson.'[1] He soon became as confiding and affectionate as an old friend; and when I talked to him of Pascal, and the monument I was raising to his memory, he put with readiness into my hands the precious documents, which he had preserved for sixty years.'[2]

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[1] Cousin, p. 10. [2] Ibid. p. 9. [3] Fougère, Introd. p. 40. [4] Ibid. p. 43.

[5] To those of our readers who are not acquainted with them, we take this opportunity of strongly recommending the 'Lettres Spirituelles,' of the last-mentioned writer.

These papers, which had been denied to others, proved not to be the original papers bequeathed by Margaret Perier to the Oratorians at Clermont; but full copies of them, made by Peter Guerrier, and given by him to his pupil M. Bellaigue. This last circumstance is not only an authentication of the documents themselves, (some of which we are glad to see announced for publication,) but it is an interesting example of the traditionary spirit preserved by the school of Port-Royal. The pupil of Peter Guerrier, who was the intimate friend of Margaret Perier, M. Bellaigue was separated from Pascal only by two persons. 'With what zeal and emotion did this feeble and aged man,' says Fougère, 'speak of *Monsieur* Pascal, of his sister Jacqueline de St. Euphémie, of St. Cyran, and the Mère Angélique. We seemed to see and hear a hermit of the age of Port-Royal. Living single out of devotion—separated from all society through a sensibility, sometimes unjust but always dignified, which is produced by attachment to an ideal of perfection, and by a simplicity of heart which makes delicacy run into fastidiousness, saying his breviary every day with the regularity of a priest—marking by prayers every day inserted in the necrology of Port-Royal—loving God, as now men know not how to love Him—having brought this life to be nothing else than an aspiration after eternity—such was the old manin whom, a few months ago, there expired one of the last Jansenists.'[3]

Our readers must pardon this short digression, the more interesting because not without parallel, we may hope, nearer home, during the interdict which for a century has been imposed six days in the week on the churches of our own England. Often do we hear the complaint of pious and tender souls in the present day, that in our places of resort, and even in those abodes of leisure and thought where sickness and age retire to die, God's house is shut against them from one Sunday to another, and His sacraments administered with sparingness and irreverence. Such neglect in the clergy, of a duty which they are sworn to perform, we believe to be the main cause why many have taken the fearful step of forsaking the mother of their new birth. From this aged disciple of the school of Pascal, they might learn a better lesson. But what a contrast does he present to the temper of many of his countrymen! How different the state of France had Pascal's spirit been more widely diffused! What effect might not have resulted even if the work before us had gained that completeness at which he aimed, and held forth to the following generations the perfect model of a Christian's convictions! For partial as is necessarily the judgment which we can form at present of Pascal's work, we know nothing more exactly adapted to meet the real wants of inquiring minds, and better suited to guide men amidst those tangled briars by which philosophy and vain deceit have hedged in the paths of truth. This we must endeavour to demonstrate to the reader. We cannot abandon, at M. Cousin's bidding, what has long been among the most cherished possessions of the mind of religious Europe. If Pascal, as he says, was never quoted by Bossuet or Fenelon, this may be attributed, in a degree, to those party motives which forbad all mention of Cicero, to him who could not 'leave Cossus unsung.' But how different the judgment of collective Christendom! Far be it from us to disparage the great authors of the 'Traité de la Connaissance de Dieu,' Bossuet; or of the 'Traité de l'Existence de Dieu,' Fenelon; but how much less have they leavened the opinion of successive generations! What editions and translations have they had, like 'Pascal's Thoughts,' in English or German? The citation of an author by his contemporaries is a partial sign of influence. Are there not great writers in our own day who are more studied than quoted? We cannot then abandon 'Pascal's Thoughts.'

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[1] It gained a prize from the French Academy, and has since been published.

[2] Fougère, Introd. p. 50.

[3] Ibid. p. 51.

> Nil dulcius est bene quam munita tenere,
> Edita doctrina sapientum, templa serena;
> Despicere unde queas alios, passimque videre
> Errare, atque viam palantes quærere vitæ,
> Certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
> Noctes atque dies niti præstante labore,
> Ad summas emergere opes, rerumque potiri.

Our defence of Pascal lies in these two propositions: first, that his arguments are sound; and secondly, that, though not the common, yet they supply an example of the right mode of vindicating Christianity. The first of these propositions brings us into collision with Cousin; the second is not likely, we suppose, to find much favour with the school of Paley and his followers. For nothing is further from our thought than to stand up for the ordinary writers of 'Evidences.' Instead of regarding the abundance of such writers as a merit, and supposing that in this respect we are more fortunate than our Romish brethren, we believe them a witness to the weakness of our own faith and the poverty of our theology. It would be no proof of health that a multitude of apothecaries had prescribed to us nauseous draughts, and that we could show the innumerable phials which we had emptied. Not that we believe the English mind to be naturally addicted to scepticism. Our countrymen show no antipathy to homœopathy and hydropathy; Mesmer and Spurzheim can surely witness to the simplicity of their faith. Whence, then, this multitude of books on evidence? No doubt one reason is that the clergy, uninformed commonly of the deep and exhaustless treasures of positive theology, are glad to find some topic of a professional kind which may occupy their thoughts. We could mention various popular writers, whose profession would be wholly gone, if the public were to take the truth of Christianity for granted, and to proceed to ask what it is. Yet this will hardly account for the interest taken in the subject by the laity. The Earl of Bridgewater did not leave his 8,000*l.* because evidence was a good employment for theologians, but because it was popular with the public. Is it merely the importance of the subject, then, which gains it attention? This were not enough, unless it were disputed. Who writes books to prove the existence of Queen Victoria, of her empire and laws? The reason is, that she speaks to men by her actions. The Queen's Bench and the Horse Guards; Lord Denman and the Duke of Wellington, are proofs of her existence which cannot be gainsayed. That so many demonstrations of Christianity are needful, is a proof that it is not equally received. So it was even in the time of Pascal. His book was called forth by that popular unbelief, which the profligacy attendant on the religious wars had left in Paris. It was made necessary by the speculations of Bruno and the profligacy of Vanini. 'In Paris,' wrote Mersenne, 'there were '50,000 atheists: it smelt of atheism more than of mud.'[1] Hence Pascal's volumes indicate plainly the corruption and levity of the age; and the same must be the inference supplied by the present course of our theological literature.

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[1] Cousin's Fragments de Philosophie Cartésienne, p. 94.

But did Pascal supply a right answer? This it is which we have undertaken to maintain against M. Cousin. We assert that, however inaccurate some of his metaphysical expressions, yet that in the main his principles are as sound, as his mode of arguing is expedient. Let us take these things in order.

The charge, then, against Pascal, is that he is a sceptic in philosophy.[1] He is supposed to have had recourse to religion as proving to him the being of God, because conscious that, except by revelation, it could not be ascertained. He is maintained to have fallen into the very error, for which Bautain has lately been censured by the Pope, and in consequence of which he has been required, by the Bishop of Strasburg, to subscribe the statement, that 'La raisonnement peut prouver l'existence de Dieu.' In proof, we are referred to the omissions by the Port-Royal critics of such expressions as that in p. 16, 'nous sommes incapables de connaître ni ce qu'il est, *ni s'il est.*' They took a different and juster view of the question, says Cousin, and saw in such passages an exaggeration destructive to the truth.[2]

So much we must of course allow to M. Cousin, that 'he 'that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that he is the 'rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.' We are profoundly convinced, (whether or no the Apostle intended to teach so much in the passage which we have cited,) that a firm belief in God's being, and personal agency, must lie at the root of any logical admission of the truth of revelation. Unless we are before aware of the existence of some one without us, what effect would be produced upon us by the evidence of miracles? They would be nothing more than startling facts in the external world, presenting themselves to us in the midst of innumerable other facts, of which we should equally be ignorant. What consequences should we draw from their occurrence: whither would they draw our thoughts? To a man who had never seen a fellow-creature, the sound of a bell would be only a noise, for the occurrence of which he could render no account. It is because our servants know beforehand the existence of the party who sounds it, that they are instantly reminded of his presence and wants. In like manner, unless we are so constituted as to believe that God *is*, the interruptions of nature, which occasionally meet us, would lead us to no conclusion respecting the party, which interfered with its ordinary course. To believe that there is a course of nature at all, that it follows a law, that it is obedient to guidance, that it displays traces of the action of a person, that there are in the universe traces of thought, a moral intention, an order and will—all these are the necessary preparation, if the argument from miracles is to be other than a process of mere wonderment, a blank staring at the strange events which are everywhere around us in heaven and earth.

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[1] Cousin, Preface, p. 5.

[2] Cousin's second Preface, p. 8.

Now there are two paths by which we attain to this conclusion—the one metaphysical, the other practical; the one commending itself more to the German, the other to the English mind; the one marked out to a certain degree by Des Cartes, and trodden by Kant and Schelling; the other, that of which our own Butler is the great interpreter. Of these paths, the first has been chosen by Cousin, the second by Pascal. That both lead ultimately to the same conclusion we entertain no doubt; but the first is more likely to commend itself to the mere speculator—the other, to those who would guide the convictions of mankind.

That Cousin should take the course he does is not surprising. It may not, perhaps, be in the recollection of all our readers that when this clever *littérateur* was displaced by the Bourbons from his professorship at Paris, in 1820, in consequence of his republican tendencies, he travelled into Germany as tutor to the children of Marshal Lannes, the Duke of Montebello. There he managed to excite the jealousy of the Prussian Government, by which he was arrested at Dresden in the year 1824. His confinement at Berlin is reported to have been alleviated by the visits of Hegel, then the greatest name in German philosophy, and by those of various members of his school. We know what passed between the imprisoned moralist of Athens, and his disciples, and from its published tone we may gather the consolations of German philosophy. What right, it suggested, has M. Cousin to complain of imprisonment till he has ascertained the reality of his durance? In his nightly visions he has often fancied himself in bondage, for what subject is so connatural to a liberal professor as the tyranny of kings? These illusions his waking thoughts have hitherto dispelled. How can he be sure that his present impression is better grounded? Why may not this be a repetition of his dreams? It depends only on the evidence of his senses, and what proof has he that his senses do not mislead him? What use is there in appealing to French diplomacy to set him free, till he has first learned from German philosophy that he is really a prisoner?

We will not assert that Cousin was altogether a stranger to such considerations before his visit to the 'classic land of school-houses and barracks,' but the metaphysical character of his thoughts was greatly strengthened by his intercourse with our brethren beyond the Rhine. Of course, though not Germans, we are far from denying that by themselves our senses convey to us nothing but impressions which are created within ourselves; and that of the real nature of external objects they can supply no criterion. The knowledge which they give is in itself wholly *subjective;* they cannot step out of us, and find out anything more of the *objects* which surround us, than that they produce a certain effect upon the organs, by which we hold intercourse with the world. If any one denies the reality of that which impresses itself upon our senses, and influences our judgment, by what means, which the senses only supply, can we confute him? How often have we found ourselves deceived by a single sense? Can a man who watches the moon's progress over the field of a telescope, entertain any doubt that, according to the evidence of the senses, what he discerns is her movement? Or, if this be not held to be a satisfactory as it is a plausible instance, who but has taken Alps for clouds, or clouds for Alps? We test the thing by another sense and find our error. But what test remains, when we have used all our senses? What criterion is there of their general truth? How are we to bridge over the interval between the subjective and the objective? How are we to satisfy ourselves that because it is plain that we entertain an opinion respecting some external object, therefore that object itself is such as we opine? Each individual man is a single insulated territory, circle it around as we will, and how can we find a passage to that which, by the very assumption, is about and beyond us?

It is plain that we must continue devoid of any certain and indisputable knowledge, unless we can refer to some other part or principle of our nature, and obtain from it the conviction which our senses alone could never supply. And this is the meaning of that course, which has been adopted in every age by all true philosophers. What were Plato's ideas, what were Aristotle's universals, but an attempt to find a sure basis for that certain knowledge, to which their consciousness witnessed, but which they were unable to vindicate for the unaided impressions of the apprehensible world? Like the beleaguered city which is cut off from its fountains, they had to dig down into the recesses of their own inherent nature. They must find the source of wisdom at home. They perceived in their own minds an irresistible impression of certain truths, which were bound up with the primeval associations of natural consciousness. From such convictions they could no more dissociate themselves than from their being. It is by the laws of mind, then, that we must assure ourselves even of the reality of matter. This was the irrefragable argument of our own Berkeley, of whom to hear men talk we might suppose that he would not have undertaken to guide a railroad carriage, lest he should be launched forth into the vacancy of non-existence. But Berkeley no more questioned the reality of matter than the Railway King, or Stephenson his engineer. He found philosophy suffering under the wounds which it had received from Locke, and already prepared for the destruction which was to be completed by Hume. His object, therefore, was to show that spiritual truths could not be destroyed save by an argument which would be fatal also to material. If the principles of Locke were conclusive (as they doubtless are) against religion, they are conclusive also against nature. And if the common principles of our being are believed when they testify for the one, why not when they testify for the other? This is in truth the real conclusion which is attained by all metaphysical philosophers. They can but draw out a fact which is attested already by the common feeling of mankind. They only put in a clearer light, and state as a philosophical truth, what man's heart has witnessed to. Newton did not *make* the earth's orbit, but proclaimed only what for ages had been its course, and the unfolder of man's nature does no more than open to men's own thoughts what they have all along been sensible of. This is well put by George Hermes, the Professor of Bonn, who was censured by the Church of Rome for attempting to mould the principles of Catholic theology on the dogmas of Kant. 'I shall neither be surprised not hurt,' he says, after he had consumed years and volumes in proving the reality of knowledge, 'if any one tells me that he has long known what I 'adduce—I knew it long myself, only I did not know that I 'knew it.'

What is it, then, which in truth assures us of the existence of all external realities, and amongst them of that highest and best, which stands at the head of the whole chain of causation? It is an instinctive belief in the reality of sensible appearances. It is a conviction from which we cannot free ourselves, that as we live, and move, and have our being, so there are other living substances around us, whose existence it were idle to dispute, and especially that one substance in whom all our notions of the good and great find a final resting-place. We are not troubling ourselves respecting the metaphysical statement of this mystery, but setting forth only what is the unquestionable fact. It is through faith in nature that we mount to faith in God. Had Pascal introduced this question amidst his discussions with De Saci, the Port-Royalist would have found in it only another example that the Doctor of Hippo had answered by anticipation all the emergent questions of philosophy. The reality of external objects, he says, may be disputed, as they were by the Academics; but the mind's perceptions of truth, since they depend on consciousness and the natural witness of our own spirit, can never be disputed. 'Cum enim duo sunt genera rerum quæ

sciuntur, unum earum, quæ per sensus corporis percipit animus, alterum earum, quæ per se ipsum, multa illi philosophi garrierunt contra corporis sensus, animi autem quasdam firmissimas per se ipsum perceptiones rerum verarum, quale illud est quod dixi, scio me vivere, nunquam in dubium vocare potuerunt.'[1]

But in truth Pascal troubled himself with no metaphysical answer to this difficulty. He wrote for the world at large, and was content to answer the perplexities by which men were really agitated. It never occurred to him that a French philosopher, in later days, would not seek to escape from durance till it had been proved to him by German metaphysicians that he was a prisoner. His father had fled into Auvergne to avoid the Bastille, without waiting for logical proof of Richelieu's existence. Yet what was this but to illustrate the very truth, for which Pascal is censured. He wrote not to advance science, but to amend life. He saw men suffering under a worse danger than that which his father had avoided. And should he delay for the puerilities of the schools? Was it not better that men should be saved without rule, than perish *secundum ărtem?*

His own statement on this matter is as follows:—' The metaphysical proofs of God are so removed from men's habit of reasoning, and so involved, that they are not striking; and even if they are sufficient for some persons, it can only be during the time that they see the demonstration; an hour afterwards they fear that they have been misled.'[2] In adopting then a different course, and arguing from the common principles, which are plainly recognised by all men, Pascal did but take the very course which was marked out by our own Butler. No man was ever fitter than Butler for the arduous walks of metaphysical speculation. But in the letters printed at the conclusion of Dr. Clarke's Sermons on the Attributes, we learn from himself what it was which disinclined him to cultivate this barren soil. 'I have made it,' he says, 'my business, ever since I thought myself capable of such sort of reasoning, to prove to myself the being and attributes of a God. And being sensible that 'tis a matter of the last consequence, I endeavoured after a demonstrative proof —— but must own with concern, that hitherto I have been unsuccessful: though I have got very probable arguments, yet I can go very little way with demonstration in the proof of these things.'[3] It was from a sense, therefore, of the unsatisfactory nature of mere metaphysical arguments, that Butler was led to look in the common laws of man's nature and the world's government for those considerations which might

'Justify the ways of God to man.'

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[1] St. Aug. de Trin. xv. 12.

[2] Fougère, ii. 114.

[3] First Letter.

The same feeling guided Pascal to those deep principles of humanity, which form the real value of his uncompleted work. But before we explain what these principles are, we must advert a little more particularly to the details of the charge against him. The charge rests on such expressions as that in the celebrated passage, 'Infini—Rien:' 'Nous sommes donc incapable de connaître ni ce qu'il est, *ni s'il est;*'[1] and on the remarks on Pyrrhonism, in the chapter 'On the greatness and misery of man.' This last may be taken as a sample of his real meaning. He evidently does not mean to trouble himself with metaphysical objections to the reality of knowledge, but sets forth only the uncertainty of mere reasoning for the ascertaining of truth. This is done by stating the arguments respectively of Pyrrhonists and Dogmatists. The first argue from the common objections of the Academics against the reality of our impressions, and are met by the second with an appeal to common reason.[2] At length, Pascal himself comes in with the conclusion, that besides *reasoning* there must be some other principle in our nature, which we cannot choose but recognise. He asserts, as his conclusion, in the distinctest manner, that the principle so adopted has the same claim to our adoption as the most conclusive demonstration. 'We know truth not only by reason, but still more *par le cœur;*' in this last way it is that we know first principles. 'We know that we do not dream, however incompetent we may be to prove it: our incompetency does not prove anything but the weakness of our reason, not the uncertainty of all knowledge, as they (the Pyrrhonists) affirm.'[3] Such is Pascal's conclusion respecting Pyrrhonism: and in proof of it he quotes the natural notion respecting the existence of space independently of body, which is pointed out by Cousin himself as wholly destructive of the system of Locke.[4] Now had Pascal said nothing respecting the origin of ideas, his general remarks on the uncertainty of knowledge would not have been a denial of their trustworthiness. When Locke, in his 'Essay on the Understanding,' enumerates all the sources of our knowledge, and maintains that we know nothing which has not been derived from the impressions produced by sensible objects, he plainly excludes all other information. But that our knowledge at best is defective, is what all men who have looked into the matter admit. And Pascal's objections do not refer to the sources of our knowledge, but to the infirmity of our reasoning; they tend, therefore, not to scepticism but to humility. Their purpose is to point out the deficiencies of that gift of deduction on which men pride themselves, and which seems to them so evidently their individual possession. Whereas the confirmation of those general principles, which lie at the root of our nature, is no gratification to the pride of the isolated reasoner. What he boasts of is a faculty, which can expatiate unchecked through the realms of intelligence, and know no limit from the sovereignty of God. The distinction which is drawn by Cousin between mediæval and modern philosophy is, that the former admitted certain fixed principles, which it was compelled to recognise as an abiding shore, beyond which its proud waters might not venture; while the last, as he says, claims the right of unlimited speculation.[1] And is it not humbling, therefore, to this audacious spirit, to see its weapons turned against itself—to see a man prove by argument that by argument nothing can be proved? Now this it is for which Pascal is censured. Against *reason*, taken for the whole of man's nature, he says nothing,—it is human *reasoning*, the weakness whereof he displays. 'Canst thou by searching 'find out God; canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?' So far is he, then, from denying the existence of other and more certain information than the senses can convey, that he speaks in various places of those convictions, which are derived from intuitive perceptions which he sometimes calls the heart's impressions, sometimes instinct, and sometimes faith.[2]

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[1] Fougère, ii. 165. [2] Fougère, ii. 101. [3] Fougère, ii. 108.

[4] Cours de la Philosophie for 1829, Leçon xvii.

We might quote in abundance the passages in which this system of thought is observed. Thus we meet with the reflections, 'Instinct et raison, marques de deux natures,'[3] and again, 'c'est le cœur qui sent Dieu, et non la raison. Voila ce que c'est que la foi: Dieu sensible au cœur, non à la raison.'[4] The students of German philosophy may find here the elements of the system of Jacobi; but it is, in truth, only the falling back on those elementary principles of man's nature, on which Anselm grounded the scholastic philosophy, and which have always been admitted in the Church of God. We are not attempting a scientific statement, but referring to admitted facts; we can only remind our readers, therefore, that the nature of man's knowledge must depend on that original constitution with which God endowed him. Now of this constitution, the image of his Maker was a main part. And since to estimate and appreciate what is without us requires faculties on our part adapted to the contemplation of what we behold; therefore when this image was perfect and unclouded, there was no let or hindrance to that unchecked communion with Almighty God, for which man was originally made. 'For God created man to be immortal, and made him to be an image of

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[1] Cours de Philosophie for 1828; Leçon i. p. 27; and Leçon ii. p. 35.

[2] Fougère, ii. 108.

[3] Fougère, i. 223.

[4] Fougère, ii. 172.

His own eternity.' And when this image of God was lost through man's sin, it was yet not so completely destroyed, but that there remained some rudiments of his pristine greatness. Had it been otherwise, had he been so completely forsaken of God's image, that there was nothing on which to engraft a regenerate nature, the recovery of man would have been impossible. Any new development of the good and great, anything to which he trusted for knowledge or virtue, must either have been foreign to God's nature, or foreign to himself. For if the connexion with God, the faculty by which we hold intercourse with Him, the common term between us and God, the road of intercourse by which divine things pass into our minds, were altogether done away—to have further alliance with Him would have been impossible. If God's image had been altogether lost, if no moral sense remained, if man had not only been utterly corrupt as a whole, but if all his properties and parts had been totally corrupted, there would have remained no qualities by which he could take in what was set before him, and learn to imitate that which he beheld. His belief, because it was his, would have been as censurable as his infidelity; and his hatred not more criminal than his gratitude. And herein we have a singular example of that judicial blindness by which the Puritan theology has been punished for its irreverence in neglecting the guidance of the Church of God. The Church has testified to the weakness and sinfulness of man in no dubious words. The Council of Orange still remains the standard of her opinions. To its protest against semi-Pelagianism, she gives the fullest acquiescence. But Puritanism, not content with the hallowed moderation which the Church had been taught by God, must needs show her zeal for His glory, by declaring the *total* corruption of all parts of man's nature. The Westminster Divines substituted for the moderate statement of our own Articles, an assertion, that the race of man was 'wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and 'body;' and the Augustan Confession declares the concupiscence which remains in the regenerate to be 'Vere peccatum.'[1] Now, what is the result of this attempt to outbid believing antiquity in its statements of the necessity of saving help? These statements issue in effect in the exact reverse of that which they were intended to produce. They have contributed to that total disbelief of gospel grace, which is now the current opinion of Protestant Europe. For how is it that pure and holy thoughts enter the mind, since that principle, by which we hold intercourse with God, is affirmed to be lost; they must either be deduced from some other source, or, if they come from God, they must be the result of His dwelling in men as a Being detached from and independent of man's nature, as He dwelt in His ancient temple, or as the sun's light dwells in the caverns of the sea. Now the first of these notions leads to a plain denial of God, and the second leads as clearly to Pantheism. Its result would be that Divine Inspiration was a power floating around the earth,—showing itself occasionally as does fire through volcanic mountains, in this or that form of human organization. And thus would the notion of responsibility and union —of Him in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, and of those who, through grace, are complete in Him—of the new Adam, who is the elder brother of all regenerate Christians,—of a personal Deity, and personal service, be altogether lost. For these we must refer to that ancient doctrine of the creation of man after God's image, and of his retaining even though fallen the rudiments of his divine original, which the Church Catholic has always held, and the English branch of it has been far from contradicting. Let this truth be admitted, and the complex nature and divine actings of man are at once explained. Through the senses, indeed, he holds intercourse with this created world, and guides his course through its entanglements. But the senses will teach him no more than the effect of impressions which are made upon them. To some higher source he turns for higher knowledge. And this he finds in that divine nature which has not altogether left him: by which he is a fit recipient for the things of God; which enables him to estimate in some faint degree the notions of conscience and holiness, of purity and greatness; and by joining these to the thought of that infinity which the same constitution of his nature impresses upon him, does he ascend to the height of heaven, and holds communion with what is spiritual and unseen. Thus is faith in reality an original cause of knowledge, because by it the soul communes with the things of God, and partakes of the better parts of its possession. And thus is a ground laid for all the mysteries of revelation. And if this is arraigned by philosophy as visionary and unsatisfying, as a dream of which there is no test, and an idle fancy on which nothing can be founded, then can we turn round with Pascal, and show that on no other principle is there aught of reality in the world, that the belief in things external rests on the same foundation, that reason not reasoning is the principle even of earthly knowledge, and that 'la nature confond les pyrrhonistes, et la raison confond les dogmatiques.'[1]

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[1] Whereas, our Ninth Article declares that 'Concupiscence and lust *has of itself* the nature of sin,' but that 'there is no condemnation,' no loss, *i. e.*, of the state of grace, to the baptized and believing man. The Council of Trent in like manner denies that concupiscence 'vere et propriè in renatis peccatum sit,' but says that it 'ex peccato est, et ad peccatum inclinat.' Sess. v.

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[1] Fougère, ii. 109.

It is through faith alone, then, that we gain the highest part of human knowledge. And through the same gracious guide are we led on to that knowledge, the perfection whereof is above humanity. For 'this is life eternal, to know Thee the only true 'God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent.' This it is which the great Anselm lays down as the basis of his philosophy. After many passionate expressions of longing for union with that in which his soul delighted, he exclaims, 'I thank Thee, O Lord, for that Thou hast created in me this holiness of Thine, that I might be mindful of Thee, might think of Thee, might love Thee. Yet, so far is it worn away by the action of defilement, so far clouded by the pollution of sin, that it cannot attain its appointed end unless Thou shouldst renovate and reform it. I ask not, O Lord, to penetrate Thy loftiness, for to it I cannot compare my understanding; but I desire in some measure to understand Thy truth, which my heart loves and believes. For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe that I may understand.'[1]

Now here we have the principle of Pascal's philosophy. He neither denies the use of reason, nor the reality of knowledge. But he makes faith the most important means for its acquisition. And for his proofs he looks not to metaphysical abstractions, but to the actual facts of man's nature. Our limits do injustice to his defence, as we are compelled to omit what we were prepared to advance respecting his censure of the Cartesian philosophy. His quarrel with it is for supposing God to have been the original author, but not to be the constant or general maintainer of this material world; to have set it in motion, and then left it to its own laws. 'He cannot pardon Descartes,' he says, 'for having represented the Almighty as having set the world in motion by a fillip, and left it afterwards to its own ways.'[2] In short, he held the obvious truth of God's *immanence,* to use the technical phrase, as opposed to his *transcendance.* So far he agrees with what was called the system of *occasionalism* afterwards introduced by Gevlinx, and with the *causa naturans* of Spinoza. From their vicious excesses he is saved by his firm hold of the real existence of individual minds, as it is inculcated by the Church. For the truths of the Gospel, as expounded by the system of antiquity, are a natural limit, which stand to metaphysical reasoners in the same stead as do the facts of external nature to the physical observer. Cousin, who is as much in the habit of repeating himself as a certain archiepiscopal writer across the channel, frequently censures this charge of

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[1] 'Neque enim quæro intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam.' Proslogium, cap. 1.

[2] Cousin, p. 43.

Pascal's. He represents it as arising only from the omission of first causes from Descartes's physical works, p. 39. The same statement is repeated in his Fragments de Philos. Cartésienne. p. 369. But it does not appear to us that this was Pascal's real objection. He seems to have felt, as Bishop Butler apparently did, that Descartes, in 'building a world upon hypothesis,' imagined himself to be giving an account of certain real, self-existent, self-operative substances. Whereas, Cousin himself allows, that in reality 'the notion of substance is involved in that of 'force,'[1] so that in truth we know nothing so certain of the external world as that God is its universal original. 'In my 'eyes,' says Cousin, 'as in those of Leibnitz, the external world 'itself is composed of forces, and, *in consequence*, of substances.'[2] Now with these views of the real nature of material being, we can hardly think that Cousin would have been seriously offended at Pascal's complaint, had it not run counter to his plan of making Descartes the founder of all modern philosophy. This is part of the national pride of our French professor. What can be said of a person who thinks that the French language will swallow up all others?[3] To say nothing of our oriental vassals and occidental colonists, how can we answer an author who thinks that the language of Bacon, Hooker, and Butler, of Shakspere, Milton, and Keble, is to be replaced by that of Rousseau and Voltaire?

But we hasten to our last statement, that Pascal's line of evidence is as seasonable as his reasoning is valid.

We are far from confounding Pascal with the ordinary writers on evidences in the present day. They are opposed to one another in this leading particular, that while they think it enough to prove the authority of a book, he contends for the authority of a system. It is not enough for Pascal to show that the Evangelists wrote; he argues for the reality of the gospel. This is a capital article of divergency in which we think Pascal plainly right, and modern authors obviously wrong. Even those who dig deepest into the argument seem to think it sufficient to refer to the necessity of a first cause, and argue back from the marks of design which are presented by the universe. Yet this mode of reasoning is eminently unsatisfying. How is it to stand against the Pantheistic doctrine of the Anima Mundi? Exclude all reference to those inward principles in man's nature to which we have referred, and why should not infinity be as we accounted for by an innumerable series, as by a single link o immeasurable size? When Vanini was brought before his judges, he picked up a straw, and from it deduced, with great eloquence, the necessity of some original cause. Yet this man avowed himself a professed disbeliever in any supreme *Being*. This mode of argument, therefore, is found to be wholly useless against modern unbelievers. The German school of Pantheists readily admits it. But even add to it the proof of the authority of Holy Scripture. No doubt this is in itself a point of unspeakable moment; but did not Mahomet profess to respect the Christian scriptures; does not Wegscheider receive them? We want something besides this to save us from that chilling system of Pantheism, which is the prevailing danger of the present day. Pantheism implies the admission that there exists such a thing as superhuman power; what it denies is the personality of the Godhead. For this it substitutes a vague dream of some universal all-encircling influence. Now as the mere argument from causes leads to the extreme development of this notion, so is there an inferior degree of it, which is produced by the substitution of a book for a system. For thereby those personal relations towards Almighty God, which form the distinguishing characteristic of the Christian scheme, are forgotten. Before a revelation was given, Pantheism was the losing sight of those personal attributes of the Deity, of which natural conscience and uninstructed faith were man's informant. Since a revelation has been given, it is the forgetting those actual indications of personal life which are set before us with increased distinctness in the gospel of Christ. To image the Creator in the notion of abstract power, was the Pantheistic philosophy; to image the Redeemer in the notion of abstract goodness, is Pantheistic religion. In either case the true action of the Being whom we serve is forgotten. And this is the natural tendency of a refined and devotional mind, if its feelings are not fixed and concentrated by the system of the Church. Hence the eminently Pantheistic character of the poetry of Germany. Poetry is naturally religious, for its essence is to be the medium of raising us to communion with that higher life, after which our better nature aspires. There is a religious tone, therefore, in whatever deserves the name of poetry. But let it cease to be influenced by the truth of our Lord's personality and presence; let it forget that the God whom it serves has taken our nature and come among us in the flesh; and further, that through the power of the Holy Ghost, He is truly present with His Church, and bestows His rich influence in the assemblies of His servants; and poetry, losing sight of the actual objects of imitation and praise, speedily melts into a mere general harmony with the religion of nature. Hence the tone of thought and expression so familiar to us in Pope's Ode to the Deity; and by this means the very nature of that individual homage which we owe to God and Christ is forgotten. Cousin tells us gravely that Spinoza himself was so far from being an atheist, that his book is a sort of mystical hymn of aspiration to the self-existent,[1] and that the author whom he most nearly resembles, is the celebrated mystic, Thomas à Kempis. And so much we must allow, that the mystical school, unless kept in check by constant reference to the actual facts of religion, is in danger of losing itself in mere abstractions. Among the evils of our own want of government, has been the lack of such control as might regulate the indispensable ardour of an enthusiastic love, and thus save it from dreamy emptiness. While we wholly deny Cousin's charge against the 'De Imitatione Christi,' we will admit that it applies in some measure to the scarcely less celebrated 'Teutsche Theologia,' which prepared the way for the writings of Tauler. In this beautiful book we have met with passages which might be construed into Pantheism. But the real safeguard against all such errors, is the full belief in our Lord's personal presence in the ordinances of His Church. Let this be fully brought out, and language, which might otherwise seem vague and uncertain, assumes fixed and definite relations. The personal addresses to our Lord in the earlier part of the Litany, at which John Knox and his followers cavilled in their letter to Calvin, like those various means which are taken in the Roman Church to bring the truth of the Incarnation before men's minds, have thus served as one main instruction of our people.

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[1] Avant Propos, p. 45. [2] Ib. p. 46.

[3] Cousin's Cours de Philosophie for 1828, Leçon. ii. p. 31. 'Cette langue, appelée peut-être à décomposer toutes les autres.'

Now it is in this same relation that Pascal's thoughts appear to us so valuable. He brings out with admirable force the original corruption of man's nature, and its restoration, by his union with Christ our head. Here it is that, like Butler, he takes the existing phenomena of man's life, and shows what is that constitution of nature which they imply. Of course, it were idle to compare these incomplete thoughts with the finished work of our countryman; neither do we see in Pascal so wide a grasp of the world of morals; but nothing can be more admirable than his mode of stating the nature, cause, and remedy of man's corruption. 'See,' he said to De Saci, 'the 'light of this great spirit, Epictetus, who so well knew the 'duties of men. I might say that he deserved to be adored, 'had he as well known their weakness. For none but a God 'could teach both these things together to mankind. And 'therefore, since he was but earth and ashes (*comme il était terre 'et cendre),* after having so well understood what men ought to 'do, see how he loses himself in presumption as to what they '*can* effect.'[2]

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[1] Frag. Philos. ii. 164.

[2] Fougère, i. 351.

On this subject he enlarges in various parts of his 'Thoughts.' 'The knowledge of God, without that of man's own misery, produces pride. The knowledge of his own misery, without that of God, produces despair. The knowledge of Jesus Christ forms the middle term, because in Him we find both God and our misery.'[1] Thus does he found his notions of man's estate on the combined view of his natural grandeur, and his fall by corruption.[2] 'Wonderful thing,' he says, 'that the mystery which is the most removed from our comprehension, the transmission of original sin, is that without which we can give no account of our constitution. . . . . So that man is more inconceivable without this mystery, than this mystery is inconceivable to man.'[3] The real union of all men with our first parent by nature, and the parallel union of all Christians with the new man Christ Jesus, to whom we are joined by our regeneration, lies in this manner at the root of his system. We see by its frequent occurrence in individual fragments what prominence it would have assumed in his completed work. And this it is, in reality, on which the soundness of his view of evidences is built. As Butler addresses himself to the moral system of the world at large, so does Pascal prove that in the individual nature of each son of Adam there are stored up inconsistencies, which nothing but the Christian system can accommodate. In this view, the firmness with which he grasps the truth, that all men by their common descent are involved in the transmission of one common evil, is admirable. For it is upon this truth that our common union in Christ our Lord is founded. It is not an unnatural error, perhaps, derived from a reaction against the Realism of the schoolmen, to suppose that there is in truth no such thing in man as a common nature, considered apart from the individuals in whom it is exhibited. We are surprised to see even Mr. Hallam fall into this mistake, and censure Pascal for not disentangling his mind from the notion 'that what we call human nature has not merely an arbitrary and grammatical, but an intrinsic objective reality.'[4] The error obviously arises from a forgetfulness, that besides those logical *genera,* which men form by abstraction, and which may be classified with equal convenience in a thousand manners, there are likewise, natural *genera,* which cannot be reconstructed, because they are tied together by a real bond. We may class fish by reference to their scales, or by reference to their bones, and alter the divisions at will; but the family of shark cannot be turned into that of ray, because these are the genera, not of art but of nature. So it is with the nature of man. In what it consists we know not. We pretend not to any power of discerning this common principle, except as it is exhibited to us in every successive individual of man's race. But that a real bond ties together the whole human family, and that what affected the first parent is fraught with momentous consequences for all his progeny, is not only attested by Scripture, but it is analogous to all that observation tells us respecting the brute inhabitants of the world. And on it stands the doctrine of Christ's Church as in like manner a living body, through union with the humanity of the Son of God. Destroy, therefore, one of these truths, and you destroy the other. The corruption of man were irremediable, were not the gift of Christ's union commensurate with the losses of the fall. The purposes of the incarnation would be inconceivable but for the recovery of a ruined race. 'For verily, He laid not hold of angels, but of the 'children of Abraham laid He hold. Wherefore in all things 'it behoved Him to be made like unto His brethren.'

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[1] Fougère, ii. 315.

[2] Fougère, ii. 104, 83.

[3] Fougère, ii. 105.

[4] Literature of Europe, vol. iv. p. 160.

It is from his strong feeling, then, of this truth, from the vivid colour which it assumes in the detached portions of his imperfect composition, that we attach so much moment to Pascal's volumes. There was in this man a true sense of what humanity is, and what it might be. There was an intensity in his apprehension of the truth, 'that unto the principalities and powers 'in heavenly places,' is 'known by the Church the manifold 'wisdom of God.' For this turns entirely upon our perception of the reality of that union by which we are bound to Adam by nature, and by grace to Christ. But for this, Church union is but an empty name, which may be paralleled by any voluntary association of God's creatures. And if it be asked why these deep truths respecting union with Christ, and the necessities of man, respecting nature and grace, the Incarnation and the Fall, are so imperfectly comprehended among us; the reason must be found in the lack of that practical working by which the Church ought to make its influence felt upon the mind of the people. That there exists a sad body of unbelief in this land is apparent from the language of those who profess religion, as well as of those who abandon it. It is as obvious at Exeter Hall as at St. Stephen's; from the 'Record' as well as the 'Dispatch.' The Gospel of Christ is wholly rejected by numbers who never question the four Evangelists. One reason is the comparative absence of a means of conviction, than which none is better fitted to impress the bulk of mankind with the realities of religion—we mean public worship. There can hardly be anything more injurious to our people's belief in the reality of those gifts which are bestowed in the Church of God, than that day by day they should pass by our unopened places of assembly, and find that God's daily worship has been abandoned in His courts. For as worship is the great method by which the individual soul may strengthen those means whereby it holds intercourse with God, so is it the best testimony to the belief of a collective people. We have stated how the knowledge of God is attained by individuals. It is an anticipation of that purer contemplation which belongs to another state. It is the gradual development of the Divine Image, which must be formed within us in this world. 'For we all, reflecting as in a glass the glory of the 'Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, 'even as by the Spirit of the Lord.' Thus it is that we attain to the view of God. Pascal has stated the thing with an inspiring force. 'Par la foi nous connaissons son existence, par 'la gloire nous connaîtrons[1] sa nature.'[2] And this leads to the observation—not needless surely, in a season of occupation like the present—that after all, the truest and highest knowledge is to be attained by those very occupations which many think a waste of existence. How often do we hear objections against the frequent and lengthened prayers of the Church! Nay, we fear that there might be found clergymen, who excuse the neglect of that short portion of daily prayers to which they are pledged by their vow of obedience to the Church, because it interferes with the composition of their sermons! They are so busy in telling others to observe engagements, that they have no time to observe them themselves. Yet, is not prayer the direct means of intercourse with God? Is it not by intercourse with God that we know Him? Is not this the means of developing that Image of God, which is left within us? And here we must call attention to Pascal's own testimony to this exercise. The method, he says, of attaining to belief, must be by following the course of those who possess it. 'Suivez la manière 'par où ils ont commencé; c'est en faisant tout comme s'ils 'croyaient, en prenant de l'eau bénite, en faisant dire des 'messes, &c. Naturellement même cela vous fera croire, et 'vous abêtira.'[3]

These words were changed by the Port-Royal editors for expressions less specific, and better fitted, therefore, to express the truth, which, if Pascal had lived to finish this passage, he would have conveyed in more general terms. Fougère proves sufficiently that *abêtira* does not necessarily mean so much as it might at first sight imply in French, or as *brutalize* would certainly imply in English. He quotes a parallel example from Montaigne. Of course the employment of some other symbol would be substituted by a member of our branch of the Catholic Church for holy water, and 'faisant dire des messes' we should translate *communicate*. But with these alterations we must adopt in the strongest manner Pascal's principle, that *worship is the true path to holiness*. He has expressed the same feeling in another passage, in which he has observed, that 'the Psalms 'chanted throughout all the earth' are among the truest marks of our Lord's Divinity.

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[1] Cousin has totally missed the force of this passage, one of the finest in the Thoughts,' by altering *connaîtrons* into *connaissons*.

[2] Fougère, ii. 164.

[3] Fougère, ii. 169; vide supra, p. 18.

There are not wanting signs that amidst the intellectual activity of our manufacturing towns, there is creeping in a subtle venom of unbelief, foreign to the ancient character of our nation. Self-confident, ready, independent, there are plainly not wanting spirits to originate or extend every species of error. And how must they be cured? Not, we are persuaded, by the mere possession of a book, which they will readily receive perhaps on condition of misinterpreting it. The value of God's written word it is impossible to over-estimate, provided only it fall on obedient hearts. But we cannot forget what is recorded in one of Cousin's volumes, that when Vanini, the very apostle of Atheism, was arrested at Toulouse, the Bible was found to be the sole book in his possession.[1] We fear that the history of Germany would offer us proofs enough, even if we could not discover them at home, that men may go forth as the very emissaries of Satan, with sneers on their lips, and the Bible in their pocket.

To what then do we look as maintaining the faith of Christ, amidst the dense masses of our industrial population? We expect it, under God's blessing, from the *worship* of His Church. In the act of serving God, is there a recognition of His presence more instructive than all the teaching of the best philosophy? Even the rude and irreverent violence of the Tabernacle is a proof of life, to which Methodism may justly appeal. And the clergyman may well think his work undone, who cannot appeal to something of a similar kind in his congregation. Unless there be the united service, and the frequent devotion, and the prostrate form, and the excited worshipper, there can be no real belief in Christ's presence, and no true participation in the communion of souls. Alas, for those congregations which sit in silence, and hear the dull unvarying round in which the inspiring words of our service are mutilated by the alternate recitations of clerk and parson! If we would quicken our brethren's hearts, we must show them the life of our own.

And it may not be without influence even on such minds, that in the 17th century there lived a Frenchman, who, with every endowment of genius, with that singular mastery over the external world which is now esteemed so highly, yet held all for nought compared to God's service. He mingled with the highest ranks, and yet preferred poverty and contempt above riches. He invented mathematical instruments, and discovered physical truths, yet thought no knowledge valuable, but the knowledge of God. And when he was taken to his rest there was found written on a parchment, which he carried next his heart, the record of that joy and faith, of that self-possession and self-control, which it had been the purpose of his life to establish within. Following an example not unknown in the same day, as these volumes witness,[1] even in the courts of kings, he desired to be thus perpetually reminded of that presence of God, which the glare of worldly objects so often obliterates. He has passed to his account. He has put off the feeble trappings of mortality. And in the 'naked thoughts' which 'knocked about' for utterance, he has left an unfailing monument to all ages of his sublimity, piety, faith, and love.

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[1] Fragments de Philos. Cartés. p. 82.

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[1] Fougère, vol. i. p. 407.

Art. II.—*The Emigrant. By* Sir Francis B. Head. London: Murray. 1846.

The period at which this book came out compels our notice of it to appear rather late in the day. Its great popularity has already called the attention of nearly every periodical, from the slower orbits of the quarterly to the more rapid circulation of the daily press. Nothing daunted, however, by the contemplation that most of our readers have probably read the book themselves—or, if they have not read it, clad in the charms of its own white binding, yet have secured the gems of it from the treasure-extracting system of modern critics—we will venture to call their attention again to it.

To give a general idea of 'The Emigrant,' we will imagine some one, who had beforetime been much pleased with Sir Francis Head's literary productions, seizing on the new effusion from his pen with avidity, in anticipation of some hours' pleasant reading; and by the external appearance of the book, so appropriately decorated with scenes from back-wood life, having his hopes still further raised. Let us suppose him again in such a hurry to begin, that he either omits the preface altogether, or, still better, just glances his eye over the amusing comparison contained in it, without particularly dwelling on its real purpose; attracted by the fascinating list of contents on the following page: and what will be the result of his expectations? At the very commencement of the book he will see that his most sanguine hopes are more than realized, that the author has lost none of his attractive thoughtfulness and originality of style. Sir Francis Head possesses a peculiarly contemplative and quiescent power of observation, which he much delights to use. All his observations, thus made, undergo a scrutiny of rather a philosophical description, before the tribunal of his judgment. The result of this scrutiny is a clearly defined idea in his own mind, be it right or wrong; either some principle developed or some vivid picture represented. He further possesses great command of language, which enables him to put his ideas on paper with singular perspicuity and exactness. He has two excellent gifts, a clear mind and a clear mode of expressing it to the world. Such powers being displayed in 'The Emigrant,' no wonder that our supposed reader is much delighted. His interest will be thoroughly sustained in his progress, till he reaches about midway through the book. A strange confusion will then come over his mind. He will gradually feel that the charm of style which has interested him is vanishing away—that he is being insensibly decoyed into far different regions of thought from what he commenced with or intended to be led into. A suspicion will come across him that he has been taken in: that the first half of the book, which, according to his idea, occupied its due proportion of the purpose of the whole, is, after all, but an introduction to the author's real object in writing. But can this really be 'The Emigrant?' he will say; as he comes across some strikingly anti-speculative or unromantic passage. Has he in a fit of absence taken up another book instead? is he not reading some political review several years old? He turns to the title-page to satisfy himself; and then reads more attentively the preface that before but caught his eye. The secret is then out. The fact is then clear enough that he is involuntarily engaged in political strife—that, using the author's own comparison of the whole volume with the 'common crow,' politics do truly constitute the 'lump of carrion' which is the subject of the book—and the light sketches that have pleased him, but the two or three 'handfuls of feathers' which 'buoy it up' and 'make it fly.' Instead of rambling in his mind over the wild forests of Canada, and listening to the midnight roar of Niagara—instead of admiring the generous-minded loyalty of the Canadians, or the native fire of the Red Indian political orator—he finds himself in what then seems to him the inhospitable regions of Downing-street, having his attention called to the chilling calculations of a more civilized statesman. Though his interest in the work and in its author is thus much altered, yet the probability is that it would be far from destroyed. Though enticed into politics against his original purpose, yet once in the subject he would see that Sir Francis Head had sufficient of right and justice on his side to claim sympathy for the cause he advocates. He will thus resignedly give up the quiet pleasure he had promised himself, and enter on an agitated field of contest, to decide on questions that involve momentous principles, as well as national and even individual honour.

From this general idea which we have endeavoured to give of 'The Emigrant,' it will appear that the book naturally divides itself into two distinct parts or subjects, of which the former is undoubtedly the more entertaining to the general reader. For this reason, although justice may require us to make a few remarks on the political part, yet we propose mainly to consider the 'lighter sketches.'

Consideration for our readers, and perhaps for ourselves, as well as want of space, alike prompt us to this course.

There is something peculiarly fascinating to the imagination in the idea of a New World. Though the Old World may usurp all that is interesting from historical or local associations —from the progress of the human mind—from social predilections, and also from the sanctity that hangs over the scenes of revelation; yet the thought of a new world is full of charms both to the philosopher and the moralist: and without assuming to ourselves these formidable cognomens, we most of us, probably, have our inclination towards the turn of mind implied by the one or the other. The philosopher sees in the thought of a new world, an enlarged theatre for his observations of nature—a thousand new discoveries rise up in his imagination, and a thousand means of confirming old theories. One secret, perhaps, of the attractiveness of a new world to the amateur philosopher is, that though he is inwardly conscious of an inexhaustible supply of material for his deepest speculations still remaining in the old world, yet he is also conscious, that whilst in it, he is rather tightly yoked to his brothers in science. He has much labour and drudgery to go through, to master the theories and learn the systems under which discoveries, already made, are classed, before he can venture to enlighten the world with his own original ideas. He requires great labour to keep himself at the surface, much more to rise above the general standard of philosophical information. The thought of a new world relieves his mind, in some degree, of this weight. He immediately sees before him an opportunity of stepping forth from the shackles around him, and of wandering over ground as yet untrodden by his rivals. Without labour and without toil, more, at least, than through which the spirit of adventure will easily support him, he hopes to gain amusement, or perhaps a name, by fresh discoveries in creation and by striking theories founded on them, such as an age of recondite study in the old world would not bring forth.

The moralist again has the following great sources of interest opened out to him. He is anxious to see how far nature in a new world is adapted to the old methods of social or public life —what are her new suggestions, or what her new requirements. He is also curious to compare his own portion of the human family with tribes and nations who are indeed of common origin, but who have for ages been entirely separated from all intercourse. And lastly, he looks on the new world as a vast arena whereon the moral theories of the old may have their full trial, unshackled by the restraints which time has hung about them. This is the interest which emigration excites in him, and which America has had full time now to develop. Multitudes have left the old world, from many nations and under great variety of circumstances. These have taken with them into a country perfectly open to their influence, different ideas of government, of social life, and of religion. Surely, then, most interesting must it be to read the answers to so many problems—to observe the moral results of so many theories put into practice.

Not only, however, do these philosophical and moral considerations make a new world fascinating to our imaginations, but there are many less intellectual or even less creditable motives which have the same effect—as we shall see when we come to consider from the evidence of our author the real character of those who have emigrated to it. Whatever class of people, however, they are who emigrate—whatever their motives for preferring the new to the old world—or even whatever causes make the idea of a new world interesting to the mind—there is one principle that is at the root of all. A new world is looked forward to as a place of freedom from the difficulties of the old, or as a place where men, either literally or metaphorically, may run at large, unrestrained by the narrower observation which our old world affords. From these considerations, therefore, it would seem the obvious course to investigate the subject of the new world under the three heads of natural features—native inhabitants—and colonists. On all these Sir Francis Head gives us much information, in a most interesting manner.

In the description of nature our author greatly excels. He powerfully represents the natural features of America to be such as if Nature herself felt what was expected of her in the new world, and was determined not to disappoint her visitors by showing them only what they had seen or felt before. She herself, in all her habits, seems to harmonize with the love of freedom, so commonly attached to America. She evidently delights in the large and grand, and hates confinement or restraint.

> ‘The heavens of America appear infinitely higher—the sky is bluer—the clouds are whiter—the air is fresher—the cold is intenser—the moon looks larger—the stars are brighter—the thunder is louder—the lightning is vivider—the wind is stronger—the rain heavier—the mountains are higher—the rivers larger—the forests bigger—the plains broader: in short, the gigantic and beautiful features of the new world seem to correspond very wonderfully with the increased locomotive powers and other brilliant discoveries, which, under the blessing of an Almighty power, have lately been developed to mankind.’

One of this list of comparatives, viz., ‘the cold is intenser,’ he illustrates by conclusive reasoning on scientific principles, but still more powerfully by woeful examples of many who have suffered from it. To account for a difference of climate in winter between the old and new world, that is equal to about thirteen degrees of latitude, certainly is, at first sight, a difficult task.

Why should that region of North America which basks under the same sun as Florence, be, in winter, as cold as Moscow? The cause of this is stated to exist in those boundless forests which yet cover a large portion of Western America. Snow, our author states, is formed in the upper regions of the air, and thence descends on the earth, in other countries besides America, but its subsequent effect would seem to depend on the reception it meets with there. In the old world this is anything but hospitable: in the backwoods of Canada it finds a more comfortable home, and accordingly is able to extend its dominion to a degree that warm-blooded creatures are apt to rebel against, though unfortunately sometimes in vain. The reception of the fallen snow in most parts of the world is thus described:—

> 'But from the mere showing of the case, it is evident that this snow is as much a stranger in the land on which it is reposing, as a Laplander is who lands at Lisbon, or as in England a pauper is who enters a parish in which he is not entitled to settlement; and, therefore, just as the parish officers, under the authority of the law, vigorously proceed to eject the pauper, so does Nature proceed to eject the cold that has taken temporary possession of land to which it does not owe its birth; and the process of ejectment is as follows.'

The melting of the snow by the sun and warm wind is then described; but, as this is a process which can be witnessed even in our own country, dull as we are generally in natural phenomena, we will proceed to another state of circumstances:—

> 'But while the combined action of the sun and wind are producing this simple effect in the old world, there exists in the northern regions of the new world a physical obstruction to the operation; I allude to the interminable forest, through the boughs and branches of which the descending snow falls, until reaching the ground it remains hidden from the sun and protected from the wind; and thus every day's snow adds to the accumulation, until the whole region is converted into an almost boundless ice-house, from which there slowly but continually arises, like a mist from the ground, a stratum of cold air, which the north-west prevailing wind wafts over the south, and which freezes everything in its way.'
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> 'The effect of air passing over ice is curiously exemplified on the Atlantic, where at certain periods of the year, all of a sudden, and often during the night, there suddenly comes over every passenger a cold mysterious chill, like the hand of death itself, caused by the vicinity of a floating iceberg.' . . . . . . 'If the presence of a solitary little iceberg in the ocean can produce the sensation I have described, it surely need hardly be observed how great must be the freezing effects on the continent of North America, of the north-west wind blowing over an uncovered ice-house, composed of masses of accumulated snow several feet in thickness and many hundreds of miles both in length and breadth.'

We will give one instance of the effects of the cold:—

> 'I one day inquired of a fine ruddy honest looking man who called upon me, and whose toes and insteps of each foot had been truncated, how the accident happened? He told me that the first winter he came from Eng-

land he lost his way in the forest, and that after walking for some hours, feeling pain in his feet, he took off his boots, and, from the flesh immediately swelling, he was unable to put them on again.

> 'His stockings, which were very old ones, soon wore into holes, and as rising on his insteps he was hurriedly proceeding he knew not where, he saw with alarm, but without feeling the slightest pain, first one toe and then another break off as if they had been pieces of brittle stick, and in this mutilated state he continued to advance till he reached a path which led him to an inhabited log-house, where he remained, suffering great pain, till his cure was effected.'

The subject of cold appears to occupy a most important position at the commencement of this book—we will give one more extract to show what the substance itself of American cold is, as we have seen its cause and effect. Speaking of ice he says:—

> 'But the truth is, that the temperature of thirty-two degrees of Fahrenheit, that at which water freezes, is only the commencement of an operation that is almost infinite. A cubic foot of Lower Canada ice is infinitely more valuable, or, in other words, it contains infinitely more cold, than a cubic foot of Upper Canada ice, which again, contains more cold than a cubic foot of Wenham ice; which contains infinitely more cold than a cubic foot of English ice.'

Here is the explanation of that extreme obstinacy of the block of ice in the Strand, whose resistance to the comfortable warmth of the metropolis so astonished many passers by.

One glimpse at summer in the same regions:—

> 'In the summer, the excessive heat, the violent paroxysms of thunder, the parching drought, the occasional deluges of rain, the sight of bright red, bright blue, and other gaudy plumaged birds—of the brilliant humming-bird, and of innumerable fire-flies, that at night appear like the reflection upon earth of the stars shining above them in the heavens, would almost persuade the emigrant that he was living within the tropics.'

One curious result of such a climate is, that animal life undergoes very much the same changes during the year, that vegetable life does.

> 'But while this joyful process is proceeding in the vegetable world, the interminable forest is once again becoming the cheerful scene of animal life. The old bear slowly descends, tail foremost, from the lofty chamber in which he has so long been dormant. The air is filled—the light of heaven is occasionally almost intercepted from morning till night—by clouds of pigeons, which, as the harbingers of spring, are seen for many days flying over the forest.'

'All is not gold that glitters,' our author here reminds us: this joyous brightening up of earth's countenance has its inconvenience — nature certainly is more beautiful, but you must remain in one place to admire those beauties—the 'breaking up' of the roads is a most serious impediment to locomotion. The baronet feels this, for he maintains the equestrian propensity so common to his order most strongly. This habit, though very beneficial to his general health, yet sometimes jeopardied his safety; for a Canadian wood, it seems, is easier to get into than out of. When, however, he lost himself, his ingenuity, as the event proved, always brought him home again: though the particular method he adopted evidently shows that 'God save the Queen' was not the only 'old song' he remembered from his native land; but that that truly British effusion entitled 'All round my hat' rung through his heart and inspired him in his greatest need. His plan of extricating himself was this:—

> 'I threw my hat on the ground, and then riding from it in any direction to a distance greater than that which I knew to exist between me and the road I was anxious to regain, I returned, on the footmarks of my horse, to my hat, and then radiating from it in any other direction, and returning, I repeated the trials, until, taking the right direction, I at last recovered the road.'

When this happy time arrived, of course he had to return for his hat; an addition to the labour which we think he might have avoided by erecting some other signal of less importance to his comfort during the remainder of his ride.

Lightning has before been mentioned as one of the powerful agents of nature in this part of the world; we will give an instance:—

> 'In one immense pine the electric mine had burnt in the heart of its victim within a foot of the ground. The tree in its stupendous fall snapped about fifty feet above the ground another pine tree, about forty feet distant, and resting and remaining on the top of this lofty column, the two trees formed a right-angled triangle of most extraordinary appearance, standing in the forest as if to demonstrate the irresistible power of one of the greatest agents of nature.'

Hurricanes, again, are formidable things, and create havoc on a larger scale:—'When a traveller inquires for a road to any particular place, he is often told to proceed in a certain direction "until he comes to a hurricane;" which means, until he finds in the lone wilderness a parcel of trees torn up by the roots, and in indescribable confusion lying prostrate on the ground.'

We will conclude our extracts which refer to natural features, by two from the account of that well-known wonder of the world, the Falls of Niagara:—

> 'It was in the depth of winter, near midnight, and pitch dark, when, following the footsteps of a trusty guide, I traversed the dry, crisp, deep snow until I came to a few rugged steps which I could only very slowly descend.

"A little this way," muttered my guide, as for some seconds I was lingering on a spot from which my other foot, after fumbling in vain, could feel no landing-place at all. At last, after blundering for a short distance among trees, and over snow-covered obstacles of various shapes, I arrived on a flat surface, which I immediately felt to be glare ice, and along which, my conductor leading me by his hard hand very slowly, we cautiously proceeded, until in a low voice he announced to me that I had reached the point to which I had directed him to conduct me—the table-rock of Niagara.

'I could see nothing, and for that very reason I had come; but although I could see nothing, yet I felt and heard a great deal.

'My first sensation was, that the "dreadful sound of waters in mine ears" was a substantial danger; and that I was an actor in, and actually in the midst of what, as a passing stranger, I had come merely to contemplate. The cold thick vapour that arose from the cauldron immediately beneath me, partaking of eddies in the atmosphere, created also by what was passing below, ascending and descending, rushed sometimes downwards upon me from behind, as if it had determined to drive me into the abyss; then it quietly enveloped me, as if its object were to freeze me to death; then suddenly it would puff full in my face, and then whirl round me as if to invite me to join in its eccentric dance. Yet, although the sensations and noises I have described were quite sufficient to engross my attention, it was, of course, mainly attracted by the confused roar and boiling of the great cataract, whose everlasting outline, though veiled by darkness, was immediately before me.'

So much for night—now let us see the effect by day:—

'It was bright daylight. Behind me, every tree, every rock, as well as the solitary cottage that enlivens them, were covered with a glittering coating of congealed ice, which was also reposing in heavy masses upon the depressed branches of the adjoining forest. The unusual brilliancy of this white scenery was deserving of great attention; but I neither dared, nor had I inclination, to look at it, because close to, and immediately before me, there stood, partially enveloped in the halo of its own glory, that great cataract, termed by the Indians, O-NI-AU-GA-RAH!'

The scene is most ably described at some length; but we must refer the reader to the book itself for the remainder, and ourselves pass on to consider the native inhabitants of these wide and wild regions.

The Red Indian has attracted a considerable share of public attention during the last few years. Mr. Catlin made them the fashion for a time by his eloquent praises of their native virtues. We doubt, however, whether he did their reputation any good in this country. Though he spoke of their virtues, yet he exhibited their more savage qualities; and after leaving the Egyptian Hall, people's eyes, we suspect, were generally felt to have made a deeper impression in their memories than their ears. They were told that the Red Indian possessed honourable and agreeable qualities, but they had to believe this on faith—now faith generally goes to the wall when people have means of judging by sight. They saw a degrading specimen of savage life exhibited for the curiosity of all who would pay for a ticket of admission; and, of course, their only impression was, that they had seen savages. They would have considered themselves cheated if it was discovered that Red Indians were not real savages.

Now is it not a severe test to the habits of any race of men, for a few of them to be taken across the world, and made to exhibit their national peculiarities to a people utterly foreign in all their habits? Take even a party of civilized English people into the heart of China, and there exhibit them dancing a quadrille. What would be the result? The grave Chinese, in the first place, would imagine that the English were always dancing quadrilles; and in the second place, that so doing was a most unprofitable and barbarous occupation. Yet we doubt whether his idea of the English would be more incorrect than ours is of the North American Indian, after seeing a war dance. We suspect they are not always dancing, as a preparatory step to scalping each other, or as a triumph on the accomplishment of that object.

We do not mean, however, to set up the Red Indian's claim to a high state of civilization; but we would advocate the principle of looking at their higher and better feelings rather than seeking amusement from their more savage habits. Our position towards them as a nation would prompt generosity of feeling. It is fated in the world's history, that these wild lords of vast territorial dominion should recede before the more useful occupiers of land from the busy East, and we are instruments in the hands of Providence for depriving them of their ancient inheritance, and for, in all probability, blotting out their very existence from the earth when their time is run. Surely then it is more generous towards a declining race, and certainly it is more interesting, to record the agreeable qualities which they possess, than the contrary.

With these feelings, we much commend the tone in which Sir Francis Head speaks of the Indians, and also the points of their character which he chooses for description; and as we believe he writes according to the honest impression on his mind from scenes of which he was an eye-witness, so we doubt not he gives a correct estimate of their true claim on our respect. Wild and uncivilized as they are, they yet possess many attractive and even refined qualities in which their invaders from the old world are, many of them, sadly deficient. We would especially allude to their courtesy and high-bred manners. Their character is indeed a curious problem, and one which together with our observation at home is calculated to teach us that the component parts of civilization are very different from what we imagine. The arts and luxuries of life we see at home do not spread courtesy and refinement of mind among our lower orders, whereas the hunting tribes of America preeminently enjoy a certain nobility of nature which imparts great elegance to their manner. Their very refinement, however, in these respects, makes their eventual prospect of being really civilized more hopeless; it shows that they have arrived, as a people, at their full growth, and that decay, speedy in proportion to their helplessness, must follow. We would not wish to retard it, though by injustice we should not accelerate it; they have, we suspect, a deficiency of mental power which is irremediable, and that deficiency is one which it is to be hoped peculiarly unfits them for the future condition of the world. The deficiency we mean is that which, humanly speaking, seems an utter inability in their very nature to receive the Gospel. As the land of Canaan became the 'Holy Land' not by the conversion of the old Canaanites, but by their expulsion before more worthy tenants, so, to judge from phenomena, must Christianity prevail over the plains of America, not by the mere substitution of the name of Christ for that of the 'Great Spirit,' but by the disappearance from off the face of the earth of that 'Great Spirit's' worshippers.

We will give a few extracts descriptive of these people; first, with regard to their state before disturbed by the white man.

> 'Fifty years ago, the region in question, which is considerably larger than England and Wales, and which is bordered by five or six of the largest states of the adjoining republic, was a splendid wilderness of deep rich soil, covered with trees, pine, beech, birch, cedar, and oak, of unusual girth and height, under the branches of which there existed, almost hidden from the rays of the sun, the wild beasts of the forests, and their lords and masters, a few Red Indians, who, with no fixed abodes, rambled through the trees as freely as the wind, which "bloweth where it listeth."
>
> 'In the hidden recesses of this vast wilderness, man and beast, unseen by any living witness, were occasionally desperately engaged in single combat. The Indian sometimes was hungry, sometimes was gorged; sometimes, emerging from the wilderness, he stood for a moment gazing at the splendid interminable ocean of fresh water before him; and then diving again into the forest, he would traverse it for hundreds of miles in search of game, or of friends, whose hunting grounds, as well as innumerable other localities, were clearly traced on the tablet of his mind. In short, he was acquainted with the best salt licks; he knew where to go for bears, or for beavers, for fish, flesh, or fur; and he knew how to steer his course to commune with "the Great Spirit," at that solemn place of worship, the falls of Niagara. Nevertheless, with all his instinct and intelligence, the vast country he inhabited remained unaltered and even untouched, except by his foot as he rambled across it.'

We would suggest as a passing thought, if there may not be some hidden relation in Providence between the unwillingness of the Indian race to undergo the penalty of man's curse, 'to till the ground,' and their apparent inability to receive redemption by becoming Christians.

The chapter called 'The Bark Canoe,' is chiefly dedicated to the Red Indian, and in power of description, as well as beauty of language, yields to none in the book. We see throughout it, that the spirit of the writer is rather to describe their more civilized aspect than their savage, to see what is agreeable rather than what is offensive.

In our author's official capacity he was about to meet many tribes of these Indians, in conference, on an uninhabited island in Lake Huron. Three days in a 'bark canoe,' were a necessary and also pleasing preparation for this singular political meeting. During the voyage his party stopped to breakfast on a small island. Let, however, the Governor tell his own story.

> 'At about eight o'clock, several of our party began to talk openly about what all of us, I believe, had for some time been secretly thinking of, our breakfast; and, out of the innumerable islands we were passing, we were looking for one to suit us, when smoke from an Indian's wigwam determined us to land on the spot he had chosen.
>
> 'It was a heavenly morning; and I never remember to have beheld a homely picture of what is called "savage life" which gave me more pleasure than that which, shortly after I landed, appeared immediately before me.
>
> 'On a smooth table rock, surrounded by trees and shrubs, every leaf of which had been washed by the night's rain as clean as it could have appeared on the day of its birth, there were seated in front of their wigwam, and close to a fire, the white smoke from which was gracefully meandering upwards through the trees, an Indian's family, composed of a very old man, two or three young ones, about as many wives, and a most liberal allowance of joyous looking children of all ages.
>
> 'The distinguishing characteristic of the group was robust, ruddy, healthy. More happy, or more honest countenances could not exist; and as the morning sun, with its full force, beamed on their shining jet-black hair and red countenances, it appeared as if it had imparted to the latter that description of colour which it itself assumes in England, when beheld through one of our dense fogs.
>
> 'The family, wives, grandfather and all, did great credit to the young men by whose rifles and fishing tackle they had been fed. They were all what is called full in flesh; and the Bacchus-like outlines of two or three little naked children, who with frightened faces stood looking at us, very clearly exclaimed in the name and on behalf of each of them, "Haven't I had a good breakfast this morning?" In short, without entering into particulars, the little urchins were evidently as full of bear's flesh, berries, soup, or something or other, as they could possibly hold.
>
> 'On our approaching the party, the old man rose to receive us: and though we could only communicate with him through one of our crew, he lost no time in treating his white brethren with hospitality and kindness. Like ourselves, they had only stopped at the island to feed; and we had scarcely departed when we saw the paddles of their canoes in motion, following us.
>
> 'Whatever may be said in favour of the "blessings of civilization," yet

certainly in the life of a Red Indian there is much for which he is fully justified in the daily thanksgivings he is in the habit of offering to "the Great Spirit." He breathes pure air, beholds splendid scenery, traverses unsullied water, and subsists on food which, generally speaking, forms not only his sustenance, but the manly amusement, as well as occupation, of his life.'

Let us now turn to his reception on reaching the island appointed for the conference.

'As soon as I landed I was accosted by some of the principal chiefs; but from that native good-breeding which, in every situation in which they can be placed, invariably distinguishes the Indian tribes, I was neither hustled nor hunted by the crowd; on the contrary, during the three days I remained on the island, and after I was personally known to every individual upon it, I was enabled, without any difficulty or inconvenience, or without a single person following or even stopping to stare at me, to wander completely by myself among all their wigwams.'

The council itself is a most striking scene, admirably described; even our European legislatures might study it with advantage.

'After a few salutations, it was proposed that our council should commence; and, accordingly, while I took possession of a chair which the chief Superintendent of Indian affairs had been good enough to bring for me, the chiefs sat down opposite to me in about eighteen or twenty lines parallel to each other.

'For a considerable time we indolently gazed at each other in dead silence. Passions of all sorts had time to subside; and the judgment, divested of its energy, was thus enabled calmly to consider and prepare the subjects of the approaching discourse; and as if still further to facilitate this arrangement, "the pipe of peace" was introduced, slowly lighted, slowly smoked, by one chief after another, and then sedately handed to me to smoke it too. The whole assemblage having, in this simple manner, been solemnly linked together in a chain of friendship, and as it had been intimated to them by the Superintendent that I was ready to consider whatever observations any of them might desire to offer, one of the oldest chiefs arose; and, after standing for some seconds erect, yet in a position in which he was evidently perfectly at his ease, he commenced his speech—translated to me by an interpreter at my side—by a slow, calm expression of thanksgiving to the Great Spirit for having safely conducted so many of his race to the point on which they had been requested to assemble. He then, in very appropriate terms, expressed the feelings of attachment which had so long connected the Red Man with his Great Parent across the Salt Lake; and after this exordium, which in composition and mode of utterance would have done credit to any legislative assembly in the civilized world, he proceeded, with great calmness, by very beautiful metaphors, and by a narration of facts it was impossible to deny, to explain to me how gradually, and —since their acquaintance with their white brethren—how continuously the race of red men had melted, and were still melting, like snow before the sun. As I did not take notes of this speech, or of those of several other chiefs, who afterwards addressed the council, I could only very inaccurately repeat them. Besides which, a portion of them related to details of no public importance: I will, therefore, in general terms, only observe, that nothing could be more interesting, or offer to the civilized world a more useful lesson, than the manner in which the red aborigines of America, without ever interrupting each other, conduct their council.

> 'The calm, high-bred dignity of their demeanour—the scientific manner in which they progressively construct the framework of whatever subject they undertake to explain—the sound arguments by which they connect, as well as support it—and the beautiful wild flowers of eloquence with which, as they proceed, they adorn every portion of the moral architecture they are constructing, form altogether an exhibition of grave interest; and yet, is it not astonishing to reflect that the orators in these councils are men whose lips and gums are—while they are speaking—black from the wild berries on which they have been subsisting—who have never heard of education—never seen a town—but who, born in the secluded recesses of an almost interminable forest, have spent their lives in either following zigzaggedly the game on which they subsist through a labyrinth of trees, or in paddling their canoes across lakes, and among a congregation of islands such as I have described!
>
> 'They hear more distinctly—see farther—smell clearer—can bear more fatigue—can subsist on less food—and have altogether fewer wants than their white brethren; and yet, while from morning till night we stand gazing at ourselves in the looking-glass of self-admiration, we consider the Red Indians of America as "outside barbarians."'

We now come to consider the history of the intruders from the old world on these vast territories.

Sir Francis Head founds the necessity of emigration on the astounding fact that John Bull's beloved wife presents him annually with 365,000 babies 'more than he had requested of her to replace those members of his family who had just died.' In this fact, our worthy baronet considers 'it is impossible for 'John Bull's bitterest enemy to help acknowledging that there 'is something generous and amiable beyond description—noble 'and high-minded beyond example—and evidently productive of 'far-sighted political results.'

Whether 'free trade in corn' would enable these 360,000 babies to stop at home if they liked, is a political question which we will not stop to consider. We have to deal with the fact, that many have emigrated, and still are emigrating, to our North American colonies. With regard to the geographical position of our colonies, Sir Francis makes the following remarks:—

> 'It is wonderful to observe how admirably Nature has parcelled out to the different nations of mankind the cultivation of those territories which are best suited to their respective characters and physical strength.
>
> 'For instance, the indolent inhabitants of old Spain and of Portugal were led, apparently by blind chance, to discover, in the New World, plains of vast extent, situated in a genial climate, which, without any culture, were fitted for the breeding of almost every animal which forms the food of man.
>
> 'On the other hand, by the same mariners' compass, the Anglo-Saxon race were conducted to a region visited by intense cold, and covered with trees of such enormous size, that emigration to this country has justly been termed "War with the wilderness;" and certainly any man who has experienced in it the amount of fatigue to be endured in cutting down a single tree, in ploughing among its roots, and in sowing and reaping around

its stump, must feel that it required a strong, healthy, hardy race of men to clear a country in which the settler has, as it were, to engage himself in a duel with each and every individual tree of the interminable forest that surrounds him.'

From several melancholy stories heard during the Governor's 'long trot,' it would appear that the 'duel with each individual tree' had not always one issue. The tree sometimes gained a sad victory. One instance we cannot help extracting.

'The emigrant had arisen in robust health—surrounded by his numerous and happy family, had partaken of a homely breakfast—had left his log-hut with a firm step, and with manly pride had again resumed his attack upon the wilderness, through which every blow of his axe, like the tick of a clock, recorded the steady progress of the hand that belonged to it. But at the hour of dinner he did not return! The wife waited—bid her rosy-faced children be patient—waited—felt anxious—alarmed—stepped beyond the threshold of her log-hut—listened: the axe was not at work! Excepting that indescribable æolian murmur which the air makes in passing through the stems and branches of the forest, not a sound was to be heard. Her heart misgives her; she walks—runs towards the spot where she knew her husband to have been at work. She finds him without his jacket or neckcloth, lying, with extended arms, on his back, cold, and crushed to death by the last tree he had felled, which in falling, jumping from its stump, had knocked him down, and which is now resting with its whole weight upon his bared breast.'

Such being the locality, and such the work to be done in it; let us inquire who they are who encounter these hardships.

'It would be incorrect to state that the many thousands of emigrants that have annually sailed for our North American provinces have been particularly athletic; but as the French army truly say, "C'est le cœur qui fait le grenadier;" so it may accurately be stated that, with a few exceptions, they must have been persons of rather more enterprising disposition than their comrades whom they left at home. Indeed, when I have reflected on the expense, anxiety, and uncertainty attendant upon emigrating to a new world, I have often felt astonished that labourers, tethered to their parish by so many ties and prejudices, should ever have summoned courage enough to make up their minds to sail with their families in a ship for countries in which, to say the least, they must land ignorant, friendless, and unknown.

'But besides a certain amount of enterprise, there has, I believe, existed in the minds of all emigrants some little propulsive feeling or other—oftener good than bad—that has tended to put them on, as it is termed, their mettle, and to make them decide on a change of scene; indeed, when I was in Canada, I often thought that it would have been as amusing to have kept a list of the various different reasons that had propelled from England those who were around me, as it is to read in Gil Blas the dissimilar causes which had brought together the motley inmates of Rolando's cave.'

Disappointment in military and naval promotion Sir Francis considers to have been productive of emigration. One gallant naval officer was told by William the Fourth, when Lord High Admiral, that he was too *young* for a ship, and within a few weeks by Sir James Graham, as First Lord of the Admiralty, that he was too *old*.

'Many fine fellows came out because they could not live without shooting, and did not choose to be poachers; a vast number crossed over because they had "heavy families and small incomes;" and one of the most loyal men I was acquainted with, and to whose protection I had afterwards occasion to be indebted, in answer to some questions I was inquisitively putting to him, stopped me by honestly saying, as he looked me full in the face, "My character, Sir, won't bear investigation!"

'Of course, a proportion of the emigrants to our North American colonies belong to that philanthropic class of men who, under the appellation of Socialists, Communists, or liberals, are to met with in every corner of the Old World. Their doctrine is, community of goods; but they have no goods at all. They preach division of property, but they have no property to divide. So that their principle is,—not so much to give all they have (for they have nothing to give) to other people,—as that other people should give all they have to *them*.

'Compelled by these motley reasons, feelings, grievances, and doctrines, many thousands of families and individuals of various grades (in 1842 their number exceeded 42,000) have annually taken leave of the shores of Great Britain to seek refuge in the splendid wilderness of Canada, or, in other words, sick of "vain pomp and glory," have left the Old World for what they hoped would be a better.'

Their first sensations are graphically described as follows.

'For a short time, on their arrival at their various locations, they fancy, or rather they really and truly feel more or less strongly, that there is something very fine in the theory of having apparently got rid of all the musty materials of "Church and State;" and revelling in this sentiment, they for a short time enjoy the novel luxury of being able to dress as they like, do as they like, go where they like. They appreciate the happiness of living in a land in which the old country's servile custom of touching the hat does not exist, in which every carter and waggoner rides instead of walks, and in which there are no purse-proud millionaires, no dukes, duchesses, lords, ladies, parsons, parish officers, beadles, poor-law commissioners, or paupers; no tithes and no taxes.'

Such being the raw material of our colonies, it is a curious speculation in morals to trace by what process this mass is worked up into a useful form.

This process is aptly compared to that of fermentation.

'Now, just as seafaring men declare that after Thames soup has undergone fermentation—during which process it emits from the bung hole of the casks which contain it a gas highly offensive, and even inflammable—it becomes the clearest, the sweetest, and most wholesome water that can be taken to sea, so does the same sort of clarification, and the same results, take place in the moral feelings of the crowds of emigrants I have described.

After this fermentation, our author would have us believe that the emigrants turn out a very respectable body of men. They find after a time, we suppose, that it is no lasting gratification to act differently from English ways,—to dress in opposition to English prejudices,—and so they sink down into ordinary kind of people.

When at length in this quiet state (we suspect by the bye that a considerable number of the 42,000 are by this time at home again in England) they begin to have pleasing reminiscences of their native land; they discover, what they never knew before, that they have a respect for their old home, with all its troublesome restraints. Then they come out in a new character. A process of what may be called mental retrogression of about a century takes place. Sir Francis describes this with great clearness; that kind of clearness, we might almost say, which an uncharitable world considers theoretical when descriptive of such stubborn things as men's hearts. It is singular, too, that this clearly described process happens to bring the subjects of it to exactly Sir Francis Head's own idea of what they ought to be, and what, to suit the object of his book, they should be. First, then, they discover liberty and equality 'to contain a great deal of alloy.' After that, they feel a desire to attend places of worship, and build them accordingly. And lastly, they are loyal subjects of the Queen, and admirers of 'British institutions.' In fact, they become regular Church and Queen men.

Whether or not, however, this is the regular course of events and principles with all emigrants, Sir Francis certainly has good reason for knowing that the Upper Canadians are loyal men, as a body, and ready, with their best arm, to maintain the cause of peace and order by putting down rebellion.

The proof of their loyalty brings us close to the political part of our work, on which we do not purpose to trouble our readers with more than a very few remarks.

No rule is without an exception, so there were exceptions in the loyalty of Upper Canada, and these same persons were also most signal exceptions to Sir Francis's otherwise universal love for the people entrusted to his care. These persons are Mr. McKenzie, Dr. Duncombe, Mr. Robert Baldwin, Mr. Speaker Bidwell, and Dr. Rolph, who are introduced to us with the prepossessing epithet of demagogues, a character which they certainly well maintain.

The first chapter in which these worthies come before us is appropriately called 'The Flare-up.' It contains most stirring events—which are the turning point of the whole work. In it we find the confirmation of our author's judgment as to the loyalty of the Canadians, and also the exercise of his powers as a military commander. From this chapter, too, spring the grounds of complaint which are so fully entered into in the subsequent parts of the book: we, therefore, here find Sir Francis Head in the threefold character of statesman, soldier, and author.

Mr. McKenzie and Co. were, it seems, strong advocates for what happened so be Sir Francis's especial abomination, viz. 'responsible government.' Considering the innocuous, or even honest idea, which these words present in their abstract signification, it is wonderful how the very sound of them appears to disturb the baronet's peace of mind. No fabled monster of old, or no creation of nightmare, ever seemed more fraught with evil to suffering man than does 'responsible government' to the judgment of the late Governor of Upper Canada. Words, however, have, of course, conventional meanings—and circumstances make the same words good at one time and bad at another.

The Commons House of Assembly rejected Mr. McKenzie's 'revolutionary innovation;' not discouraged, however, by that, he commenced an agitation, 'he wrote, and then he printed, and then he rode, and then he spoke, stamped, foamed, wiped his seditious little mouth; and spoke again; and thus, like a squirrel in a cage, he continued with astonishing assiduity the centre of a revolutionary career.' From such harmless antics, however, he came to talk of 'loaded fire-arms,' though under the pretence of shooting pigeons; bullets, however, were recommended for the purpose. Such proceedings created a natural desire on the part of loyal subjects to arrest this active-minded man: and the Governor himself says, 'I was as anxious to incarcerate Mr. McKenzie, and as willing to disperse illegal assemblages, as any who advocated these measures.' He was obliged, however, to be cautious, for it seems he had not troops, and 'no physical force but that which is the representative of moral justice.' We must here remark, that we think his measures, with regard to the troops, to have been very noble, and, at the same time, not rash; for he knew that he could trust to the loyalty of the militia, and events proved that he was right.

> 'Many people have blamed, and I believe still blame me, for having, as they say, "sent the troops out of the province." I, however, did no such thing. Sir John Colborne, the commander of the forces in Canada, felt that he required the whole of them to defend the lower province, and deeming the power which he saw I possessed sufficient, he offered me a couple of companies, and then, without consulting me, recalled the whole of the remainder of the troops.
>
> 'Considering that Upper Canada was larger in surface than England and Wales, I felt that I should gain more by throwing myself *entirely* upon the militia, than by keeping these two companies; and Sir John Colborne fully concurring in this opinion, he acceded to my request, and accordingly by recalling them enormously increased my power.'

To return, however, to Mr. McKenzie—it was thought that the time appointed for the execution of a young girl who had poisoned her mistress would be a fit one for revolt. An unsuccessful appeal for mercy on her behalf had been made, so we presume our tranquil-minded author was held forth as a bloodthirsty tyrant. A neat plan was concocted, which had for its object 'to dispose of me (Sir F. H.), save the girl, plunder the banks, seize the government muskets,' &c. The author, however, of this beautifully-arranged piece of mischief could not remain quiet enough, and, consequently, 'a small portion of the militia' were called out—which proceeding was answered by Mr. McKenzie, through his newspaper. As Hector took up a mighty stone from the plain to hurl at Ajax, so Mr. McKenzie hurled a mighty 'leader' at the Governor of Upper Canada. In both cases the missile was harmless; sound was the only immediate result of the 'leader,' as it was also of Hector's stone; '*περιήχησεν δ' ἄρα χαλκός*.' More serious, however, was the continuation of the contest. Ajax threw back a much larger stone than he had received—so the Governor retaliated by hurling 'British law' at his adversary.

> 'The Attorney-General, who with calm, unremitting attention, had been watching the eccentric movements of this contemptible demagogue, now called upon me to report that Mr. McKenzie had at last crossed the line of demarcation, and that he was within the reach and power of British law.'

The Governor then took measures to arrest his rebellious subject, but the bird was flown.

> 'He had all along understood his position as clearly as the legal adviser to the Crown, and accordingly, at the very instant I was ordering his apprehension, he had fled from Toronto, had assembled his followers, and as a leader of a band of rebels, armed with loaded rifles and pikes, he was advancing to attack Toronto.'

Now then was the Governor's opportunity to call on the militia, and also to put into practice his best theories of the art of defence. We will not attempt to describe the means he took, how he converted the town-hall into a citadel at midnight, and armed the Chief Justice with thirty rounds of ball-cartridge; we will not spoil the reader's pleasure by anticipating the events of this charming little tragedy. It is really a pet of an insurrection from beginning to end, more like one written for a child's story-book than one which is recorded in the annals of history. There is no doubt as to the right side, one is so purely right, and the other so purely wrong. Then it is so pleasing to find the right side much more numerous than the wrong; then there is no horrid blood: it just stops short of that, except, indeed, poor Colonel Moodie's gallant death. The scenes are vividly described; moreover the absence of regular troops, and a correct line of march, gives a romance to it. All are volunteers in a good cause, full of enthusiastic zeal, as if all were 'going to be married.' As usual, an Irishman adds to the fun of such a scene—'If your Honour will but give us *arms*, the rebels will find *legs!*' This is eventually fulfilled to the letter, and then the whole winds up with a glorious blaze, 'a flare up,' literally.

It was a noble experiment on the part of Sir Francis Head, which nobly was responded to by the Canadians. He was right in his confidence on the loyalty of the colonists, and they, in return, had their zeal rewarded in finding (probably what they had expected to find), that they had a generous-minded and stout-hearted governor.

Nor did the relative position between them cease here; their mutual confidence was again called forth. And though the scene of action was not so merry the second time, yet this was from no want of zeal on the part of either master or men. The whole story connected with 'Navy Island,' and 'the Caroline,' is a strong confirmation of the virtues previously shown by all parties in the 'flare up' history.

But alas! we now come to the melancholy side of the picture. Such enthusiasm, such loyalty, surely deserved well of the mother country; but the *object* of 'The Emigrant' is to prove that these deserts were but ill paid: that, by some strange perversion of justice, the very movers of all this rebellion were freely forgiven, or even received government patronage, while the loyal subjects were coldly dealt with, and never had any recompense for their self-devotion.

It would be far beyond our purpose or our space to enter into the question generally between the Ex-Governor of Upper Canada and the 'Conservative Leader.' We have, moreover, only to do with the book before us, which is but one side of the question. To judge impartially, of course, further evidence would be necessary. As far as this book goes, however, we must say that we think the case fairly stated, and therefore deserving of counter evidence, if the 'great Conservative Leader' would not add to the reputation, which he already enjoys among many in this country, of having a cold heart, or even an ungrateful spirit.[1]

We can readily excuse one, who is in the overpowering position of Prime Minister to such an empire as Great Britain, not entering into the enthusiasm of local contests; but it is another thing, and not so excusable, to purchase peace and quietness with a troublesome neighbour by deserting those who have been most loyally devoted to his country's good.

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[1] It is but fair towards Sir Robert Peel to remember that after he came into power his colonial secretary was responsible for all minor arrangements, and that Lord Stanley, an old whig, occupied that position in the ministry of 1841.

It has ever been of great weight in evidence to have two witnesses to establish either a fact or an opinion. The fact or opinion Sir Francis Head goes to prove, is that Sir Robert Peel deserted his old cause and his old friends in their greatest need, and when they were most looking to him for help. The bill founded on Lord Durham's report was about to be brought before the house; it was most obnoxious to the party Sir Francis Head represents, and that party looked on Sir Robert Peel to oppose it. It was fated to be otherwise.

> 'The doom of Her Majesty's splendid North American Colonies was now evidently pronounced; the Conservatives, in melancholy silence, sat behind their leader, watching with astonishment his mysterious alliance with principles which they could not comprehend; and thus, almost in funeral silence, the fatal Bill proceeded.'

We need not go far back, for a repetition of the same kind of policy in the same statesman, as a second witness to establish Sir Francis Head's proposition. With grim pleasure will the Protectionist of last session catch hold of these words in confirmation of his own views as to the late Premier's stability of mind.

In making these remarks, we do not at all commit ourselves to an opinion as to the soundness of the policy advocated by Sir Francis Head. We put it only on the general question, whether zeal and enthusiasm are qualities which a statesman can with impunity, not to talk of gratitude, throw cold water on. If they are misjudged, he may direct them —but he must not repress them. It is ever the token of a high mind to take pleasure in calling to its aid the higher faculties of our nature; but if Sir Francis Head's statements be true, we cannot give the commendation to the 'Leader of 'the Conservatives.'

We cannot, however, deny that Sir Francis Head's general manner of going on may be a little off-hand. We conceive him to have the faults as well as the agreeable qualities of his style of mind. He is clear, brilliant, and thoughtful, but not profound. His mental vision is distinct and penetrating, but not widely diffused; this failing, in a person of his enthusiastic feelings, makes him, perhaps, take a too one-sided view of any question before him. What he does see, what is actually in his mind, is singularly clear; and he cannot allow it possible that others should see differently. A little more enlargement of mind might make him more distrustful of his own conclusions. We see this failing, especially in the story of the British Flag.

We have no doubt that this disposition of mind is acutely perceived by his former political leader, and has been made the ground of withholding approbation where it is most deservedly due.

We now take leave of our author, with sincere thanks for the amusement and instruction he has afforded us, and also with our best wishes that, in the judgment of the English reading world, the Canadian loyalists, for whom, and not for himself, he writes, may feel some assurance that, though distant from their mother country, their cause is not without admirers. We wish, indeed, they had received more substantial tokens of the gratitude they so well deserve.

ART. III.—*Life and Correspondence of David Hume.* *By* JOHN HILL BURTON, Esq. Advocate. Edinburgh. Tait. 1846.

THE treasures of the Royal Society of Edinburgh have, at length, been opened, and the 'Hume Papers' made their appearance—not so early as might have been desired, for conjecture has been busy with their contents, and while still unseen they have lost the first charm of novelty; not quite in their completeness, for Mr. Burton has, he informs us, under the guidance of their guardians, suppressed some portions of the documents, though none which he could have wished to publish. With these new resources at his command, he has produced his life of Hume, a good specimen of a certain class of narrative, though far from a model of biography. A life, to be perfect, should, like any other piece of art, be thoroughly well proportioned; beautiful in itself, as well as adapted to the purposes it is to answer, and the position it is to occupy.

Mr. Burton's work, tried by this test, would fail. It is so framed as to give an undue, though intentional prominence to his new materials. Perhaps the whole of Baron Hume's collection might, with more advantage, have been printed by itself. Mr. Burton might then, had he pleased, have written a life of Hume, every part of which should have a surer recommendation than that of novelty. As his work now stands, the deepest interest is that which will be least permanent. But his task has been well performed, though not one of the highest order. He has exhibited with great skill and judgment, in a setting which relieves his treasures without diverting the attention from them, much that casts a new light on the character and conduct of Hume. The portrait is well drawn; and the philosopher and historian steps forward on the canvass, arresting our attention for a time, though he cannot claim much of our sympathy.

Some men owe their reputation, in a great measure, to their misfortunes. We look with pity on their disadvantages, and attribute to them all the good which might have been hoped of their possible future. Even mere shortness of life has a great effect in disarming the severity of judgment. It would be unamiable permanently to entertain the idea, that greater length of years might have shown Titus to be in heart another Domitian, or have developed in Edward VI. the savage violence of will and capricious cruelty of his father. Or, in a very different case, who would hastily calculate, what home the wandering heart of Shelley would have found at last, had his life been prolonged to the common age of men? In so doing we must assume, that his course must needs have had, from beginning to end, but one unbroken tenor. From such an assumption it is natural and right to shrink. Unquiet souls have been prematurely withdrawn from our tribunal; we perceive it, and are silent. Their life appears as an incomplete passage in the world's history, as something rudimental and imperfect; and we pronounce only on what it was, not on what it might have been.

But Hume belongs to a type altogether different. His life is quite a wonderful instance of another kind—of a man's first sitting down to form his plans, and then being allowed to accomplish them; of a scheme conceived in early youth, acted on in opening manhood, expanding with the increase of years, bearing fruit in due time far beyond the expectation of its framer, and leaving as few desires unsatisfied, as few resolutions unfulfilled, as few parts unfinished, as in this world it is well possible to imagine. And this not in the case of a man who had an evident place in the providential history of the world, and was visibly fitted for the precise time at which he appeared,—whom the force of circumstances obliged to go on or perish, and to make his way where he could not find it. He was not thus urged on to victory, but chose his own course, and elaborated his own success. Nor can it be fairly said that he underrated his powers, and therefore stooped to objects below the level of those to which he could justly have aspired. On the contrary, we are astonished almost more at the premature boldness of the design, than at its issue. He looked over life, at the outset, as calmly and confidently as a young mountaineer measures with his eye the breadth of a leap which he feels will test his strength, though he knows it is not beyond it. Mr. Burton admits us to the confidence of the boy of sixteen, and we discern, without any application of the microscope, the young tree all but perfect in the seed. In a letter written at that early age to his confidential friend Michael Ramsay, we have the following passage.

> 'You say that I would not send in my papers, because they were not polished nor brought to any form: which you say is nicety. But was it not reasonable? Would you have me send in my loose, incorrect thoughts? Were such worth the transcribing? All the progress that I have made is but drawing the outlines, on loose bits of paper: here a hint of a passion; there a phænomenon in the mind accounted for: in another, the alteration of these accounts; sometimes a remark upon an author I have been reading; and none of them worth to any body, and I believe scarce to myself.' Vol. i. p. 13.

Meanwhile this mind, so soon shaped into a form which proved to be permanent; dissatisfied with the order and arrangement of its thoughts at a time when others are just becoming equal to the real labour of thinking, and when they would be bent on gaining matter, attending to points of style, and looking about for embellishment and illustration to string upon the thread of an already formed argument, was, as the same letter informs us, undergoing a course of moral training on a plan of its own, and taking for a rule of life the precepts of ancient philosophy. But we will not extract the passage, which some, we think unjustly, would deem artificial and affected. We will proceed to the twenty-third year of Hume's life, to which a much more curious and formal document belongs. We could seriously envy Mr. Burton the pleasure he must have felt in bringing before the world this fragment of a most genuine autobiography. It is an account of certain symptoms of disease, affecting, as he thought, the healthy action of his mind, under which Hume at that time laboured, and is drawn up with great care, having been meant to meet the eye of some eminent physician, whom Mr. Burton conjectures with great probability to have been Dr. Cheyne. Whether it was ever actually submitted to him, we have no means of ascertaining: there are, at least, no sufficient reasons for believing it was not. We should observe, that the communication was anonymous. Its particularity of detail adds to our knowledge of the young writer and philosopher, rather than of the man. It would enlist the physician's curiosity in the case, not attach his sympathy to the person. Habitually guarded and unobtrusive, Hume felt no inclination to throw himself, unsuspiciously, on the kindly disposition of a stranger. The greater part of the paper is too curious not to be quoted.

'You must know that, from my earliest infancy, I found always a strong inclination to books and letters. As our college education in Scotland, extending little further than the languages, ends commonly when we are about fourteen or fifteen years of age, I was after that left to my own choice in my reading, and found it incline me almost equally to books of reasoning and philosophy, and to poetry and the polite authors. Every one who is acquainted either with the philosophers or critics, knows that there is nothing yet established in either of these two sciences, and that they contain litle more than endless disputes, even in the most fundamental articles. Upon examination of these, I found a certain boldness of temper growing in me, which was not inclined to submit to any authority on these subjects, but led me to seek out some new medium by which truth might be established. After much study and reflection on this, at last, when I was about eighteen years of age, there seemed to be opened up to me a new scene of thought, which transported me beyond measure, and made me, with an ardour natural to young men, throw up every other pleasure or business to apply entirely to it. The law, which was the business I designed to follow, appeared nauseous to me, and I could think of no other way of pushing my fortune in the world but that of a scholar and philosopher. I was infinitely happy in this course of life for some months, till at last, about the beginning of September, 1729, all my ardour seemed in a moment to be extinguished, and I could no longer raise my mind to that pitch which formerly gave me such excessive pleasure. I felt no uneasiness or want of spirits when I laid aside my book, and therefore never imagined there was any bodily distemper in the case, but that my coldness proceeded from a laziness of temper, which must be overcome by redoubling my application. In this condition I remained for nine months, very uneasy to myself, as you may well imagine, but without growing any worse, which was a miracle. There was another particular which contributed more than anything to waste my spirits and bring on me this distemper, which was, that having read many books of morality, such as Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, and being smit with their beautiful representations of virtue and philosophy, I undertook the improvement of my temper and will, along with my reason and understanding. I was continually fortifying myself with reflections against death, and poverty, and shame, and pain, and all the other calamities of life. These, no doubt, are exceedingly useful when joined with an active life, because, the occasion being presented along with the reflection, works it into the soul, and makes it take a deep impression; but in solitude they serve to little other purpose than to waste the spirits, the force of the mind meeting with no resistance, but wasting itself in the air, like our arm when it misses its aim. This, however, I did not learn but by experience, and till I had already ruined my health, though I was not sensible of it.'

Here follows a minute detail of symptoms, their treatment, and its effects, which we omit; the writer then proceeds:

'Thus I have given you a full account of the condition of my body; and without staying to ask pardon, as I ought to do, for so tedious a story, shall explain to you how my mind stood all this time, which on every occasion, especially in this distemper, have a very near connexion together. Having now time and leisure to cool my inflamed imagination, I began to consider seriously how I should proceed in my philosophical inquiries. I found that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by antiquity laboured under the same inconvenience that has been found in their natural philosophy, of being entirely hypothetical, and depending more upon invention than experience; every one consulted his fancy in erecting schemes of virtue and of happiness, without regarding human nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend. This, therefore, I resolved to make my principal study, and the source from which I would derive every truth in criticism as well as morality. I believe it is a certain fact, that most of the philosophers who have gone before us have been overthrown by the greatness of their genius, and that little more is required to make a man succeed in this study, than to throw off all prejudices either for his own opinions or for those of others. At least, this is all I have to depend on for the truth of my reasonings, which I have multiplied to such a degree, that within these three years I find I have scribbled many a quire of paper in which there is nothing contained but my own inventions. This, with the reading most of the celebrated books in Latin, French, and English, and acquiring the Italian, you may think a sufficient business for one in perfect health; and so it would had it been done to any purpose; but my disease was a cruel encumbrance on me. I found that I was not able to follow out any train of thought by one continued stretch of view, but by repeated interruptions, and by refreshing my eye from time to time upon other objects. Yet with this inconvenience I have collected the rude materials for many volumes; but in reducing these to words, when one must bring the idea he comprehended in gross nearer to him, so as to contemplate its minutest parts, and keep it steadily in his eye, so as to copy these parts in order—this I found impracticable for me, nor were my spirits equal to so severe an employment. Here lay my greatest calamity. I had no hopes of delivering my opinions with such elegance and neatness, as to draw to me the attention of the world, and I would rather live and die in obscurity than produce them maimed and imperfect.

'Such a miserable disappointment I scarce ever remember to have heard of. The small distance between me and perfect health makes me the more uneasy in my present situation. It is a weakness rather than a lowness of spirits which troubles me, and there seems to be as great a difference between my distemper and common vapours, as betwixt vapours and madness. I have noticed in the writings of the French mystics, and in those of our fanatics here, that when they give a history of the situation of their souls, they mention a coldness and desertion of the spirit, which frequently returns; and some of them, at the beginning, have been tormented with it many years. As this kind of devotion depends entirely on the force of passion, and, consequently, of the animal spirits, I have often thought that their case and mine were pretty parallel, and that their rapturous admirations might discompose the fabric of the nerves and brain, as much as profound reflections, and that warmth or enthusiasm which is inseparable from them.

'However this may be, I have not come out of the cloud so well as they commonly tell us they have done, or rather began to despair of ever recovering. To keep myself from being melancholy on so dismal a prospect, my only security was in peevish reflections on the vanity of the world and of all human glory; which, however just sentiments they may be esteemed, I have found can never be sincere, except in those who are possessed of them. Being sensible that all my philosophy would never make me contented in my present situation, I began to rouse up myself; and being encouraged by instances of recovery from worse degrees of this distemper, as well as by the assurances of my physicians, I began to think of something more effectual than I had hitherto tried. I found, that as there are two things very bad for this distemper, study and idleness, so there are two things very good, business and diversion; and that my whole time was spent betwixt the bad, with little or no share of the good. For this reason I resolved to seek out a more active life, and though I could not quit my pretensions in learning but with my last breath, to lay them aside for some time, in order the more effectually to resume them. Upon examination, I found my choice confined to two kinds of life, that of a travelling governor, and that of a merchant. The first, besides that it is in some respects an idle life, was, I found, unfit for me; and that because, from a sedentary and retired way of living, from a bashful temper, and from a narrow fortune, I had been little accustomed to general companies, and had not confidence and knowledge enough of the world to push my fortune, or to be serviceable in that way. I therefore fixed my choice upon a merchant, and having got recommendation to a considerable trader in Bristol, I am just now hastening thither, with a resolution to forget myself, and everything that is past, to engage myself, as far as is possible, in that course of life, and to toss about the world, from the one pole to the other, till I leave this distemper behind me.'—Pp. 32—38.

It might not be easy for any but a Dr. Cheyne to determine, whether Hume's case was really one for a physician, a bodily ailment answering to Sir John Falstaff's idea of apoplexy, 'a 'kind of lethargy, a sleeping in the blood, a tingling, having its 'original from much grief, from study, and perturbation of the 'brain.' Perhaps mental rest alone was sufficient to cure the evil which mental exertion had evidently brought on. Be this as it may, we must admire the real strength of that mind which could thus scrutinize itself, and detail the particulars of its disarrangement, without exhibiting any symptoms of morbid self-contemplation. Had the above letter been laid before a close observer of human nature, who was wholly ignorant of its author, with a request that he should use his utmost sagacity in determining the probable fate of the writer, his retrospective prophecy would most likely have been wrong indeed. It would be quite natural to suppose it the offspring of a young mind, already overwrought and failing, yet unwilling to entertain so discouraging an explanation of its disorder. It might have been argued that there awaited the subject of this divination a short but unquiet career, an aggravation of the disease till it assumed a more fatal character, and, having consumed its victim's power of mind, extended to his strength of purpose. But Hume was not destined to be thus sacrificed on the altar of literary ambition. Something he surrendered to the goddess, but soon found her placable. He went indeed to Bristol, according to his expressed intention; but, as he informs us in his 'own life,' found, in a few months, that scene totally unsuitable to him. No details have been preserved which enable us to picture him engaged in his new and distasteful avocations. He appears under better auspices when, soon after, he proceeds to France. Here, at Rheims and La Fleche, he resumed his old habits of thought and study, and, in three years' time, could show definite results of his labours. We find him, in 1737, leaving France for London, to superintend the publication of his first work, the Essay on Human Nature. His whole metaphysical philosophy was laid before the world at once, not in all points fully drawn out and arranged in a connected system, yet stamped decisively with a formed character of thought, and perfect in its parts if not in its proportions. The writer indeed considered it in after years as a hasty and insufficient delineation of his philosophical scheme, and referred the inquirer to another work, in which, as he hoped, some negligences in the former reasonings, and more in the expression, were corrected; but the Treatise on Human Nature has never been superseded by the Enquiry into Human Understanding.

Thus, at the age of twenty-six, Hume, if ever, had proved himself a great philosopher. Men at first did not perceive this. The book was far from exciting a sensation. But its young author, though by no means sanguine, did not yield to despair. Ambitious of literary distinction, and with no disposition to rest satisfied with a scanty measure of success, he was content to wait, but not without some murmurs. In a letter written about this time to Henry Home, the future Lord Kames, having observed that the success of the work will probably remain long doubtful, he thus continues:—

> 'Those who are accustomed to reflect on such abstract subjects, are commonly full of prejudices; and those who are unprejudiced are unacquainted with metaphysical reasonings. My principles are so remote from all the vulgar sentiments on the subject, that were they to take place, they would produce almost a total alteration in philosophy; and you know, revolutions of this kind are not easily brought about. I am young enough to see what will become of the matter, but am apprehensive lest the chief reward I shall have for some time will be the pleasure of studying on such important subjects, and the approbation of a few judges.'—Vol. i. pp. 105, 106.

He was right in thus hoping without anxiety. The work made its way slowly yet surely, as books of deep and original thought, even under disadvantageous circumstances, will eventually do. A third volume of the treatise appeared in 1740; and each of the two following years produced a volume of Essays, Moral and Political. By gradual stages Hume was mounting the ascent of fame One step might now be considered as fairly gained. Another, and of a different kind, was yet to be taken. He had won his place among philosophers, but the distinction was an honorary one. Though just safe from actual want, he was in fortune as by birth a younger brother; and he was not so devoted to metaphysics, as to despise common prudence. The chair of Ethics and Pneumatic Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh promised to be vacant, and Hume was anxious to fill it. But his fitness for holding such an office in a Christian University was more than doubtful; and several of his firmest friends were obliged, on grounds of conscience, to refuse him their support. He anticipated the result, and never formally appeared as a candidate. Even before the professorship was finally adjudged, we find him turning to a strangely different occupation. The rising author, the ingenious theorist, at the age of thirty-four, without any display of cynical feelings, with no confirmed antipathy to the literary world, or contempt for the sane portion of his fellow-creatures, assumes the office of keeper to a lunatic. We will allow him to describe the step for himself.

> 'In 1745, I received a letter from the Marquis of Annandale, inviting me to come and live with him in England; I found, also, that the friends and family of that young nobleman were desirous of putting him under my care and direction, for the state of his mind and health required it. I lived with him a twelvemonth. My appointments during that time made a considerable accession to my small fortune.'—Vol. i. p. 170.

It should be added, that in 1748, the Court of Chancery decided that the nobleman in question had been incapable of managing his own affairs since December, 1744. It was not till some months after that time that Hume's engagement commenced.

The whole transaction is a strange and unpleasant incident in a not very eventful life. Hume does not seem to demand pity, or we might be disposed to grant it. No advantage, beyond the pecuniary gain to which the provident philosopher alludes, could well have been expected from it. That it cost him much annoyance and vexation of every kind, cannot be doubted. Beside the nature of the duties he had to perform, in themselves enough to test his equanimity, he found himself involved in the petty cabals and intrigues of an ill-regulated household, and treated almost as a menial by one himself a dependant. We must not forget that our philosopher, in addition to the actual augmentation of his wealth, carried away with him a claim on the Annandale estates to the amount of seventy-five pounds, on his right to which he for a long time strenuously insisted. As Mr. Burton elsewhere (p. 222) observes, 'it must 'be admitted that when he thought fit to make a pecuniary 'claim, he did not easily resign it.' But this disagreeable passage of his life may have had its good effects. The unpractical and abstracted student might derive benefit from this rough schooling, which convinced him substantially of the existence of an outward world. It prepared him for his coming acquaintance with camps and courts, by teaching him to read not only books, but men. It was one step, though a short one, taken towards uniting the historian with the philosopher. Towards this consummation we hasten on, informing our readers by the way, that Mr. Burton's pages contain an able and ingenious apology for conduct, which may have struck them, we think justly, as somewhat sordid and mercenary.

It was now Hume's fortune to visit France a second time, though with a very different object: not as a solitary student, busy in preparing his youthful speculations for their introduction to the literary world, but in a half-warlike capacity, as secretary to a military expedition. Originally destined for America, like many others it fell short of its mark, and instead of crossing the Atlantic, reached only the other side of the English Channel. For his post, Hume was indebted to the leader of the expedition, General St. Clair. The following extract is curious, as showing that literature had not made him wholly her own, and that the force of circumstances made him, for a time, doubt his vocation. We can almost see the bulky and awkward man of letters swinging, by way of experiment, the military belt over his grave-coloured coat, and fidgetting somewhat uneasily with the hilt of a sword or the lock of a pistol:

> 'As to myself, my way of life is agreeable; and though it may not be so profitable as I am told, yet so large an army as will be under the general's command in America, must certainly render my perquisites very considerable. I have been asked, whether I would incline to enter into the service? My answer was, that at my years, I could not decently accept of a lower commission than a company. The only prospect of working this point would be, to procure at first a company in an American regiment, by the choice of the colonies. But this I build not on, nor indeed am I very fond of it.' Vol. i. p. 209.

No glory resulted from the enterprise; nor would the secretary's share in any case have been large. It was, in fact, a failure; and Hume took his pen to defend it from the ridicule of a French writer, whom he supposed, whether justly or not, to be Voltaire. Some warlike operations, however, he had personally witnessed. No doubt he valued such experience, as likely to assist him in the historical labours he was contemplating. We have a key to his thoughts in a letter written from London to Henry Home soon after his return. The shadow of a great plan is rising before him; but he is neither sanguine nor excited. In this respect, the twelve years that had passed had little altered the young man of twenty-three.

> 'I must own I have a great curiosity to see a real campaign, but I am deterred by a view of the expense, and am afraid that, living in a camp without any character, and without anything to do, would appear ridiculous. Had I any fortune which would give me a prospect of leisure and opportunity to prosecute my *historical projects*, nothing could be more useful to me, and I should pick up more literary knowledge in one campaign, by living in the general's family, and being introduced frequently to the duke's, than most officers could do after many years' service. But to what can all this serve? I am a philosopher, and so, I suppose, must continue.' Vol. i. p. 221.

In 1748, he once more visited the Continent in company with General St. Clair, to whose mission to the court of Turin he was appointed secretary. But between his return from France and his entrance on his diplomatic office, he had enjoyed a period of repose. We find him with his books around him, sharing the domestic retirement of Ninewells. But these no longer exclusively attracted him; he gave some attention to the passing events of the day, and his correspondence betokens a rising interest in the state of the political world.

While he was yet on the way to Turin, Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding was published anonymously at London. Quietly and gradually, like his other works, it crept into reputation. Hume (vol. i. p. 285) speaks with some complacency of Warburton's railing him into fame. Meanwhile, the mission had fulfilled its purpose, and he returned to Ninewells once more.

But here he was not destined to remain. In 1751, his brother married, and it became necessary for David to establish himself in a new residence. After some debate, Edinburgh was fixed on as the place of his domicile. Here, we find him again ambitious of an academic chair, and again disappointed. As Edinburgh had declined to sanction his morality, Glasgow refused him the professorship of logic. Compelled to teach only by his writings, he published his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and appeared as an utilitarian long before the word was invented.

Hume was now busy with his pen. The Political Discourses followed in 1752. He informs us, that this was the only work of his which was successful at the first publication. Certainly they deserved their success. But the world has seldom sufficient discernment to appreciate at once works of merit which are more original in matter than in appearance, and which open new fields of truth without any air of startling novelty or pretence of unusual observation. In these discourses, Hume appears as the precursor of political economy; had not a friend of his soon after so far outstripped him, he might have been called its father. But if Adam Smith was the Newton, David Hume was the Copernicus of Catallactic. Nor in treating of these forbidding subjects, did his graces of style forsake him; to this day, his political essays interest while they instruct. And, at the present time, when political economy is becoming something more than an abstract theory, and is extending from the study to the council-board; when the greatest of nations has ventured to desert the maxims of an empirical policy, and, trusting to the correctness of *a-priori* calculations, to make alterations on so huge a scale that we dare not think them experiments; when the world seems to be recasting its social relations, and superseding the old balance of power with the new balance of commerce; when the monarchy of Spain is a trifle in men's thoughts if compared with the merchandize of America; when wealth is the great instrument to all ends, the 'universal joint' of human action; when it casts questions, foreign to itself, in its own mould, and reduces national and constitutional principles to the unyielding formulæ of finance, we have perhaps good reason to be grateful, that this master science of the time was not unveiled to the English nation in troublous times by some sanguine and irregular spirit, whose zeal outran his discretion, and whose wishes were fathers to his conclusions, but was, at the very first, treated calmly and impartially by the clear and consecutive mind of Hume.

Through political economy, there was a ready road from philosophy to history. Hume had now fairly changed his course, and was devoting himself to this new study. His views in this direction were aided by an event not otherwise of much importance—his appointment as librarian to the Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh. The year before, we find him desirous of borrowing a Strabo from that very library; now, its valuable and copious collection of historical works was at his disposal. He set to work in earnest. In a New Year's letter to Dr. Clephane, he gives us the following lively picture of his habits, pursuits, and purposes:

> 'I must now set you an example, and speak of myself. By this I mean that you are to speak to me of yourself. I shall exult and triumph to you a little, that I have now at last, being turned of forty,—to my own honour, to that of learning, and to that of the present age,—arrived at the dignity of being a householder. About seven months ago, I got a house of my own, and completed a regular family, consisting of a head, viz., myself, and two inferior members, a maid and a cat. My sister has since joined me, and keeps me company. With frugality I can reach, I find, cleanliness, warmth, light, plenty, and contentment. What would you have more? Independence? I have it in a supreme degree. Honour? that is not altogether wanting. Grace? that will come in time. A wife? that is none of the indispensable requisites of life. Books? that *is* one of them; and I have more than I can use. In short, I cannot find any blessing of consequence which I am not possessed of, in a greater or less degree; and without any great effort of philosophy, I may be easy and satisfied.
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> 'As there is no happiness without occupation, I have begun a work which will employ me several years, and which yields me much satisfaction. 'Tis a History of Britain, from the Union of the Crowns to the present time. I have already finished the reign of King James. My friends flatter me (by this I mean that they don't flatter me,) that I have succeeded. You know that there is no post of honour in the English Parnassus more vacant than that of history. Style, judgment, impartiality, care,—every thing is wanting to our historians; and even Rapin, during this latter period, is extremely deficient. I make my work very concise, after the manner of the ancients. It divides into three very moderate volumes: one to end with the death of Charles the First; the second at the Revolution; the third at the accession, for I dare come no nearer the present times. The work will neither please the Duke of Bedford or James Fraser; but I hope it will please you and posterity. Κτῆμα εἰς ἀεί.
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> 'So, dear Doctor, after having mended my pen, and bit my nails, I return to the narration of parliamentary factions, or court intrigues, or civil wars, and bid you heartily adieu.'—Vol. i. p. 378.

From this letter it appears, that the plan of the history changed under the hands of its author. As it stands, it was the work of eleven years to a student in the prime of his genius, with formed habits and unexhausted powers of application. Hume would have better consulted his permanent fame, had he made the period still longer. We shrink from entering on the worn-out question of its merits. Be it observed, however, that its defects are of conception, not of execution. We have seen the qualities he desiderated in an ideal historian, 'style, judgment, impartiality, care.' It is to be regretted he did not add to the number, a thorough knowledge of his subject, and a burning zeal for truth.

The publication of Hume's History was finished in 1762. Another stage of his life was close at hand. He had passed from the philosopher to the historian; he was now to be transformed from the historian into the man of practical life, and to be an actor in scenes like those he had been describing. His former experience with General St. Clair had not effected the metamorphose. He had laboured but for a short time, and in a subordinate capacity; his office had been half-military, and yet he was not a soldier; he was out of his place among men of arms, and not in circumstances to vindicate his half-acknowledged claims as a man of literature. His position was uneasy, anomalous, absurd. But under very different circumstances he accompanied Lord Hertford, in 1763, to France; to perform the duties of secretary to the embassy, with a prospect, which was afterwards fulfilled, of himself succeeding to the office. The ambassador, feeling that the titular secretary was a person with whom he could not co-operate, proposed that Hume should act as his substitute. The proposal seems to have been made wholly with a wish to be of service to a distinguished man of letters. This kindness was not unrepaid; Hume laboured to requite it; and the connexion which began in official labours ripened into a permanent friendship.

It was now that there opened upon Hume the most brilliant portion of his career. In Scotland he had been perhaps appreciated, but never over-estimated. With one substantial particular of success, a quick and ready sale for his works, he had never met to an extent which equalled his desires. They went off indeed edition after edition, but slowly and at considerable intervals. The echo of his fame was long in reaching his ears; and when it came, it came clearly and distinctly, but not loudly. He always speaks of his successes in a tone which conveys the impression, that he thought them below his merits.

But nothing short of the deepest humility or the most overweening arrogance could have enabled Hume to bear with absolute equability the flood of applause which attended his reception at Paris. That his reputation was widely extended on the Continent, he was well aware. While his person was unknown, his name was familiar in the literary circles of France. His correspondence shows that flattering proofs of the fact had reached him in his comparative retirement. But he could not have been at all prepared for the extraordinary sensation which his arrival created. He became at once the Lion of the day. The excitement was not confined to those remarkable coteries then existing in Paris, which in lack of any unity of opinion or principle, (if principle were not altogether out of the question,) were held together by literary tastes alone. It was natural enough that these should fix upon Hume, and treat him for the time as the symbol on which to expend their unbounded idolatry of talent. But the court was seized with the infection; the royal family did not refuse to take their part in the homage; even the children had a character to play. The residence of the Dauphin at Versailles contained at the time three future sovereigns of France, ignorant alike of their coming dignities and coming sorrows. Of these the Duc de Berri, afterwards Louis XVI., had read parts of the history, and of course was ready to praise it. The Comte de Provence, seven years of age, had also his laudatory word for Hume, although the pleasure of reading his works was still in expectation. This was Louis XVIII.; and the Comte D'Artois, a child of six, who lived to be king of France, only to die ten years since in exile, lisped forth the fragments of a panegyric, which he had learned by heart and partially forgotten. In short, wherever rank and fashion could be found, there Hume was indispensable; nothing was complete without him. He went to masquerades: and the maskers made their disguise an excuse for being less reserved in their praise than ever: at every *souper fin* he was a guest, and acted charades, rather naturally than gracefully, with the first beauties of Paris. His popularity seems to have excited the jealousy of Horace Walpole, who in his letters of the time lets fly an occasional dart at the over-fêted philosopher. But it was Hume's happiness not to be very long the object of these shafts, which seemed as random as they were deliberate. He escaped the mortification which would certainly have overtaken him if he had fixed permanently his residence in Paris. No new wonder had fixed the attention of the fashionable world, when he withdrew from the scene. His patron Lord Hertford was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Hume for a time remained in France as *chargé d'affaires*, but early in 1766 departed for England. There seemed at the time to be some prospect of his becoming secretary to Lord Hertford in his new and more important position. But difficulties arose to interfere; and Hume showed, and probably felt, no disappointment at his exclusion from an office for which he was, by habit and temperament, peculiarly unfit.

Once more, however, he mingled with the political world, and exercised his powers as a diplomatist in a capacity which kept him nearer home. For a little more than a year, he held the responsible office of Under-secretary of State. Its duties he performed without enthusiasm, but with his usual industry and accuracy. The burden was not so heavy as to discourage him, or to occupy all his time. But in July, 1768, Lord Weymouth succeeded General Conway as Secretary of State, and Hume was no longer a placeman.

The labours of his life were now over. He returned to Edinburgh, as he informs us, in 1769, 'very opulent (for he possessed a revenue of 1000*l.* a year) healthy, and though somewhat stricken in years, with the prospect of enjoying long his ease, and of seeing the increase of his reputation.' In spite of many invitations, and some longings of his own heart towards Paris, we find him once more domiciled at a house in James's-court. But he wanted neither the wealth nor the disposition to indulge in the expensive amusement of house-building. We hear of his superintending the erection of his new residence in St. Andrew's-square. A lively young lady of his acquaintance wrote in chalk, by way of jest, 'St. David's-street,' upon the house when finished. His answer to the servant, who caught the obvious application of the inscription, and indignantly informed her master, is characteristic—'Never mind, lassie, many a better man has been made a saint of before.' The story became current; and characters more permanent than chalk mark the place of St. David's-street among the handsome thoroughfares of the New Town of Edinburgh.

Here, with many friends around him, so near indeed to most that this period is marked by a very sensible diminution of his correspondence, he spent the concluding years of his life. No literary cares disturbed him; the project of continuing his history, which the repeated solicitations of the bookseller had persuaded him in some measure to entertain, was gradually dropped; he had won the desired place in the world of letters, and sat quietly in comfort and opulence to enjoy it. This was not to last very long. About six years after his return to Edinburgh, a disease, from which he had been some time suffering, told him of his approaching end. In April, 1776, about four months before that event, he thus wrote in his 'own life:'—

> 'In spring, 1775, I was struck with a disorder in my bowels, which at first gave me no alarm, but has since, as I apprehend it, become mortal and incurable. I now reckon upon a speedy dissolution. I have suffered very little pain from my disorder; and what is more strange, have, notwithstanding the great decline of my person, never suffered a moment's abatement of my spirits; insomuch, that were I to name the period of my life which I should most choose to pass over again, I might be tempted to point to this latter period. I possess the same ardour as ever in study, and the same gaiety in company. I consider, besides, that a man of

> sixy-five, by dying, cuts off only a few years of infirmities; and though I see many symptoms of my literary reputation's breaking out at last with additional lustre, I know that I could have but few years to enjoy it. It is difficult to be more detached from life than I am at present.'

As he wrote, he acted. He calmly and quietly awaited that death for which he did not think it necessary to prepare—spending his time cheerfully in the company of his friends while his strength was equal to the exertion, and when this became too fatiguing, 'passing his time very well with the assistance of amusing books.' So writes his physician three days before his death; he adds, that the patient was 'quite free from anxiety, impatience, or low spirits.' And shortly before, Adam Smith tells us, 'his cheerfulness was so great, 'and his conversation and amusements ran so much in their 'usual strain, that, notwithstanding all bad symptoms, many 'people could not believe he was dying.' But Hume himself entertained no such unfounded hopes. Adam Smith has recorded one of his last conversations. However familiar, it must not be omitted.

> '"When I lie down in the evening, I feel myself weaker than when I rose in the morning; and when I rise in the morning, weaker than when I lay down in the evening. I am sensible, besides, that some of my vital parts are affected, so that I must soon die." "Well," said I, "if it must be so, you have at least the satisfaction of leaving all your friends—your brother's family in particular—in great prosperity." He said that he felt that satisfaction so sensibly, that when he was reading, a few days before, "Lucian's Dialogues of the Dead," among all the excuses which are alleged to Charon for not entering readily into his boat, he could not find one that fitted him; he had no house to finish, he had no daughter to provide for, he had no enemies upon whom he wished to revenge himself. "I could not well imagine," said he, "what excuse I could make to Charon, in order to obtain a little delay. I have done every thing of consequence which I ever meant to do; and I could at no time expect to leave my relations and friends in a better situation than that in which I am now likely to leave them. I, therefore, have all reason to die contented." He then diverted himself with inventing several jocular excuses, which he supposed he might make to Charon, and with imagining the very surly answers which it might suit the character of Charon to return to them. "Upon further consideration," said he, "I thought I might say to him, 'Good Charon, I have been correcting my works for a new edition. Allow me a little time, that I may see how the public receives the alterations.' But Charon would answer, 'When you have seen the effect of these, you will be for making other alterations. There will be no end of such excuses; so, honest friend, please step into the boat.' But I might still urge, 'Have a little patience, good Charon; I have been endeavouring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfal of some of the prevailing systems of superstition.' But Charon would then lose all temper and decency—'You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy loitering rogue.'"'—Vol. ii. pp. 511, 512.

To the very last he was the same; preserving his senses and judgment, showing his sensibility of the kindness and attention of his friends, betraying no restlessness or impatience, and dying, so far as man could judge, with no regrets, no fears, no hopes.

Let us turn from this scene, so painful from its very repose, and regard Hume from a point of view in which he appears to the greatest advantage. Whatever were his faults, he had a kind, unenvious spirit. He really endeavoured to fraternize in heart with those whom he met on the common ground of literature. Hence arose many of his friendships, which, if marked by no extraordinary warmth, were yet sincere and lasting. The names of Ferguson, Adam Smith, and Robertson, suffice to show, that he did not find rivalry incompatible with attachment. The tie of blood might seem to account in a great measure for his intimacy with the author of Douglas. He discovered a whole fund of amusement in discussing the orthography of the family name; though we could wish he had not recorded this point of difference, and another yet more unimportant, in a jocose paragraph of his will. But his kindness overflowed the bounds of personal intimacy. The poor blind poet, Blacklock, received substantial proofs of his sympathy. Hume, besides endeavouring to enlist the feelings of his friends on his behalf, transferred to the bard the salary, while he himself retained the office, of librarian to the Faculty of Advocates. Sometimes, which is surprising, his good nature got the better of his judgment. He wondered, for instance, when the rest of the world did not, at the failure of Wilkie's Epigoniad. Many will pardon him for having allowed himself a few biting expressions with regard to Warburton and his school, which show that on occasion he could be a good hater. Yet he did not, generally, indulge in unfriendly feeling. With no high opinion of Smollet's merits as a historian, he pitied and endeavoured to assist him in his distress. When Dr. Campbell produced his answer to Hume's theory of miracles, wherein he showed no mercy to its very objectionable positions, the object of the attack made no reply except in the form of a private letter, in which he thanked his adversary for the civil and obliging manner in which he had conducted the dispute against him. His differences with Rousseau offer no real exception to this general inoffensiveness of character. Hume, in the whole transaction, was much more sinned against than sinning. With all possible good nature, he had offered to conduct the eccentric author of Emile, who had been wandering through Europe under the sting of partly real and partly fancied persecutions, to a safe asylum in England. Rousseau accepted the offer; and when Hume, early in 1766, finally bade farewell to France, they came to England together. It cannot be denied that Hume had wholly mistaken the character of his companion. In that strange compound of whim, sentiment, and melancholy vanity merging into madness, he thought he had found a man of genius, of somewhat unusual manners, but warm-hearted and sincere, of the most open and confiding disposition, glad to love, and willing to be pleased. He determined that his enthusiastic friend should know of at least one heart which should not refuse its sympathy. He endeavoured to meet all his exaggerated expressions of affection, but with so bad a grace, that Rousseau afterwards insisted on the awkward look of the Scotchman in returning an embrace as a proof of his hollowness and insincerity. But if deeds are good evidence of intentions, Hume was in earnest; he introduced his *protégé* to his friends, when he would receive them, provided him after much difficulty with a home, and secured him a pension. But within six months of his arrival in England, Rousseau became disgusted with his new position; and the natural course was to quarrel with those who had placed him there. On the most frivolous pretences, he declared himself an injured man, and the enemy of his injurer. He affirmed that Hume's character was in his power, and threatened an exposure. His unhappy patron, after much debate and doubt, in self-defence published his correspondence. The strong language which he employs in his confidential letters on the subject shows how deeply he felt the annoyance. Such was the penalty for trusting first impressions, and despising the cautions of his friends. At the beginning of their acquaintance he writes, 'The philosophers of Paris foretold to me that I 'could not conduct him to Calais without a quarrel; but I think 'I could live with him all my life, in mutual friendship and 'esteem.' Just six months after, he ejaculates, 'Surely never was 'there so much wickedness and madness combined in one human 'creature; nor did ever any one meet with such a return for such 'signal services as those I have performed towards him.' This was the opposite error; Rousseau was no such monster of evil, but a weak, selfish, inconsistent man of genius, with an ill-regulated mind, uncontrolled passions, and a morbid egotism which made him unhappy if he seemed for a moment to become like other men, and descend to the level of ordinary existence.

Mr. Burton has inserted in his work the well-known letter from Hume to Gibbon, and adds, that 'it is not, perhaps, 'uncharitable to suppose, that the eulogium would have been 'more warm, had the person it was addressed to not been one of '"the barbarians who inhabit the banks of the Thames."' Hume, it must be confessed, did not so easily extend his sympathies to the south of the Tweed. Like all Scotchmen, he sincerely loved his country; but his patriotism had a tendency to degenerate into national vanity. This is a failing which with North Britons often goes hand in hand with many virtues. They determine, and justly, in the first place, that their land, with its inhabitants, has a right to be admired; on what particular features this claim to admiration is grounded, is quite an after question. Here they are not unwilling to take a lesson from strangers, and to urge their claims to applause on those grounds which others are open to admit. Sometimes, it is to be feared, they would sacrifice their national peculiarities to their national vanity, and, to obtain the praise to which they are so strongly attached, will follow fashions ill adapted to them, however becoming in others. Of this error Hume, to whom we will confine ourselves, affords an example with the other Scotch literati of the day. Since that time, we have learned to admire the border legends; Englishmen did not then regard them, and therefore Hume did not. His family had long lived too near the frontier, not to have had its share, active and passive, in raid and rapine; the seat at Ninewells seems to have been at least once destroyed by an invading army; Norham castle stood in the immediate neighbourhood, and there were old battle fields close by, to stir the heart of the historian and the patriot. But Hume refused to be excited; he found no charm in such associations; he preferred present civilization to past barbarism. Loving Scotland, and hating England, yet to be as an Englishman was, in one direction, the extent of his ambition. All his life long he was labouring, never with entire success, to banish Scotticisms from his style. Mr. Burton gives several letters, in which he reiterates the request that Mallet should peruse the second volume of his History, and mark the provincial expressions. Nothing short of a very strong feeling could have induced a writer of the position and character of Hume to submit his works to such a censor, by no means unblemished in reputation, and yet of sufficient talents and pretensions to seem, at times, to aspire to the rank of a rival. What though Mallet, writing to Hume himself, (vol. ii. p. 142,) speaks of 'the task of looking after verbal mistakes, or errors 'against the idioms of a tongue,' as 'trivial, and disgusting in 'the greatest degree,' and declares that the labour is one which 'nothing but the greatest regard for the writer, and the truest 'friendship for the man, could have made him submit to.' Hume suffered his presumption to pass, endured his professions of friendship, received his corrections, and was grateful for his improved English. Yet how does he speak of the country of whose vernacular he was so ambitious?

> 'I am delighted to see the daily and hourly progress of madness, and folly, and wickedness in England. The consummation of these qualities

are the true ingredients for making a fine narrative in history, especially if followed by some signal and ruinous conclusion,—as I hope will soon be the case with that pernicious people.'—Vol. ii. pp. 431, 2.

And in the same view he attacks the popular favourite, Lord Chatham, calling him 'villain,' declaiming against 'the impudence of that fellow, and his quackery, and his cunning, and his audaciousness,' and describing the species Englishman as 'a rude beast, a bad animal . . . corrupted by above a century of licentiousness.' Altogether he reminds us of an inhabitant of a conquered country, disgusted with his inferior position, and resolved to conform to the customs and habits of the conquerors, only that he may defeat them with their own weapons, and while he seems to emulate them, may despise them in proportion to his success.

But prejudices of such extent as this are, for the most part, superficial. Hume affords one of many examples that they can co-exist with general kindness. Benevolence was a prominent feature in his character. It will be remembered that Mackenzie, in his touching tale of La Roche, where he depicts the philosopher as alleviating the sufferings, enjoying the gentle charities, and sharing the holy sorrows of life, drew a picture so like the original, that the absent Adam Smith, on reading the narrative, expressed his wonder that he had never heard from Hume himself the history of his adventure. His sympathies were with his friends to the last; only five days before his decease he wrote to the Comtesse de Boufflers, in terms which show that he was doubtful whether he should live to receive an answer, at once taking his last farewell, and condoling with her on the death of the Prince of Conti. Many of his latest letters prove his deep interest in the welfare of his youthful nephews. His correspondence with Gilbert Elliot of Minto, who was anxious that his sons should enjoy the doubtful advantages of a French education, shows, that in the vortex of Parisian society, laden with diplomatic cares, and anxious to devote his vacant hours to literature, he still found time to expend an amount of trouble on his friend, of which the contemporary record is rather a formidable affair. His charity to the poor is established on unexceptionable, because impartial, evidence—that of James Boswell. The quiet and even course of his private life, coupled with the unimpassioned tone of his writings, might seem to forbid our supposing he was irascible. But a letter to Lord Elibank, given by Mr. Burton, (vol. ii. p. 252,) makes it clear that on literary subjects, at least, he could not always command his temper. This infirmity he alleged as a reason for never answering attacks that were made upon his writings. Too many have insisted on the right of reply who had much stronger motives for silence.

Moreover, he was modest in his youth to an extent, perhaps, beyond that which either reason or custom requires, if we may judge from several allusions which he makes to his bashfulness, and the curious fact, that Butler's appointment to the bishopric of Bristol deterred him from using an introduction that he had brought from Henry Home, in spite of his strong desire to submit his youthful performances to the judgment of the author of the 'Analogy.'

It is sad to dwell on the unfavourable points of a character, which, with many imperfections, has yet so much to please. But one question demands consideration. With this even philosophic temperament, and calm decision of judgment, with so many amiable qualities, which even his enemies could not deny, and which attracted to seek his friendship, men far better than himself, with much consideration for the feelings of those who differed from him, and sensibility enough to be disgusted with others who thought as he did, yet made a vain parade of their opinions, why was Hume an infidel? That he was vain, cannot be denied; that literary ambition was his ruling motive, he himself confesses. But his ambition never transgressed the bounds of decent composure, and his vanity was so kept in order, as to escape becoming ludicrous or offensive; neither passion was so extravagant as to interfere with his perceiving the ordinary events of life in their due proportions, and we cannot fairly assume that they were sufficient not only to disarrange but to destroy his appreciation of more important truths. Nor is any credit whatever due to the hypothesis, which represents Hume as insincere, a disciple of the fashionable infidelity of the day, from interest and not from conviction, who brought before the public, as to market, his stores of barren scepticism and ostentatious paradox. It were unjust to brand him with the hateful title of apostate: there is no reason to suppose that he was ever, from his earliest years, a believer. The small measure of the religious instinct which he possessed he spent on the heroes and authors of antiquity, to whom he paid that reverence which he denied to their gods. As to Christianity, it always appears in his writings as a great delusion, to be treated as any other widely prevalent error, and the chief wonder of which is that it has not ere now been dissipated; as much a matter of external history as any by-gone superstition, with no right to claim that the philosophical mind should give it a trial, and endeavour to enter into its spirit. To consider the possible solutions of the problem is to increase its difficulty. If we regard his kindness, his generosity, his fidelity to the ties of blood and friendship, we naturally seek the reason of his unbelief in some great defect of mental constitution. But this view in its turn fails us; his mind was almost perfect as an *organon*, not many sided, wanting perhaps in comprehensiveness and breadth of view, but clear, penetrating, and marked by a happy mixture of caution and confidence. True, there were some moulds of thought into which he could not enter, some institutions of which he could not understand the spirit, some ages of the world which were a riddle he failed to interpret;—but if bold ventures and expansive sympathies, and that intellectual bent which is necessary for enlightened toleration, were also a requisite for goodness and a vital hold on the truth, how much would even the small number of good men which the world has seen be diminished!

Perhaps we have in his case an instance, how a smaller fault often involves a greater. One praise, and that not the highest, we must deny him—the title of an earnest-minded man. Philosopher as he was, he wrote with no vision of a glorious work to be accomplished in the realms of science, no agony of effort to attain the perfect truth. His labours began with an endeavour to effect a revolution; he saw that the natural consequences of success would be the overthrow of the existing philosophy. Yet he formed no plan for erecting a nobler temple on the ruins of the old. He saw the direction of his researches, and was content to let them have their way: but he made no exertion to drive them home, and press them to their positive results. A genuine hunter, his pleasure lay in the pursuit. No sanguine, earnest, hopeful warrior, no saintly champion, contending against evil powers which he hated and longed to exterminate, he viewed his prey with an idle toleration, and spared when he began to tire of slaughter.

It would have been strange if this mitigated aversion to error had produced a truthful writer. Perfect accuracy of statement cannot be counted among the literary virtues of Hume. He thought it unnecessary, perhaps impossible; as if no subject admitted of one unfailing law, and every rule implied an exception. One remarkable instance may be given. At the opening of his 'Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,' the mature statement of his philosophical opinions, he devotes a chapter to the 'origin of ideas,' in which he aims at proving that they are derived from previous *impressions*, by which he means, our individual perceptions or passions. An unlucky exception occurs to him, one which we might have thought sufficient, in the hands of a skilful enemy, to demolish his entire theory. But Hume, with singular calmness, thus disposes of it.

> 'This may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions, *though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observation, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.*'

And then he continues to erect his system on this foundation, not at all disturbed by the doubt which he himself has inserted into it. To the same habit of mind we must ascribe the unfairness of many parts of his history, its suppression of the truth, and hasty assumption of constitutional theories, its ingenious introduction of general sentiments and gratuitous imputation of motives, wherever these rhetorical arts can hide the absence of minuteness in research, and exactness in detail. It is painful to find that his casuistry allowed the same license in life which he exhibited in his writings. He deliberately advised a clergyman, whose faith had unhappily been shaken, to adopt a course of systematic hypocrisy, and resume the sacred duties he appears for some time to have relinquished. Colonel Edmonstoune asked his counsel as follows:

> 'I write to you at present to consult you about an acquaintance of yours, Mr. V., who is here with Lord Abingdon, and who thinks of returning in May next. You'll be so good as to determine what character he is to assume on his arrival, whether that of a clergyman or a layman. I suppose you know he is in orders, but he is very, very Low Church. To speak plain language, I believe him to be a sort of disciple of your own; and though he does not carry matters quite so far as you, yet you have given him notions not very consistent with his priestly character, so that you see you are somewhat bound to give him your best advice.'

We subjoin Hume's detestable reply.

> 'What! do you know that Lord Bute is again all-powerful? . . . . Let this be a new motive for Mr. V. to adhere to the ecclesiastical profession, in which he may have so good a patron, for civil employments for men of letters can scarcely be found: all is occupied by men of business, or by parliamentary interest.
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> 'It is putting too great a respect on the vulgar, and on their superstitions, to pique one's self on sincerity with regard to them. Did ever any one make it a point of honour to speak truth to children or madmen? If the thing were worthy being treated gravely, I should tell him, that the Pythian oracle, with the approbation of Xenophon, advised every one to worship the gods—*νόμῳ πόλεως*. I wish it were still in my power to be a hypocrite in this particular. The common duties of society usually require it; and the ecclesiastical profession only adds a little more to an innocent dissimulation, or rather simulation, without which it is impossible to pass through the world. Am I a liar, because I order my servant to say, I am not at home, when I do not desire to see company?'—Vol. ii. pp. 187-8.

Conduct like this admits of no excuse; perhaps it does of explanation. Powerful minds of very opposite character feel temptations to transgress the strict bounds of truth, to which those of more ordinary constitution are wholly insensible. On the one hand, eager, imaginative temperaments reach forward at once to their objects, and, with eyes fixed intently on the end at which they are aiming, are apt to be careless as to the means. On the other hand, the calm, calculating reasoner, especially if endued with no remarkable powers of perception, often learns to regard the most stubborn facts as mere terms in the series of his reasonings, till they seem to take a tinge of uncertainty from their neighbours, and to rest on the same evidence as his most doubtful speculations. Hume is in no danger of being accused of over-excited imagination. We have already observed how little he was moved by the force of local associations, though connected with the history of his family and the recollections of early youth. Mr. Burton remarks, that in none of his works, printed or manuscript, do we find an allusion to the fact, that La Fleche, where he accomplished so much towards his own literary eminence, had also witnessed the early studies of Des Cartes. The journal of his adventures on the road to Italy, is singularly dull and uninteresting, displaying no sympathy with places of old historical interest, or the charms of natural scenery. There is no proof that he ever really admired a picture or a statue. His essay on the subject shows, that he regarded taste as a habit of mind which any clever man could acquire, as a mere function of our common understanding, not as a separate sense, and an intuitive power of discernment. The muse was all but utterly averse from him: it was supposed that four lines scratched with a diamond on a window of an inn at Carlisle, were the whole of his poetical compositions. Mr. Burton has shown that he wrote more verses; scarcely, that he wrote better. His ideal, so far as he had any, was a cold classic beauty. His great apprehension for his friend John Home was, that he might, unhappily, write too little like Racine and Sophocles, too much like Shakespeare. In point of fact, he went wrong on such subjects, wherever it was possible to do so without betraying an utter want of common judgment.

He met with too little to rouse and stimulate this imaginative nature. Undisturbed by strong passions and vehement desires, he slumbered on in the pleasing torpor of prosperity. Perhaps, under these circumstances, his freedom from temptation to grosser vices was no unqualified blessing. With stronger dispositions to evil, he might have been a better man. As it was, he took for his rule of life the standard of heathen morality, and found no difficulty in keeping it. He felt no need of a supernatural power to second or supersede his exertions. He could sustain his moral being in a state above absolute inactivity, on a few bare truths which belong as much to natural history as to natural religion, and steer a steady course by the guidance of ‘reason and moral sentiment.’ Beyond these narrow limits, there was a wide field for interesting and amusing speculation, but nothing imperatively necessary for action. When certain here, he thought he might be sceptical elsewhere. He resembled the natives of hot climates, who, when the labour of an hour has procured the food of the day, pass the rest of their time in idleness.

We are, therefore, far from agreeing with the position which Mr. Burton more than once enunciates, that Hume was a Stoic in life, though a sceptic in philosophy. There is really no such antithesis between the elements of his character. He lived regularly, and on system, it is true; but so did Epicurus. The effort cost him little, and was a sacrifice well offered to his own comfort and satisfaction. Constitutionally studious and of a literary turn, he found a rule of life necessary for his daily well-being: a rule of thought he could dispense with. He wandered on from theory to theory as he pleased, without ever conceiving that he was responsible for his opinions. Quite unprepared to become a martyr to philosophical accuracy, and embrace a position, however disagreeable to himself, simply because it was the truth, he disliked Christianity, and therefore he disbelieved it. His theory of miracles was, probably, the attempt of an ingenious, easy-minded man, to save himself the trouble of going into a distasteful question, by erecting a prejudice into a principle, escaping the fatigue of weighing evidence, by denying it can possibly convince, and defending himself by his own canon of disbelief from all accusations of unfairness.

There is nothing inconsistent with this view even in the darling product of his youthful labours. His system of philosophy is almost wholly negative. When he attempts direct proof, he becomes very tedious and unsatisfactory, but displays great talent and dialectical skill in opposition. It is surprising to take his opinious in detail, and see how little they amount to. To save the ardent inquirer from disappointment, he soon puts forward his great major premise, that we can be sure of nothing. And when he proceeds to enumerate what positions are as near certainty as this general doubt will allow, we find little which, in its parts, was not familiar to the schools of Hobbes and of Locke. That all ideas are gained from particular acts of an external or internal sense, that experience gives us not only facts, but the law under which we combine them, that the evidence of sense, as that on which all other proof is grounded, is the highest in kind we can attain, that to be unusual is necessarily to be improbable, are all fair deductions from a theory not new in Hume's time, and which he stated less boldly than some of his predecessors—the *à posteriori* character of all human knowledge.

Yet we must not underrate an author, because he came too late into the world to invent an entirely new system of metaphysics. The effect of Hume's writings is the greatest proof of their power. He has deposited his scepticism as a sandbank, which has parted the stream of inquiry on its onward course as effectually as any rock could have done. Though only one of the two great existing schools of philosophy assents to his teaching, neither ventures to despise him. One class of thinkers he has convinced that a science of mind is impossible, another, only that it required re-construction. Kant, as Mr. Burton reminds us, believed that his whole theory started into being during his perusal of Hume's Essay on Cause and Effect. To that essay, at least, we owe the form of the later philosopher's inquiries, if not their matter. It taught him a most necessary acquirement for a metaphysician, the art of self-defence. He stood among the ruins of the ancient dogmatism. His object was, to erect on the narrow space which lay between these and the lines of the sceptical assailant, an impregnable barrier of *à priori* truth. He has succeeded, if not finally, at least so far as to show that the attempt is not hopeless.

Meanwhile, the exclusive advocates of positive science feel and acknowledge their deep obligations to Hume. He called attention, accidentally, perhaps, to a method of inquiry, on which he did not himself enter. We do not find that physical subjects attracted any considerable share of his attention. Thus much only is known, that he made a few irregular notes of natural phænomena, evidently with the impression that they might be of use, but with no distinct notion what was to be done with them, and wrote, though he never published, a short dissertation, containing 'some considerations previous to geometry and natural philosophy.' But men, who have accepted his sceptical conclusions, have argued further thus: If absolute truth be unattainable, if there be this hidden doubt lying at the root of all things, there is at least an order in their uncertainty, a method in their very derangement. Here is a fair field of research, which will repay our labours: to seek more were to be disappointed. What things are, we care not, or why they are; their existence is, perhaps, matter of question; but this granted, they co-exist and follow one another; and we may discover the laws which regulate this co-existence and sequence. The value of the terms may be small, and grow continually smaller, yet they have their place and importance in the series. We may start from a doubt, and proceed indefinitely onward, with still increasing doubtfulness; but though our knowledge be thus untrustworthy in its parts, its sum may be all but certainty.

We will not, however, undertake to trace out those consequences of his theories which Hume did not foresee. The rival schools are still in warm debate, and the world must wait the issue. The contest is a more exciting, though not a more perplexing subject than the character of him who unintentionally roused it. About this there is a strange obliquity, which prevents our seizing its positive aspect. This is exemplified in the fate of his system, which has wrought long and powerfully, but not in the direction in which the writer intended. A plausible reasoner, but never conclusive, we follow him in his arguments, and wonder we are not convinced. It is with the man as with the philosopher; we can neither respect nor despise him; we are angry with ourselves, whether we incline to hate, or succeed in loving him. A moral idea seems wanting to his life: its unity is wholly its own; it has a consistency quite irrespective of good and evil. Take these into consideration, and it becomes a riddle, which seems to tempt a solution, yet admits of none. The different elements are mixed mechanically, but not combined; an excuse can always be found for his faults, and his best actions are in an asymptote to virtue.

His name is still an occasional war-cry, but he is now no longer a warrior. The tide of battle has swept by; and where it is still raging, we see new parties contending, and under different banners. The eternal truths, which seemed to him enthusiastic and fanciful, strike this age as inoperative and cold. He thought to exclude all unwelcome dogmas by drawing accurately his lines of demarcation: modern infidelity, for the most part, owes its charm to its indistinctness, and shrinks from the Ithuriel's spear of definition. Truth will prevail, at last, by her own power; it is an unprofitable, and perhaps unworthy, though natural, wish, that opposite errors would arise at once, engage in a Cadmean battle, and destroy each other.

ART. IV.—1. *The Ancient Liturgy of the Church of England, according to the Uses of Sarum, Bangor, York, and Hereford, and the modern Roman Liturgy, arranged in Parallel Columns.* By the Rev. WILLIAM MASKELL, M.A. Second Edition. London: Pickering. 1846.

2. *Monumenta Ritualia Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ: or, Occasional Offices of the Church of England, according to the ancient Use of Salisbury; the Prymer in English, and other Prayers and Forms; with Dissertations and Notes.* By the Rev. WILLIAM MASKELL, M.A. In Two Volumes. London: Pickering. 1846.

MR. MASKELL has more than followed the reviving taste, or rather, we hope, study, in ritual and liturgical subjects: he has, by a previous work, contributed not a little to its growth, or even formation among us. It were only natural that towards this particular subject of investigation a very early prominence should be secured in that acknowledged rise and lift which the ecclesiastical temper and feeling has of late years sustained, and which is popularly known as the Revival, or Church Movement. Accordingly, we find that one of its earliest presages consisted in the course of private lectures given by the late Bishop Lloyd, which finally issued in Mr. Palmer's well known and useful *Origines Liturgicæ.* It is interesting at the present moment to record this and other remarkable anticipations of, or rather preparations for, the vague and dispersed, however gradually systematizing, spirit of the movement. Like the greater recastings of the physical world, the hidden agents exhibited themselves in separate, in distant and uncombined, jets and throes, as it were, of activity and life, however scanty and brief such manifestations. This is an evidence, we trust, of other than human agency. The works of Mr. Davison—the poems of Mr. Keble—the lectures of Bishop Lloyd—some remarkable sermons by Mr. Miller: there is not one of these facts but stands isolated and apparently independent. Yet all these—may it be said with reverence—seem, chiefly because they display this sort of unintentional yet real affinity, remarkable evidences of that working which is 'where It listeth,' and whose 'dividing is to every man severally as He will.'

And, consistently with that great law which governs the Church's life, it will be found that this particular subject has acquired importance, or the opposite, exactly as the Church, in this or in other branches, has striven to fulfil her vocation. Not only, as Mr. Maskell remarks, is 'her liturgy a sure test of the Catholicity of any Church,' (Preface, Ancient Liturgy, &c. p. cxviii.), but parallel with the sense and estimate of those privileges which appertain to Catholicity—to use a loose phrase—we find ritual studies to acquire prominence, or the reverse. The pursuit or neglect of liturgical subjects always coincides with the life or torpor of the Church. And this not as a mere literature, but as the recognition of a deep and solemn truth. It is a striking fact, that the stream of the great continental ritualists which has flowed from Walafridus Strabo, or from Durandus, through such later scholars and divines as the Martenes, the Renaudots, the Zaccarias, the Bonas and the Catalanis, has, after the stagnation of a century, but lately re-appeared abroad, in such as the Abbé Guéranger: while among ourselves the same period of silence marks at once the interval of torpor between the works of Wheatley and Palmer—between the collapse of the Non-jurors and the rise of the existing Movement.

It may, perhaps, be as well to admit, what indeed we would rather boldly plead than desire that it should be extorted from us, that we can quite understand how it is that liturgical and ritual inquiries should have remained at a disadvantage among us. The very mixed, or, as some would say, hesitating, character of our Church is conspicuous chiefly in her ritual; and most of all, in her Liturgy. (Once for all, we desire to use this word in its strict and proper sense.) Indeed, the character of the liturgy is that of the Church. The Church can be judged only by her liturgy. The liturgy is the sum and substance of the Church's system. It is the centre of the ecclesiastical life; the fountain from which is replenished all spiritual being and light. To be excluded from communion is to be 'twice dead.' The Holy Eucharist, as even one of the modern philosophy (Coleridge) could say, is not so much part of Christianity, but rather it, together with Holy Baptism, which it presupposes, *is* Christianity. Hence the most valuable and ancient documents of the Church are her Four Great Liturgies, mysteriously answering, perhaps, to the fourfold one, yet various, record of the Gospels themselves. East and West, North and South—coincident with the triumphs of the Cross itself, each of the four winds of Heaven has heard and retained the solemn forms in which the Primitive Church, with a voice everywhere uniform and consistent as to doctrine, however varying in phrase and tone,—whether Oriental, Roman, Gallican, or Alexandrian—has offered the one sacrifice for quick and dead, has distributed to the faithful the strengthening and refreshing of all Christian souls. Hence the ancient Liturgies constitute the highest form of tradition. They admit of no further appeal. They are consent. From the Patristic writings we may—and this not without dispute—gather what Catholic doctrine is: the Liturgies announce it. Hence, to cite a familiar, but valuable, instance, it was felt that Dr. Pusey had settled the question, both as to the sense of the Church of England, and its perfect accordance with Primitive and Apostolic Christianity, by his Synopsis of Baptismal Liturgies,[1]—consisting entirely of a comparison of, and an appeal to, the Sacramentaries of the ancient Church. After this, the doctrine might be received or rejected upon quite a new ground: but it was henceforth placed beyond the range of theological controversy. The only tribunal to which theology, as such, could appeal, had been shown to have given a decision. And in point of fact it is quite remarkable how, and unquestionably from this authoritative mode of stating it, *that* doctrine, at least, viz., of Baptismal Regeneration, has been of late years received in quarters among ourselves which still remain inaccessible to other, perhaps because differently framed, statements of Catholic truth. It is now admitted in all quarters where there is the least pretence to theology, or anything beyond the insane individualism of the day, that Baptismal Regeneration is the doctrine of the Church of England: a state of things which all the writings of Bishop Mant, and Archbishop Lawrence, and Bishop Bethell, did not, as a fact, produce; and which, as a fact, Dr. Pusey has produced, not altogether because he wrote better, as, because he made a new appeal.

With this, which certainly is the ecclesiastical estimate of Liturgies, and the view which must obtain with churchmen of the finality of an appeal to the venerable Sacramentaries of the Church, it is not without some apprehension that we observe the progress of ritual studies in our own communion. It is the most delicate subject upon which to take a stand. It is, to say the least of it, the subject upon which explanations and admissions, and an apologetic tone, are unavoidable. It is our debateable ground. Yet, sooner or later, it is one which we cannot decline. And, to say the least of it, we regarded Mr. Maskell's first publication as a very bold experiment. It was trying the Church of England upon a fresh issue. It was a direct comparison of the most essential and vital doctrine of the Reformed Communion with that service which was deliberately abandoned in the convulsion of the sixteenth century. And though references had from time to time been made to the existence of the 'Ancient Liturgy of the Church of England,' yet Mr. Maskell's publication was, in form, quite a new era in our controversial inquiries. Hitherto the existing Liturgy was appealed to as a standard, and all other Liturgies were used in illustration of, and in subordination to, it. Now it was demanded that the *de facto* Church herself should descend to a comparison with something *ab extra.* This was a novelty. Mr. Palmer's work proceeds upon quite another principle. He assumes, or at least the form of his 'Origines' would lead us to gather an assumption of, the absolute infallibility and perfection of the Prayer Book, and he only illustrates it by a literary and almost antiquarian collection of parallel passages from more ancient formularies. We are far from saying that Mr. Palmer personally undervalues the relative value of the documents from which he selects his 'illustrations;' there are, throughout his work, plain indications of a true estimate of the voice of the Catholic Church. It is his method to which we ask attention. And this method, we think, concludes but little. At the utmost it only amounts to this, that for most of our prayers and forms there is some precedent in antiquity. But this proves nothing more than might be concluded for our Prayer Book were every alternate page in it obliterated. We could prove that the residuum of the Creed were Catholic, if five or six of its articles were excised. But this argues nothing for the Catholicity of a Church which, like the Anglo-American, has suffered such omissions in the Faith. A given Church must be prepared not only with a constructive proof of what it retains, but with a destructive argument against what, once acknowledged, it relinquishes. So that Mr. Palmer's choice of method is not so much unfair, which we are far from saying, as incomplete. The argument against us is not, certainly, that we are heretical, and teach false doctrine, as that we are deficient. And to this point none of our ritualists, neither L'Estrange nor Wheatley, the best of them, address themselves. We have observed the like inadequate method pursued in works which have acquired a not undeserved popularity; which we specify, not upon intrinsic grounds, but because, to say the truth, they go for so little polemically. One to whom we all owe the greatest obligations, as having been among the very first to prosecute the appeal to the Fathers, published a work in which the Thirty-nine Articles were illustrated from Tertullian. That is to say, the negations of the Articles are to be proved, because Tertullian makes certain positive statements which, it is assumed, could not coincide with what the Articles condemn. So, also, Mr. Tyler disproves the *cultus* of the Blessed Virgin, by quoting passages which inculcate the worship of our Lord. To say the least of it, this method approaches to the *ignoratio elenchi.*

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[1] 'The English Baptismal Liturgy, compared with those of the Ancient Church, and Liturgies on the Ancient Model, and contrasted with those derived from Zuingle and Calvin.' This valuable Table still remains in the inaccessible First Edition of Nos. 67, 68, 69, of Tracts for the Times. Since the respected writer has not proceeded further than the first portion of his recast of these valuable papers, we shall put in a plea against the incorrect phrase, 'Baptismal Liturgy.'

Mr. Maskell has, certainly, approached his subject in a bolder and more logical way. Not that he has very accurately or closely sought to explain what his object is: but he has, certainly, furnished materials for a fair judgment of the English Church. Whether this was his object, or whether he was conscious of the use to which his materials are sure to be put, we cannot pronounce. But so important do we consider this aspect of the series now under consideration, that we may be excused if we clearly, yet briefly, state how far this comparison may be legitimately made to tell; and what a very delicate and important one it amounts to. It obviously requires limitations and explanations: it requires guarding and fencing *in limine.* And this we propose to do, not so much because we have any apprehension that Mr. Maskell has failed in perceiving a very possible misapplication of his principles, as because a succinct statement of the real question involved in such publications may be useful to those who approach the subject with imperfect information.

Here are two bodies of teaching set before us, between which we are tacitly asked to institute a comparison. This comparison must be requested, or at least implied, or why are the two documents produced? A comparison involves a standard of decision. Such standard only exists in the most ancient Sacramentaries. And it is therefore by no means an unimportant appendix that we find in Mr. Maskell's work a reprint of the Clementine Liturgy, which he rightly characterizes 'as a guide . . . . . as 'containing in an earlier form than, as we have them now, the 'Liturgies of Jerusalem, or Alexandria, or Rome, as those rites 'which are essential to a valid consecration and perfecting of the 'Eucharist, and without which no Service, though it may claim 'the name, can be allowed to be a Christian Liturgy.'—(Preface, p. xxxix.) Neither may we be charged with insisting unduly on the paramount and imperial authority of at least the substance of the ancient Liturgies, when we remember what was the deliberate 'Answer of the Bishops to the exceptions of the Ministers' at the Savoy Conference. 'That there are ancient Liturgies in 'the Church is evident: St. Chrysostom, St. Basil, and others; 'and the Greeks tell us of St. James, much older than they. 'And though we find not in all ages whole Liturgies, yet it is 'certain that there were such in the olden times, by those parts 'which are extant; as "Sursum Corda," &c., "Gloria Patri," &c., '"Hymnus Cherubinus," &c., "Vere dignum et justum," &c., '"Dominus vobiscum," &c., with divers others. Though those 'that are extant may be interpolated, yet such things as are 'found in them all consistent to Catholic and primitive doctrine, 'may well be presumed to have been from the first.'

Not that the Clementine or any other Liturgy is authoritative in all its particulars. In a ceremonial so complex as that of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, there must be degrees of importance;

there arises then the distinction between essentials and non-essentials. And while all circumstantials thus admit of imparity, some being *de esse*, some *de bene esse*, of the valid administration, there are various degrees of importance attached to the subordinate rites. And this the Roman Ritualists have especial reasons for insisting upon. According to them, by the most naked application of the Catholic axiom, 'Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum,' the mere recital of the words of Institution is all that is required to a valid consecration. 'Hoc est Corpus Meum,' is sufficient; and there is a legend, to which a writer so respectable as Zaccaria attaches some credibility, which shows to what dangerous lengths, even to a degree totally repugnant to the simplest notion of the priesthood, this view may be forced.[1] But while the general stream of Roman authorities restricts to the simple recitation of the original Institution, the act of Transubstantiation, there are at least three rites of the Eucharistic office, which, as they meet us with the venerable sanction of Catholic consent, are usually held to be of the essence of the Sacrament. Of course, if it were our interest only to defend ourselves against the Roman doctors, writers, who allow the legend of the shepherds just alluded to, would have little difficulty in dispensing with any Liturgy: and therefore, objections *from that quarter* against our Communion Office cannot range above cavil. Indeed, in what many deem the chief defect of the English Liturgy, the Roman Canon, as we shall see, is equally deficient. So that in truth the most serious objections to which our Liturgy is open, come from a quarter very different from Rome. As far as this matter goes, it is our mere interest to take part with the Missal: for if the Roman Liturgy is sound, the English office in essentials follows it; and whatever assaults are made on the latter on the ground of insufficiency, tell just as much against the present Roman Missal. It is remarkable that on this question, if on no other, Rome and Canterbury have a common cause. Essentially—we can quite anticipate the way in which such a statement would be used at Exeter-hall—the present Communion Office of the Church of England is a great deal more akin to Rome and the Roman doctrine of the Eucharist, than what we have heard so much about of late as the 'Papistical' Scottish Communion Office.[2]

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[1] Ancient Liturgy, &c., Preface, p. ciii. note 63. If a conjecture might be permitted, this 'tale' of a consecration *per ludicrum* must have been designed as a parallel to the well known, though somewhat dubious, case of scenic baptism related of S. Athanasius in his childhood.

[2] 'Though I conceive he (Bishop Morton) has fully and unanswerably refuted this *new* Romish doctrine, as he justly calls it, ... yet whether he has sufficiently cleared the Church of England from maintaining *that very doctrine*, is a

The principle of the recent objections to this formulary, as Romanizing, only displays the remarkable ignorance of those who make them.

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point in which I am not satisfied. The words in this Rubric are these :—"If the consecrated Bread and Wine be all spent, &c., the Priest is to consecrate more, beginning at 'Our Saviour, &c., in the same night,'" &c. This Rubric maintains, as the Romanists do, that the words of institution are all that is necessary to the consecration. Is not this a demonstrative argument that this Church teaches that nothing more is necessary to the consecration of the elements, than the pronouncing over them the words of institution? . . . . . What, therefore, Bishop Morton says to the Romanists, may justly be applied to the communion office of the Church of England.'—(Brett. Dissertation, &c. pp. 81—83.) Wheatley, it is well known, felt the difficulty, and (as Brett remarks) in direct violation of the Rubric, 'humbly presumes that the Minister should repeat again the whole form of consecration.' Mr. Maskell (Preface, p. cxxxvii.) takes a similar view; but suggests no remedy, except to remark, with great truth, that 'Wheatley cuts the knot by breaking the rule.' Mr. Maskell consoles himself with the reflection, that the case 'ought not to occur.' Perhaps not: but the difficulty is, that the Church does contemplate its occurrence and rules accordingly. If objections are urged to the English law for inflicting the punishment of death, it is but a slender consolation to believe that murders are rare. However, it is curious to find that this questionable Rubric is exactly framed upon one of the old Sarum 'Cautells of the Mass.' In the frightful case of a poisoned chalice being discovered after the consecration, 'Sanguis talis cui venenum est immissum debet reservari. Et ne sacramentum maneat imperfectum debet calicem denuo rite præparare, et resumere consecrationem sanguinis ab illo loco, *Simili Modo?*—(Ancient Liturgy, &c. Appendix, p. 173.) Why this Rubric was introduced at the Restoration it would be hard to imagine, except upon the belief that the then Revisers, as indeed Comber their contemporary expressly asserts, had adopted the simple Roman teaching of the consecration being perfected by recital of the Institution only; because while they introduced this Rubric from the Scotch Liturgy of 1637, they did not, which they might readily have done, recur to the same source for the prayer of Oblation after the words of Institution. The existence of this Rubric in the Scotch Liturgy, combined with the presence of an oblatory prayer, is a greater perplexity than in our own. Unless it was meant that not only the words of Institution, 'Our Saviour in the night . . . . . remembrance of Me,' which is all that is enjoined, but also the 'Memorial or Prayer of Oblation,' 'Wherefore, O Lord,' were to be repeated at each fresh consecration of bread or wine. This course alone, which certainly is not ordered, could obviate a much greater inconsistency in the Scotch office than in our own. That Liturgy implied, that the *verba institutionis* are not sufficient, and therefore added the prayer of oblation: and then, by Rubric ordered another consecration, specifying only the *verba institutionis*. Right or wrong, our present Order is at least consistent, which the Scotch was not. We are speaking all along of the elder Scotch Liturgy of 1637, which in other particulars illustrates the imperfections and inconsistencies of the Laudian theology. The Scotch office now in use, together with the cognate Anglo-American Liturgy, very consistently combines, when fresh elements are to be consecrated, with the Prayer of Consecration the Oblation and the Invocation, from 'All glory be to Thee,' down to 'that they may become the Body and Blood of Thy dearly beloved Son.' It would be a curious inquiry what the actual English practice was up to 1662: for it is very remarkable that this Rubric, ordering a second consecration to consist in the words of Institution, first occurs, with reference to the cup only, in the Order of Communion of 1548, but was suppressed not only in the Book of 1549, but in that of 1552, and in all its revisions until the Restoration—with, as we have said, the exception of the Scottish Book of 1637. Practically, however, this discussion may serve to impress upon the Clergy the extreme desirableness of never having occasion to recur to a second consecration: an expedient clogged, as it seems, with all but insurmountable difficulties.

These three rites,[1] which are of the essence of a valid consecration, are, 1. The rehearsal of the words of Institution. 2. The Oblation of the elements. 3. The Invocation of the descent of the Holy Ghost. About the first there can be no question of its distinct presence in the English Communion Office.

It is with the second that the chief difficulty exists; and it is this point which involves the doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. It is quite notorious that herein lies the great strength of the objections urged by the Non-jurors against the sufficiency of the present English Liturgy. This is the main point of Collier and Brett, and it was to remedy this that their 'new Communion offices' were framed: the dispute about the Usages being very subordinate. Nor was the difficulty then first perceived; neither was its recognition confined to the Non-jurors. It was this which Sharpe, and Horsley, and Horne, and Jones, and Seabury acknowledged. In order to obviate it, Bishop Overall transposed[2] the first prayer of the present post-communion, and used it between the consecration and administration. Bishop Wilson recommends it to be said by the celebrant *secreto;* and in his Directions to Communicants, advises even them to make a secret invocation. Robert Nelson does the same. But it is obvious that from Overall's remedy we are *now* precluded by the Act of Uniformity: and Wilson's does not amount to more than a very praiseworthy shift. We must therefore meet the question fairly: does the present English Liturgy recognise an Oblation?

And here it is with extreme diffidence that we cannot express our concurrence with Mr. Maskell's mode of meeting the difficulty: First, he seems to say that the Oblation is made in the permitted, but not enjoined, prayer, the first which follows the administration, p. cxxxix. But surely this is no answer at all. How can there be an oblation of that which has already been consumed? Certainly if this were all the oblation in the present ritual, we should be compelled to admit that there is none at all, notwithstanding the consequences which follow such an admission. Though in the next page, Mr. Maskell cites a passage from Johnson, which goes to the effect that the consecration prayer, generally taken, implies it. Mr. Maskell goes so far as to say that 'it is quite enough if the whole 'action supposes and carries on an Oblation,' (p. cxli.); a mode of speech which we do not profess to understand. He admits that the Oblation must occur after the Anaphora, which he makes to commence with the 'Sursum Corda,' thus excluding what we call the Prayer for the Church militant from the oblatory action. (Compare Ancient Liturgy, &c., Appendix, p. 150.) It is at this point that we part company with Mr. Maskell: we cannot agree with him that an Oblation is possible when the administration is finished, however distinct and important such oblation might be in the first post-communion prayer, if rightly placed; neither can we admit that Johnson's resource of the implied Oblation in the act of consecration, is adequate to the requirements of the ancient Church. We are therefore compelled to the alternative, which Mr. Maskell will by no means admit, that a valid Oblation is made in the Prayer for the Church militant. 'We humbly beseech Thee most mercifully to accept our . . . OBLATIONS, ' . . . which we OFFER unto Thy Divine Majesty.' Here, if anywhere, we think, consists the formal Anglican Oblation: and this view is the more confirmed by the history of this insertion in 1662. It is certain that the Caroline Divines did hold the necessity of a verbal oblation: it is certain, also, that they did insert this word 'Oblations,' and command the oblatory rite by the celebrant's own hands. The conclusion then appears that the revisers of 1662 thought that they had secured, what certainly they intended, a verbal oblation, and consequently the doctrine of the Sacrifice. And in our opinion they judged rightly.

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[1] Ancient Liturgy, &c. Preface, p. cxxxvi. p. cviii.

[2] Which he might well do, since the Liturgy of 1552 never received the consent of Convocation, and was therefore devoid of canonical authority. This fact, alluded to by Mr. Froude and Dr. Pusey, will account for many additions to, and variations from, that office adopted by Andrewes and Laud. Though the same plea will hardly serve us: for we are tied up to the present Liturgy and none other. And it is a matter of special regret that the revision of 1662 did not do more towards the restitution of the Communion Office. Such an opportunity is not likely to recur.

Not that this view is unencumbered with difficulties, though none we trust so large as those between which Mr. Maskell seems to fluctuate. It is a difficulty, certainly, that this Oblation occurs in its present position: but that dislocation of parts under which the present Liturgy confessedly labours, is, as all hold, and as Mr. Palmer has proved, and as Mr. Maskell throughout insists, by no means fatal, however deplorable. Again, it is a difficulty that this Prayer for the Church militant seems to hold a double office: at one time it is, in this view, (which Mr. Maskell denies,) part of the Liturgy, when it embraces the term 'Oblations;' at another, it is no part of the Liturgy. But in the latter case it shares this difficulty, though in an inferior degree, with the Missa Sicca, which, whether permitted or not, was certainly a Roman practice, and which Mr. Maskell (Ancient Liturgy, &c., Appendix, p. 148,) properly stigmatizes as 'a mere repetition and a most objectionable one, 'of part only of the Service, without consecration and without 'communion.' Mr. Palmer, it may be well to observe, concludes that a verbal Oblation is not essential, a point which we are hardly prepared to admit, yet argues (Orig. Liturg. &c. ii. pp. 86, 87,) that it does exist where we have thought to find it in the English Liturgy. The only particular in which we should be disposed to join issue with Mr. Palmer, is as to the fact that the English Church does not follow the Roman in restricting the act of consecration to the words of institution, which (Origines Liturgicæ, &c. vol. ii. p. 14,) he seems to deny. As we have said, the rubric relating to the fresh elements we think decisive. Mr. Palmer's view seems to be that 'the memorial of 'Christ's sacrifice is performed by the whole service;' *i. e.* that the whole action need only be virtual, not verbal.

It only remains to examine the third ruled essential of a valid Eucharist—the Invocation of the Descent of the Holy Ghost. As before, we are again confronted with the remarkable fact, that the Roman Canon labours under the same practical deficiency as ourselves. In the earliest Liturgies this prayer was most distinct; especially in those of the East; and yet 'in the Western Church an express Invocation has not been 'used for a thousand years.' So that it is scarcely conceivable how this objection could be urged in good faith against our office from the Roman side. We have an implied invocation, which is all that the Roman Canon has. And when the dispute only turns upon shades of implication, where it is plain that the express form is absent, there must be something behind. The real objection of Rome against our Liturgy, is—not that it is deficient in this or that particular, for a form much more meagre than our own would satisfy the technical essentials, as they rule them; but—that it is not the Roman form.

Indeed it may be safely asserted that the most serious impugners of the present Anglican Liturgy are to be found rather in the Non-jurors than in the Roman doctors. And whenever the case comes fully before the Eastern Church, we shall have much greater difficulty in maintaining, in common to a considerable extent with Rome, our position when attacked by the oriental bishops. In the East, maintaining their singular oriental character for immobility and permanence, the existing Liturgies have kept much more strictly to the primitive model, than those authorized in the Western obedience.

The late Mr. Froude, in his valuable paper on the Ancient Liturgies, sums up the following particulars as points of agreement common to them all. 1. *Sursum Corda*, &c.; 2. The Cherubic Hymn; 3. Prayers for the Church on Earth; 4. Consecration Prayer, including Invocation; 5. Commemoration of Institution; 6. The Oblation; 7. Prayers for the

Dead; 8. Breaking of Bread (after Consecration); 9. The Lord's Prayer; 10. The Kiss of Peace; 11. Communion. To which might have been added—12. The mixed Chalice. Of these it must be acknowledged that we are materially deficient in 7, and entirely in 8, 10, and 12; while there is a dislocation of 3, which ought to occur in the Canon, whether, as we hold, constituting the Oblation, or not—of 6, which, according to Mr. Froude and Mr. Maskell, is only to be found among us in the post-communion, and then labours under the additional difficulty of being discretionary—and of 9, which ought to precede consecration. To these may be added as minor deficiencies, the absence of the sign of the Cross—of the *Dominus vobiscum*—and the misplacing of the *Gloria in excelsis*, that sacred Hymn, which, as the Liturgists say, was begun by the Church in heaven, and finished by the Church on earth.

All that we are bound to do is to maintain,—in common we repeat it with the teaching of the Roman schools,—that our deficiencies are not of the essence of the Sacrament; and that the collocation, which indeed has never been uniform, though as it seems governed by some law, is not vital. Further than this we are not bound to go: and even if with Mr. Maskell, we admit, with what ever sorrow, that even the 'essentials are dis-'jointed, misplaced, obscured,'—(Ancient Liturgy, &c. Preface, p. cxliii.)—whilst with him we 'regret what we have lost,' (p. cxliv.)—if we claim that 'with a better knowledge, we 'shall seek, when fit opportunities shall offer, to regain whatever 'can be proved to be really good and holy,'—(p. clix.)—even though we say, 'it had been well for the members of the Church 'of England, if the reviewers of her Liturgy had remembered 'not only the *doctrine* of the early disciples in the celebration of 'the Eucharist, but their *openness* no less,' (p. cxix.) or that 'it is impossible to say how much of the omission of sound 'teaching, and consequent forgetfulness, has been caused by the 'obscurity, as all must allow, of our present Service,' (p. cxvi.) or even if we own that our escape is only by 'the skin of our 'teeth,' we shall acknowledge no more than has been acknowledged by Laud and Andrewes, by Overall and Cosin, by Grabe and Brett and Hickes and Johnson and Collier, by Bull and Wheatley and Sharpe, by Horsley and Horne, by Wilson and Nelson. And when those who boast of the absolute perfection of our present Prayer Book, can produce such a roll of scholars and divines, of holy men and confessors, it will be time enough to taunt us with unworthy suspicions of our Spiritual Mother. Truest duty is shown, not by the indiscriminate eulogy of an ignorant satisfaction, but by hearty repentance for those sins which still keep us out of the fulness of our heritage.

It were less than honest to conceal, indeed it seems a duty on all fitting occasions, and surely, when the subject is brought before us by the present publication, such is one, to declare that whatever sympathies on other grounds the Reformers can establish with ourselves, we owe them less than thanks and other than respect for their unintelligible substitution of the book of 1552 for that of 1549,—that Book, which, as Collier bitterly remarks, was ‘formed by Divine assistance and discharged by human infirmity.’ Unintelligible, we say advisedly; for it is entirely impossible to trace one marked intelligent or intelligible principle, upon which they lopped and mangled, ‘holy ‘prayers, which for a thousand years rose through the aisles of ‘our village, equally with our cathedral, churches, and solemn ‘rites by which devotion was not only quickened, but directed ‘to its proper end.’ (Ancient Liturgy, &c. Preface, p. clviii.) The recent discussions on Rubrics, from whichever side they proceed, only tend to establish one great truth, that it is utterly impossible to harmonize, or reconcile, scarcely even to understand the external rules of our Prayer Book; and the patent insincerity and bad faith, deficient even in the consistent excuse of compulsion, on the part of the revisers, is plain by the open confession of those who employed them; a confession which would advance claims upon our pity, were not that feeling absorbed by a kindred one into which pity often subsides. We believe it to be without parallel, even in the world's code of ethics, that it should be advanced as a reason for abrogating a ritual, that ‘it is a very godly order, ‘agreeable to the word of God and the primitive Church;’ that ‘it was completed by the aid of the Holy Ghost, with one uniform agreement;’ and that it was ‘very comfortable to all ‘good people desiring to live in Christian conversation,’ which are the words deliberately used with respect to the first book of Edward VI., even in the very act of superseding it for one totally different, for the miserable and meaningless excuse, that ‘there ‘hath arisen in the use and exercise of the foresaid Common ‘Service, divers doubts for the fashion and manner of the ministration thereof, rather by the curiosity of the minister and ‘mistakers, than of any other worthy cause.’ (Statutes V. and VI. Edward VI.) We have alluded to this the most painful chapter in our ecclesiastical annals, not so much on its own account, for it is deplorably familiar to us all, as to express our surprise that Mr. Maskell, who has so openly and pathetically deplored the evils attendant upon ‘that foreign ‘influence, hourly increasing in pertinacious opposition to ‘Catholic antiquity, whose successful efforts became *unhappily* ‘apparent in the Book of 1552,’ (Preface, p. xcvi.) should descend to such a φενακισμὸς as to write that ‘the Church of

England,' at the time of the publication of the second Book, 'trusted that the doctrines' which she had so carefully 'veiled' and purposely 'obscured,' and all but obliterated, 'might still 'be retained, not merely in the Liturgy, but in men's minds.' (Preface, p. cxvii.) If so, the mode adopted for this purpose was singularly ill-contrived to effect its purpose. To trust that 'doctrines might be retained in men's minds,' by the act of concealing them from their spiritual sight, is but a sorry sign of sincerity.

In the midst of this distress there is, however, one remarkable series of facts which, taken together, constitute plain indications of a certain conservative bias, and a healthy, vital re-action against corruption, the principle of which it is impossible to mistake or misstate. To have been so nearly committed and yet not to have quite fallen, is important and has often been noticed. But more than this, even certain failures are symbolical. That we have broken down and failed in some very singular and well-contrived, as well as well-intentioned struggles, after a sort of private judgment kind of Catholicism, is very curious, and instructive as well as comforting. Laud's ceremonial and architecture is a case in point. The Pontifical, which he projected, would have been a curiosity, as indeed was the anomalous and unmeaning ceremonial which he observed. 'The silver and gilt 'canister for the wafers, *like a wicker basket, and lined with cambric 'lace*—the Tonne *upon a cradle*—the Tricanale, being a *round ball 'with a screw cover, whereout issue three pipes*—the *triquertrall 'censer*, wherein the clerk putteth frankincense, at the *reading of 'the first lesson*.' All this, which Prynne assures his ignorant readers is borrowed from the Missal and Pontifical, is just simply ludicrous, because it is not taken from that source. It is destitute both of authority and precedent; and symbolism never looks so unwise as when it is self-evolved. How much better it would have been if Laud, which before the Caroline Act of Uniformity he might have done, had re-appropriated the first Liturgy of Edward VI. So too, of the copes which are as a fact the legal vestment of the English celebrant: what a consolation it is that we, in practice, are relieved from this utterly inapplicable misappropriation of a Catholic vestment. On the other hand, how curious it is that a conservative practice, in more ways than one, has fought for us against a positively destructive law. That the 'honest tables' of the Reformers might be brought into the body of the Church, is the law: practice has, by a happy anomaly, abrogated it. And with our views of the object of the 'Prayer for the Church Militant,' we do think it a very good thing, that in practice it has not been read weekly, as has lately, with perfect good faith, been ordered. The further we go into the Liturgy, without attempting or intending to perfect it by the Eucharistic Sacrifice itself, the greater is the danger of profaning it: and, perhaps, nothing will serve so effectually to force the clergy into weekly communion, as experience of the meaningless, and insufficient Sunday service which some most respected names among us have thought the acme of ceremonial propriety, when it goes to the length of embodying the 'Prayer for the 'Church Militant, together with one or more of these collects 'before rehearsed, concluding with the blessing.' To finish with the sermon—though manifestly and plainly unrubrical and illegal—was morally preferable, because it did not pretend to so much. And this is a curious instance in which practice has overruled law, and unintentionally, and, therefore, most significantly, we have been withheld and restrained from a more Protestant course which seemed inevitable, because commanded. Mr. Maskell has some hints upon this 'Second Service,' with which we heartily concur; with respect to this 'Office, for which 'we have no name, consisting of some Collects, a Lesson, the 'Epistle and Gospel of the day, the Nicene Creed, and, perhaps, 'a Sermon, *with other additions;* an office which, whatever it may 'be called, is not an imitation of a Communion Service,' (Preface, p. xc.) and which, adopting Mr. Maskell's severe language, we readily agree with Archbishop Whitgift, is 'unjustly likened' to the Commemoration of the Mass, (ibid. note 41,) an office for which our author ingenuously 'confesses that he is at a loss 'for a name,' and of which we own that the less it is prolonged into what may be the solemn Oblatory Prayer, the better.

As we are about concluding with this, Mr. Maskell's first work, we may observe, that it is much fuller than his first edition; that certain retrenchments in the way of vehement language have been made; and that some additions, which display a more loyally Anglican direction, have been inserted. These last come in with somewhat of the forced character which is inseparable from the *arrière pensée.* One or two strong protests against 'any unauthorized attempts to introduce the practice 'of [privately] praying for the dead, to a greater extent, and in 'more particular terms, than the Church of England has recom'mended and allowed;' (Preface, p. cl. note 32,) 'for the Church 'of England would not, it may almost be argued, have acted 'unreasonably, if her rulers had removed it entirely from her 'Liturgy,' (p. cxlvii.) seem to fall short of the calmness and consistency which usually characterize Mr. Maskell's statements; especially when (p. cxlv.) he had just assured us that, 'with an undoubting and steady voice, the 'Church has 'always, East and West, North and South, prayed for the 'Dead.' The same observation applies to a wholesale condemnation of devotional books, written by members of the

Roman Communion. Of Mr. Maskell's judgment and feeling we think so highly, and of his learning he has given such solid proofs, that we are bound to except, in such a writer, against instances of unmodified and unlimited statement, however rare or solitary, and which, in any one else, we should hardly be able to distinguish from sops to the Cerberus of the day. We acquit Mr. Maskell of any such unworthy intention; but he will, perhaps, be sorry to find his authority, for such it is, adopted in quarters which only exist upon a virulent animosity to any Catholic revival among us.[1]

We group together a few observations of Mr. Maskell, which, we think, deserve eminent attention, concerning themselves, as they do, with palpably practical matters.

> 'It may remain a question, whether we do not too hastily, now-a-days, translate our Common Prayer-book, at least the more solemn parts of it, those, I mean, relating to the due administration of the Sacraments, into the languages of heathen people, which we do not ourselves fully understand? One thing is unhappily most certain: an easy door is opened for designing men to intrude their own heretical opinions. Secure from almost the possibility of detection, innumerable errors may be foisted in, and the most important doctrines of the Faith perverted, under the apparent sanction of the Catholic Church of England herself; the truth of regeneration in Baptism be denied, or of the communion of the Body and Blood of our Blessed Saviour in the Holy Eucharist. Thus we may give in name only, and not in deed, the Common Prayer-book of the Church of England to some new-converted nation in their own tongue; and blindly, by her authority, plant in most pestilent heresies, which even succeeding centuries may not be able to eradicate.'—Ancient Liturgy, Preface, p. lxvii.

Since the publication of Mr. Maskell's work, a case has come before us which serves most forcibly to illustrate these contingent evils. We find by the reports of some of the Church Societies, that a Mr. O'Meara is engaged in translating 'the Liturgy into the language of the Ogybwa Indians,' the people whose *gentilititium* is more familiar to us as the Ojibbeways. Against Mr. O'Meara we have not a word to say: he appears, from other sources of information, to be an admirable and earnest person. But he might not, as Mr. Maskell says, be sound in the faith; he must, we suppose, have private opinions, and whether he intends it or not, such opinions must colour his translation. But even a more serious objection than this remains to this preposterous 'Ogybwa Liturgy.' What security have we that the jargon of these savages is, in any real sense, a language at all? The 'Ogybwa' classics have yet to win their niche in the temple of Fame. But seriously, for the matter is a very serious one—to say nothing of the danger of perpetuating an imperfect language,—Mr. O'Meara undertakes not so much to translate into, as to make, a written language for the first time. This work is to be printed. And we put it to all who know anything of the formation and philosophy of language, how extremely dangerous it must be to attempt, in the confined and narrow tongue of a rude people, necessarily restricted to the reception only of material and sensuous images, to render the complex and spiritual language of the English Liturgy and Ritual. The roots are wanting to a nation who possess but a few nouns; and the strange compounds, all taken from external nature, and none from the scanty list of verbs, which such a nation must possess; compounds with which we are familiar as the titles of Ojibbeway individuals, go to prove how little susceptible of the ideas involved in a state of mind, or condition of subjective being, a language, if such it may be styled, must be, which salutes its rulers as the 'Great Elk,' and the 'Little Beaver.' No compounds, no circumlocutions, can express that in language, of which the idea has never existed: the signs are not, because the idea is not. And unless Mr. O'Meara is prepared to repeat Psalmanazar's experiment, and invent a language which he is pleased to call 'Ogybwa,' not only do we say that he must fail, but he ought to fail. We are fain to hope that the 'translation' will break down. Let any person of the most common information imagine, if he can, the 'Ogybwa' for—Holy Catholic Church,—Regenerate, —Sacrament,—Only Begotten,—Trinity,—Co-Eternal,—Co-Equal,—Repentance,—Faith,—Elect,—Redemption.—The very thought of this to a serious mind involves something closely allied to profanation, however well-intentioned and honest, as in this present case we freely admit, the translator may desire to be.

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[1] There seems to be a fatality about the XXXIst. Article: it was said that it was never quoted correctly in the No. XC. controversy. Mr. Maskell forms no exception: he writes, (Ancient Liturgy, Preface, p. cxv.) 'They (the members of the Church of England) have been told, and rightly told, that it is a dangerous deceit to say the priest does offer Christ in the sacrifice of masses, &c.' Now whatever this teaching may be, this is not what they have been told. The Article says that 'the sacrifices of masses, in the which it was commonly said, &c., were, &c.,' which Mr. Maskell will be the first to admit, is by no means identical with 'the sacrifice of masses.'

Not the least valuable portion of this volume consists in the 'Cautelæ Missæ,' which may be profitably compared with similar directions in the modern Roman Missal. Mr. Maskell, with his usual soberness and good taste, expresses with considerable delicacy of feeling a hint, for the sake of which we allude to the subject. After admitting the possible excess to which these 'Cautells' might be carried; he goes on (p. 164) to say, that 'in such a matter, concerning the highest Mysteries, 'concerning that Bread and Wine, that Body and Blood, it is most 'difficult to say where reverence becomes a superstition; but it 'is not so difficult to say where irreverence begins. I wish that 'I could add, that I think the Priests of the English Church 'now, as a body, are so reverent in their administration of the

'Supper of the Lord, as I do believe they really wish to be: I 'cannot suppose but that much that looks like carelessness is 'without intention.' We trust so too; but really a very little forethought and attention would secure even to our present Service that decency, not to say dignity, which is too often absent from it. And to those who are disposed to consider the 'Cautells' to which we have alluded a mere piece of burthensome formalism, unsuited to the spiritual mind, we recommend this golden maxim, so affectingly beautiful, which they enshrine, and which ought to be inscribed in all our sacristies: 'Eo affectu est quælibet missa habenda et dicenda a quocumque 'sacerdote, *quasi prima dicatur et nunquam sit amplius dicenda:* 'tam magnum enim donum semper debet esse novum.'

There is one very important document which we think would have added much to the completeness of Mr. Maskell's volume, in the way of reference; we allude to the Order of Communion of 1548. This was only designed as a temporary expedient, or perhaps experiment, on the Church, as preparatory to the first book of Edward VI.; 'made to stay the stomachs of earnest longers for 'the present,' as L'Estrange oddly expresses it. The old Latin Mass was not altered at all; this form only furnished a rite for communicating the people in the vulgar tongue. It was valuable for restoring the full communion of the Cup, and is noticeable as helping us to understand the origin of difficult parts, such as the Confession, of our present Liturgy. It will be found in L'Estrange, also at the end of Cardwell's 'Two Liturgies, &c.,' and at the beginning of the similar work, published by the Parker Society. Burnet, without advancing any proof of his assertion, says that this form was received 'everywhere without opposition.' Mr. Maskell (Preface, p. lxv. note 10, and p. xciv. note 49) thinks that it is improbable that much notice of it was taken by the clergy; but neither does he give authority for this view, which is perhaps near the truth. There is a passage in Parsons' 'Three Conversions,' &c. (vol. i. p. 602), which, coming from an enemy, must be taken *cum grano*,—or perhaps with a good many grains —*salis*. Speaking of the effect of this Order, he says,—

> 'And now what a Babylonicall confusion ensued in England upon these innovations, in all churches, parisshes, and bishoppricks commonly, is wonderful to recount. For some Priests said the Latyn masse, some the English communion, some both, some neyther; some said halfe of the one, and halfe of the other. And this was very ordinary: to witt, to say the *Introitus* and *Confiteor* in English, and then the Canon of the Masse in Latin, and lastly the Benediction, and last ghospell in English. And this mingle-mangle did every man make at his pleasure, as he thought it would be most grateful to the people.
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> 'But that which was of more importance and impiety; some did consecrate bread and wine, others did not, but would tell the people before-hand plainly, they would not consecrate: but restore them their bread and wine backe againe, as they receyued it from them. Only adding to yt the church

benediction. And these that did consecrate, did consecrate in divers formes, some aloud, some in secret, some in one forme of words, and others in another. And after consecration some did hould up the host to be adored after the ould fashion, and some did not. And of those that were present, some did kneele downe and adore, others did shutte their eyes, others turned their faces aside, others ran out of the Church, blaspheming, and crying Idolatry.'

It may seem that a word by way of explanation is needed for the strong expressions which we have employed with regard to the alteration of King Edward's first Book. It is a serious thing to charge those to whom we must have some duties, if on no other ground, yet as bishops and priests of the Church, with deliberately suppressing doctrine which they knew to be true, and acknowledged to be true, and the objections against which, *as* doctrines, they owned to be frivolous at the very moment when they were yielding to them. This is the plain state of the case, and we have quoted the very words which prove this. But, be it observed, that to have an opinion of the conduct of certain individuals, is not to disparage the Church; the Church of England and the compilers of the second Prayer Book are not convertible terms. That Prayer Book, strictly speaking, never was the Prayer Book of the English Church; it never was accepted by the legitimate ecclesiastical authority, by the Synod of the Church of England.[1] We may criticise it, being only the performance of a few divines, and an act of the State, just as freely as we might a Bishop's charge, or the Six Acts, or the Submission of the clergy, or the state suppression of the Irish Bishoprics, or the Jerusalem scheme, to which it bears a close affinity of principle and fact; and surely parties who are so free with opinions on Archbishop Laud's conduct, or S. Jerome's rudeness, or the acts and decisions of even Œcumenical Councils, may concede a little liberty to others in expressing sentiments on documents with which we of the present Church of England are only concerned as a matter of history. That the Prayer Book and Liturgy of 1552 did not express a true and consistent doctrine is plain from the fact that their most painful and questionable features were almost immediately abrogated, that they underwent successive changes during the space of 110 years, and that every one of these changes went to erase the very features and alterations which we have condemned. So far forth, therefore, as duty to the Church is concerned, it really does seem to be a matter of plain duty to the Church as it is, to disavow and disown what the Church has taken so much and such anxious pains, at so many different periods during nearly three centuries, to disavow and disown. Those, it cannot be repeated too often, whose opinions we are bound to consider, are the compilers and revisers—not of the Book of 1552, but—of the Book of 1662. They are *our* Reformers and Fathers. And upon whatever grounds anybody deems it his duty to object to the Uses of Sarum and York, upon them we, in turn, claim the same right to hold, and to express too, an opinion upon the Book of 1552. For the one is just as much and completely superseded as the other. And, to put it the other way, if the Book of 1552 and the recorded proceedings of its compilers are to be ranged above the reach of an opinion, we should like to know what answer would be forthcoming for those who required the same sacred immunity for Bishop Osmund and Bishop Grandisson, and the author of the 'Cautells of the Mass.'

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[1] This is a well-known fact; but the first *popular* allusion to it—at least in our own times—is due to the keen and discriminating notice of Mr. Froude (Remains, vol. i. p. 366.) It seems that Heylyn contrived to get the Book of 1662 legitimately authorized. In his 'Letter to a Minister of State,' he says, 'I hope that the selecting some few bishops and other learned men of the lower clergy, to debate on certain points contained in the Common Prayer-book, is not intended for a representation of the Church of England [in speaking thus of the Savoy Commission, he but describes the revisers of 1552], which is a body more diffused, *and cannot legally stand bound by their acts and counsels.*'—Collier, vol. ii. p. 886.

The 'Monumenta Ritualia,' which is the title of Mr. Maskell's new publication, is in plan, we believe, fresh to the Church of England. Its object is one in which many have preceded him, viz. the illustration, from the original sources, of the existing Ritual. But the means are a novelty. It is well known, at least to those of the most ordinary literature, that our services are chiefly derived from those previously in use at the beginning of the sixteenth century. This is, we say, well known, though at the same time it is notorious that popular writers and preachers often express themselves as though they fancied that Cranmer and Ridley sat down in their studies to write off a Prayer Book, *currente calamo,* as Mr. Baxter did about a century afterwards. The ancient Service Books of the Church are its annals—its *Fasti;* and without some knowledge of them it is impossible to understand the doubtful or disputed expressions in our present Book. This is a value which attaches to them far beyond the literary and antiquarian importance of the subject. Although, in this way, it is something surprising to find the amount of ignorance on the subject which prevails. It was not long since that we, nearly all of us, used to describe whatever illuminated MS. fell in our way as a 'Roman Missal;' and though, perhaps, we had some slight suspicion that a Breviary was not a Pontifical, and, perhaps, that there was such a thing as a Processional; yet what and how many the ancient Service Books were, and how they differed from each other, what they contained and how they were used, what pretty little illuminated vellum books were of public authority, and what for private use, we were nearly as ignorant as, perhaps much more ignorant than, 'entertaining' Dr. Dibdin and his perverter, the 'egregious blunderer,' Mr. Gough, who are especial objects of Mr. Maskell's scorn. (Monumenta Ritualia, vol. i. pp. viii—xi.) An unsuccessful attempt was made, a few years ago, to publish the Sarum Breviary; but it was printed in such ugly fashion—abroad, if we remember right—that the scheme died. To say the real truth, so scarce were the books, thanks to the vigilance and number of King Edward's *Autos-da-Fé*, which burned books as vigorously as his two successors burned and hanged bishops and priests, that few even of our well-educated theologians ever saw a book of Salisbury Use:—and, the truth must out, still fewer could read them. A ludicrous instance of this occurred a year or two ago, known, perhaps, to some of our readers, when a writer, clever enough in his way, took it into his head to 'give an account of the Sarum Missal,' not having taken the preliminary trouble to learn black letter, and before he had even read the modern Missal. The consequence was that he found the word *discoopertum:* which he thought was to be read *disco opertum.* So he actually translated it 'the chalice covered with a disc.' This writer's ignorance was not worse than that of his neighbours: only he was unlucky enough to print it: and we mention the story but as a specimen of the prevailing and complete darkness on the subject.

Our own knowledge, we may as well confess, is so confined, that on this part of the subject we desire to abdicate the critical chair; and if we shall succeed in giving our readers a sufficient prelibation of this full and instructive work of Mr. Maskell, as to send them to his publisher, we shall do most credit to ourselves and service to those who have borne us company thus far. In fact this is the sort of work about which we feel much disposed to revive the honest and compendious practice of our forefathers in the reviewing craft, who used boldly to print page after page of a book, and then ended by referring for further particulars to the work itself.

Now, whether we like it or not, we are tied to the past: and a mighty past is this ancient Christian England of ours. We are not cut off from the Saints, or from the Worship, of old: a chasm may have opened between us, but it is bridged over by much which is common to them and to us. That we minister or pray in the same churches, that the same aisles have rung to the solemn Sequences of the ancient Church and to the plainer devotions of our own sweet Matins and Evensong—that the lofty 'Te igitur' and the lowly 'We do not presume to come,' have been 'said or sung' on the same spot for six centuries—all this forms a tie of love which we cannot, if we would, sever. And if 'the stone does not cry out of the wall' of Westminster and York, and forbid us to boast ourselves of the same blood, we will not deny that we are of the same faith, in essential things, with those who have gone before us into rest; and into the fruit of whose labours, the work of their own hands and charity, we do not refuse daily, or at least weekly, to enter. Who can pass one of the ten thousand of England's olden churches, and coldly forget that once there was a system of religion which, whether good or bad, superstitious or not, did daily, in a population not a tithe of our own, from the altars of its '45,000 churches and 55,000 chapels 'which existed before the Reformation,'[1] offer certain Prayers and Services,—and did dispense in a certain system, and in certain forms of Church order and law, to every man, woman, and child, something which, to say the least of it, pretended to be religion —and not feel at least a desire to know what services these were—how these old churches were used—what was done in in them—what was said in them? Natural feeling prompts such an inquiry. We do it with classical and heathen monuments of antiquity. We strive to realize their original purpose. We go into a house at Pompeii, and then begin to think of Roman domestic life. We traverse the sands of Egypt, and then we picture the mighty processions of Memphis and Thebes. We stand beneath the Parthenon: once more we view it garlanded with flowers, and the strong bull bleeds before the portico. Santa Sophia, even in its desecration, may perhaps suggest S. John Chrysostom and the majestic Liturgy which still bears the great Patriarch's name. But at Winchester, if we think of Wykham, it is rather through a drift of 'mouldings' and 'perpendicular,' than as the great Bishop celebrating the Pontifical Mass; and if we turn to its gorgeous choir, it is far more frequently with a critical eye to the 'crisp foliage' and the 'pierced trefoil-work,' than with any remembrance of either the million Litanies and Lauds to which these stalls have echoed, or the thousand Priests who in past days have sung in them. We do not realize the purpose and end of these stately aisles and vaulted roofs: and yet surely this should be our first and obvious thought.

It is remarkable, therefore, that the very aspect and presence of the old churches among us has not suggested more interest and inquiry into the Services which were their soul and life. We can understand less of the material church without some knowledge of the daily uses and solemnities to which it was dedicated, than we can of the services themselves, even without a critical skill in the temples in which they were celebrated. It was the Christian Ceremonial which produced Christian Art; as the service and sacrifice is older than the altar. And perhaps the impulse which has been of late given to the study of ecclesiastical architecture among ourselves, has necessitated the study of the ancient ritual. Our most natural thought is, what was the end of this great multitude of churches? How did our fathers use them? What prayers and services did they imply and presuppose?

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[1] 'Atkyns' Gloucestershire:' a statement which, when years ago we met with it, staggered us extremely: but which Mr. Maskell's researches (vol. i. p. clxviii. note 83) only tend to confirm.

The volumes before us, it were little to say in their praise, have done more to illustrate this vast subject than any work which our own literature has hitherto possessed. Few will be prepared to learn the immense number of the old Service Books. In the present work as many as ninety-one separate Books are counted: and if Mr. Maskell had done no more than distinguish and describe them, which he has done at great length and with constant reference to the whole series of the great foreign liturgical writers, in much greater profusion and with more varied selection than has hitherto been known among us, he would have given a worthy contribution to our students in his Preliminary Dissertation alone. In this treatise and in his notes, especially in those on the Ordinary and Canon of the Mass, Mr. Maskell has introduced us into a new circle of learning. Possessed himself of a collection of the English Service Books of unrivalled splendour and completeness, as the librarian of the British Museum has testified in a report lately presented to Parliament, he has certainly had ample and peculiar means at his command; but to have acquired the taste and knowledge to form such a collection, is in itself praiseworthy. But apart from this accident in its construction, the present series must take rank as a standard work at once. It consists of the old orders of Baptism, Confirmation, Matrimony, Visitation of the Sick, Extreme Unction, and Burial—together with various forms of Benediction—the Order of Consecrating Churches and Cemeteries, and other occasional offices, such as those for a Synod, Purification of Women, Espousals, the Commendation of the Dying, the Benedictions of Breads, (the ancient *εὐλογίαι*), Forms of Excommunication, Absolution, and Reconciliation. Extracts from these would be out of place in these pages.

But we cannot avoid an obvious reflection to which their perusal gives occasion. It is, that since our present offices must, from the nature of the case, presuppose the use and familiarity of the old Services, unconsciously and as a matter of course; therefore we cannot understand them, either in their use or intention, without placing ourselves in the actual position of those who were first called upon to use them. There remained, and there was intended to remain, a considerable amount of vague, floating, undefined tradition and practice which the new Services never sought nor desired to interfere with. Much, therefore, was left to prescription and the undisturbed influence of the old traditions, and to their recognised sway both upon the understanding of the people, and the practice of the priest. And this seems somewhat fixed and admitted in the way of principle by the present English Church, in that remarkable direction placed in the very front of the Service Book, 'that 'the Chancels shall remain as they have done in times past;' which cannot be understood as less than a direct claim of succession by way of inheritance to the one and the same Church, its offices and its doctrines, wherever such were not formally set aside and abrogated. And certainly both in this way of argument and probability, a movement which like the Reformation went generally upon the principle of protesting against, forbidding and denying, must in consistency be allowed to permit and recognise a good deal which is not so forbidden. This is but natural. When a man contradicts one of your assertions, he is supposed to admit all the rest. To reform much, implies that somewhat is left unchanged.

Besides this importance of the old Ritual Books in settling that principle upon which alone the Church of England can consent to be tried, they afford valuable practical guides in ascertaining the sense of doubtful phrases, or directions which must occur in understanding or administering the present formularies. Take the *Ritus Baptizandi* as an example. Difficulty has often been felt in the present baptismal office, in the questions being put in the second person singular; 'Wilt *thou* be baptized?' &c. The old rite explains it, 'Abrenuncias Sathanæ?—Credis in Deum? —Quid petis?' Together with the Rubric, 'Si baptizandus non poterit loqui, vel quia parvulus vel quia mutus, &c., tunc debent patrini pro eis respondere,' &c. In the old books there was no separate office for Adult Baptism.—So in another, and a very remarkable case. Considerable difficulty has been felt about the Rubric on Spiritual Communion, in our present office for Communion of the Sick. 'If a man, either by reason of calamity of sickness, . . . although he do not receive the sacrament with his mouth.' On both hands it has been largely argued from this Rubric, that the Church of England entertains very lax views on the necessity of sacraments; and if we remember right, this very Rubric was very much insisted on by one of the 'recent converts,' as his strongest τόπος, or difficulty, against his own Church. It is very curious that the Sarum Rubric is precisely the same, and obviously constitutes the source from which ours is derived. 'Deinde communicetur infirmus: et

nisi de vomitu vel aliâ irreverentiâ probabiliter timeatur: in quo casu dicat sacerdos infirmo. "Frater in hoc casu sufficit tibi vera fides, et bona voluntas: tantum crede et manducâsti."' Mr. Maskell has an excellent note (11) on this subject.—(Monumenta Ritualia, vol. i. pp. 89, 90.)[1]

A few random observations on the contents of the first volume occurred to us. The word 'pye,' which is found in the preface to the Prayer-Book—'the number and hardness of the rules 'called the Pie,' and which is blunderingly explained by L'Estrange, almost his solitary attempt in that line,—we do not find that Mr. Maskell has adequately explained; he assumes it at p. xlviii. of his Preface.—An amusing ambiguity in the office of Espousals occurs; which may account for that traditional rite, unsanctioned by Rubric, of which Petruchio availed himself so freely.

'This done,—he took the bride about the neck,
And kissed her lips with such a clamorous smack,
That, at the parting, all the church did echo.'

The Rubric—speaking of the delivery of the Pax—is (p. 61,) 'Tunc amoto pallio surgant ambo sponsus et sponsa: et accipiat sponsus pacem a sacerdote, et ferat sponsæ osculans EAM et 'neminem alium, nec ipse nec ipsa; sed statim diaconus a presbytero pacem accipiens, ferat aliis sicut solitum est.' Whether 'EAM' refers to 'pacem,' or 'sponsam,' is by no means clear.—We suspect some mis-print, or mis-scription, at p. 145 in the Benedictio Mapparum Altaris, from the Manual: 'Domine 'Deus, qui Moysen famulum Tuum . . . . docuisti: qui etiam '*maria texuit* in usum tabernaculi fœderis.' This spinning the sea we cannot make out.—At p. ccxlviii., Mr. Maskell says that the distinction of burying Ecclesiastics with their feet towards the people, 'does not appear from any record to have 'been allowed in the Church of England.' Restricting it to documentary evidence, this may be true enough; but as to the fact that it was practised, whether allowed or not, there are plenty of instances. Our readers remember that as the ancient tradition authorizes the expectation that our Lord will appear in the East, all the dead are buried with their feet towards the East to meet Him: the priests, on the other hand, are buried in the reverse way, that they may meet their flocks face to face. —At p. ccliii. we do not follow Mr. Maskell's conclusion, that hallowing of altar-cloths might be performed by priests, from the item in the Churchwarden's accounts of St. Margaret's, Westminster. 'Of the gift of my Lady Clinton, j tabil-cloth 'now hallowed for the high altar by the hands of Mr. Curate.' This need mean no more than that it was given at Mr. Curate's request, as there is no punctuation in the original document. —At p. cclxx. we should be disposed to render *Sacramentarium*, by the stone tabernacle, not the altar; it were quite superfluous to distinguish the latter in 1287 by such a phrase as *lapideum et immobile.* There is a noble tabernacle of this kind, 'lapideum et immobile' at Louvain.—In the same remarkable regulations we are doubtful whether 'philatoria [quasi velatoria? see *Du* '*Cange*,] *ad cornu* altaris' mean the side curtains, or the curious altar stoles which sometimes occur; the 'unum (philatorium) ad 'patenam' is the veil or air.—In the Constitutions of de Bleys in 1229, (p. cclxix.) occurs an authority for something very like altar-rails, just where we have them, between the stalls and the altar itself, inclosing the *Sacrarium*, 'operimentum decens et 'honestum inter altare et summitatem chori.'

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[1] The Sarum Manual directs, that the priest, who administers the Viaticum, should be stoled. The variation of the York Manual is very curious, 'Et nota quod Sacerdos infirmus et communicandus induetur stola,' and the Sarum Pontifical requires a sick Bishop to be similarly vested. In the old Printed Horæ of Salisbury Use, a priest *stoled* is represented communicating a sick man, in the wood-cuts which precede each month in the Calendar. Compare also Monumenta Ritualia, vol. i. p. ccxxx—ccxxxi.

The second volume of the 'Monumenta Ritualia' contains many of the old devotional works which were in daily use before the Reformation;[1] and chiefly 'The Prymer:' the importance of which involves a valuable 'Dissertation on the Prymer.' Here Mr. Maskell gets into a serious controversy. 'The 'Prymer in English,' which he prints, is from a MS. in his own possession, which he thinks 'not later than the year 1410,' (Dissertation, &c. p. xxxiii.) perhaps 'as far back as the latter end 'of the fourteenth century. (Ibid. p. xxxiv.) Of these MS. 'Prymers' there are eight copies described, and chiefly discovered, by Mr. Maskell's own researches; to which may now be added a ninth, not then known to our author, existing in Queen's College Library, Oxford. A 'Prymer,' be it known to our readers, 'contains a definite set of prayers: the Hours [B. V. M.] 'the Dirge, the seven [penitential] Psalms, the fifteen Psalms, a 'Litany, Commendations, the Pater Noster, the Creed, &c.' Now it has, generally, been quietly assumed that these 'Prymers,' and similar works, which really did contain popular religious knowledge, were never authorized: that the Wickliffites and the Lollards attempted something of this sort; but that the Church steadily kept the people in complete spiritual darkness, and proscribed, very reasonably, Wickliffe's publications, but produced none of its own: and that a chief glory of the Reformation era, especially of Henry VIII., was to publish, 'for the first time under authority,' the Prymer, or the 'King's Book of 1535,' which was its nascent glory. All parties[1] seem to have settled down into this assumption, either that there were no religious books for the use of the laity before the reign of Henry VIII., or that, if they did exist, they were heretical, and consequently suppressed by the Church. Mr. Maskell's able and interesting Preface, which contains a view, perhaps, more striking and important than any other advanced in his volumes, will, we think, dispose of this question. He proves, incontestably, that the Prymer was always allowed to the laity by the Church,[2] and he traces its systematic use and permission to Anglo-Saxon times. This branch of the subject brings Mr. Maskell into direct collision with the late Dr. Burton, whose preface to the Oxford edition of the 'Three Primers' certainly leads to the impression that he believed 'The Primer' to be a discovery of the sixteenth century.[3]

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[1] Some curious papers on this subject, proving that the England of the centuries immediately preceding the Reformation was by no means deficient in devotional books for general use, appeared last year in the 'English Churchman.'

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[1] Burnet, with the usual hardihood which characterizes his ignorance, informs us that when 'Popery prevailed here, parents teaching their children the Lord's Prayer, 'the Ten Commandments, and the Creed, in the vulgar tongue, was crime enough 'to bring them to the stake:' a statement which Collier, with truth enough, declares to be 'a mistake in matter of fact: even though the Bishop cites Fox for his authority, and Fox cites . . one Mother Hall.' Upon these two passages Mr. Lewis of Margate has the following remark. 'I do not find that Mr. Collier offers to 'assert that there was, at this time, any translation of the Ten Commandments, &c. '*allowed of by the then Church of England*; what translation there was of them 'seems to have been Wickliffe's.' (Gutch's Miscellanea Curiosa.) 'And to read these,' Lewis goes on, 'was, by Archbishop Arundel's Constitution, heresy.' Mr. Maskell's Prymers of the fourteenth century, and the Rubric in the Sarum Manual, which orders the Godparents to teach 'ante omnia orationem Dominicalem et . . 'symbolum fidei,' would have enabled Collier to assert that which he felt to be true yet could not prove. (See, especially, 'Monumenta Ritualia,' Preface, p. xlv.-xlix. notes 59 & 63.)

[2] The odd extract (Dissertation, p. xlv. note 56) from a will published by the Surtees Society—'Lego filiolæ meæ j romance book is called the Gospelles;' on which the question is asked by the editors, 'Did the testatrix consider the Gospels 'a series of fables?' is, we are disposed to guess, a misreading of the MS. We suspect it to be a 'Roman' book, or some cognate of Rome. 'Romance' was not so spelt in the fifteenth century.

[3] Mr. Maskell's remarks have led to a correspondence between him and Dr. Jenkyns, Professor of Divinity at Durham, and the editor of Cranmer, which has been printed, and it is to be had *gratis*, at Pickering's. We cannot see why Dr. Jenkyns has thought it necessary to publish this correspondence. The objections of Mr. Maskell against the accuracy of Dr. Jenkyns, and the want of exactness of inquiry shown by the late Dr. Burton, in his Preface to the 'Three Primers,' are not of sufficient interest, we conceive, to have called for so public a defence; more especially, if Dr. Jenkyns has none better to offer than this: viz. that his sentences, which Mr Maskell has interpreted in one way, are capable of being interpreted in another. It would have been a plainer course, if Dr. Jenkyns could have taken it, to have said, 'I did mean so and so,' or, 'I had seen such and

Not only however as a ritual publication, (for the Prymer is an abbreviated Breviary,) but as one curiously illustrative of the state and progress of the English language, do we recommend this second volume to the attention of antiquaries, as well as theological students, together with its appendix, consisting of the Golden Litany, forms of Confessions, and of daily private Prayers, pious Ejaculations, &c. The volume concludes in a miscellaneous way, with an order for the Consecration of Nuns—on this subject we recommend Mr. Maskell to examine a very curious MS. formerly belonging to Sion, existing in the library of St. Paul's,—and with a very unintelligible tract on the Sarum rubrics, 'Defensorium Directorii,' which might well have been omitted. The series wants a good index—for the matter, perhaps unavoidably, is not over clearly arranged;—and the meagre attempt at index which we find is a very miserable one. And we may be allowed to express our regret that, with such ample means at his command for increasing our knowledge in that branch of study, a little knowledge of the old music is not among our author's accomplishments.

Our readers must expect more instruction than amusement from this series. Mr. Maskell's style is not very flowing, and his subject perhaps scarcely admits the graces of composition: but if the writer's object was the far nobler one of furnishing English readers with a repertory of solid learning, carefully put together, gathered from very inaccessible and difficult sources,

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such copies of the Primer;' this would have been an answer which every one might have understood, and to which none would have denied credit. With respect to Dr. Burton, we think that his reputation *is* affected, and seriously, also, by Mr. Maskell's remarks; and we are not at all inclined to agree with Mr. Jenkyns, (*Correspondence*, p. 19,) 'that strictures upon his works might well have been avoided, especially as he is no longer among us to defend himself.' We cannot allow the force of this 'especially.' Historical and critical studies are at an end if no work is to be criticized because the author is dead. In one respect we congratulate both parties: this correspondence has been conducted in a kind spirit, and each has seemed anxious to show courtesy to the other. Literary, and especially theological, differences, ought always to be so managed.—As, perhaps, an opinion may be expected of us upon the matters in dispute, we think Mr. Maskell over hasty in his sarcasm on Dr. Jenkyns, on the point whether the Prayer Book was 'to be on the list of Cranmer's works.' On this count we find for Dr. Jenkyns. As to the date of the first Ordinal, we see that Mr. Lathbury, in his life of Collier, (p. xxix.) just published in the ninth and concluding volume of Collier's works, (Straker,) without any reference to this matter, helps Mr. Maskell to prove his point; viz. that the first Prayer Book was published in March, 1549; that is to say, that the celebrated March book is of March, 1549, and not as Dr. Jenkyns argues, March, 1550. Mr. Lathbury shows that the English Prayer Book was used at Easter, *i.e.* 21st April, 1549, in some of the London churches, according to Stowe. On the other side, Dr. Jenkyns, it must be admitted, quotes great authorities. On this point we reserve our judgment. And on the remaining counts we have already said that we think Mr. Maskell may claim a verdict, though he allows judgment against him on the Becket's tomb affair. The pamphlet is an unimportant one.

and all this honestly to be applied to the illustration of our Services and Prayer Book, he has succeeded in an attempt as judicious and laborious as it is novel. We shall be glad again to welcome him in the same field; and we find a third volume of Occasional Offices, among which the Coronation Service is to occur, already promised. And for those patient readers who have travelled thus far, we reserve some reward in the following amusing contribution to a mediæval 'Art of Pluck.' Mr. Maskell, with all his gravity, seems to be aware that he has stumbled across a good thing, and, quite *apropos* of nothing, inserts it in his 'Ancient Liturgy, &c.'

'Vitalis presbyter, vicarius perpetuus de Suning, præsentavit capellanum, quem secum habet, nomine Simonem, quem modo retinuit usque ad festum B. Michaelis. Requisitus idem Simon de suis ordinibus; dicit, quod apud Oxoniam recepit ordinem subdiaconi, a quodam episcopo Yberniæ, Albino nomine, tunc vicario episcopi Lincolniensis. Item ab eodem recepit ordinem diaconi. Item ordinem presbyteratus ab Hugone modo Lincolniensi episcopo: transactis quatuor annis. Probatus fuit de evangelio Dominiciæ primæ in adventu, et inventus est minus habens, nec intelligens quod legeret. Item probatus fuit de canone missæ: "Te igitur, clementissime Pater," *etc.* Nescivit cujus casus esset "Te," nec a qua parte regeretur. Et cum dictum esset ei, ut diligenter inspiceret quæ pars posset competentius regere "Te," dixit, quod Pater, qui omnia regit. Requisitus quid esset "clementissime," vel cujus casus, vel qualiter declinaretur; nescivit. Requisitus quid esset "Clemens;" nescivit. Item idem Simon nullam differentiam antiphonarum novit, nec cantum hymnorum, nec etiam de illo, "Nocte surgentes:" nec aliquid scit de Officio Divino, vel Psalterio cordetenus. Dixit etiam, quod indecens ei videbatur quod probaretur coram decano, cum jam esset ordinatus. Requisitus super quo fuisset probatus quando ordinem presbyteratus accepit: dicit quod non meminit. Sufficienter illiteratus est.

'Johannes de Herst præsentavit capellanum suum Ricardum nomine, natum apud Rosam. Juvenis quidem est, et nihil scit. Dicit quod ordinem subdiaconi recepit London. a Willielmo episcopo. Ab episcopo Petro, Winton. ordinem diaconi, transactis sex annis: a Willielmo vero episcopo Cestrensi eodem anno ordinem presbyteratus. Probatus de hac collecta Adventus: "Excita quæsumus Domine;" dixit quod nihil voluit respondere. Requisitus de canone, dixit, quod nihil voluit super hoc respondere. Postquam enim suus Presbyter primo exierat ab ecclesia post examinationem, et venisset ad alios, omnes inierunt consilium unum quod non responderent. Aliqui tamen eorum in articulo responderunt postea ad magnam instantiam decani. Postea requisitus noluit in ultimo capitulo examinari, et remansit suspensus.

'Johannes de Erburge præsentavit capellanum Reginaldum, natum apud Windelshoram. Ordinatus, sicut ipse dicit, ad ordinem subdiaconi apud Sarum. Diaconi vero et presbyt. apud Winton. transactis jam iiij annis. Probatus de hac oratione "Excita," *etc.* et de hoc textu canonis, "Te igitur, clementissime Pater;" nihil prorsus voluit respondere. Postea venit et obtulit se examinationi et nihil scivit, vel legere vel canere.

'Capellanus de Sandhurst Johannes de Sireburñ. dicit quod ordinatus fuit subdiaconum apud Cicestriam. Diaconum apud Winton. ab episcopo Godefrido, in Ybernia: et jam ministravit in prædicta capella per iiij annos. Probatus de hac oratione, "Excita," *etc.* et de "Te igitur," nihil scit respondere. Probatus de cantu, de offertorio dominicæ adventus, scilicet: "Ad te levavi;" nescivit cantare.

'Item Vitalis Presbyter præsentavit ad capellam de Rotiscamp Jordanum Presbyterum, natum apud Stratton in Dorset. Ordinatus ut dicit subdiaconum et diaconum apud Sarum ab episcopo Herberto. Presbyterum autem ab episcopo Roffensi Gilberto de Glanvill. ante generale interdictum. Probatus ut alii supra, de oratione, "Excita," et "Te igitur;" nihil scit. Proposito ei libro ut cantaret, noluit cantare. Præceptum est Vitali, ut bonos capellanos inveniat et ibi et apud Sunning; vel decanus capiet beneficia in manus suas.

'Item apud Erberge fuit quidam veteranus in domo Ricardi Bulloc, presbyter quidam de Rading̃; et cum probaretur a decano, utrum videret et utrum verba integra proferret, inventum est quod nullum verbum evangelii vel canonis integrum potuit proferre. Et ideo præcepit decanus Johanni de Erburge ne ulterius permitteret eum ministrare in capella illa.'—*Additional note,* pp. 181-3.

This worthy set of 'illiterate priests' must have fully appreciated the delectable *Memoria Technica* which was constructed to help them to remember the Feast-days of the Calendar, of which Mr. Maskell gives a ludicrous, some will think a profane, specimen.

June.

In. June. eras. mus. dyde. thynke.
Not. to. gyve. bar. na. be. drynke.
But. then. bo. tulph. thought. it. me. ter.
That. John. sholde. drynke. be. fore. pe. ter.

Decembre.

Loy. was. bar. ber. to. ny. coll.
Ma. ry. pray. thou. for. lu. cies. soll.
And. for. grace. pray. good. tho. mas. ynde.
To. Christ. steuen. john. chylde. tho. be. kynde.

—Monumenta Ritualia, vol. ii. Dissertation, p. xvii.

Art. V.—1. *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. By* John Henry Newman, *author of Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church.* London: Toovey.

2. *The Sayings of the great Forty Days between the Resurrection and Ascension, regarded as the outlines of the kingdom of God; in Five Discourses; with an Examination of Mr. Newman's Theory of Development. By* George Moberley, D.C.L. *Head Master of Winchester College. Second Edition.* London: Rivingtons.

3. *The Doctrine of Development, and Conscience, considered in relation to the Evidences of Christianity, and of the Catholic System. By the Rev.* William Palmer, M.A. *of Worcester College, Oxford.* London: Rivingtons.

4. *The Church of England cleared from the Charge of Schism, upon the Testimonies of Councils and Fathers of the first Six Centuries. By* Thomas William Allies, M.A. *Rector of Launton, Oxon.* London: Burns.

5. *The Epistle to the Hebrews; being the substance of Three Lectures, delivered in the Chapel of the Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn, on the Foundation of Bishop Warburton; with a Preface, containing a Review of Mr. Newman's Theory of Development. By* Frederick Denison Maurice, M.A. *Chaplain of Guy's Hospital.* London: J. W. Parker.

6. *Remarks on certain Anglican Theories of Unity. By* Edward Healy Thompson, M.A. London: Dolman.

7. *The Fourfold Difficulty of Anglicanism: or, The Church of England tested by the Nicene Creed. In a Series of Letters. By* J. Spencer Northcote, M.A. *Late Scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.* London: Richardson.

8. *The Theory of Development Examined, with reference especially to Mr. Newman's Essay, and to the Rule of St. Vincent of Lirins. By* W. J. Irons, B.D. *Vicar of Brompton.* London: Rivingtons.

9. *Mithridates: or, Mr. Newman's Essay on Development its own Confutation. By a* Quondam Disciple. London: Cleaver.

10. *Romanism, as represented by the Rev. J. H. Newman, briefly considered. By the* Rev. A. Irvine, B.D. *Vicar of St. Margaret's, Leicester.* London: Rivingtons.

Before entering upon an examination of this book we have to express our thanks, and to own our obligations, to the writers of various replies to it, the titles of which we have prefixed. To the replies of Dr. Moberley, Mr. Allies, and Mr.

Palmer, we would especially call attention. Dr. Moberley's essay has one fault, and that is its shortness. His clear and logical mind could easily have controlled a much wider region of theological and historical research; and the intellectual framework which he supplies would bear filling up with large materials from the book-shelves. Mr. Allies's solid and able treatise we have already discussed. Mr. Palmer writes with the quiet, sustained circumspection, and even strength, which distinguish his regular theological works. He argues patiently, and in general closely. His style is clear and easy; and if it never carries the reader on by any overflow of impulse, never, at any rate, obstructs or entangles him. His extensive patristic and controversial reading gives him an ample command of passages, which he uses with singular judgment and discretion; not overloading his argument with the whole amount of the material bearing upon it, but selecting what is most applicable and to the purpose. We would point to the chapter on the 'Argumentative foundation of the Theory of Development,' as a favourable specimen of his mode of treating a question.

For ourselves, we must state at the outset that we cannot pretend to embrace, within that space which a review affords, the whole of that large field of matter which Mr. Newman's book presents to us. It is necessary to confine our scope; and, therefore, we shall select the argumentative part of the essay, in distinction to the historical, as the subject of this article.

A short acquaintance with the Essay on Development suggests to the reader such a division of the book as we mention. He sees some vividly drawn historical sketches, the object of which is to prove the identity of the present Church of Rome, in religious spirit and character, with the Church of the first centuries. This does not form a part of what we may call the strict logic of the Essay; because its truth is perfectly consistent with the truth of the identity, *e. g.* of the Greek Church also, in religious spirit and character, with the Church of the first centuries. An ethical similarity in one Church does not preclude an ethical similarity in another. And, therefore, such statements, as applied to the purpose of proving that the Church of Rome is the only Church of Christ upon earth, do not profess to be of the nature of logical arguments; though they produce their particular effect upon the mind, as forcibly drawn pictures. On the other hand, there are arguments professing to prove, from the necessity of things, and the absolute wants of the Christian society, the full Roman developments and claims logically and conclusively. We shall confine ourselves, then, in this article to this latter part of the Essay, and shall devote some thoughts to Mr. Newman's argumentative proof of the doctrine of development in connexion with the authoritative claims and the peculiar teaching of the Church of Rome. And we shall not scruple, in doing so, to avail ourselves of the assistance which some of the prefixed publications afford.

On the first opening, then, of this subject, two great lines of thought encounter us; each of them a true, natural, and legitimate line; and one of them tending to check and balance the other. One of these lines of thought takes up the idea of Development. We see unquestionably everywhere a law of development operating. It meets us in nature and art, in trade and politics, in life vegetable, animal, intellectual. The seed grows into the plant, the child into the man; the worm into the butterfly, the blossom into the fruit. Education developes the individual, civilization the nation. The particular ideas we take up, grow. A simple thought, as soon as the mind has embraced it, ramifies in many directions, applies itself to many different cases, sees reflections of itself in nature and human life, gathers analogies around it, and illustrates and is illustrated in turn. Wealth and power both multiply themselves. The first round sum is the great difficulty to the rising merchant; which once made, a basis is gained, and money accumulates spontaneously. The nucleus of power, however small at first, once formed, enlarges, and absorbs material from all quarters. The jurisdiction of courts, boards, and committees grows; aggrandizing cabinets get all the local interests of a country into their hands; and empires, from a union of two or three tribes, spread over half the globe. Our languages, our philosophies, our machinery and manufactures, our agriculture, our architecture, our legal codes, our political institutions, our systems of finance, our civil courts, our social distinctions, our rules of fashion, our amusements, our occupations, our whole worlds, domestic and public, are developments. We cannot walk, or sit, or stand, or think, or speak, without developing ourselves. We go into a room; we address somebody, or we listen to somebody addressing us; we act in some way or other under the situations in which successively we are; and are brought out by circumstances, acting upon us in connexion with our own will, in one direction or another. This is the development of human character, which advances as life goes on. The whole constitution of the world physical and moral thus impresses development upon us, and points natural expectation in that direction. We find ourselves readily entertaining the probability that principles, sentiments, fashions, institutions, will expand. The change from the small to the large, and from the simple to the manifold, does not surprise us: and an image of that kind of alteration in things which is called growth, and takes them through different stages of magnitude and strength, is domesticated in our minds.

This is one great line of thought which encounters us, on a *primâ facie* view of the progress of any great political or religious institution. There is another equally genuine, natural, and true. If the idea of development has established itself as a natural and familiar one in our minds, the idea of corruption has done the same. If we see things grow larger, we also see things grow worse. History and experience have contrived to fix very deeply in us the apprehension of perversion, in some shape or other, and, in one or other degree, accompanying the progress of institutions, nations, schemes of life, and schools of thought. There is the maxim that the stream is purer at its source. It is observed that the intention with which a movement begins often insensibly declines, or becomes alloyed, in the progress. We attribute a mixed set of results to time, and welcome its operations in one aspect, and fear them in another. With all its functions of growth and enlargement, a general suspicion attaches to a class of slow, gentle, insinuating influences it betrays: the notion of the lapse of time suggests indefinite apprehensions, and the mind forms an instinctive augury of some change for the worse which it is to bring. Legislators, philosophers, and founders of institutions, are haunted by the image of a progress destined for their creations, which they never designed for them, and portend some departure from original principles which would elicit their protest, by anticipation, could they foresee it accurately enough. That things are better at first, and then deteriorate; that freshness and purity wear off; that deflections arise, and that the inclination from the strict line, once made, widens with insensible, but fatal, steadiness: in a word, the tendency of things to degeneracy, is one of those observed points which has naturalized itself in men's minds, and taken the position of an axiom. It is one of those large, broad, and fixed experiences, which stand out in strong relief amid the mixed and shadowy world of minor and less settled ones. It cannot be passed over, or put aside, or touched on and left, as if it were a mere casual difficulty. It is one of those great settled judgments which we bring with us to the consideration of human questions; and it claims to be acknowledged as such.

Moreover, if we go a step farther, and fix upon one very important and prominent line which this general idea takes, we find that, after establishing broadly and indefinitely this tendency in moral and physical nature, it next proceeds specially to remind us that this tendency acts by the perversion and abuse, as well as by the positive extinction of the good element which it accompanies. There is the corruption of exaggeration and excess, as well as that of decay. We see good tending to bad, without wholly losing its original type and character in the process. How this takes place, we are not at present concerned to inquire. Indeed, what the essential truth, the deep internal metaphysical reality in the case is; what the thing is which really and at bottom takes place when we speak of good thus changing into bad,—is a question which perhaps lies below the reach of any limited powers of analysis. We are only concerned here with broad and practical truth, as the general sense of mankind has laid it down; and, practically speaking, we see corruption taking place constantly by some good principle's simple exaggeration and excess. Our fine moral qualities are proverbially subject to this change. Courage becomes rashness, and love becomes fondness, and liberality becomes profaneness, and self-respect becomes pride. In these and such like cases the original type of the virtue remains, but undergoes disproportion and disfigurement: the original disposition, which was good, does not evanesce and cease to be; but, continuing, is carried out beyond a certain limit, and transgresses some just standard. It would be absurd to say that the rashness of the soldier, whatever extravagances or madnesses it might commit, lost its type, and ceased to be courage. It retains the original element which we admire in the courageous character, that species of indifference to self, and willingness to meet pain and death; but it retains it in a particular form, which we term exaggerated, and which is offensive to our moral taste. The rash man remains the courageous man; we cannot deny it; we feel ourselves compelled to preserve an under-current of admiration for him on this account; but we apply it to the simple original element itself of courage which we see in him, and not to its actual form and embodiment, as he exhibits it. A vast number of characters exist in the world, which we consider more or less faulty ones, of which the only account we have to give is, that they carry some natural principles of conduct, or some natural lines of feeling, too far. Men are over-busy, over-anxious, hasty, suspicious, thin-skinned, rigid, vehement, obstinate, passionate, yielding. In each fault, we see the good element at the bottom, which it carries out unsoundly. How completely does the whole region of enthusiasm, when we look into it, present an essential similarity, as far as the fundamental quality itself is concerned! We see a certain wide-working mysterious mental characteristic, which we call by this name: all the enthusiasms which come before us in actual life and history, are of this stock; all the enthusiasts we see have this enthusiasm running in their veins; but, quite independently of the question of a good or a bad cause, we like one form of enthusiasm, and dislike another. One man is a natural enthusiast, another an unnatural and extravagant one. In these instances, indeed, the continuity of development is even sometimes marked by the identity of the name. Jealousy is a virtue, and jealousy is a fault. We ought to be high-minded, we ought not to be. We ought, and we ought not, to be severe and stern, soft and tender. Such a person is so scrupulous, and another person also so scrupulous: we mean it favourably in one case, unfavourably in another. A fastidious taste is admired, and is condemned. We extol zeal, and stigmatize the zealot. We use the word enthusiasm, in the same breath, in a good and a bad sense. The identity of the word in these cases, is symptomatic of some great intimacy in the two things; and often where we have not the same identical word bearing its cognate good and bad sense, an unfavourable sense hovers around the virtuous term, a favourable sense about the faulty one: each is capable of being used in its contiguous good or bad meaning, and viewed in the shade and the sunshine, which respectively haunt them. A particular look or half-formed smile in the speaker, who is describing a person's character, throws a dubiousness over the pleasing epithets of courteous, polite, agreeable, prudent. Even justice is rigid, and virtue is obstinate; and we call men determined, or vigorous, or simple, or strict, or pliant, or cautious, or sharp, when the context has to decide the favourable or unfavourable sense in which the epithets are used. A whole class of words, connected with character and action, are very neutral and ambiguous, capable of expressing bad or good, according as they are used. The look, the tone of the speaker, must give the bias which the term itself wants. And in exploring the region of verbal meanings and significances, we find ourselves wandering among unknown quantities and formless embryos, which wait in suspense for the decision of time, and place, and context, to give them definite and fixed being. That is to say, whereas one main idea runs through a whole series of characteristic epithets, it depends upon the stage and the measure of this idea, whether it presents itself to us as right or wrong. Our verbal identities, and verbal modifications, the defects and the pliabilities of language, point to some unity of element in the case of various virtues and faults, of which the former are the just, the latter the unjust developments, but in which it is the measure of development which makes the difference.

In the same way, the intellectual character of a man's mind is often unfavourably affected by the over-expansion of an intellectual gift. A talent, however noble and useful in itself, requires reining in. Eloquence, versatility, richness of thought, power of illustration, are mighty gifts, and great snares at the same time. The mind of the writer or speaker is barren and feeble without them; and if it has them, we see it carried away by them. How does the impoverished mind long for the power of illustration; the author seems to be able to do nothing without it; every truth falls dead, and every thought comes out hard and attenuated: but give it him, and it instantly begins to clog his course; its impertinent fertility interrupts his argument; it interferes where it is not wanted; it goes on where it ought to stop; it cheats and fascinates his eye, and leads him off his road in the pursuit of far-fetched analogies, and superfluous parallelisms and juxta-positions. Some intellects, again, are too accurate, and narrow themselves by their own over-definiteness; they refuse to see anything vaguely, and consequently see nothing grandly; they leave the picturesque masses and groupings of a view, and always put their minds too close to each part to see the form and outline of the whole. Thus argumentative subtlety is a real gift, and at the same time a most dangerous one. We see it at first dividing acutely and truly, cutting a clear course through perplexing statements, and winding through a circuitous argument with self-possessed flexibility. But how easily does its fineness become too fine, and its nicety minute and trivial. Thus, men of the world are not rare who would often judge much better, if they were less shrewd; their shrewdness carries them away, and they are always seeing deeper and further than the fact before them, and never rest in an ordinary natural view of a man's character and actions.

It is in particulars, however, that is, in insulated processes of the intellect and movements of the feelings, that the truth perhaps comes nearest home to us. In such cases, however fairly we may start, we often feel ourselves under the influence of some active though hidden force, some spring of motion in our minds, which impels and expands us with a strength greater than that of constitutional nature; and carries the internal movement, seeming all the time simply to advance and go farther and add one degree of force and depth to another, by that very accumulation and continuous increasing intensity, to an exaggerative issue and a plain corruption. Thus, in movements of the imagination, we observe the poet's mind too often starting with the natural, and ending with the morbid. The sentiment which in its first stage was healthy and sound, becomes, as his fancy works more and more upon it, as he draws it out and carries it on and on, sickly and artificial. We may be able to fix on no exact line where poetical rectitude ended and deterioration commenced; yet there is the result. By fine imperceptible steps, and a continuity which seemed actually to forbid the developing operation a pause, simplicity has become puerility, and sweetness mawkishness. While the poet has been fondly dwelling upon his own idea, and caressing it, and contemplating himself in it, he has spoiled it by his own weak idolatry; till, spun out, exhausted, attenuated, and frittered away, the mind of the healthy reader rejects it in disgust. A like process has spoiled real grandeur and sublimity. How difficult does the poet seem to find it to prevent himself, in unfolding ideas of that character, from becoming bombastic. Even Shakspere does not always succeed. In truth, real and deep poetry of a certain class, and not a weak and hollow one only, has a strong tendency to bombast; and the bombastic development need not rise upon a false basis, but only exaggerate a true one. A poet expands a grand idea, and is only bent on expanding it; he attends to that too exclusively; he does not check or balance himself by other points of view. The thought swells, in the very act of simply expressing and unfolding itself, into rude and gigantic dimensions, and seeks unsuitable and excessive height. And an expansion, going upon the basis of the original thought, and only seeming at the time its essential elevation and full poetical career, in the result spoils its subject matter, and does the work of an enemy, while it acts as pure exponent and promoter. Thus many an emotion of heart can appeal confidently to a line of continuity which it has maintained from its very commencement to its very last stage and extreme vent; and yet, from a sound natural impulse, it has become an extravagant and morbid one. 'Be ye angry, and sin not,' the Apostle says: that is to say—anger is a natural and proper feeling at a certain point in its duration. 'Let not the sun go down upon your wrath,' he adds: that is to say—anger beyond that point is wrong. There is no change of type or essence in the feeling contemplated; it becomes wrong by the act of simply going on beyond a limit assigned for it. It is the same with other affections. The genuine moral affection of love becomes, before persons are aware of it, partiality and favouritism; and proceeds to idolize an object. Yet it only seems to itself to follow in the process, step by step, that tenderness which is its natural character and very constitution. Indeed, in the mind's daily and hourly history, every feeling and thought, as it arises, seems to go through a like course, and the process of corruption seems to go on in miniature, with respect to every creation of taste, and every stir of heart within us. Nature herself is sound; the thought, immediately as it arises, is true, the impulse clear; just the very first dawn of a sentiment, when the mind is half unconscious of it, its primordia and earliest infancy are pure. But the perfect healthy stage is an evanescent one; it is gone before it can be caught. Follow the impression for any time, and it glides out of our control; it swells, and unfolds itself too freely and boldly, and we are conscious it has passed out of its stage of simplicity, into a more or less unsound state.

The characters of great systems, schools of philosophy, religions, nations, instance the same excessive stamp. The Spartan character was an exaggeration; the Cynic was; the Stoic was; the fatalist temper of the Mahometan religionist, the fortitude of the American savage, the self-denial of the Hindoo saint, are exaggerations. The idea at the bottom of these characters we admire; but there is something painful about them; we shrink from the boldness of the moral development, as from something out of measure, unnatural, and prodigious. National characters are exaggerations. Anglo-Saxon stubbornness, French vivacity, Italian subtlety, Spanish pride, German speculativeness, Irish warmth, Scotch shrewdness, are excessive developments of good national elements of character. Nations gradually alter, and show, in the course of a century or two, that a particular character has grown upon them. The Anglo-Saxon becomes stiff-necked; the Frenchman revolutionary. The Greek, of the age of Pericles, was the Græculus of the Augustan era. Philosophical schools exhibit the same history; they exaggerate the mystical, or the argumentative character, whichever it may be, of the original philosophy. The tempered mysticism of Plato is extravagantly reflected in the wild obscurities of Alexandrian Platonism; and Aristotelian logic became disputatious and rationalistic in the hands of the sophistical schools.

The history of Christianity presents us with like phenomena; and particular schools or sects have carried out particular gospel precepts immoderately, and exhibited an exaggerated and deformed development of the Christian ἦθος. The peculiar meekness inculcated in the precepts, 'Resist not evil,' 'Unto him 'that smiteth thee on the one cheek offer also the other, and 'him that taketh away thy cloke, forbid not to take thy coat 'also,' and other similar texts, has been carried out into Quietism and Quakerism. The temper of reserve has been exaggerated in the same way, and developed into a tortuous and underhand spirit. There can be no doubt that Christianity does very significantly recommend, and very naturally produce, a temper of reserve; the temper is a feature in Christian morals; and other religions have not paid such attention to it. Christianity has done this because it is so essentially practical a religion; it does not stand aloof from the human throng, it enters boldly and familiarly into it, and deals with human nature as it finds it. It therefore thinks much of the quality of considerateness, and it tells its disciples to be watchful and gentle to people's feelings and prejudices. Violence defeats itself. This quality, on the other hand, sees difficulties, looks beforehand, and suits itself to the state of mind it addresses; mixes tenderness and prudence, forbearance and penetration, love and good sense. Such texts as 'Be ye wise as serpents, and harmless as doves,' 'Give not that 'which is holy unto dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before 'swine;' and such declarations as that of St. Paul's, that he 'became all things to all men,' evidently suggest some modification or other of the politic type of mind, as one intended to exist under the gospel. Now, whether or not the Jesuitical order as a whole has exaggerated this type, at any rate it seems certain that some members of it have, and that many who have not been Jesuits also have. Indeed, it is one easily exaggerated: there is an indefiniteness as to what it allows and what it does not; as to where its prudential character ends, and deceitful begins. A sort of cowardice soon couples itself with it, and a man uses reserve as a shelter and fortress to himself, instead of a charity to another. In time, the principle of accommodation becomes relished for its own sake. The machinery of management pleases. The undermining position flatters the mind with sensations of its own depth and power. The relation of watcher and schemer with respect to others, which makes one side the material upon which the other exercises his skill and tact, feeds a subtle vanity, and stimulates an earthly activity. A keen professional spirit grows upon the mind, like the love of some trade or occupation. The fineness of natural conscience with respect to sincerity is dullened; a technical standard obtains; and, step by step, without transgressing any absolute law at any one point, the principle of Christian reserve has developed into that policy which is often conventionally called Jesuitism; though we want to lay our stress not on the name, but on the thing. That which people mean to censure under the name, is the abuse of a good and a specially Christian principle. There is a legitimate principle of economy, which simple forbearance and charity in dealing with other minds involve; and this has received an inordinate and excessive development.

A general view of things thus impresses strongly a form of corruption upon us, which is the corruption of exaggeration, and not that of failure; the perversion, and not the destruction, of an original type: we see in a multitude of cases principles, in themselves true, over acted; good feelings over wrought; fine perceptions over cultivated. Our moral nature tends to indignation, enthusiasm, tenderness, determination, self-respect in excess. The intellect may be too rich, too accurate, too subtle, too shrewd; and poetry can develop into bombast and sentimentalism; philosophy into sophistry; national character into caricature. Whether any particular illustrations are right or wrong, and apply to the case or not, that form of corruption which consists in excess, and not failure, is too clearly marked, too broad, too common and palpable a one, to admit of any doubt. We may add, that though the word corruption suggests etymologically the latter rather than the former, and puts the image of decay primarily before us, yet the strong habitual observation amongst us of corruption exaggerative, has turned it the other way; and in calling the excess of a virtue, rather than its failure, its corruption, made the word suggestive of excess. This form of corruption Aristotle saw as a fact, and gave it a place in his philosophy. He said a thing can become worse by excess; the good principle need not cease, and an evil one be substituted in its place, in order to have deterioration; it may continue to exist, but exist inordinately. The measure, as well as the substance, is part of the virtue. *Est modus in rebus:* there is symmetry and form in moral nature; there is a standard of growth in the constitution of things. It is not enough that the good principle simply exists; it should exist in a certain way. True, indeed, good is good, and evil evil, and there is nothing between; but this settles nothing as to the mode by which good and by which evil become such. In forming a correct image in our minds of what makes good and makes evil, we must not only have the image of two separate principles, as it were two points or atoms, and say that one of these is good, and the other is evil. Practical morality is a more complex and balanced thing; and the principle of form, as well as that of substance, should enter into the idea of good. If good refuses to exist according to a certain standard or measure, it gets wrong by excess, just as, if it declines, it gets wrong by ceasing altogether. Without diving, however, into the metaphysical part of the subject, or attempting to get at the bottom of the relation of good and evil, it is enough to appeal to a plain and practical truth. All phenomena, natural or moral, are more or less inexplicable when we come to analyze them; but the difficulty of the analysis does not interfere at all with the certainty of the fact. And the matter of common sense, the practical phenomenon, is plain, that things become worse upon their original basis, and that good becomes evil by exaggeration.

Thus early, indeed, and in the moral department, before coming to theology at all, we find ourselves in collision with a certain idea of development. There is a philosophy of development, which regards it in its progressive aspect exclusively, and puts its form and measure in the background. Such a view has the advantage of simplicity; it makes the question of truth a question of quantity; and the biggest development, whatever it be, the truest. Development, simply as such,—as so much continuous swelling and pushing forward of an original idea,—is the more perfect the farther it goes, up to the very extremest conceptions of size and extension which the mind can entertain. A pure, progressive, illimitable, mathematical movement hangs argumentatively *in terrorem* over us, with the assertion of a logical necessity and impossibility of stopping short of consequences. But such a rationale of development is inapplicable to the subject matter to which it is applied. In morals we cannot develop mathematically, because we have not a basis which will bear it. In mathematics, we have fixed and defined principles to start from; we have them by hypothesis; we know, therefore, exactly what we are about, and have a pledge, in a known and ascertained premiss, for the truth of all the results. But in morals we have no ascertained premiss to begin with. We do not know what we have; we have to wait for a development before we do know. Here is the point. In mathematics the principle is known prior to its results. In morals it is only known in its results. Take the principle of love and fear in religion and morals. We call them two principles conventionally, and imagine them, for convenience sake, existing as two definite entities, prior to any concrete manifestations or developments of them. But the truth is, we do not know them or their character, except in their manifestations and developments. We see moral principles, as we see the laws of material motion, not prior to, but in their external and cognizable action: and the dramatic or practical developments of love and fear alone declare what love and fear are. The developments thus, in morals, explaining the principle, to argue from the principle to the developments is to argue in a circle. And, therefore, to any mathematical veto forbidding us to form a distinct judgment of any moral development, on the ground that we have already committed ourselves to the principle from which it proceeds, the answer is obvious:—we could not have committed ourselves in such a sense to the principle, because we never committed ourselves to this development. In other words, in the department of morals, as distinguished from that of mathematics, we go by the eye; and the moral taste necessarily forms its judgment of a moral exhibition, as a present object before it. The general principle being allowed, the phenomenon has still to be judged of: the mode of development is a separate question, when development arrives, and the undefined moral substance has to receive its form and measure, before it becomes that final reality about which we judge.

To go back to the point at which we started.

We have, then, two great lines of thought encountering us *in limine*, in entering upon the question which the Essay before us raises. We have the natural idea of development, and we have the natural idea of a tendency to exaggeration and abuse in development. In giving an account of the progress of any great institution, political or religious, either of these ideas is admissible; and one party may put forward the rationale of development, and another the rationale of abuse. One may fasten singly on the former idea, may illustrate it copiously, and by filling the imagination with the idea of development exclusively, preclude all other aspects in which any given progressive changes can be viewed; another may carry to the consideration of such changes the idea of development, and the idea of abuse too.

Under the contending claims, then, of these two ideas, the history of Christianity comes before us; and the question is how to decide between the pretensions of the two. The principle of development is of course admitted, to begin with, in this case. There can be no doubt that Christianity was intended to develop itself. It was intended to do so on the same general law on which great principles and institutions, we may say all things, great or small, do. If a man cannot enter a room full of fellow-creatures without developing himself, still less could Christianity enter into this world without developing itself. It had precepts, it had doctrines; those precepts must be practised, those doctrines must be entertained in the mind. Human life and human thought were the receptacles of the gospel. People who became Christians, would have to act upon, and to think of, what Christianity imparted to them. The peculiar Christian temper, in the first place, would be brought out more prominently, as different relations, religious or secular, social or civil, had to be sustained and responded to. While the apostles lived, Christians showed their obedience to apostles; when the apostolic office descended to bishops, Christians showed their obedience to bishops, and the hierarchical spirit of Christianity appeared in more regular form. Christians found themselves, as a matter of fact, under civil governments; and they had to act *as* Christians in this relation. They had a general principle inculcating meekness; that meekness became in this relation the temper of non-resistance. The charity enjoined in the gospel developed itself, under the particular circumstances of the church after the day of Pentecost, in community of goods. It afterwards developed itself in Sunday collections for the poor, and all the charitable rules and institutions of the early church. Thus there could not be martyrs before there were persecutions; the latter developed the martyr spirit in the Christian mind:—that generosity which made the individual ready wholly to sacrifice himself for the Truth and for the brethren. Heresies developed the dogmatic temper of Christianity; it could not show its fidelity to the Truth so forcibly before as it could after the truth was assailed. The self-denying temper of Christianity developed itself in stated fasts, voluntary poverty, retirement from society, celibacy, and monasticism. It was necessary that the Christian temper, when it found itself in the world, should act in some way or other; it could not act without developing itself: action is itself development. The simple fact of Christianity being in the world—being there just as other things are—being among governments, the poor, persecutions, heretics, made a Christian development. The question whether that peculiar temper has always developed itself properly in the world—one which we incidentally alluded to above—is one which we need not pursue.

Besides this internal temper of Christianity, a department of doctrine, or rather a mixed department of doctrine and feeling, was brought into existence by the New Dispensation, which, when once existing, could not but expand, and lead to farther ideas. And though those ideas might at first be strictly Apostolical in their origin, and have the rank of an unwritten revelation, yet, a time would come, when inspiration would cease, and the uninspired operations of human feeling and reason begin. We will instance three or four important departments in which original doctrine has received development from the thought and feeling of the general Christian mind to which it was communicated; not disguising, as we proceed, our preference of some to other stages of that development, though we are only giving, at present, its whole course as a fact. And we shall take development upon its broad and practical ground, not confining ourselves to public verbal statements only, but looking to their actual interpretation and mode of reception in the Church.

The doctrine of an intermediate state, with the relations of Christians to the departed accompanying it, presents, in the successive stages it has gone through, an instance of this development. The Gospel revealed, with a clearness with which it had not been before, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. The dead were, to the Christian believer, real persons, living in another state; that he did not see them was nothing to the purpose—they existed: the same personal beings whom he had known upon earth were alive in some invisible portion of the universe. But the dead could not exist without some relation between him and them ensuing. The first duty of a being to all other beings, is to wish them well. The Christian could not, on the first principles of religion, help wishing the dead well. If he wished them well, he implicitly prayed for them; for the wish of a religious mind is itself a prayer. Every one's eternal lot, indeed, is decided at his death; and that lot in the case of all for whom we can pray is a happy one. But we can pray for a benefit which is already certain, where that certainty is only the certainty of faith, and not of sight. The certainty of faith as to any event, can never of its own nature be so certain as not to leave room for a wish or prayer for it. We believe, but do not see; we look upon the dark; there is a veil before us, and we pray that something, which we believe to take place behind it, may take place. We pray in the baptismal service that the water may regenerate the infant, though we believe, in accordance with Catholic doctrine, that it certainly will; and in the same way the early Church prayed that the righteous dead might receive their eternal reward, though it believed, for certain, that they would. The doctrine of the intermediate state and prayers for the dead was thus a natural development of the revelation of the soul's immortality, specially made in the Gospel. The dead existed now; the day of judgment was yet to come: an intermediate state of existence therefore between death and judgment there must be: the righteous souls waited for their eternal reward, the wicked for their eternal doom. The primitive doctrine of the intermediate state reflected simply the original Christian truths, of the departed soul's present existence and future judgment. For the righteous it was thus a state of pure rest; their earthly labours over, their final bliss gradually approaching. 'Blessed are the dead which 'die in the Lord, even so saith the Spirit, for they rest from 'their labours.' 'Verily, I say unto thee, To-day shalt thou 'be with Me in Paradise.' Nature was a type of grace:—'man 'went forth to his work and to his labour until the evening;' in the evening he rested. From the whole idea of life as a scene of labour, followed naturally the idea of death as a state of peace; and the life after was not the continuation, but correlative, of the life before. The busy day, the still night, the journey and the rest, waking and sleeping, life and death, corresponded to each other in the Divine dispensation of things. 'Them that sleep in Jesus, will God bring with him.' 'We 'which are alive shall not prevent them which are asleep.' The language of the New Testament ascribes a character of peace and rest to the state of true believers after death; the idea pervades it remarkably, and lays strong hold of a reader. It is impossible for one careful and anxious about a true belief in this subject, not to regard with awe that sentence which, in its obvious meaning, seems so clearly to intimate what was in our

Lord's own mind on this subject. The Liturgies of the early Church followed up this tone in their prayers for the righteous dead. 'Return, my soul, into thy rest.'—'I will fear no evil 'because Thou art with me.'—'Be mindful, O Lord God of the 'spirits of all flesh, of such as we have remembered, and such 'as we have not remembered, being of right belief, from Abel 'the just unto this present day. Do Thou cause them to rest 'in the land of the living, in Thy kingdom, in the delight of 'Paradise, in the bosom of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, our 'holy fathers.'—'Remember, O Lord, Thy servants and handmaids, which have gone before us with the ensign of faith, and 'sleep in the sleep of peace. To them, O Lord, and to all that 'are in rest in Christ, we beseech Thee that Thou wouldst grant 'a place of refreshing, light, and peace.'—'Vouchsafe to place 'in the bosom of Abraham the souls of those that be at rest.'—'Place in rest the spirits of those which are gone before us, 'in the Lord's peace, and raise them in the part of the first 'resurrection.'

So stood the doctrine of the intermediate state for some centuries. It then gradually altered; till the simply waiting expectant state at last issued in a painful and troubled one, and the interval between earth and heaven, in which the righteous had rested, was occupied with pain and torture. A purgatorial doctrine had existed from the first in the Church. It was piously and naturally held, that the soul did not enter heaven without some purifying process at some point of time intervening, to take away the vestiges of its earthly stains. The day of judgment was fixed for this process by some; others did not fix a time. This belief long went on harmonizing with the primitive peaceful idea of the intermediate state; and an intervening purification of some kind, and at some time, supposed, left the general idea of the intermediate rest still whole and entire. By degrees, however, the purgatorial idea attached to this state grew and expanded; it grew, till it at last completely drove out the idea of rest. The purgatorial idea absorbed the whole state, and placing at once some highest saints in heaven, the obstinately wicked in hell, made the intermediate state one scene of fiery punishment for the great body of the faithful; the souls of the righteous suffering in flames equal to those of hell in intensity. As to the length of their continuance in such torture, nothing was certified; but nothing also was certified as to their deliverance. That they had gone there, the believer upon earth knew; when they would come out, he knew not. They would come out when they were perfected; but when would that be? The chantry was founded to pray and offer masses, throughout all time, for righteous human souls, not quite perfected, and suffering this pain, so long as they remained so. The difference between a process and a place was great. The idea of a purifying process, even though it be by fire, suggested a vague, transient, and merciful purification, and did not destroy the general image of the intermediate rest of the righteous; a purgatorial place, on the other hand, suggests the idea of punishment always going on in it, and makes the idea of punishment the standing, lasting, prominent one. The primitive purgatorial process having now become the fixed purgatorial place, the purgatory and prison of human souls; while that fixed place existed, the departed soul could not, in the idea of the believers upon earth, be quite separated from it; and that place existed till the end of the world. Thus a whole different impression from the primitive one, as to the intermediate state, spread and became dominant. The state of rest was changed into a temporary hell. A whole growth of popular theology filled it with horrible, minute, circumstantial details and particulars. The image was fastened on the popular mind, and a complete legendary creation arose. The system of indulgences made a constant appeal to it. Days, weeks, years, hundreds of years of purgatory were commuted, in the popular divinity, for penances upon earth; a second commutation turned those penances into alms. So much money bought off so many years of purgatorial suffering. The expenses of wars were defrayed, the necessities of the Papal see supplied, churches built and ornamented, out of the appeal to purgatory. The doctrine of purgatory was wielded as an established ecclesiastical engine, became a regular source of revenue, and could be counted on. It was eagerly applied, and warmly responded to; and a whole mixed practical system, carrying with it good and evil, much real devotion and charity, with much trickery, profaneness, and profligacy, completed the development.

Again, in the feelings and regards of Christians towards saints and holy men, development was natural and necessary. When Christians died, Christians began to feel relations to the dead. When saints departed, left a name and memory behind them, Christians began to feel relations to saints. The new relation followed from the fact, and honour to the saints arose on the same law as prayers for the dead did. It was natural to reverence their memories, and take care to transmit them. Any memorials of them would be tenderly preserved; their tombs would be especially sacred; the martyrdom would be celebrated; the saint's day would be kept. The mind would image to itself their present state, as resting from their labours and waiting for their crowns. Thoughts upon thoughts, in this natural line of meditation, would follow. It is unnatural to suppose that souls departed cannot pray. The prayers of saintly souls were intercessory in life; why may they not be so afterwards? We do not *know*, indeed, that, in their present state, they remember us, or think of us, or know anything about us upon earth; but neither do we know that they do not. All we know is, that saints, once intimately connected with us, are now personally existing in some portion of the universe of God, having the same essential disposition to intercede for us that they ever had. Upon this knowledge, when realized in a certain strong way, a farther step might not unnaturally follow in some minds; and, supposing departed saints could intercede for them, the wish might arise that they should. The wish again that they should, might, in some minds, lead to a kind of apostrophe or an hypothetical address to them to do so, only as a mode of expressing that wish. 'If you hear me, and I do not know that you do 'not, do what I ask you; if I *can* address you, I do.' If even some very ardent religious imagination, annihilating the interval between what may be and what is, hardly felt the hypothetical chain, and sent its address straight and unconditional into the spiritual world, the liberty might only be a mode of expressing the lively and realizing impressions which such an imagination creates. A whole line of indefinite feeling to, thought of, mental reference of some kind to departed saints, extending from the most ordinary popular honour to their memories, to the most internal supposition of individual piety and imaginative meditation about them, would thus not unnaturally follow from the fact of their existence, and would express itself in ways open or secret, public or private.

This is a development. But development being necessary to some extent, development goes on farther. The pious inward wish of the journeyer upon earth that the saints might intercede for him; the inward apostrophe and address which arose in individual minds, in moments of deep and imaginative meditation, when the spiritual eye seemed to see the invisible world actually open, and the saints in their own regions above taking part with the prayers of the church upon earth; all which pious individual impulse might just allow of or sanction in its own inward sphere, was brought into regular public usage, and made part of the established worship of the Church. The indefiniteness which inspiration had left over the fact of such intercourse between us and the saints departed, that veil of uncertainty which unsuited it for the Church's whole public ground removed,—that the saints heard prayers became a simple popular fact. The prayer to the saint was offered up publicly, side by side with the prayer to God. By degrees, the language of the prayer itself became bolder. The *ora pro* *nobis* had to be understood, and the earthly supplicant, as far as language went, asked of the saint the same things which he did of the Almighty, in the same form. Other and other developments followed, which it is unnecessary here to go through; the result was the present recognised worship of the saints established over so large a part of Christendom.

The honour of the blessed Virgin has been developed still more boldly, largely, unflinchingly; with a boldness and a largeness, indeed, which serve to throw all other developments into the background. But as we shall have to enter upon this more at length farther on in this article, we shall content ourselves for the present with a simple allusion, and leave the reader to recall to his own mind the general features of it; the style adopted in the 'Litanies of the Blessed Virgin,' and such books as St. Bonaventure's Psalter, the Gloires de Marie, and innumerable others; and the whole position given to St. Mary in the Roman church.

The doctrine of transubstantiation is another bold development in another department. The doctrine of the early church on the subject of the Lord's supper, declared that the bread and wine were changed into the Body and Blood of Christ. Nevertheless, it regarded the bread and wine as continuing to be bread and wine, the same in all material respects as what they were before. Bread and wine were material substances before their conversion; they were material substances after. Looking upon consecrated, and looking upon unconsecrated bread and wine, it regarded the former as being all that the latter was, however much more it might be; there was no idea of matter which the human mind could entertain, which it did not entertain of the material bread and wine in the Eucharist. How the material substance, continuing such, was at the same time changed into a spiritual one, it did not profess to say; it asserted the truth, and maintaining a thoroughly natural view as to the material bread and wine, such a view in all respects as any ordinary human intellect would take, on the one side, and the truth that they were become our Lord's Body and Blood, on the other, left the two truths to stand together. A simple, absolute, mysterious idea of a change; not analyzed, or pushed out, but stopping at its first conception; practically intelligible, intellectually unintelligible, combined both. Our ideas on mysterious subjects are necessarily superficial; they are intellectually paper-ideas, they will not stand examination; they vanish into darkness if we try to analyze them. A child, on reading in fairy tales about magical conversions and metamorphoses, has most simple definite *ideas* instantly of things, of which the *reality* is purely unintelligible. His ideas are paper ones; a philosopher may tell him that he cannot have them really, because they issue when pursued in something self-contradictory and absurd; that he is mistaken, and only thinks he has them; but the child has them such as they are, and they are powerful ones, and mean something real at the bottom. Our ideas, in the region of religious mystery, have this childish character; the early church had such. It held a simple, superficial, childlike idea of an absolute conversion of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood; and with this idea, as with an hieroglyphic emblem of some mysterious and awful reality, it stopped short. But the time came when the idea of conversion was analyzed, and pushed; it was inferred that if the bread and wine were changed into the Body and the Blood, they must cease to be the substances of bread and wine; and comparing consecrated with other bread, the Roman church pronounced this difference between them, that whereas all other pieces of bread in the world were material substances, this particular bread was not. The bread upon the altar was not a material thing, it only had the appearance and not the reality of it. We look on matter as a substance. We take up a piece of wood, or piece of stone: the wood is grainy, fibrous, igneous, and has all ligneous qualities; the stone is gritty and frangible, and has all lapideous qualities: but no assemblage of ligneous or lapideous qualities is to us the wood or the stone; we regard the latter not as those qualities, but as the substances which have those qualities, the qualities essentially implying to our minds the substance which has them: and the idea of wood or stone is utterly void and hollow while the substance is withdrawn, and is satisfied only when that comes in. Thus bread means substantial bread, and wine substantial wine, and they are not in idea bread and wine unless they are this. And this the doctrine of transubstantiation, unsubstantiating the bread and wine upon the altar as it does, denies the bread and wine upon the altar to be. The doctrine of their conversion has been pushed out into a denial of their continued existence, and the idea of change has gained a forced intensity at the expense of ordinary truth and reasonableness.

Taking these, then, as samples of a general development which has gone on in the Christian church; here is a course of development before us, and the question is, is all of it right, or is only some of it right? Has development simply brought out truth, or has it exceeded a limit, and become, beyond that limit, erroneous? One general view taken of this course of development holds it to have exceeded. Of the later and more extreme developments, what is ordinarily asserted by writers of our church is, that they are exaggerations; that they push certain feelings or ideas to excess, and corrupt them by doing so; that they go beyond the authorized boundary, and overlay the truth. The general form of charge against Rome is this, as distinguished from the charge of having extinguished truth: it points to the faults of an adding, not a diminishing system; to error in the line of growth and not that of decay. The tendency of Protestantism is to decay: it diminishes, dilutes, speculates away Christian truth: it dislikes mystery, distrusts awe: and therefore the Christian religion, as an essentially mysterious and essentially devotional one, would gradually lose its fundamental characteristics and original type, under the sway of unchecked Protestantism. Upon the Roman system, on the other hand, the special charge made is, that in various doctrines, keeping the original type, it has introduced an exaggerative corruption of it. The care for the dead, the veneration of saints, the peculiar reverence to the Mother of God, the acknowledgment of the change in the Eucharist, the sense of punishment due to sin, are all Christian feelings and doctrines, and they all exist in the Roman system; but they are asserted to exist in an immoderate and disproportionate way. The system which intensifies the spiritual by denying the material substance in the Eucharist; which gives the Mother of our Lord, because great honour is due to her, the place which it does give her; which makes, because it was natural to imagine some purification of the soul before its entrance into heaven, the whole intermediate state a simple penal fiery purgatory; which pushes out doctrines and expands feeling towards particular objects to the extent to which it does, has had one general fault very prominently charged to it, viz. that of exaggeration; including in that term all that commonly called extravagance, all that abuse and perversion of the exaggerative kind, which it practically means.

Such is the view which one side takes of certain large developments of Christian doctrine, which took place over the world after the first centuries; viz. as deteriorations or corruptions: let us now see how Mr. Newman, as the advocate of the other side, proves them not to be corruptions, but true and sound developments.

Mr. Newman's argument on this point proceeds on a certain definition of corruption; a certain view which he lays down of what corruption is. His definition of corruption is 'the 'destruction of the norm or type.' 'The corruption of philo-'sophical and political ideas, is a process ending in dissolution 'of the body of thought and usage, which was bound up, 'as it were, into one system; in the destruction of the norm or 'type, whatever it may be considered, which made it one; in 'its disorganization; in its loss of the principle of life and 'growth; in its resolution into other distinct lives, that is into 'other ideas which take the place of it.' He adds:—'That 'development, then, is to be considered a corruption which 'obscures or prejudices its essential idea; or which disturbs the 'laws of development which constitute its organization, or which 'reverses its course of development; that is not a corruption 'which is both a chronic and an active state, or which is capable 'of holding together the component parts of a system.' Again, 'The corruption of an idea is that state of a development which 'undoes its previous advances.' He goes to the analogy of nature: 'Corruption, as seen in the physical world, not only 'immediately precedes dissolution, but immediately follows upon 'development. It is the turning-point or transition-state in 'that continuous process, by which the birth of a living thing is 'mysteriously connected with its death. In this it differs from 'a reaction, innovation, or reform, that it is a state to which a 'development tends from the first, at which sooner or later it 'arrives, and which is its reversal, while it is its continuation. 'Animated natures live on till they die; they grow in order to 'decrease; and every hour which brings them nearer to perfection, brings them nearer to their end. Hence the resemblance 'and the difference between a development and corruption are 'brought into close juxta-position.' He introduces the existence of a falling state: 'Thus, as to nations, when we talk of the 'spirit of a people being lost, we do not mean that this or that 'act has been committed, or measure carried, but that certain 'lines of thought or conduct, by which it has grown great, are 'abandoned.' In all these passages, with the exception of that slight ambiguity occasionally, which in argumentative writing fulfils the purpose rather of guarding and securing a bold position, than really modifying it; one bold assertion runs throughout, viz. that corruption can only take place by positive failure and decay. Corruption is the 'abandonment of a line of thought.' Corruption is that which 'reverses the course of development.' Corruption is 'that state of an idea which undoes its previous 'advances;' that is to say, so long as an idea goes onward at all, it is sure not to be wrong: the onwardness of the movement constituting its truth. 'Where is the opportunity of corruption,' he argues in another place, 'in the three hundred years between 'St. Ignatius and St. Augustine? or between St. Augustine 'and St. Bede? or between St. Bede and St. Peter Damiani? 'The tradition of eighteen centuries becomes a chain of indefinitely many links, one crossing the other; and each year as it 'comes is guaranteed with various degrees of cogency by every 'year which has gone before it.' That is to say, corruption is excluded by the simple continuity of progress on the part of the idea: there is no interval by which it can slip in: the steps lap over one another like scales: 'one is so near another that no air 'can come between them: they are joined one to another, they 'stick together that they cannot be sundered.' The definition of true development and of corruption is thus; of development, simple advance; of corruption, simple retrogression: of true development, that which pushes out an idea; and of corruption, that which extinguishes it. A philosophical theory of development makes all development true, so long as it is such in kind; so long as there is progression as distinguished from retreat, and enlargement as distinguished from reduction. The fact is its own evidence, the mathematical pledge and certificate of its own correctness. So long as an idea is simply pushed out, extended, added to; so long as one step has naturally led to another, and the movement has been continuous and course onward; so long as it can appeal to a naturally gliding career, to a process in which the end of one advance has fitted on to the beginning of the next, to a line of arithmetical consistency and material succession, so long its career is *ipso* right. 'The *destruction* of the special 'laws or principles of a development, is the corruption of an idea,' and that only.

Now this definition simply omits the whole notice of corruption by excess. Corruption being defined to be loss of type, it follows that exaggeration, which is not this, is not corruption. The latter has no head for it to come under, and is not taken cognizance of. If indeed it be asked whether Mr. Newman wholly denies that there can be such a thing as exaggeration, the answer is that he does not, but that he does not admit and recognise it argumentatively. The value of a truth lies in its recognition in the argument. If the argument does not recognise it, an incidental allusion to such a truth in some other connexion is nothing to the purpose. In those two or three places where he appears to allude to this truth, the allusion stops with itself, and nothing comes of it. To take the following passage:—

> 'It is the rule of creation, or rather of the phenomena which it presents, that life passes on to its termination by a gradual imperceptible course of change. There is ever a maximum in earthly excellence, and the operation of the same causes which made things great, makes them small again. Weakness is but the resulting product of power. Events move in cycles; all things come round, "the sun ariseth and goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose." Flowers first bloom and then fade; fruit ripens and decays. The fermenting process, unless stopped at the due point, corrupts the liquor which it has created. The grace of spring, the richness of autumn, are but for a moment, and worldly moralists bid us *carpe diem*, for we shall have no second opportunity. Virtue seems to lie in a mean between vice and vice, and, as it grew out of imperfection, so to grow into enormity. There is a limit to human knowledge, and both sacred and profane writers witness that overwisdom is folly. And in the political

world states rise and fall, the instruments of their aggrandizement becoming the weapons of their destruction. And hence the frequent ethical maxims, such as "Ne quid nimis," "Medio tutissimus," "Vaulting ambition," which seem to imply that too much of what is good is evil.'

Here allusion is made to the idea of exaggeration, and it is implied that the idea is true, and that there may be such a thing. Various time-honoured maxims, 'Ne quid nimis!' 'Medio tutissimus,' are alluded to. The 'virtue which grows into enormity,' and that 'too much of good which is evil,' are alluded to. A whole side of truth, as seen in 'the appearance of things and popular 'language;' the phenomenon of good becoming evil by excess; (though with the protest against the paradox, that good leads '*literally*' to evil,—a metaphysical part of the subject which we have already shown not to interfere with the phenomenon,) are alluded to. The chapter is on the subject of 'Preservative additions,' and therefore the idea of exaggeration almost necessarily must be alluded to in it. And accordingly we do find an allusion to it. But when it has been alluded to, it is alluded to no more. The subject drops. The idea of excess in growth becomes mixed with quite a different idea, that of a climax or end of growth, the consummation which precedes decay, the bloom of flowers before they fade, the maturity of fruits before they rot; and after coming up to the top once or twice, vanishes altogether; leaving that of a 'corroborative,' 'adding,' 'illustrating' development, to proceed without a check.

Whereas then the ordinary charge maintained by English divines against the Roman system is, as we have said, that of exaggeration, and abuse in exaggeration, we have here a definition of corruption which excludes exaggeration from its meaning. With such a definition, an arguer of course proceeds with considerable advantage, to vindicate the Roman system from all corruption. He has only to say that Roman doctrines have not destroyed or reversed the ideas and feelings in which they arose; that in distinction to being departures from original truths altogether, they have been expansions, growths, developments; and immediately no absence whatever of measure in extent of expansion, growth, development, can make corruptions of them. They are secure by the definition, and have a pledge of faultlessness which no controversialist can touch.

Such is Mr. Newman's general argument: and we need not say there is an obvious form of reply to it. It is open to any one to deny the correctness and completeness of Mr. Newman's definition; and to assert that there is a kind of corruption which is not a whole departure from an original type, but which carries out that type excessively and extravagantly; that such a kind is seen in life and morals; and that it may take place in religious systems too. Mr. Newman asks, indeed, what room there is for error to slip in, in a course of absolutely continuous advance: but is not this just the question which any one in any case of the most ordinary exaggeration may ask? A man carries out some natural feeling or habit to an obvious excess. If fault is found with him, he can of course demand to know the exact point at which the action of the feeling ceased to be right, and began to be wrong. He can say that the feeling was certainly good in him to begin with; that being good to begin with, it has been carried on continuously, each advance in it naturally leading to a further one; and that at last he finds himself in the state of feeling in which he is. An ultra fastidious taste, a morbid delicacy, a lavish liberality, a haughty self-respect, a venturesome, a hasty, an obstinate, a garrulous, a taciturn temper, may each give this account of itself. And our answer in each case would be, that we were not obliged to fix accurately on the particular line which separated good from bad, sound from unsound; that we observed the feeling or habit had made the advance which it had, and that we judged of it as we did. It is characteristic of the process of exaggeration to be thus continuous, subtle, and gradual. But this is no difficulty with us. We look to the result, which is plain and large; and not to the steps, which are subtle and small. And therefore, when Mr. Newman, in the case of the Roman development, sends us back from the result to the process, and with a phenomenon before us will not let us judge of it till we have accurately accounted for its rise; when he says, 'Where was the 'opportunity between St. Augustine and St. Bede, and between 'St. Bede and St. Peter Damiani?' and requires us to pick some definite hole in the process as such, before we hesitate at the result; we can only say that the request is not a reasonable one; that we do not judge in moral and religious subjects as we do in mathematical, in which the process is everything, and the result mechanically forced upon us by it; but judge of the result independently, and, seeing an exaggeration for a result, can pronounce that the process has been in some way or other, however gradually and insensibly, an exaggerating process.

Indeed, Mr. Newman's own reason, incidentally given in one place, for his taking no notice of this great department of error, is a sufficiently self-convicting one. He mentions excess in one place, and mentions it as something wrong; but says he is not concerned with it, because excess is not 'corruption,' and he is only concerned with the question whether Roman doctrines are corruptions or not. 'We predicate corruption not of 'the *extreme* (meaning something wrong by the extreme), which 'preserves, but that which destroys a type.' That is to say, he excludes the idea of excess, because he has limited the idea of corruption, so as to exclude it. But surely this is no legitimate reason; for the question is easily asked, why did he so limit his idea of corruption? He has, by the nature of his argument, to clear the Roman developments of all that is wrong, of whatever kind, and by whatever name called. Well, here is something wrong, and something, therefore, from which he has to clear the Roman developments. He does not relieve himself of this task by saying that he does not admit this particular wrong thing into his definition of corruption; it exists all the same whether admitted into that definition or not, and whether outside or inside of the meaning of that word; and, existing, has to be disproved. The arguer in the present case may take corruption in any sense he likes, as far as the word is concerned, and may take it exclusively in its etymological sense of decay or dissolution. But in that sense, if there is anything else wrong which is not corruption, he cannot put it aside, because he has not made it corruption. He has adopted a defective and partial type of evil, and therefore must admit other types to his argumentative notice when they present themselves. At present the hiatus in the argument before us is a large one. We wonder, while we read, at the ease with which the conclusion is arrived at, and feel an argumentative power drawing us along without a tendency to convince us, or relieve the perpetual undefined consciousness of something wanting. As Mr. Newman's argument stands at present, he first excludes that form of error which is charged upon the Roman system from the field of existence; and then securely determines on that system's perfection. He defines, and then proceeds on his own definition. The scholar, in the old illustration of logic, who was locked up in the Bodleian after four o'clock, and from the window asked the beadle in the quadrangle to let him out, was refuted out of Bocardo: no man is in the Bodleian after four o'clock; therefore you are not in the Bodleian. The arguer first limited the capacity of the Bodleian for holding human beings to the part of the day before four o'clock, and then irresistibly inferred that there were none in it after. Mr. Newman limits deterioration to that form in which it does not apply to the Roman system, and then confidently determines that there has been no deterioration.

Having noticed the substantial argument, we shall not follow the detail and division, through which Mr. Newman subsequently takes it. The Christian 'Tests of true development' which he gives, only profess to be, and only are, an expansion of the one and leading argument. They all successively go on the supposition, that there is no kind of corruption, but that of the departure from, and destruction of an idea. In a development he says there should be, first, the 'preservation of the idea;'

secondly, 'continuity of principles;' thirdly, 'power of assimilation;' fourthly, 'early anticipation;' fifthly, 'logical sequence;' sixthly, 'preservative additions;' seventhly, 'chronic continuance.' Of such a series of tests we can only say, that in any sense—and we presume this is not intended—in which they do not beg the question at issue: every one of them may be responded to, and the result may still be an exaggeration,—an enormity. An evident exaggeration may 'preserve the idea,' may 'continue the principles;' *i.e.* go on in the same direction, as distinguished from a totally contrary one, with the original idea: it may make its additions preservative of, as distinguished from destructive of, the idea. Of logical sequence we have something to say shortly. How 'power of assimilation,' 'early anticipation,' and 'chronic continuance,' can prove a doctrine in a church, any more than a disposition in an individual, to be correct, we do not see. The latter test is proved thus:—'Dissolution is the state to which corruption tends: corruption, therefore, cannot be of long standing.' 'Corruption is a transition state, leading to a crisis,' the crisis, viz. of extinction. It follows that 'that which is both a chronic and an active state is not a corruption,' and that 'duration is a test of a faithful development.' But this proof rests entirely on the one prevailing assumption, viz. that there is no other kind of corruption or deterioration but that of failure. The idea of exaggeration does not enter. We see no reason for our part why failure may not be a long, as well as a short process. But to say that doctrinal exaggerations may not get strong hold of large portions of the world, and gain a chronic continuance, would certainly be, in our opinion, as purely arbitrary an assumption as any reasoner could make. The tests as a whole, in short, following the general argument of which they are the ramifications, just refuse to touch the point for which their testing virtue is most solicited; and allow the most common fault charged upon the system they are to test, to slip through them.

Of one of these tests, however, we must speak, inasmuch as it is one which, if truly answered to, entirely settles the question of truth or falsehood in a development. We mean the test of logical sequence. There can be no doubt that what is logically derived from any acknowledged truth is as true as that from which it is derived. But then the question comes, how are we to ensure the right application of this test, and how prove, in any given case, to other minds, that such and such inferences are logically drawn. We have heard much lately of the necessity of accepting all the consequences of the truths we hold, to the utmost bounds of logical exhaustion. Perfectly acknowledging the necessity, we want to know how the acknowledgment is to facilitate the argument, and how certain conclusions are proved to be logical.

The region of logic is a very plain and very unanimous one, up to a certain line. Where a thorough agreement and understanding as to any premises exist, all competent men will draw the same conclusions from them; and the inference will command acceptance, and carry self-evident truth with it. All mankind infer from the facts before them, that sunshine ripens, that rain makes things grow, that food nourishes, that fire warms. All men who knew what a watch was would infer that it had a maker. We may go into moral nature;—and so far as people understand, and are agreed upon their moral ground, they will raise the same inferences upon it: all people, *e.g.* who appreciate the fact of a conscience, will infer from it future reward or punishment. We may come to theology, and so far as men have a fair agreement and understanding as to any idea, they will draw the same inference from it. In all these cases the inferences will be the same, because the premises being the same in people's minds, the inferences are actually contained in the premises, and go along with them. But what explains the commanding irresistibleness of the inferential process at the same time limits its range. When the inferential process enters upon a ground where there is not this good understanding, or when it slides out of its own simply inferential functions into conjectural ones and attempts discovery, it loses this command; and the appeal to simple logic to force unaccepted premises, or subtle conjectures, will not answer. On this latter sort of ground, one man's logic will differ from another man's logic; and one will draw one inference and another another: and one will draw more and another less in the same direction of inference. In this way the logical controversy proceeded on the great doctrines of Christianity in the first centuries; different sects developed them in their own way; and each sect appealed triumphantly to the logical irresistibleness of its development. The Arian, the Nestorian, the Appollinarian, the Eutychian, the Monothelite developments, each began with a great truth, and each professed to demand one, and only one, treatment for it. All successively had one watchword: and that was, Be logical. Be logical, said the Arian: Jesus Christ is the Son of God; a son cannot be coeval with his father. Be logical, said the Nestorian: Jesus Christ was man and was God; he was therefore two persons. Be logical, said the Apollinarian: Jesus Christ was not two persons; he was not, therefore, perfect God and perfect man too. Be logical, said the Eutychian: Jesus Christ was only one person; he could therefore only have one nature. Be logical, said the Monothelite: Jesus Christ was only one person; he could therefore only have one will. Be logical, said the Macedonian: the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Father, and therefore cannot be a person distinct from the Father. Be logical, said the Sabellian: God is one, and therefore cannot be three. Be logical, said the Manichean: evil is not derived from God, and therefore must be an original substance independent of him. Be logical, said the Gnostic: an infinite Deity cannot really assume a finite body. Be logical, said the Novatian: there is only one baptism for the remission of sins; there is therefore no remission for sin after baptism. Be logical, to come to later times, said the Calvinist: God predestinates, and therefore man has not free will. Be logical, said the Anabaptist: the Gospel bids us to communicate our goods, and therefore does not sanction property in them. Be logical, says the Quaker: the Gospel enjoins meekness, and therefore forbids war. Be logical, says every sect and school: you admit our premises; you do not admit our conclusions. You are inconsistent. You go a certain way, and then arbitrarily stop. You admit a truth, but do not push it to its legitimate consequences. You are superficial; you want depth. Thus on every kind of question in religion, has human logic from the first imposed imperially its own conclusions, and encountered equally imperial counter ones. The truth is, that human reason is liable to error; and to make logic infallible, we must have an infallible logician. Whenever such infallibility speaks to us, if ancient proved tradition be such, or if the contemporary voice of the universal Church be such, we are bound to obey: but the mere apparent consecutiveness itself, which carries on an idea from one stage to another, is no sort of guarantee, except to the mind of the individual thinker himself. The whole dogmatic creed of the Church has been formed in direct contradiction to such apparent lines of consecutiveness. The Nestorian saw as clearly as his logic could tell him, that two persons must follow from two natures. The Monophysite saw as clearly as his logic could tell him, that one nature must follow from one person. The Arian, the Monothelite, the Manichean, saw as clearly as their logic could tell them on their respective questions, and argued inevitably and convincingly to themselves. To the intellectual imagination of the great heresiarchs of the early ages, the doctrine of our Lord's nature took boldly some one line, and developed continuously and straightforwardly some one idea; it demanded unity and consistency. The creed of the Church, steering between extremes, and uniting opposites, was a timid artificial creation, a work of diplomacy. In a sense they were right. The explanatory creed of the Church was a diplomatic work; it was diplomatic, because it was faithful. With a shrewdness and nicety like that of some ablest and most sustained course of state craft and cabinet policy, it went on adhering to a complex original idea, and balancing one tendency in it by another. One heresiarch after another would have infused boldness into it; they appealed to one element and another in it, which they wanted to be developed indefinitely. The creed kept its middle course, rigidly combining opposites; and a mixed and balanced erection of dogmatic language arose. One can conceive the view which a great heretical mind, like that of Nestorius, *e. g.*, would take of such a course; the keen, bitter, and almost lofty contempt which, with his logical view of our Lord inevitably deduced and clearly drawn out in his own mind, he would cast upon that creed which obstinately shrunk from the call, and seemed to prefer inconsistency, and refuse to carry out truth.

Let us examine how this logical process acts, in one or two instances, in the department of doctrine before us.

In the case of Purgatory, for example. The doctrine of Purgatory, we are told, is a corollary from the doctrine of Repentance. The one is contained in the other. Admit the doctrine of Repentance, in its genuine meaning, and you cannot stop short: it carries you, by necessary reasoning, to a Purgatory.

It is not easy, indeed, to see at first what this logical claim means. The principle of Repentance is a general Gospel principle. Taken in a satisfactional sense, it still remains a general principle; the principle that sin should be atoned for by pain. Purgatory, on the other hand, is a particular fact. A general principle cannot involve, logically, a particular fact. Charity is a general principle—the principle that we should love and do good to others. The general principle of Charity cannot, without an absurdity, be said logically to involve a given instance of it, at a given time; as that we should give, on such a day, such a sum, to such a person. If such a fact takes place, indeed, it is a consequence of the principle, but the fact cannot be inferred from the principle. Purgatory is a particular place, entered into at a particular time, viz. between death and the day of judgment, for the endurance of pain for sin. That particular endurance of pain is no more to be inferred from the general principle that pain should be endured for sin, than the particular act of charity is to be inferred from the general principle that we should act charitably. We draw from an approving and disapproving conscience, indeed, the inference of reward or punishment for actions. True; but that the sentence will be awarded on a particular day, that that day will be at a particular time, viz. at the end of the world, and that all the world will be judged together, are not contained in the principle of conscience, but are matters of simple revelation. We believe in a day of judgment, because the fact is revealed to us: and why are we to believe in a Purgatory, but for a similar reason?

There is an obvious hiatus in such an argument; and Mr. Newman fills it up in the following way. If the pain endured for sin, he says, is necessary, not only as a sign of contrition for, but as an absolute satisfaction for sin, then whatever amount of it ought to be endured, cannot be diminished from. Consequently, if it is not endured in this world, it must be endured in another. The early church, by their rigorous penances, inflicted it in this world: those penances have since been softened: it follows that the difference must be suffered in purgatory. 'How,' he asks, 'is the complement of that satisfaction to be 'wrought out, which on just grounds of expedience has been 'suspended in the Church now? If in consequence of death or 'the exercise of the Church's discretion, the "*plena penitentia*" is 'not accomplished in its ecclesiastical shape, how or when will 'the residue be exacted?' We will explain the particular assumption on which the force of this reasoning depends:—

Minds properly alive to the nature of sin, will admit the doctrine of satisfactional pain, in every practical and ethical sense. It is a doctrine not peculiar to Christianity, but part of natural religion; and does not apply to post-baptismal sin only, but to all sin whatever. Every one who genuinely feels that he has committed a sin, will feel something of an impulse to punish himself for it. A heathen will feel it. It is an original instinct in our nature, though post-baptismal sin comes peculiarly under its operation, as being the much greater sin of a fall from special grace. The mere necessary pain contained in the sense of guilt tends to lead us to some action similar and cognate to itself. Even the mere additional internal self-mortification which the increase of care and vigilance to avoid a repetition of the sin will cause, will be regarded by the mind as in some way satisfactional, and atoning for the past; and that aspect of such discipline will be reposed in with a natural accompanying sense of relief to the mind, side by side with, but distinct from, the other aspect of self-amendment and improvement. The idea has laid irrevocable hold of common language, and we talk about a person 'atoning for his conduct,' 'making satisfaction,' and so on; not confining the meaning of such expressions, though we use them vaguely enough, to effects of such atoning conduct in the way of compensation to others, but including the person himself also under its benefit and grace. As a practical truth, then, we believe in satisfactional pain; we believe, *i. e.* that we ought to be willing to undergo pain as a punishment for sin, and that to do so is beneficial to us and pleasing to God.

But as soon as we leave the practical ground, and enter on the metaphysical; as soon as we have to do with the intrinsic value of such pain itself, and its real effect, as so much pain, upon our eternal condition, we enter upon a subject on which we are wholly ignorant, and on which we have no means of forming a conclusion. Mr. Newman's argument proceeds on the assumption that equal sinners must suffer equal amounts of pain, in punishment for their sin. But this is an assumption and nothing more. We know what the sinner's disposition should be, on his side: we do not know what God's dispensation is, on the other. We do not fully know upon what laws, or for what reasons, he inflicts, in the course of his providence, various degrees and forms of suffering upon those moral beings whom he is training for a future life. The improvements in the art of medicine, and the greater security of civil government, have relieved Christians of a later age from much pain which Christians of an earlier underwent. There are all shades of difference in suffering among Christians of the same age: and some of the same apparent goodness have much less bodily illness than others. We do not know why all these differences take place; and therefore to proceed to calculate them, and infer from them that complement to come in each case, which is to give the balance, would be to argue in the dark. The Christian penances were less rigorous at first; became more rigorous after, became less rigorous after that: to say that a Christian, who repented with the same sustained care and self-denying disposition in a less severe age of the Church, would have to go, after death, into purgatory, because he had not suffered so much pain as a brother Christian in another age, is one of those forced pieces of reasoning which show their arbitrary basis. The great difficulties connected with the visible course of Providence, as regards our preparation for a final state, every one grants. The difference we see in persons' situations, educations, spiritual opportunities here; the premature death, which seems to cut the formation of a character in the middle; the existence of those vast masses which we see, of whose character we cannot pronounce decidedly either way, suggest undefined and involuntary conjectures to our minds with respect to the intermediate state. But we are not concerned here with conjecture but with logic.

Such is the main argument for the doctrine of Purgatory itself. A defensive one, to account for the fact of its late introduction, is skilfully turned into the same channel, and made to tell positively for it. 'Considering,' says Mr. Newman, 'the 'length of time which separates Christ's first and second coming, 'the millions of faithful souls who are exhausting it, and the 'intimate concern which every Christian has in the determina-

'tion of its character, it might have been expected that Scripture would have spoken explicitly concerning it, whereas in 'fact its notices are but brief and obscure. We might indeed 'have argued that this silence was intentional, with a view of 'discouraging speculations upon the subject, except for the 'circumstance that, as in the question of our post-baptismal 'state, its teaching seems to proceed upon an hypothesis inapplicable to the state of the Church since the time it was delivered. As Scripture contemplates Christians, not as backsliders, but as saints, so does it apparently represent the day of 'judgment as immediate, and the interval of expectation as 'evanescent. It leaves on our minds the general impression 'that Christ was returning on earth at once, "the time short" 'worldly engagements superseded by "the present distress," 'persecutors urgent, Christians sinless and expectant, without 'home, without plan for the future, looking up to heaven. But 'outward circumstances have changed; and with the change of 'necessity, a different application of the revealed word became 'necessary.' The argument here accounts for the difference of doctrine in the primitive and in a later age, by the fact of there being a totally different state of things before the Christian mind at these two periods; it asserts that, Christians being contemplated as sinless, and the day of judgment as immediate in the first, and both of these views being reversed in the second; purgatory, which was superfluous in the former of the two periods, obtained a legitimate existence in the latter. Now with respect to one of these two assertions,—without at all denying the existence of such an expectation as Mr. Newman mentions in the early Church, viz., that the world was coming immediately to an end—it is surely not true to say, that 'Scripture leaves 'on the mind the general impression' that that expectation was right. The prophecies of St. Paul, pointing forward to the 'fulness of the Gentiles,' *i. e.* the spread of the Gospel over the world; and the restoration of the Jews (whatever that is) to take place when that epoch had arrived, convey a first impression certainly of a very opposite kind. Those prophecies of St. John, which look onward to the rise of great events and large changes and commotions over the political surface of the world, to the career of empires and to their fall, and to the time 'when the kingdoms of the world are become the kingdoms of 'our Lord and of his Christ,' leave a like impression. We do not naturally imagine St. Paul or St. John thinking that the world was going to end immediately: and St. Paul in one place specially corrects that notion.

With respect to the other point, that Scripture 'contemplates Christians as sinless,' if it be meant by this, that it contemplates them as sinless so far as they are Christians, it certainly does; and so has the Church done always. But if it be meant—and the distinction in the matter-of-fact state of things at the two periods is the one wanted for the argument—that Scripture contemplates Christians as sinless in fact, this it certainly does not do; for there is no ordinary vice, bodily or mental, which the New Testament does not allude to, as more or less prevailing in the Christian society of that day. They are Christians of the days of the Apostles who are described as 'unruly and vain talkers and deceivers,' acting from the love of 'filthy lucre;' 'having their mind and conscience defiled,' professing that they know God, but in works denying Him, 'being abominable and disobedient, and unto every good work reprobate.' Those Christians could hardly be contemplated as sinless, about whom the memento was given, 'the Cretians are alway liars, evil beasts, slow bellies,' with the addition—'this witness is true; therefore rebuke them sharply.' The existence of 'rioters,' 'drunkards,' 'brawlers,' 'strikers,' 'self-willed' and passionate persons in the Church of that day was certainly distinctly contemplated, in that direction which provided that a bishop should not be chosen out of such a class. A very far from perfect state of the Christian temper was certainly contemplated in those Christians who, according to their condition or sex, were to be specially exhorted 'not to purloin' from their masters, not to be 'false accusers and slanderers,' not to be 'gadders about,' not to be 'disobedient to their husbands.' The men of the Church, described in the New Testament, appear to have exhibited amongst them very obviously and definitely the common faults of men; intemperance in eating and drinking, violence, covetousness, envy, pride and boastfulness, over-respect to worldly rank and station: the women to have exhibited among them the common faults of women, those 'of being idle, wandering about from house to house, tattlers, 'busy-bodies, speaking things which they ought not.' The Christian Church of that day, as the Christian Church of a later age, had 'spots in its feasts of charity,' and displayed as coarse a mixture of bad and good, in the very sanctuary of religious fellowship, as it ever did afterwards. 'Filthy dreamers among 'them, despised dominion, defiled the flesh, turned grace into 'lasciviousness, spoke evil of the things which they knew not, 'and what they knew naturally as brute beasts, in those things 'corrupted themselves.' Men externally Christians, 'went 'after the way of Cain, ran greedily after the error of Balaam, 'perished in the gain-saying of Core.' They were 'murmurers, 'complainers, walking after their own lusts, speaking great 'swelling words, having men's persons in admiration because of 'advantage.' External Christians were 'mockers,' 'sensual' men, 'feeding themselves without fear;' were 'clouds without 'water carried about of winds; trees whose fruit withereth, 'without fruit, twice dead, plucked up by the roots; raging 'waves of the sea foaming out their own shame, wandering stars 'for whom is reserved the blackness of darkness for ever.' It was in days in which all the above descriptions had their application, that Mr. Newman says, 'Christians were contemplated as sinless:' and that the actual state of the Church, small and holy, did not suggest a purgatory; whereas afterwards 'when the nations were converted and offences 'abounded,' it did. 'Christians did not recognise a purgatory, 'as a part of the dispensation, till the world had flowed into the 'Church, and a habit of corruption had been superinduced.' We see no essential distinction in the actual moral condition of the Christian society, at the former, and in the latter period; none to suggest to Christian minds at one age a purgatory as necessary, while it precludes it, at the other, as not wanted. And the facts of the case appear simply to refute the view taken of them, and the argument which is built upon it.

We will add that it is not the omission in Scripture with which we are concerned, so much as a positive counter-tone. With the Christian Church a mixed body, around them, and containing all the moral shades and inconsistencies, all the unformed, half-formed characters, all the alloy and general imperfection, which it did afterward; Apostles preached the doctrine, that 'the dead which die in the Lord rest from their labours.' An arguer may doubtless insist on being told accurately who were 'the dead which died in the Lord;' and assert that it meant some true believers, and not others; but we do not see how any fair mind can deny that the New Testament, as a whole, throws a peaceful and tranquil character over the collective state of good Christian souls departed; and that the established doctrine of Purgatory throws a directly contrary one: and that, without insisting on the universally traditionary meaning given to the Paradise and Abraham's bosom of the Gospels, the intermediate state to which good souls went after death has a paradisal character in inspired and primitive, and an infernal one in later theology.

We come to another and much more formidable instance of the asserted 'logical sequency' in development.

The whole extreme cultus of the Virgin Mary,—involving all the prerogatives, distinctions, powers and attributes assigned to her in the practical Roman system, and in the works of those Divines who have gone the greatest lengths on this subject,—is made the logical result of the fact that she was, in His human nature, the mother of our Lord. We are referred to the word

Theotocos as the voucher and proof of the whole. The relationship of mother to God as man, so mysteriously and awfully near to Him, as man, although infinitely distant from Him as God, has appeared to include, by logical sequence, ratifying itself, step by step, to some minds, as they dwelt in long speculative contemplation on that one idea, the whole formal and distinct 'place of St. Mary in the economy of Grace,' which we see assigned to her. The idea—mother of God—was entered to, pursued, brought out; it seemed mathematically to contain, to the religious reasoner, such further truths about her. Far be it from us, as members of the English Church, to deny the incommunicable dignity bestowed upon the blessed Virgin, in that mysterious relationship. We write now under the painful conviction that she has been, in our popular theology, abridged of that honour which is due to her: though how far the known principles of re-action may operate or not, as our excuse, we do not now inquire. But nevertheless when such inferences as we are speaking of, are said to be logically drawn from the simple original fact of the relationship, the question must be asked how we can argue certainly from data so mysterious and incomprehensible. We can express the truth indeed that the blessed Mary was the mother of God, as we can express the doctrine of the Trinity, in all modes and forms which amount but to the expression of that truth: and the truth itself invests her with an incommunicable dignity. But when the reasoner goes further and says—She was the mother of our Lord; therefore she was born without original sin, in the first place; therefore she was the 'created idea in the 'making of the world,' in the second place; therefore she is the one channel through which all grace flows, in the third place; it is right to ask, why? How do these second truths follow necessarily from the first? Show, for example, that it inevitably follows, from her being the Theotocos, that her own conception was immaculate? 'Can a clean thing come from an unclean,' we are told. But it is evident that on such an application of Scripture as this, the mother of the Virgin must be immaculate, for the same reason that the Virgin herself was: and so the stream of original sin is driven backward till no place is left where it ever could have existed. The truth is, we are not sufficiently acquainted with the nature of the mystery of the Incarnation, to be drawing such conclusions from it. Show us indeed, as we said before, an infallible logician, and we will accept whatever his logic extracts. But it is absurd to suppose that the mere consecutiveness, which human logic sees in this or that line of thought, and process of evolution, can be appealed to as proof of a doctrine.

Without dwelling, however, further on such general lines of argument, we will proceed at once to the examination of the particular argumentative position which Mr. Newman has put forward on this subject. Mr. Newman has discovered,—discovered we say, because we are not aware that any one has maintained it before him,—a new argumentative position for the extreme cultus of the Virgin: — a position, moreover, which does not stop at a simple defence of the existing doctrine, but aims distinctly at heightening it, and giving new and indefinite space for it to expand in. Exerting the privilege of genius, Mr. Newman does not enter the Roman Church as a simple pupil and follower. He enters magisterially. He surveys her with the eye of a teacher. He tells her new truth. He commences a doctrinal rise in her; he takes her by the hand, and lifts her up a whole step, in system and idea, on her very boldest ground of development. He will not allow her to stand still even there, and rest contented with her advances. 'Catholicity,' he says emphatically, 'does not sleep; it is not stationary *even now*.' He points out, and institutes accordingly a new doctrinal movement within the Roman pale, before he is himself in it; and he does not permit her to 'be stationary even now,' but gives her a distinct move forward, in what occupies so bold and extreme a place in her system, as her view of the Virgin Mary.

It is unnecessary for us here to transcribe all the authorized titles of the Blessed Virgin in the Roman church, or describe again what has been so often described, the whole practical and authorized idea of the Virgin's position, with the *cultus* attached to it, and all the ramifications of the *cultus*, the nature of the litanies and prayers addressed to her, and other expressions of the general idea. The reader may easily recall them, and suppose them put down here.

Now Mr. Newman seems to himself to see, that if the Church of Rome goes so far as this, in her view of the Virgin, she ought to go farther; and that all those prerogatives and powers assigned to her, want some one comprehensive basis to stand on, some one hypothesis to systematize and consolidate them. He accordingly provides one, and takes care that it is sufficiently ample. The early controversies on the subject of the Divinity of our Lord led, as an inevitable result, the opposers of that doctrine into a very difficult position. Overwhelmed by the force of universal testimony and tradition, which spoke to the fact of the revelation of that doctrine, and affirmed it to have been distinctly and uninterruptedly handed down from the days of the Apostles; the Arians wanted to deny the doctrine, if we may so speak, as little as they could: as little, that is, as was consistent with their own logical hypothesis on the subject. They would not acknowledge our Lord to be God; but, that provided against, they made His being, with an anxious and emulous subtlety, as near that of absolute Godhead as it was possible for the speculative faculty to conceive. They raised Him to the very highest and farthest point of secondary divinity;—'they did all but confess,' says Mr. Newman, 'that He was the Almighty.' First of all they said He *was* God: he was Πλήρης Θεός, full and perfect God; that is to say, they tried to make secondary Divinity more than secondary, and lift it above itself in the instance of our Lord. They proceeded: He existed before all worlds; He was the actual Creator of the universe; the God of the Evangelical Covenant; the Mediator between God and man. He was, as such, a legitimate Object of Christian worship. This position the Arians gave our Lord. This position Mr. Newman claims for the Virgin Mary. 'The Arian controversy,' he says, 'opened a question which it did not settle. It discovered a new 'sphere, if we may so speak, in the realms of light, to which the 'Church had not yet assigned its inhabitant. Arianism had 'admitted that our Lord was both the God of the Evangelical 'covenant and the actual Creator of the universe; but even this 'was not enough, because it did not confess Him to be the One, 'Everlasting, Infinite, Supreme Being, but to be made by Him. 'It was not enough, with that heresy, to proclaim Him to be 'begotten ineffably before all worlds; not enough to place Him 'high above all creatures as the type of all the works of God's 'hands; not enough to make Him the Lord of His saints, the 'Mediator between God and man, the Object of worship, the 'Image of the Father: not enough, because it was not all, and 'between all, and anything short of all,—there was an infinite 'interval. The highest of creatures is levelled with the lowest, 'in comparison of the One Creator Himself. That is, the Nicene Council recognised the eventful principle, that, while we 'believe and profess anything to be a creature, such a being is 'really no God to us, though honoured by us with whatever 'high titles, and with whatever homage. Arius, or Asterius, 'did all but confess that Christ was the Almighty; they said 'much more than St. Bernard or St. Alphonso have since said 'of St. Mary; yet they left Him a creature, and were found 'wanting. Thus there was "a wonder in heaven:" a throne 'was seen, far above all created powers, mediatorial, intercessory; a title archetypal; a crown bright as the morning star; 'a glory issuing from the Eternal Throne; robes pure as the 'heavens; and a sceptre over all; and who was the predestined 'heir of that Majesty? Who was that Wisdom, and what was 'her name, "the Mother of fair love, and fear, and holy hope"— '"exalted like a palm-tree in Engaddi, and a rose plant in Jeri-

'cho;—created from the beginning before the world," in God's 'counsels, and "in Jerusalem was her power?" The vision is 'found in the Apocalypse,—"a woman clothed with the sun, 'and the moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of 'twelve stars."' The conclusion of the argument is that St. Mary is truly that being which the Arians falsely maintained our Lord to be. She 'supplies the subject of that august proposition of which Arianism provided the predicate:'—'As containing all created perfection, she has all those attributes, 'which, as noticed above, the Arians and other heretics applied 'to our Lord.'

Now, in the first place, what does Mr. Newman mean here? The attributes, which he noticed above as those which the Arians applied to our Lord, were, that He was 'begotten before the world;' that He was 'the actual Creator of the universe;' that He was 'the Mediator between God and man;' and others. Does he mean to say that the Virgin Mary was 'begotten before the worlds;' that the Virgin Mary was 'the actual Creator of the universe?' Without a wish to attribute to him such ideas, we must at any rate be permitted to say, that, if he does not mean these, his language is loose, and is not what language should be on such an awful subject. We are told, generally, that the Virgin supplies the subject of that august proposition of which 'Arianism provided the predicate.' We are told, particularly, that, 'as containing all created perfection, she has all those attributes which the Arians applied to our Lord.' And the attributes here referred to are those of 'being begotten before the worlds,' being 'the actual Creator of the universe,' being 'the Mediator between God and man.' Nor does 'as containing all created perfection' qualify, but only explain the application of them. Interpreting Mr. Newman grammatically here, we cannot understand him but as asserting that the Virgin Mary was 'begotten before the worlds,' was 'the actual Creator of the universe,' was 'the Mediator between God and man.' If Mr. Newman uses the terms 'mere child of Adam,' and 'mere human being,' of the Virgin, in one part of his book, we will not charge him with the full grammatical meaning of another. But the question still remains, and is not answered—What is his meaning? Does he confine himself to the general animus of the Arian proposition, which was to make our Lord simply and shortly all but God? The general proposition, however, does not omit the fact of, but only the mention of, the particulars. Does he mean that the position of the Virgin Mary is equal, and tantamount in dignity, to the position of the Arian 'perfect God,' without being the same? But this would be a vague difference; and, moreover, the whole position of the Arian Demiurge was expressed with the view to quantity—greatest imaginable quantity of dignity not Divine: if it is to be adequately represented then, it must be represented as it was expressed, and with those attributes by which it was. To express an equal position to it there must be the same means used to express it. We are not, however, strictly speaking, concerned with the process by which Mr. Newman enables himself to hold such a view. It is enough that, as a matter of fact, he does hold it; that, whatever he may do with obstacles to it, he holds, and holds directly and categorically, the view—that the Virgin Mary 'supplies the subject of that august proposition of which Arianism provided the predicate;' that she is what the Arians affirmed the Second Person in the Trinity to be.

To proceed then—what is the proof which Mr. Newman gives of the Arian idea being thus fulfilled in the person of the Virgin? The answer is, none at all, except the facts that Arianism existed, and that the cultus of the Virgin does. The rest is supplied by assumption. Let us follow him. First in order there is the fact that the Arians, in depriving our Lord of his divinity, made him as divine as they could, consistent with so depriving him; and that thus a certain idea was arrived at, viz., the Arian idea of secondary Divinity. He then proceeds: 'Thus there was 'a wonder in heaven; a throne was seen far above all created 'powers, mediatorial, intercessory; a title archetypal; a crown 'bright as the morning star; a glory issuing from the eternal 'throne; robes pure as the heavens; and a sceptre over all. And 'who was the predestined heir of this great Majesty?' He proceeds, that is, to say that this Arian idea, demanded fulfilment; and asks who was to fulfil it? To which the answer follows, no one but the Virgin. The Arians imagined a position. It was necessary that that position should be impersonated. As our Lord was not the impersonator of it, some one else must be; and no one comes before us so suited for it as the Virgin Mary.

We must be allowed to pause, in some degree of wonder, at a train of reasoning like this, exhibiting such largeness, we must even say, wildness of assumption. It is assumed that the Arian idea must be realized, must be fulfilled, must be verified in some personage or other. Why? Are all conceptions, as such, true ones? Are all ideas, as such, verified by facts? If not, why must the Arian idea of our Lord needs be verified? What reason is there to be on the look-out for any personage at all, to substantiate it? Why trouble ourselves to find a subject for an Arian predicate? What is there to prevent us from considering the whole idea of those heretics, subject, predicate, and all, as a falsehood and a nullity, *their* idea, and nothing more? Certainly, there may be such a case as an idea strongly suggesting its own fulfilment; but in such a case the idea must show some peculiar tokens of truth, genuineness, authoritativeness; and even then the argument is a hazardous one. But to say that because a profane heresy raises an idea, that therefore orthodox Christians are bound to discover a verification of it, and that if Arianism conceives a predicate, the Church must supply the subject—how can this be reasonable? Let those who conceived the one, discover the other if they can; and let them verify their own conception; but they are responsible for it, and not others. If the Arian conception remain the Arian conception, and nothing more; if an idea in their case has no fulfilment, a predicate no subject; if a whole speculation, issues in hollowness, vacancy, and delusion; it is no more than what has happened to the conceptions of a hundred other sects, and is happening to ten thousand creations of the human brain every day.

We must add, that if anything can increase the strangeness of such an assumption, it is the absolutely matter-of-course way in which it is made. It is not mentioned, it does not appear; it simply lies underneath the argument, is simply supposed, and gone upon, as any self-evident principle is in ordinary reasoning. 'The Arian controversy opened a question, which it did not 'settle.' He means that the Arians put forth a position, and that the Church did not decide who occupied it. Observe the implied assumption; as if it was self-evidently necessary that it should be occupied. 'Arianism discovered a new sphere in the 'realms of light, to which the Church had not yet assigned its 'inhabitant.' The same implied assumption again, as if it were self-evidently necessary that it should have its inhabitant. Arianism gave its 'throne and sceptre over all: and who was 'the predestined heir of that Majesty;' the same implied assumption again, as if it were self-evidently necessary that there should be an heir.

The historical view is drawn up in a somewhat similar style to the argumentative. The drawer-up describes an easy, a natural, an inevitable succession of ideas on the subject. He exhibits the Church as going on in one continuous line of thought, and forming in two grand successive stages a doctrinal creation; first, embracing an ideal position, and then proceeding in due course to impersonate it. 'There was in the first ages no public or ecclesiastical recognition of the place which St. Mary holds in the 'economy of grace; this was reserved for the fifth century, as the 'definition of our Lord's proper divinity had been the work of the 'fourth. There was a controversy contemporary with those I 'have already mentioned, I mean the Nestorian, which brought 'out the complement of the development. In order to do honour 'to Christ, in order to defend the true doctrine of the Incarnation, 'in order to secure a right faith in the manhood of the Eternal Son, 'the Council of Ephesus determined the Blessed Virgin to be the 'mother of God. Thus all the heresies of that day, though opposite to each other, tended in a most wonderful way to her exaltation; and the school of Antioch, the fountain of primitive rationalism, led the Church to lay down, first, the conceivable greatness of a creature, and then the incommunicable dignity of St. 'Mary.' We have here an illustration of what may be effected by the instrumentality of partial aspects and points of view. The writer fixes an aspect on the Arian controversy;—the Church took cognizance then of the idea of a secondary Divinity. He fixes an aspect on the Nestorian controversy; the church decided then that a certain high title was due to the Virgin Mary; and these two put together are the Church's successive steps of predicate and subject. Now what are the facts of the case on which these aspects are fixed? The Church condemned the Arians for attributing to our Lord only a secondary divinity: the Church condemned the Nestorians for making God and man in the Incarnation two persons. On this latter point we will speak more at length.

It is true then that the Virgin was declared to be the Theotocos at the Council of Ephesus; but that title had final reference in its bestowal, not to her, but to our Lord. The Council of Ephesus pronounced our Lord to be One Person. It necessarily followed hence, that the Virgin Mary, being the mother of that One Person, was the mother of God; but the assertion of our Lord's one personality was the end for which the Council of Ephesus met: and the term Theotocos was introduced subordinately, as the sign of that one personality. The Council had not the rank of the Virgin Mary, but the truth of the Incarnation as its object; and the word Theotocos comes down to us with this distinctly subordinated character and significance stamped upon it by its early use. It may be said, indeed, that it makes no difference whether the Church used the word primarily or subordinately, so long as the word was used as a fact; and that the rank of the Virgin is a result from the word itself, with whatever view employed. But it is undeniable that the original motive for the word necessarily presents it to the mind, with a certain connexion, direction, and meaning attached to it. Between being used for one purpose, and being used for another, there is unquestionably a difference; and that difference has an inevitable bearing upon the word itself. Mr. Newman, at any rate, seems to acknowledge this; for he studiously moulds his whole historical statement so as to leave an impression on the reader of the rank, as such, of the Virgin being the subject of the Church's deliberations. Even the construction of a sentence, aiding as it does a general bias in this direction, is symptomatic.

'In order to do honour to Christ, in order to defend the true 'doctrine of the Incarnation, in order to secure a right faith 'in the manhood of the Eternal Son, the Council of Ephesus 'determined the Blessed Virgin to be the Mother of God.' The reader will observe that the sentence leads up to the Virgin's title, as to a climax; and at the very time that a statement recognises its subordinateness, a certain form and arrangement makes it a principal. A simple transposition would considerably alter the effect:—'The Council of Ephesus determined the Blessed Virgin to be the Mother of God in 'order to do honour to Christ, in order to,' &c. &c. We instance this to show what a very little tells in this way. The whole statement of the case is moulded with the same view; in order to produce, viz., a general impression different from what the facts of the case themselves give, an impression of the Virgin's personal rank as the primary subject of, her personal elevation as the crowning work of, the Ephesian Council.

Such are the two proceedings of the church on which Mr. Newman has to build. And he builds thus. Out of the Arian idea of our Lord, and its condemnation, he chooses the idea itself apart from our Lord, and apart from its condemnation, and so gets an idea of secondary Divinity, simply taken cognizance of by the Church. Out of the Nestorian controversy again he selects the Virgin's title apart from the doctrine to which it was subordinated. Thus, on his view, the Church first takes cognizance of a position of secondary Divinity, and then provides formally an occupant for it. But of this argumentative proof by a succession of aspects, it must be remarked that that whole mode of arguing cannot be considered conclusive, which goes upon arbitrarily selected abstractions from facts, and not from the actual facts themselves. An arguer may abstract one aspect, but all the others which he does not abstract still remain; and it will continually happen that one aspect of the selfsame fact will wholly negative another, for a given argumentative purpose. Mr. Newman holds up the Arian idea, in its aspect as taken cognizance of by the Church: it certainly has that aspect; but it was taken cognizance of only as the idea of an heretical party; and that is another aspect. Mr. Newman takes the former, and omits the latter: and the Arian hypothesis accordingly appears, in his view, as the sacred and awful property of the Church from the first, insisted upon, pursued, and in time furnished with its occupant.

Such is Mr. Newman's positive use of the Arian hypothesis, as brought to bear on the cultus of the Virgin: but he also uses it negatively, and as a defensive argument, for that cultus. The Arians were denounced by the Church as disbelievers in our Lord's divinity, notwithstanding their high and *quasi* deifying hypothesis concerning Him. Upon that fact the general principle is raised, that no one who regards any being as at all short of the One and Supreme God, can be charged with regarding that being as God; or be charged, therefore, with idolatry, with respect to such a being. 'Between all and anything short of all there is an 'infinite interval.' 'The highest of creatures is levelled with 'the lowest in comparison of the One Creator Himself. The 'Nicene Council recognized the eventful principle, that while we 'believe and profess any being to be a creature, such a being 'is really no God to us, though honoured by us with whatever 'high titles, and with whatever homage. Arius, or Asterius 'did all but confess that Christ was the Almighty; they said 'much more than St. Bernard, or St. Alphonso have since 'said of St. Mary; yet they left Him a creature, and were 'found wanting.' He concludes—'The votaries of St. Mary 'do not exceed the true faith, unless the blasphemers of her 'Son come up to it. The Church of Rome is not idolatrous, 'unless Arianism is orthodoxy.'

Now, without at all professing to be of that number who throw a whole-length charge of idolatry upon the Roman Church, we see an argument here before us, and we would deal with it as an argument. The argument, then, is based on a particular implied definition of idolatry; idolatry being considered to mean, the regarding of a being as the One and Supreme God, who is not such, and nothing short of such regard being considered to be idolatry. This definition, we must next remark, the writer gets from his own mind, and not from the Nicene Council. The Nicene Council asserts that a being who is not the One Supreme God, *is not God:* God being the One and Supreme God. Mr. Newman turns this assertion into the assertion that, 'such a being can be 'really *no God to us.*' Now, if by the latter phrase Mr. Newman means simply, 'not regarded as the One and Supreme 'God by us,' in that sense his assertion is coincident with that of the Nicene Council; but it is not the assertion which he wants; because it does not declare that such a being may not be idolatrously regarded by us. If, on the other hand, he intends his phrase positively to express the meaning wanted, viz., 'not regarded idolatrously by us:' in that sense it is only coincident with the assertion of the Nicene Council on the supposition, that the two meanings, 'not regarded as Supreme 'God,' and 'not regarded idolatrously,' are the same; that is to say, on the supposition that his definition of idolatry is true. He argues in a circle, and has to assert the definition on his own authority to begin with, in order to prove it to be of Nicene.

Of the definition of idolatry, then, thus assumed in Mr. Newman's argument, we must observe, that it appears to us a wholly inadequate and a practically futile one. There is a look indeed of irresistible logic about a train of reasoning, which runs:—idolatry implies regarding as God: no being is regarded as God who is regarded as anything short of the One and Supreme God; therefore the attribution of no kind of secondary divinity to a being, even up to the point of making it 'all but' the One and Supreme God, is idolatry. Such an argument may appear at first sight to bring the matter to an immediate point, and to the test of mathematical demonstration. But an argument is too irresistible, if one may say so, and defeats itself, if it refutes demonstrably a plain and obvious fact. The plain and obvious fact, in the present instance, is that there has been all along, for ages and ages in the world, an idolatry which has not answered to this definition. It is well known—and the fact is largely dwelt on in the first volume of Cudworth—that the ancient Polytheisms expressly condemned as idolatrous in the Bible, acknowledged a subordination in the sphere of deity, and placed over all the minor and secondary divinities, notwithstanding their temples and worship, one God supreme, the Creator of all things.[1] Scripture takes the broad and practical view here, viz. that such divinities were gods, and that they received divine worship; and that, however persons might intellectually deify, in a peculiarly deifying sense, some Highest Being distinct from them all, they practically treated the latter as divine, and put themselves, in their whole feelings and ideas, in a certain practical position to them, to which the term idolatry was due. But upon Mr. Newman's definition, how Scripture will prove its charge against the Polytheist, it is not easy to see. The latter will immediately present his belief in the One and Supreme God, as the infallible security against the idolatrous regard of the subordinate ones: and will say, 'between all and anything 'short of all there is an infinite interval: the highest of creatures is levelled with the lowest in comparison with the One 'Creator himself.'

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[1] 'Let it be granted, as you assert,' says Arnobius, 'that your Jupiter and the Eternal Omnipotent God are one and the same. Are not almost all your gods such as were taken out from the rank of men, and placed among the stars? Have you not advanced into the number of your Divi, Bacchus or Liber for inventing the use of the wine, Ceres of corn, Æsculapius of herbs, Minerva of the olive, Triptolemus of the plough, and Hercules for subduing beasts, thieves, and monsters?' 'The one and only God,' says Clemens, 'is worshipped by the Greeks paganically.' 'It is unquestionable,' says Cudworth, 'that the more intelligent of the Greekish Pagans did frequently understand by Zeus, the supreme unmade Deity, who was the Maker of the world, and all the inferior gods.' 'That there is one supreme Deity,' says Lactantius, 'both philosophers and poets, and even the vulgar worshippers of the gods themselves, frequently confess.' 'The Pagans,' says St. Augustine, 'had not so far degenerated as to have lost the knowledge of one supreme God, from whom is all nature whatsoever; and they derived all their gods from one.' 'The Maker of the universe,' says Proclus, 'is celebrated both by Plato and Orpheus, and the Oracles, as the father of gods and men, who produceth multitudes of gods, and sends down souls for the generation of men.' We have the Orphic verses—

. . . . Διὸς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη
Αἰθέρος εὐρείης ἠδ' οὐρανοῦ ἄγλαον ὕψος
Πάντες τ' ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοὶ ἤδε θέαιναι,

and the celebrated—

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος,

and Homer's—

Τόσσον ἐγὼ περὶ τ' εἰμὶ θεῶν, περὶ τ' εἰμ' ἀνθρώπων.

Or put such a summary mode of reasoning as Mr. Newman's into the hands of the idol worshipper of the Old Testament. It appears to be quite certain that if such logic as this is to be allowed to settle the question, the idol worshipper has a ground positively irresistible to fall back upon against the charge of the prophet. The prophet charges him with regarding an idol which he has himself made, as God. He enters into the most vivid and accurate detail in describing the entire and unqualified way in which this worshipped god is a creature, known to be a creature, actually made by the hands of the worshipper. The worshipper does not worship the matter as such; he worships the form: that form is the actual workmanship of the person who worships it. 'The smith with the tongs both worketh in the 'coals, and fashioneth it with hammers, and worketh it with the 'strength of his arms: yea, he is hungry, and his strength 'faileth: he drinketh no water, and is faint. The carpenter 'stretcheth out his rule; he marketh it out with a line; he 'fitteth it with planes, and he marketh it out with the compass, 'and maketh it after the figure of a man, according to the 'beauty of a man; that it may remain in the house. He 'heweth him down cedars, and taketh the cypress and the oak, 'which he strengtheneth for himself among the trees of the 'forest: he planteth an ash, and the rain doth nourish it. Then 'shall it be for a man to burn: for he will take thereof, and 'warm himself; yea, he kindleth it, and baketh bread; yea, he 'maketh a god, and worshippeth it; he maketh it a graven image, 'and falleth down thereto. He burneth part thereof in the fire; 'with part thereof he eateth flesh; he roasteth roast, and is 'satisfied: yea, he warmeth himself, and saith, Aha, I am warm, 'I have seen the fire: and the residue thereof he maketh a 'god, even his graven image: he falleth down unto it, and 'worshippeth it, and prayeth unto it, and saith, Deliver me; 'for thou art my god. They have not known nor understood: 'for He hath shut their eyes, that they cannot see; and their 'hearts, that they cannot understand. And none considereth in 'his heart, neither is there knowledge nor understanding to say, 'I have burned part of it in the fire; yea, also I have baked 'bread upon the coals thereof; I have roasted flesh, and eaten 'it: and shall I make the residue thereof an abomination? 'shall I fall down to the stock of a tree?' Now the idol worshipper of the old world, because he was spiritually hardened, was not therefore intellectually stupified. We are expressly told of such, that 'professing themselves wise, they became fools.' He was, in regard to intellectual power, fully as profound a philosopher, as deep a thinker, as subtle a reasoner, as the worshipper of the One Invisible God. Let us at any rate suppose him so, for it is all the same for the argument. Is it possible to imagine that an intellectual idolater would not have had the wit to urge in his defence that he did not worship the idol itself, and that the prophet misapprehended him? Could he not confront his accuser, *in limine*, and before he troubled himself with a single step in the line of apology, with the self-evident proposition that it was simply impossible, an absurdity in terms, that he should regard a piece of matter as God? And could he not retort, with irresistible effect upon the prophet, those very details of image-making which had been urged against him? Could he not say that that very description only proved the more vividly that the idol was, because it *must* be, looked upon by the worshipper as a creature? that if the latter made the image with his own hand, he had an *ipso facto* proof, which it was not in his power as a rational being to deny, that it was a creature; that if he knew it to be a creature, he must think it to be one? and that if he thought it to be a creature, he could not at the same time think it to be God? What logical contradiction could be given to such a defence? Undoubtedly it is impossible that any human being should think the material substance of a stone or a log to be God. The prophet would, of course, proceeding upon his own substantial meaning in his charge, treat such a reply to it as an evasion, and not an answer. If there be a species of regard to, a feeling to, a whole internal attitude of the mind toward an image which is idolatrous, while it does not absolutely deify it, such idolatry is not refuted by this reply. But take away this species of idolatry from the field of existence, as Mr. Newman does, and we do not see how the prophet can make good a charge of idolatry in the case. He must yield to irresistible logic; the thing charged is simply impossible. Mr. Newman's reasoning makes the plain assertions of Scripture inexplicable, and empties the whole arguments of the whole line of prophets, on the subject of idolatry, of validity. The Bible is made to talk what is in truth nonsense; and the refinement of later speculative analysis throws over its holy scorn, and confident denunciation, a character of little more than —to use the expression—a high fanaticism.

Such logic, then, as that before us, is refuted by the fact. And this is only another form of stating that it is not sound logic. The principle of 'summum jus summa injuria,' in justice has its counterpart in reasoning. There is an extreme, a purist species of logic, which marches through a question like a phantom, and leaves it just where it was. The present is an attempt to decide a practical question by the test of an abstract truth. Idolatry is a practical thing; it exists, where it does exist, in the shape of a certain actual state of feeling and sentiment in an individual mind toward a particular object; and it must be tested by being compared with the same individual's actual state of feeling toward another object, viz. God. If the former, on comparison, exhibits a sufficient distinction from the latter, it avoids the idolatrous character; if it does not, it assumes it; but the distinction lies between two practical states of feeling. Mr. Newman's test, on the other hand, is a belief in the abstract truth that one being is God, and the other not. Now the reception of the abstract distinction does not necessarily carry with it that amount of the practical one. It might seem, indeed, at first sight, that the simple idea of a Supreme Being implied in the holder of it a corresponding supreme and inapproachable standard, in his idea of that Being's dignity, as compared with his idea of any other's. Because we form the idea of an infinite Being, we seem to have an infinite idea, and therefore to be *ipso facto* secured from the possibility of an approach to it in our idea of any other being. But that is not true. In the present case the Being is infinite, our idea of Him is finite. We have from the imperfection of our nature a necessarily limited idea of God; the consequence is that that idea is not incapable of being approached in the case of forming a conception of some other being, and that such a thing is possible as raising the dignity of some other being too near to His, to leave room for that difference which should exist between them. 'Between all, and anything short of all, there is an infinite 'interval;' certainly, in the region of abstract truth, but not in the region of human idea and conception. The human idea of 'all' is a finite one, and therefore the interval between that 'all' and something just short of it, is not infinite in the human mind. Were we infinite beings, indeed, and had an infinite idea of God to begin with, we could afford to erect any finite conception of any magnitude whatever, and run no risk of approach to the infinite one. But such a liberty cannot be conceded to circumscribed minds without an interference with their finite idea of that Being. And to throw open the whole world of human conception to them, and allow them to raise their idea of secondary divinity as high as they please, only with the abstract salvo that it is short of supreme, is to be secure in the finiteness of the idea approaching, while we forget the finiteness of the idea approached. The image which our limited faculties can form of the Supreme Being is one to which daring ascents in the scale of secondary divinity can, if pursued, make an approach, and attain an improper vicinity. And although it may be argued that if our idea of the Supreme Being is finite, we have the evil, any how, of a less interval than there ought to be between our idea of Him and other beings; still we may have quite a sufficiently large and awful idea of Him, to make the practical distinction we want: and an interval may be wide enough, if properly preserved, though it may not be if rudely invaded.

Moreover, this whole argument is just not the one which, as a matter of fact, the Fathers of Nice took with respect to the Arian hypothesis. Mr. Newman says, 'the Nicene Council re-'cognised the eventful principle, that while we believe and profess 'any being to be a creature, such a being is really no God to us, 'though honoured by us with whatever high titles, and with 'whatever homage.' If this, as we said before, means only that the Nicene Council asserted of the created God of the Arians, that such a being could not be regarded as the One and Supreme God by them; that is, indeed, as true, as it is irrelevant. But if it means that the Council asserted that such a being could not be 'God to them,' be regarded idolatrously by them, because they professed Him to be a creature—then, so far from asserting such a thing, the Nicene Council, in the person of her principal Father and expositor, most clearly, positively, and literally asserted the contrary. 'If,' says Athanasius, 'the Word is a creature, either He is not true God, or 'they must of necessity say that there are two Gods—one Creator, 'and the other creature; and must serve two Lords—one regene-'rate, and the other generate and a creature. Wherefore, 'when the Arians have these speculations and views, do they 'not rank themselves with the Gentiles? For they, like the 'Gentiles, *worship the creature*.' St. Athanasius here clearly asserts, that the titles and homage with which the Arians honoured our Lord, made our Lord a God to them, notwithstanding His being pronounced by them a creature: he clearly asserts that they paid divine worship to this creature, believing Him to be such. He charges them with idolatry, as the immediate and necessary result of their position. St. Ambrose repeats the charge, and attacks their worship of a created god: 'If the Son is posterior to the Father,' he says, 'He is a new 'god: if He is not one with the Father He is a strange god: 'why do they worship a strange god?' It is obvious, that he could not imagine the Arian paying such divine worship in the first instance, on the principle that the bare acknowledgment of creatureship in the being honoured precluded the possibility of such worship in the honourer. St. Hilary has the same argument. 'Knowest thou not, O heretic, who callest Christ a 'creature, that cursed are they who serve the creature? Thou 'confessest Christ to be a creature: know what this confession 'makes of thee: know that cursed is the worship of a creature.' St. Hilary, that is to say, recognises the fact of divine worship being paid to a creature, confessed by the worshipper to be such. 'Why,' says St. Cyril, 'do they believe the Son to be a creature, 'and yet worship Him?' the same fact recognised. 'God forbids 'us,' says St. Cyril again, 'to think any new god to be God, or 'to adore a strange god:' and he proceeds to enlarge on the sin of paying divine worship to a being confessed not to be the Supreme and Eternal God. 'If thou believest in,' says Faustinus, 'and worshippest and servest the only begotten Son of 'God, calling Him a creature, expect the punishment due to 'those who turn the truth of God into a lie.' 'Very many of 'the ancient Fathers,' says Petavius, 'were accustomed to 'call the Arians idolaters, because they adored one, whom they 'confessed to be a creature; and they assert that they did not 'differ from the heathen. . . . . . So says Cyril, in his fourth 'dialogue on the Trinity. He shows the dogma of these heretics 'to be that the Son was not true God, and was yet to be adored 'and worshipped; from Christians, he thus argues, they had 'become Gentiles again; for that they adored and served creatures, and confessed a plurality of gods, just as the Gentiles 'did. Inasmuch as even the Gentiles served the creature, and 'worshipped gods, who are no gods, with the understanding 'that they gave, while they did so, the first place to some One 'and supreme God, the Maker of the universe.'

The Fathers, then, certainly considered the Arian position an idolatrous one. If it be said, that this was a mistake as to a fact; that they misapprehended the Arian worship; that if they had asked the Arians, the latter would have told them that they could only, from the very nature of their hypothesis, pay a relative and not a divine worship to their Demiurge: the plain answer, in the first place, is, that the Fathers knew that the

Arians *could* say this—it is so obvious a defence—and that they charged them with such worship, notwithstanding. And the answer, in the second place, is, that the Arians *did* say this; and that the Fathers did not listen to them. The Arians made this very distinction; they asserted that they worshipped Christ, σχετικῶς, with a relative worship. They said, what the early Socinians have said since, that they paid a relative worship to Christ, as to a created God. 'Is honour and 'worship,' stands the question in the Racovian Catechism, 'paid 'to Christ in such a way, as for there to be no distinction 'between Christ and God, in this respect?' And the answer is: 'No: there is a great distinction. For we adore and worship 'God as the primary cause of our salvation; Christ as the 'secondary: God as Him from whom, Christ as Him through 'whom, are all things.' Such a defence had the Arians, and it did not avail them. The judgment of the Fathers was decided. Nay, we have Mr. Newman's own authority for the fact of, and Mr. Newman's own concurrence in, the truth of this judgment. 'The Arians,' he says, 'were under the dilemma of holding two 'gods, or worshipping the creature.' 'The reason,' he says again, 'for the title ungodliness (ἀθεότης) as applied to the Arians, 'seems to have lain in the idolatrous character of the Arian 'worship, on its own showing, viz. as worshipping One whom 'they yet maintained to be a creature.'[1] What? the Arian worship idolatrous on its own showing? A creature worshipped as God, by those who maintained Him to be a creature? But this is exactly the thing of which we have just heard Mr. Newman denying the possibility. Let us put the two sentences side by side: 'that while we believe and profess any being to be a 'creature, such a being is really no God to us,' is what we heard asserted just now, as the view of the Fathers, and of the writer: that Arian 'worship is idolatrous on its own showing, as being 'the worship of one, who is maintained to be a creature,' is what we next hear asserted, as also the view of the Fathers and of the writer. On the same self-evident ground, of 'its own 'showing,' in both cases, the same worship is pronounced to be essentially idolatrous in the latter sentence; essentially *not* idolatrous in the former.[2]

The truth is—for it is time that the distinction between the two views should be summed up—the Fathers plainly condemned the whole Arian hypothesis, application, substance and all. Mr. Newman does not do this, and does not allow that the Fathers did. He views the Arian hypothesis as consisting of two parts:

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[1] St. Athanasius against Arianism, Part 1, p. 3.

[2] We have to acknowledge many obligations here and throughout this article to Mr. Palmer's able and learned treatise.

the hypothesis itself, as we may call it, and the subject of it. To make the subject of it our Lord was erroneous. But the hypothesis itself involved no idolatry, and was sound. He separates, by an ingenious process, the application of the Arian idea from its substance, and applies the censures of the Fathers to the former, and not to the latter. But the Fathers censured the latter. They condemned the application of the idea of a created divinity to our Lord: they also condemned that idea of created divinity. They charged the Arians with idolatry. But idolatry could not attach to the Arian idea in its application; for so far as our Lord was the object of their worship, they were not idolatrous. It attached to it in its substance. The position was in itself an idolatrous one. It supposed a being, who was not to be supposed; a being who demanded worship on account of his greatness, and could not receive it on account of his creatureship: endowed with a quasi eternity and creatorial attributes which overwhelmed the imagination with the look of, while they did not touch the abstract notion of, Deity: a being, virtually a god to human minds, and yet an idol the instant he was a god. The conception produced idolatrous relations from within itself, and made its disciples and believers, necessarily, worshippers of what they ought not to worship. The ideas of heretics are perpetually inconsistencies and obliquities, and this was one. The hypothesis was internally unsound. The Fathers, as a matter of fact, did not view the Arian created godhead as 'a wonder in 'heaven, a throne mediatorial, a title archetypal, a crown bright 'as the morning-star, a glory issuing from the eternal throne, 'robes pure as the heavens, and a sceptre over all.' They did not look upon the conception as a noble, grand, and inspired one. They regarded it with simple detestation and abhorrence; and the Arian Demiurgus, not simply as a misrepresentation of another, but also as being what he was, was a theological monster in their eyes, unlawfully, profanely, and falsely imagined. It was a principle with them to dislike proximities to Deity. They feared and suspected, as such, ambiguities and borderings in this department; and a scrupulous and jealous eye was ever on the watch to preserve, in its proper broadness, not merely by abstract definition, but in actual image and idea to the mind, the interval between the Creator and all created beings. Let creatures be creatures, and let God be God, their theology said: the halfway and mixed being, who was a god to the imagination and not to the reason, the nature which trembled on the very verge of godhead, 'just all but' divine, and yet not divine; were not legitimate existences, in their eyes. They dreaded the confusion which vicinity caused; the shading off of the keen distinction between what was God, and what was not; the dilution of the idea of Deity. The heathens, with their gradual ascent of being up to the Supreme, and system of approximation, had diluted the idea of Deity: the work of the chosen people, on the other hand, was to preserve that idea keen and pure. The Fathers showed, on this subject, much of what a modern philosophical developist will perhaps think a Judaic spirit, and the ἦθος of the law; mental vestiges of the old dispensation still surviving but intended to disappear with the progress of truth. 'It 'pleased God,' says Athanasius, 'to show in man His own 'Lordship, and so, to draw all men to himself. But to do this 'by a mere man beseemed not; lest having man for our Lord, 'we should become worshippers of man. Therefore, the Word 'Himself became flesh, and the Father called His name Jesus; 'and so made Him Lord and Christ, as much as to say, "He 'made Him to rule and reign."' The idea is, evidently, that a human, a created Redeemer, would have been an ensnaring object to us, on this ground, as seeming to claim worship, while he was after all only a creature. It is the midway being, the secondary god which is objected to. 'Consistently,' says the same writer again, in mentioning some of the features of the Incarnation, 'were such ascribed not to another, but to the 'Lord, that the grace also may be from Him, and that we may 'become not worshippers of any other, but truly devout towards 'God; because we pray to no creature, no ordinary man, but to 'the natural and true Son from God, who has become man, yet 'is not less Lord and God and Saviour.' The drift is clear; and pointedly against the idea of secondary godhead. Again, 'It was right that the redemption should take place through 'none other than Him who is the Lord by nature, lest we 'should name another Lord, and fall into the Arian and Greek 'folly, serving the creature.' Again, 'If the Son was worshipped 'by the angels, as excelling them in glory, each of things subservient ought to worship what excels itself. But this is not 'the case, for creature does not worship creature, but servant 'Lord, and creature God. Thus Peter the Apostle, hinders Cornelius, who would worship him, saying, I myself also am a 'man. And an angel, when John would worship him, in the 'Apocalypse, hinders him, saying, See thou do it not: For I 'am thy fellow-servant: worship God. Therefore to God 'alone appertains worship; and this the very angels know, that 'though they excel other beings in glory, yet they are all creatures and not to be worshipped, but worship the Lord.' Again, 'Since He is not a creature, but the proper offspring of the substance of God, therefore is He worshipped.' Certainly Athanasius's condemnation of the Arian position is no 'vindication' of a theology that would profess to verify and impersonate it.

The whole tone of mind, line of thought, implied principles, on which the Fathers' condemnation of the Arians proceeds, and which runs through their arguments, is repugnant to the fundamental idea of the Arian Demiurge. The modern theologian may say, that it is an open question whether they were right or wrong; but that the Fathers had their theological line, and that that was not one of sympathy with secondary divinity, is a matter of fact; and the advocate of that idea must go to other ages than that of Athanasius, for its defence.

To return now to the main line of argument with which we commenced.

We gave at an early point in this article a statement of the question of development; that the mind has a natural idea of development, and has a natural idea of the tendency to exaggeration and abuse in development; that if, in any given case, the former supplied a rationale on one side, the latter supplied a rationale on another; that the history of Christianity comes before us under the contending claims of these two rationales, and that the question is how to decide between the pretensions of the two. We now observe that Mr. Newman has not hitherto decided this question. He has given a series of tests, to distinguish a true from a false development, which, in the way we explained, entirely omit one very large, important, and common kind of false development, viz. exaggeration, and suppose abuse upon the same type to be impossible. And one of these tests, which seemed to demand peculiar attention, from its summary and conclusive pretensions, viz. that of logical sequence, has appeared to possess no force whatever (in any sense which does not make it assume the question at issue); inasmuch as persons differ very much in their views of what is logic;—in particular, some arguments which appeared very conclusive to Mr. Newman, having appeared quite inconclusive to ourselves. The appeal to 'system' is only another form of this appeal to logic, and fails for the same reasons. And such challenges as the following, which almost pervade, in one or other shape, the whole essay, fall dead. To say that 'we must accept the whole, 'or reject the whole; that reduction does but enfeeble, and 'amputation mutilate; that it is trifling to receive all but 'something, which is as integral as any other portion; and that 'on the other hand it is a solemn thing to receive a part, for 'before you know where you are, you may be carried on by a 'stern logical necessity to accept the whole;'—to say of later Roman doctrines 'that they include in their own unity even 'those primary articles of faith, such as that of the Incarnation, 'which many an impugner of the system of doctrine, as a 'system, professes to accept, and which, do what he will, he 'cannot intelligibly separate, whether in point of evidence or of 'internal form, from others which he disavows'—to say this again and again is throughout one appeal of the writer to the certainty of his own logic; that is to say, one act of begging the question. Indeed Mr. Newman himself admits the incompetency of his arguments, in any practical sense, for deciding the question. 'Tests,' he says, 'it is true, for ascertaining the correctness of 'developments in general have been drawn out in a former 'chapter, and shall presently be used; but they are insufficient 'for the guidance of individuals in the case of so large and 'complicated a problem as Christianity, though they may aid 'our inquiries and support our conclusions in particular points. 'They are of a scientific and controversial, not of a practical, 'character, and are instruments rather than warrants of right 'decisions. While, then, on the one hand, it is probable that 'some means will be granted for ascertaining the legitimate 'and true developments of Revelation, it appears, on the other, 'that these means must of necessity be external to the developments themselves.'

Here, then, one division of our subject ends, and another begins. We enter on another and a further field of argument, and perceive, that, in distinction to taking any representation, however large, ingenious, and exuberant of the simple notion of development; any explanation, however full, of its naturalness, probability, commonness in ordinary life, and the career of nations and schools, as a single step towards settling the question of the rightness or wrongness, the justness or immoderateness of any given development;—we are referred, as the ultimate point on which the whole argument turns, to the asserted existence of an infallible guide, who is able to, and does decide, by that simple gift of infallibility, in each case the question; and pronounces with certainty the fact of a development being right or wrong. The doctrine of the Papal Infallibility comes out as the keystone of Mr. Newman's whole argument, and according as he proves, or fails to prove, that doctrine, that argument stands or falls.

The argumentative ground here, for the opponent of Mr. Newman, has a very different general character from the one he has hitherto had to maintain. He has hitherto had to argue against the faultlessness of certain developments themselves, and to give his rationale of them, as opposed to Mr. Newman's. The general direction of his argument now is, not so much against those developments, as against the necessity of imposing them. For though the argument against the Papal Infallibility comes on in the present discussion, as an argument against a professed conclusive proof of the faultlessness of these developments, still what it directly proceeds against is that claim itself of infallibly sanctioning and enforcing them. The assertion of this claim is of course a much more invidious one than the mere assertion of the truth of the developments themselves. Where Revelation has left a blank, the human mind, if it dwells at all upon the unknown contents of it, will naturally form some sort of conjecture about them. To take the example already referred to, of the state of departed souls,—Scripture has, to a great extent, left a veil upon it; and we are not told what will happen after death to a great number of imperfect Christians, who seem to go out of this life with good dispositions, and often generous hearts in the main, but who have lived carelessly. It is better, doubtless, to form no conjecture about them; at the same time we are not positively forbidden to form conjectures within our own minds, as to the unknown and unseen world. If any one from a religiously amiable repugnance on the one hand to supposing that such persons as the above are necessarily reserved for eternal damnation, and from a strong idea on the other that they must require some searching purification to fit them for a heavenly state, attaches some accompaniment specially purgatorial to the intermediate state in their case, it would be hard to condemn him for doing so. The formal doctrine itself of Purgatory, Bishop Andrewes would allow as an opinion of the schools. But it is a different thing when the pious conjecture is made a fixed doctrine, an article of faith, and people are not allowed a neutral state of mind on a subject which Revelation has left veiled.

Before examining Mr. Newman's argument for the Papal Infallibility, there is one preliminary remark we will make about it, and that is the exceedingly small space that it occupies in the book. Certainly quantity is no test of strength in such a matter, and yet where a particular hypothesis is the turning point of the whole argument of a book, we expect to see its establishment occupy some proportion of the book, and to see some legitimate prominence given to it. But amidst large, expansive and detailed representations of development itself, the argument for the only position which can decide that development in his favour, comes in, in the book, as a kind of subordinate point. No reader would find out, from the way in which it comes in, the absolutely fundamental place which it holds in the discussion. Of this argument for infallibility again, a very large proportion is taken up, in the statement and refutation of certain arguments against it, and is of no positive force whatever for it. After such reductions the solid positive argument for the Papal Infallibility is found to occupy but a small space in the essay. It hangs and hovers over the reader throughout as a thing supposed to be proved, making good, *if* true, the whole of the rest of the argument as it goes on, supporting, *if* solid, all that wants supporting; but the actual proof of it hardly catches his eye as he turns over the pages. We are not saying that this is difficult to be accounted for, or that Mr. Newman does not know best his own line of argument; and that the fact of development is not, in his view, itself the substantial proof of the existence of an infallible decider upon them: it is, however, worth noticing such a feature as this.

Mr. Newman states then the positive argument for infallibility as follows:—

> 'Let the state of the case be carefully considered. If the Christian doctrine, as originally taught, admits of true and important developments, as was argued in the foregoing section, this is a strong antecedent argument in favour of a provision in the dispensation, for putting a seal of authority upon those developments. The probability of their being known to be true varies with their truth. The two ideas are certainly quite distinct of revealing and guaranteeing a truth, and they are often distinct in fact. There are various revelations all over the earth, which do not carry with them the evidence of their divinity. Such are the inward suggestions and secret illuminations granted to so many individuals; such are the traditionary doctrines which are found among the heathen, that, "vague and unconnected family of religious truths, originally from God, but sojourning, without the sanction of miracle, or a definite home, as pilgrims up and down the world, and discernible and separable from the corrupt legends with which they are mixed by the spiritual mind alone." There is nothing impossible in the notion of a revelation occurring without evidences that it is a revelation; just as human sciences are a divine gift, yet are reached by our ordinary powers, and have no claim on our faith. But Christianity is not of this nature; it is a revelation which comes to us as a revelation, as a whole, objectively, and with a profession of infallibility; and the only question to be determined relates to the matter of the revelation. If then, there are certain great truths, or proprieties, or observances, naturally and legitimately resulting from the doctrines originally professed, it is but reasonable to include these new results in the idea of the revelation, to consider them parts of it, and if the revelation be not only true, but guaranteed as true, to anticipate that they will be guaranteed inclusively. Christianity, unlike other revelations of God's will, except the Jewish, of which it is a continuation, is an objective religion, or a revelation with credentials; it is natural to view it wholly as such, and not partly *sui generis*, partly like others. Such as it begins, such let it be considered to continue; if certain large developments of it are true, they must surely be accredited as true.'—Pp. 117—119.

Now the proof of the Papal Infallibility is made here to rest on the necessity of the continuance of a Revelation if once given. The argument is that so long as nature is our basis of knowledge, we have no reason to look for certainty of knowledge; but that when a revelation has been once made, we have: that a Divine act of communicating truth has thus taken place, different from the ordinary one by natural means, and having once taken place, must be expected to go on. This granted, it follows of course, that there must be some person or tribunal always to keep this communication, this revelation, going: and that tribunal is then pronounced to be the Papal one.

But it is to be observed that this argument is put in a peculiar form in the passage before us; and this form deserves some examination in the first instance. 'Christianity is a revelation 'which comes to us as a revelation, as a whole, objectively, and 'with a profession of infallibility; and the only question to be 'determined relates to the matter of the revelation. If, then, 'there are certain great truths, or proprieties, or observances, 'naturally and legitimately resulting from the doctrines originally 'professed, it is but reasonable to include these true results in 'the idea of the revelation, to consider them parts of it; and 'if the revelation be not only true, but guaranteed as true, to 'anticipate that they will be guaranteed inclusively.' We will examine, then, this form of putting the argument for a standing revelation before we proceed to the argument itself, and attend to the subtler dress before we go to the simpler substance.

We have then here supposed to begin with, an original revelation, and various unrevealed results and developments from it. The arguer for a continuing revelation has to convert this unrevealed truth into revealed; and he does it by an argument which runs thus:—A revelation must have consequences and developments of some kind or other, beyond its own original substance. Of these developments some must be true, though others may be false. The true ones, whatever they are, being real results of the original revelation, are a part of the latter; and being a part of it, must be revealed with the rest.—Now if Mr. Newman means here that there exist in the abstract universe of truth such absolutely true ulterior results of the original revealed truth as he describes; fully admitting this, we ask, why must such results be a part of the original revelation? Because they exist in the universe of abstract truth, it does not follow that they are even known to a single human being, much less known for certain and revealed. Undoubtedly, if they were revealed, they would be a part of the original revelation, but their abstract existence does not go one step to making them revealed. It is almost a truism, indeed, to say, that there must be, at this moment, an infinite number of results from the Christian revelation existing in the universe of truth, which have not so much as entered the mere threshold of human thought, and which never will enter it so long as the world lasts. Again, if Mr. Newman means that a certain number of such true results must, in the progress of Christianity, have entered into the human mind; that it is unreasonable to suppose that the whole mass of actual Christian developments is every bit of it false, and therefore but reasonable to allow that there have been and now are actually in the world some or other existing really true developments: we do not see, even if we admit this, what he has gained in the way of proof that we have such developments revealed to us, in the ordinary sense of the word revelation. Because such developments are somewhere, we do not therefore know where they are; and if we see them, we do not know them as true. We may make a guess, and that is all. Mr. Newman starts with uncertainty; he has a mass of developments from an original revelation before him, of which, by the supposition, he does not know which are true and which are false ones. He professes to convert this certainty into uncertainty, by simply saying that some are really true, and others really false. He divides uncertainty to us into absolute truth and absolute error in themselves; and to any one asking where certain developed truths are, and what they are, simply answers, never mind, they are somewhere; and if they are somewhere, that proves that you must know them. But, surely, uncertainty to us is not removed by being viewed as certainty in the abstract; and truth is not a bit the more ascertained and revealed because one side or another must be true.

It will be seen that the whole point of this argument lies in viewing the truths, for the additional revelation of which it contends, as *resulting* truths; instead of truths simply. But this is not a relevant difference. It makes no difference if the uncertain truths in question *are*, supposing we knew them, results and developments of some truth which we know. If they are uncertain, the fact of their coming from something else which is certain does not the least repair or undo their uncertainty. All truth is connected together, we believe, and forms one whole: and yet that does not prevent part of it being ascertained, and part of it not being. 'Christianity,' says Mr. Newman, 'is a revelation which comes to us '*as a whole;*' and he specially argues, therefore, that its results and developments being included in that whole, are revealed to us. But if he means by the 'revelation coming as a whole,' that the whole of what is revealed to us is revealed as a whole, such a truism does not help him the least to his inference that a variety of indefinite resulting truths are in that whole: if he means that that revelation, from the fact of revealing certain fundamental truths, pledges itself to reveal these other indefinite resulting ones; in that case we entirely deny the assumption. And therefore, the particular point on which so much stress is laid, that the uncertain truths in the present case are developments from an original truth, and not independent and isolated truths, does not seem to us to add anything to the argument. Mr. Newman lays out, as it were, a general substratum of truth *in se* before us, part of this truth being in the revealed world, and part of it out of it. On the view, then, of all of it, whether revealed or not, having one common existence as truth *in se*, he calls upon us to infer that it has all one common revelation. But this is to ask us simply to contradict ourselves. We suppose all this further existence of truth *in se*, when we talk of any given part of truth being revealed: and cannot undo this limitation of revealed truth by simply resupposing that further existence of abstract.

Nor is it anything to the purpose, again, to call Christianity a 'guaranteed revelation,' a 'revelation that comes to us with a profession of 'infallibility:' as if such phrases amounted to anything more than saying that Christianity was a revelation, as everybody believes it to be. What we *mean* by a revelation is a guaranteed revelation: we use the word, in contradistinction to natural religion, in that sense. Mr. Newman separates, indeed, in his use of the word, the guarantee from the revelation, the truth *in* revelation from the guarantee for that truth. Recurring, that is, to the simply etymological meaning, he makes the word revelation mean whatever is disclosed—whatever has been made to enter into any human mind, being also true: in which latter sense, all true thought in the world whatever may be called revelation; and, with it, these true results from the original revelation, in whosever mind entertained, may be called revelation. But though, as a mere verbal transposition, this makes certain indefinite unascertained results of the original revelation *look* more like revelation themselves, because, if they have *de facto* occurred to any minds, they are, by this verbal process, raised to the rank of unguaranteed revelation:—yet the reality remains exactly the same as before. And when Mr. Newman asks whether the *guarantee* for the original revelation does not include these (in his sense) revealed results from it—he only asks, in another form, the question, whether the *revelation*, because it reveals some truth, does not reveal a variety of other resulting truths. The original absence of revelation, which the argument found at starting, in the developments it deals with, and which it undertook to remove from them, never is removed: the defect adheres to its subject matter, through every stage that the arguer takes it, and confronts him at the end, the same as it was at the beginning.

Let us see—if an original revelation is guaranteed, its resulting truths will be. Apply this formula to a common case. A powerful medicine is discovered, and attested or guaranteed beyond a question by actual experiment: but some properties remain unguaranteed and conjectural, and medical men dispute about them: there is a revelation certain, that is to say, with some resulting truths uncertain, but existing in the world of truth somewhere, could they be ascertained. Apply the formula: the original discovery is guaranteed, therefore the ulterior results are: therefore they are known and ascertained, and medical men need not dispute about them. A great chemical law is guaranteed to a certain point by actual discovery; ulterior and finer results from the same law are uncertain, but there are some, could they be hit on. Apply the formula: the law is guaranteed; therefore the results are: therefore you are wrong in supposing that you do not know them, because you do.

The fact is, this whole mode of arguing from the mere supposition of truth abstract beforehand, before we know *what* is true, to the fact that we know the latter, is a simple anticipation and forestalment: an antedating of the known before its real existence. Mr. Newman professes to perform a feat of logical magic, and to get something out of something else which has nothing at all to do with it. He converts the known into the unknown, as a conjurer changes one thing into another before our eyes: we know that the change does not really take place. With the formula—some uncertain truths are results of certain truth: if they are, they are certain themselves—he gets something out of nothing, converts uncertainty into certainty without a medium; and transmutes the known into the unknown by a stroke of legerdemain. The case is like trying to make a number more than it is by transposition, and to produce additional length by a rapid shifting from the bottom to the top. Impress the addition at the top on the eye, before it has realized the shortening at the bottom, and the line seems longer. Make the mind put unknown truth before itself, as truth, and it will imagine it as *known* truth.

We must add—besides what we have said about this form of argument itself—that Mr. Newman states it in a way in which he has no right to state it, and assumes in connexion with it what he cannot possibly, by the supposition know. For he says, 'If certain *large* developments of it are true, they must surely be 'accredited as true.' Now if he is referring here to the world of abstract truth, there certainly are in that world large, nay, infinite true developments of this original revealed truth; but with which, as we said, human knowledge has nothing to do. But if he is speaking of the true *actual* developments existing in this concrete world, what does he know of these developments by the supposition, as to whether they are large or small? He is stating the case of actual truth in the Christian developments in the world, and he states it exactly to coincide with the desiderated truth of the Roman developments. He assumes that there are large existing developments of the original revelation *absolutely true;* and he appeals to us to know whether, there being these large existing developments which are purely and absolutely true, it is not reasonable just to crown their truth with the guarantee. But this is to lay out the state of Christian truth in the world upon a mere assumption. Of the existing true developments of Christian truth in the world, he does not know whether they are large; of the existing large ones he does not know whether they are true. The general state of development may be, for anything he knows, neither wholly true nor wholly false, but a mixture of both. And if his anticipatory picture of it describes his view of the Roman developments, another anticipatory picture may describe another.

With this preliminary notice on the form of putting the argument, we proceed to the substance of the argument itself. Divested of its particular form that argument stands thus:—That because God guarantees some truth, he must necessarily guarantee more: that because there is certainty to some extent, there must be certainty to a greater: that because an original act of revelation took place, it must be continued. To this we answer, Why? We see no reason for thinking so; no presumption for the expectation. If the argument is then stated with greater point, and revealed religion is exhibited in its special distinction to natural, to remind us that God has confessedly done something different in the latter from what he did in the former, and that having done differently, he must be expected to continue to do so;—we answer again, as we did at first, Why? Why should He go on acting differently? Why should He not cease acting differently? Why should He not after acting differently, recur to acting as He did before? Is it impossible to look upon the act of revelation as an exception to a general rule, which, having taken place, the general rule operates again? Are there no such things as general rules with exceptions to, or particular interruptions of, them in the ordinary government of the world? And is an act of revelation, therefore, because it takes place, necessarily not an exception to a general rule, but a new general rule itself? Whence do you get that latter view of it, but from pure hypothesis? You may say, indeed, that you have as much right to an hypothesis of continuation, as another has to an hypothesis of cessation. But who forms an hypothesis of cessation? We do not. We form no hypothesis at all: but taking the fact of a revelation simply, of which fact we are certain, ask you for your ground for more than that fact, viz., for that revelation's continuation. We stop with the fact: you go beyond the fact, and must, therefore, give a reason why you do so. And the only reason you can have, is a simple hypothesis of your own. You say a particular kind of communication must be continuously repeated, because it has been made. We say we see the fact in the case, but do not see at all why it should be a reason for that conclusion. Let us consider.—Revelation is a new course of proceeding entered on by God: if it begins, it must be expected to continue—'The circumstance that a work has *begun* makes 'it more probable than not that it will proceed.' But what does this mean? Beginning is not an idea we have got from the fact, because beginning implies continuance: we do not get the fact of a revelation *beginning*, in the mere fact of it being given. If by putting revelation before our minds, as a new *course* of Divine action, in this way, the arguer makes revelation a continuous thing to begin with; he is begging the question. If he means that a Divine *act* of revelation took place, the question is then simply whether that act must be continuously repeated: and to that we say again, Why? Let Mr. Newman put the question in his own peculiar or any other way, the same substantial argument has the same answer ready for it. 'If a revelation be guaranteed as true, its true results 'will be guaranteed inclusively.' Why? 'Such as a revelation 'begins such let it be considered to continue.' Why? 'If 'certain developments of it are true, they must surely be 'accredited as true.' Why? We cannot possibly know what the whole of God's purpose was in making at a particular time a revelation: we cannot possibly therefore have the ground necessary for asserting that he must 'surely' make other revelations in continuous succession after it. On the contrary, if we are to go at all by the actual course of providence before us, it is most natural to suppose that God would after such a revelation leave men, with the additional light of truth, and all the other advantages of every kind which may be part of it in their possession, to carry it out with more or less of abuse or perversion if they will. To whatever extent we have positive evidence for His not doing so, we must believe that He does not do so. But the facts of providence before our eye, would lead us to expect that course rather than the other; and tend to discourage the idea of a revelation always going on.

We are approaching here that whole line of argument called the argument of analogy. The argument of analogy takes the course which has just now been taken, and maintains the valuelessness of simple presumptions respecting revelation. The argument of analogy brings us at once upon Butler's great treatise. Mr. Newman here comes into collision (we have not a right as yet to call it more than a *primâ facie* one, but that it certainly is), with the argument of a writer for whom he has necessarily a great respect, and with whom he has many reasons for wishing to be in harmony. To guard his essay from the disadvantage of having so great an authority in opposition to it, he has to explain Butler. One or two instances, before we come to the main one with which we are concerned, will serve to show the character of the explanation which goes on, and the way in which particular meanings are extracted. The writer presents Butler to us, as a sympathizer at bottom with the doctrine of development advocated in the essay; as holding and teaching principles which necessarily lead to that doctrine.

The medium of such an interpretation is the fact of Butler holding *a* principle of development; speaking of some truth as involved in other truth; of natural inference; of necessary result. For example—the divinity of the Second and Third Persons in the Trinity being granted, Butler says, the duty of worshipping them necessarily follows. 'The duty of religious 'regards to both those Divine Persons immediately arises to the 'view of reason out of the very nature of the relations in which 'they stand to us . . . The relations being known, the obligations to internal worship are obligations of reason, arising out 'of those relations themselves.' 'Here,' says Mr. Newman, 'is 'the development of doctrine into worship.' Butler is teaching development. It is true he is. But he is only, by the very nature of the argument, teaching a development which is necessarily contained in the original truth. Mr. Newman cannot apply this reasoning to the support of the 'hyperdulia' paid to St. Mary, except he first assumes the existence of certain relations to St. Mary which oblige to such worship of her. Grant these relations and the cultus will follow, on Butler's principles: but Butler's principles have no kind of tendency to establish those relations.

Again, Butler in a remarkable passage speaks of the meaning of Scripture being brought out more and more in the course of ages by study and reflection on the part of thoughtful minds. He says, 'Practical Christianity, or that faith and behaviour 'which renders a man a Christian, is a plain and obvious thing; 'like the common rules of conduct, with respect to our ordinary 'temporal affairs. The more distinct and particular knowledge 'of those things, the study of which the apostle calls *going on* '*unto perfection*, and of the prophetic parts of revelation, like 'many parts of natural and even civil knowledge, may require 'very exact thought and careful consideration. The hindrances, 'too, of natural and of supernatural light and knowledge, have 'been of the same kind. And as it is owned the whole scheme 'of Scripture is not yet understood, so, if it ever comes to be 'understood before the *restitution of all things*, and without miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way as natural 'knowledge is come at; by the continuance and progress of 'learning and of liberty, and by particular persons attending to, 'comparing, and pursuing, intimations scattered up and down 'it, which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of 'the world. For this is the way in which all improvements are 'made; by thoughtful men tracing out obscure hints, as it were, 'dropped us by nature accidentally, or which seem to come into 'our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book, 'which has been so long in the possession of mankind, should 'contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all the same 'phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation, from which 'such great discoveries in natural knowledge have been made 'in the present and last age, were equally in the possession of 'mankind several thousand years before. And possibly it 'might be intended, that events, as they come to pass, should 'open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture.'

Of this passage Mr. Newman says, 'Butler, as a well known 'passage of his work shows, is far from denying the principle 'of progressive development.' 'Butler is bearing witness to the 'probability of developments in Christian doctrine.' If by 'doctrine' he means anything that is taught, truth of any kind connected with Christianity, in that sense Butler is certainly 'witnessing to the probability of development in Christian 'doctrine.' But if 'doctrine' is at all intended to mean necessary doctrine or the faith, in that sense the passage does not throughout give the least sanction to a development of doctrine. Mr. Newman allows this, but he seems to allow it only as the absence of a conclusion, a stopping short in a line of reasoning which intrinsically proceeded further. 'Butler of course was not contemplating the case of new articles of faith, or developments imperative on our acceptance.' It ought rather to be said that it is quite obvious from the whole passage that he was contemplating something totally different from it. Indeed the very first sentence in it happens to show the fact not only that he 'did not contemplate,' but that he expressly disavowed any reference to the Christian creed: for he there carefully prefixes the mention of 'that *faith* and behaviour which makes a man a Christian' as being specially that which he is *not* going to talk about, and to which the passage he is about to write will not refer.

To return to the subject. The argument of Butler with respect to presumptions concerning revelation, and our incompetency to form them, is as follows:—

> 'As God governs the world, and instructs his creatures, according to certain laws or rules, in the known course of nature, known by reason together with experience; so the Scripture informs us of a scheme of

divine Providence, additional to this. It relates, that God has, by revelation, instructed men in things concerning his government, which they could not otherwise have known, and reminded them of things which they might otherwise know; and attested the truth of the whole by miracles. Now, if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things are both from God, if they coincide with each other, and together make up one scheme of Providence, our being incompetent judges of one, must render it credible that we may be incompetent judges also of the other. Since, upon experience, the acknowledged constitution and course of nature is found to be greatly different from what, before experience, would have been expected; and such as, men fancy, there lie great objections against: this renders it beforehand highly credible, that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different from expectations formed beforehand; and liable, in appearance, to great objections; objections against the scheme itself, and against the degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions, by which it was attested and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by common known laws; and that upon some exigencies he should suspend these laws, and govern, in several instances, in a different manner: if one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand, by what common rules the government should or would be carried on, it could not be expected, that the same person would be a competent judge, in what exigencies, or in what manner, or to what degree, those laws commonly observed would be suspended or deviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordinary administration, there is no reason to think he would be a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he had objections against the former, doubtless, it is highly supposable, he might think also, that he had objections against the latter. And thus, as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes, whenever we pretend, otherwise than from experience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and course of nature, it is evidently supposable beforehand, that we should fall into as great, in pretending to judge, in like manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there any more ground to expect that this latter should appear to us clear of objections, than that the former should.

'These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, are applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no sort judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by what means, it were to have been expected that God would naturally instruct us; so, upon supposition of his affording us light and instruction by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us by reason and experience, we are in no sort judges, by what methods, and in what proportion, it were to be expected, that this supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us. We know not beforehand, what degree or kind of natural information it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his own reason and experience; nor how far he would enable, and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should be, to each other; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon any good ground, I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the faculty itself by which we are capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at once, or gradually. In like manner, we are wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge, it were to be expected, God would give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of his affording one; or how far, or in what way, he would interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to whom he should originally make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live; and to secure its being transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant, whether the evidence of it would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful; or whether all who should have any degree of instruction from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the same: or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded gradually. Nay, we are not in any sort able to judge, whether it were to have been expected, that the revelation should have been committed to writing; or left to be handed down, and consequently corrupted by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time as they are permitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as they will.

'But it may be said, "that a revelation in some of the above-mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, which was not committed to writing, and thus secured against danger of corruption, would not have answered its purpose." I ask, what purpose? It would not have answered all the purposes which it has now answered, and in the same degree; but it would have answered others, or the same in different degrees. And which of these were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general government, we could not at all have determined beforehand.'—*Analogy*, pp. 155—157.

Now such a passage as this, supported as it is by, and forming part of, one whole line of reasoning which runs through the 'Analogy,' appears to decide beyond a doubt what Butler's view was. He asserts generally in the first place, that, the existence of a revelation supposed, we are in no way whatever judges, *à priori*, as to the whole plan on which it is conducted; that we are quite ignorant, and that our presumptions on the whole subject are valueless. Then, in particular, among the items mentioned, about which we are totally ignorant, and about which our presumptions are valueless, is that of 'degree.' He says plainly we 'are not competent judges of the *degree* to which 'God's ordinary laws should be suspended,' supposing a suspension of them: that we 'are in no sort judges in what proportion supernatural light should be afforded us,' supposing it afforded us; '*what* supernatural instruction were to have been expected' supposing any given. Now supposing a revelation made, the question of its going on or stopping at a certain point is one as to its degree: Butler therefore plainly asserts that we are no judges whether a revelation, supposed to be made, will go on indefinitely, or stop at a certain point; will be given once for all, or be a standing revelation.

To this Mr. Newman says: 'This reasoning does not here 'apply: it contemplates only the abstract *hypothesis* of a 'revelation, not the fact of an existing revelation of a particular 'kind, which may of course in various ways modify our state of 'knowledge by settling some of those very points on which, 'before it was given, we had no means of deciding.' Again: 'Butler is speaking of our judging *before* a revelation is given. 'He observes that "we have no principles of reason upon which 'to judge beforehand, how it were to be expected revelation 'should have been left, or what was most suitable to the divine 'plan of government," in various respects; but the case is 'altogether altered, when a revelation is vouchsafed, for then 'a new precedent, or what he calls "principle of reason" is there 'introduced, and from what is actually put into our hand, we 'can form a judgment whether more is to be expected.' The conclusion is that there is an essential distinction between the presumption Mr. Newman contends for, and that which Butler's reasoning invalidates. But is such a distinction shown?

First of all we have the distinction between 'the hypothesis 'of a revelation and the fact of an existing revelation,'—between judging beforehand and judging after; that if a revelation actually exists, we can argue that it will go on, whereas, in Butler's reasoning, it was only hypothetical, and therefore he could not so argue. This is absolutely a distinction without a difference. True it is that Butler is *supposing* a revelation with his opponent: and true it is that Mr. Newman can take for granted a revelation with us. But what is the difference between a fact and a supposed fact, as to the argumentative erection upon it? In supposing a fact, you make it a fact as far as reasoning is concerned: a real fact is, as far as reasoning is concerned, no more. Its hypothetical, as distinguished from its actual existence, makes all the difference to it *as* a fact, but can make none whatever to it as a premise. In the present case, agreeing with Mr. Newman in the fact of a revelation, we are solely concerned with that fact as the premise of a conclusion which he fastens upon it. Bishop Butler says, on the supposition of a revelation we are no judges beforehand to what extent it ought to go on. In supposing a revelation Butler supposed the fact of it: he supposed it being made. He might have presumed with Mr. Newman from that supposed existence, that once existing it would go on *in perpetuum* revealing; but he does not presume so. He had the self-same argumentative ground in an hypothetical fact, which Mr. Newman has in an actual one, and he argues differently from it. Mr. Newman's fact is the *idea* of the fact, the same as Butler's was: *if* a revelation takes place it must go on: a revelation *does* take place, and therefore goes on: it is the same thing: Butler, in denying the former, denies the latter. Indeed, for a person to form a certain inference (or absence of one) from a supposed fact, and then to form a totally different one from the same fact afterwards because it is a real one; to say, I judged thus beforehand, before it did take place, but I judge differently afterwards because it does take place, is simply self-contradictory. If we abstain from presuming beforehand the continuation of a revelation from its original bestowal, we must abstain from presuming it after. 'Before' and 'after' are nothing in the case:

we do not argue from the fact as before, or from the fact as after, but from the nature of the fact itself. Mr. Newman thinks that from the fact of a revelation taking place, we must presume that it will continue: Butler had that very fact before him, and he forbade such a presumption.

We mean to say that Butler only differed from Mr. Newman in the persons he was arguing with, not at all in what he was arguing from. He had the actual fact of a revelation before him, as far as he himself was concerned, just as Mr. Newman has; and of that actual revelation he argued that it need not, because it was a revelation, be such and such a kind of one, which persons presumed it ought to be. Mr. Newman, on the other hand, argues that because it is a revelation it *ought* to be a certain kind of one, viz. a standing and continuing one.

Mr. Newman next urges that Butler contemplated indeed a revelation, but did not contemplate a revelation 'of a particular kind:' of the kind, viz. which Mr. Newman is contemplating. And to this it is enough to answer, that it is not necessary that Butler should particularize all the kinds of revelation in the case of which he does not allow presumption; for that would be endless: it is sufficient if he lays down a general head of what he considers groundless presumptions, and if Mr. Newman's comes under it. His argument asserts generally that we are not judges of what a revelation should be; and therefore any particular judgment formed on this subject, comes, by the nature of the case, within his argument's operation. However, he does happen to go very near to mentioning the very particular which Mr. Newman's presumption concerns. Mr. Newman's argument on this latter head proceeds thus:—'The developments of 'Christianity are proved to have been in the contemplation of 'its Divine Author, by an argument parallel to that by which 'we infer intelligence in the system of the physical world. In 'whatever sense the need and its supply are a proof of design in 'the visible creation, in the same do the gaps, if the word may 'be used, which occur in the structure of the original creed of 'the Church, make it probable that those developments which 'grow out of the truths which lie around them, were intended to 'complete it.' Hence he concludes, that when we have a revelation before us 'of a particular kind,' *then*, 'from what is 'actually put into our hands, we can form a judgment whether 'more is to be expected.' Now the 'particular kind' of revelation, described above, is a revelation which reveals some truths, and does not reveal others; which guarantees some ground, and does not guarantee more. The creed is what is revealed; the gaps are what are not revealed. So far as the word 'gap' means anything more than this, so far *e.g.* as it is intended to insinuate in the word, that the original revelation is inconsistent without the additions to it; so far its meaning, as begging the whole question at issue, is irrelevant and is to be excluded. The fact before us is a revelation, which tells us some things; which does not tell us others. However much we may desire to know those other things; however much we may be led by that part of truth which is revealed to us, to desire to know them; however well, supposing them to be known, they would join on to and complete an original revelation: such a revelation comes, with all these accompaniments, under the head of a revelation which tells us some truth, and does not tell us more. Now this kind of revelation Butler distinctly contemplates. He contemplates many kinds of revelation. He contemplates a revelation with 'certain evidence,' one with 'highly probable' evidence, one with 'doubtful evidence;' a 'revelation revealed at once,' a revelation 'unfolded gradually,' a revelation 'committed to writing,' a revelation 'handed down by verbal tradition' only. He contemplates other kinds of revelations. Among these various kinds of revelation thus contemplated, he contemplates a revelation which revealed to a certain 'degree' and not further; a 'supernatural light afforded' in a certain 'proportion,' and not a larger one. He contemplates, that is, a revelation incomplete in its communication of truth. And of such a revelation he distinctly asserts, that there is no presumption whatever against it. That is to say, in other words, there is no presumption from the fact of its incompleteness, that it will go on to fill that incompleteness up. Let us take one of Mr. Newman's instances of the argument. The original revelation does not tell us what the divine dispensation is, with respect to a large mass of imperfect human souls on their departure from this life; this is a gap; purgatory fills up this gap; therefore purgatory is a revealed doctrine. Can Mr. Newman seriously think, that Butler would have admitted such a mode of arguing (we mean the mode simply without reference to the subject of it) as this? Suppose a sceptic coming to him, and saying that he could not believe in the Christian revelation, because it had so many gaps in it. Would he have set to work to prove one by one, that these different gaps were in reality filled up? or would he have told him, that it did not become a person of his imperfect knowledge to be bringing gaps at all as any objection; that he could not know what God's whole purpose was in a revelation, and therefore could not know that such gaps were inconsistent with his purpose? And if the sceptic replied that these gaps were of more than intellectual importance, inasmuch as if they were filled up some practical duties would ensue, which do not exist now, or would at any rate have a clear positive ground, instead of an hypothetical one; would the line and tone of the 'Analogy' compel us to yield to such a reply, or would it suggest that there was no presumption that God would reveal to us all truths, from which practical duties would follow supposing he did? 'It is highly credible beforehand,' is its great general answer, 'that revelation should contain many things appearing to us 'liable to great objection. The analogy of nature shows before'hand, not only that we may, but also probably that we will, 'imagine that we have strong objections against it.' 'The whole 'constitution and course of nature shows that God does not 'dispense his gifts according to our notions of the advantage and 'consequence they would be to us.' 'It may be said that a 'revelation (wanting in certain things) cannot answer its pur'pose. I ask what purpose? It will not answer all the 'purposes which it would answer with them, and in the same 'degree; but it will answer others, or the same in different 'degrees.'

It will be seen that this is an argument from our ignorance. Butler is arguing ultimately, not from analogy, but from something prior to analogy. Prior to all proof from analogy, such an imperfect creature as man must confess the great probability of his ignorance with respect to the whole designs of God, in his several dispensations, and therefore must confess the valuelessness of his presumptions as to them. Analogy indeed comes in and proves this ignorance demonstrably; because it shows that, whereas we had formed various presumptions respecting what a Divine dispensation would be, these presumptions are as a matter of fact falsified by the dispensation of nature before our eyes. We had imagined that God would certainly act in such and such a way, some best imaginable way of our own conception; but we find that as a fact he does not. Well then, argues analogy, here is proof positive of your ignorance. It is indeed absurd that you should want any external proof of it; but here is the proof, as you want one. You have made your guess, and your guess turns out wrong. Now then, at any rate confess your ignorance, and be wise.—This is what is called the negative side of the argument of analogy, that side on which it is conclusive. It is not conclusive on its positive side; far from it: it only gives us probabilities on that side, because on that side it only argues that because such and such a course of things has gone on, it will continue to go on the same. On its positive side it only conjectures future facts; on its negative, it points to present; it is a presumptive argument on its positive side; it argues from actual fact against presumption on its negative. It is arguing on the latter side now. Butler argues from analogy, but from analogy as proving by matter of fact what was sufficiently evident before in itself—human ignorance. 'We may see beforehand,' he says, 'that we have not faculties for this kind of speculation.' And analogy comes in as confirmative. 'So, prior to experience, 'they would think they had objections against the ordinary 'course of nature.' 'Since, upon experience, the acknowledged constitution and course of nature is found to be greatly 'different from what, before experience, would have been expected; this renders it beforehand highly credible that they will 'find the revealed dispensation likewise very different from expectations formed beforehand.' And thence the conclusion follows. Men must not 'pretend to judge from preconceived 'expectations.' 'It is self-evident that the objections of an incompetent judgment must be frivolous.' 'Since it has been shown 'that we have no principles of reason upon which to judge beforehand, how it were to be expected revelation should have been 'left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of government; 'it must be quite frivolous to object afterwards to any of them, 'against its being left in one way rather than another; for this 'would be to object against things upon account of their being 'different from expectations which have been shown to be without 'reason.' This negative use of analogy is *the* use to which Butler's work as a whole applies it. 'The design of this treatise is to show 'that the several parts principally objected against in this moral 'and Christian dispensation are analagous to what is experienced 'here; and that the chief objections which are alleged against the 'former are no other than what may be alleged, with like justness, 'against the latter, where they are found in fact to be inconclusive;' which 'argument from analogy is in general unanswerable.'

We write the above with reference to what follows.

Mr. Newman, after explaining Butler's reasoning in his own favour, in order to be utrimque paratus, proceeds to give reasons for doubting the validity of it; and after proving that the argument from analogy is not against him, opposes the argument from analogy. 'Nor can it, as I think, be fairly denied that the argument 'from analogy in one point of view tells against anticipating a revelation at all; for an innovation upon the physical order of the 'world is, by the very force of the terms, inconsistent with its 'ordinary course. We cannot then regulate our antecedent view 'of the character of a revelation by a test, which, applied simply, 'overthrows the very notion of a revelation altogether. Anyhow, analogy is in some sort violated by the fact of a revelation, 'and the question before us only relates to the extent of that 'violation.' Now here it will be observed that Mr. Newman has glided out of one ground into another. He has got upon the ground of *positive* analogy, and is arguing against *its* conclusive-ness; whereas, this has not been Butler's argument. He has not been telling us what antecedent views to form of revelation, but dissuading us from giving weight to any; not been arguing that revelation is like to present fact; but proving by present fact that we are ignorant beforehand what revelation should be.

The argument positive indeed of analogy is of undoubted force in its own way, and Butler brings it in. We do unquestionably argue from like to like, 'from that part of the Divine government over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to 'that government of them which is beyond it; and from what is 'present collect what is likely, credible or not incredible, will be 'hereafter.' And this argument undoubtedly tells, in a way which we need not describe here, but which is familiar to all readers of Butler, much more against the presumption for a standing revelation than for one. The obvious irregularities, breaks, and limitations in the case of natural knowledge, suggest the same in the case of the revealed. But no one ever supposed that such analogical presumptions were conclusive. 'There is a very 'strong presumption,' says Butler, 'against common speculative 'truths, and against the most common facts before the proof of 'them, which yet is overcome by almost any proof;' and 'presumptions from analogy,' he adds, 'are overcome by the same 'proof.' The probability of things being like what we see, only holds good of them 'in those respects in which we have no reason 'to believe they will be different'—'real probabilities which 'rise even to moral certainty are overcome by the most ordinary testimony.' Analogy tells us, for example, with all the certainty with which analogy can, that the sun will rise to-morrow; but we know that a day will come when it will tell this falsely; a day when the heaven and the earth shall be dissolved. Such intrinsic defectiveness, however, in the positive argument from analogy does not prevent Butler from giving the argument weight. In particular, he allows for 'a peculiar presumption from analogy' against a revelation in the first instance; and yet continues taking analogy for his guide in his presumptions to that revelation. Mr. Newman appears to see a contradiction here, and says, 'We cannot regulate our antecedent 'view of the character of a revelation by a test which, applied 'simply, overthrows the very notion of a revelation altogether.' But there is no contradiction. Analogy did not '*overthrow* the 'very notion of a revelation;' it could only *presume* against it. It never pretended to be conclusive, and therefore is not invalidated by being shown not to be. A demonstrative proof is refuted by one contrary case; a ground of probability is not; and exceptions do not undo an argument which, of its own nature, admits of exceptions. After this particular case of violation, just as after any other, the positive argument of analogy goes on and holds good; we continue, and cannot help ourselves, judging of the unknown from the known; and we apply it to the very revelation against which it has presumed, just as to other things. We regulate, in spite of this or other mistakes which positive analogy may make, our *à priori* views of revelation by positive analogy, though only presumptively, of course, not conclusively, and subject to the chance of reversal when we come to the fact. Indeed, what Mr. Newman comes to after all, is only that that expectation is weakened in *degree*, and that the violation of it is made *less* of an objection by the consideration he puts forward. He considers still that we *have* that expectation, and that the violation of it *is* an objection.

But he here meets us with a distinction, which seems to him, while he allows the general force of positive analogy, to exempt the particular case of a continual revelation from its jurisdiction. 'I will hazard,' he says, 'a distinction here between the facts 'of revelation and its principles; the argument from analogy is 'more concerned with its principles than its facts. The re'vealed facts are special and singular from the nature of the case; 'but it is otherwise with the revealed principles. They are 'common to all the works of God; and if the author of nature 'be the author of grace, it may be expected that while the sys'tems of fact are distinct and independent, the principles displayed 'in them will be the same, and form a connecting link between 'them. In this identity of principle lies the true analogy of 'natural and revealed religion, in Butler's sense of the word. 'The doctrine of the Incarnation is a fact, and cannot be paral'leled by anything in nature: the doctrine of Mediation is a 'principle, as is abundantly exemplified in its provisions. Mira'cles are facts; inspiration is a fact; divine teaching, once and 'for all, and continual teaching, are each a fact; probation by 'means of intellectual difficulties is a principle.' Now with regard to this distinction between 'facts' and 'principles,' considered in itself, we do and can give no opinion, because the value and legitimacy of all such distinctions depend entirely on the way in which they are used. If such distinctions are used, so as faithfully to represent the substantial state of the case, they are convenient; but they must be used with an entire subservience to the substantial state of the case, and not bend the latter to themselves. If a continual revelation is a 'fact,' it is not a fact like the 'Incarnation,' in which it is impossible by the nature of the case to look for an analogy. If it is a 'fact,' it is one in a sense in which probation of the intellect may be called one too: it is a general line of proceeding on God's part toward mankind. The substantial truth in the present case is, that we expect an analogy everywhere, except where, by the nature of the case, we are prevented. The nature of the case does prevent us from expecting an analogy or likeness in certain instances, but it does not prevent us from expecting one in the present; and therefore we expect it, and we argue from a certain line of proceeding in nature to a like line in revelation.

Thus much with respect to the positive argument of analogy, and its weight in the present question. But this argument is not—and we have introduced it principally for the sake of showing that it is not—the argument which Butler uses for showing the valuelessness of *à priori* reasonings with respect to revelation. The argument by which he proves that, is an appeal to the simple fact of human ignorance, from which the incapacity for so reasoning necessarily follows. He strengthens this fact, indeed, by a reference to analogy; by showing that the very things we object to exist in God's natural dispensation, and that therefore the fact proves that we are wrong. But it is analogy as proving ignorance, and not analogy simple and positive, which is the basis of his argument. It follows that to endeavour by various objections and distinctions to weaken the force of the positive argument of analogy, is, in the present question, to fight the air, for we do not invalidate one ground by detracting from another. Whatever arguments may be adduced to relax the force of simple verisimilitude, and the inference from the known to the unknown, do not in the remotest way touch the ground on which we have been going in this question. They do not touch that truth of human ignorance which no verisimilitude but actual consciousness witnesses, nor that evidence of human ignorance which no probabilities but actual facts afford us. And on the ground of that ignorance, and that incompetency for *à priori* judgment, we cannot allow any weight to Mr. Newman's presumption that a revelation is to be continued because it has been made.

And now we will make one remark on the whole mode of treating the argument of analogy which has come before us here—on the general relations which Mr. Newman, as a reasoner, seems to have entered into, to that argument. There is an established argument then, to which all this discussion has had reference, called the Argument of Analogy. We have had to view this argument on different sides, but, taken comprehensively, it is an argument which intervenes between the *à priori* reasoner and revelation. It establishes a certain medium through which *à priori* reasoning has to pass; and checks and regulates our presumptions with respect to revelation by an appeal to the course of nature. That there are difficulties connected with the theory of this argument may be true; and Butler invited the attention of philosophers to them when he wrote his treatise, though the invitation, we believe, has never been attended to, and the theory of the argument has remained comparatively uninvestigated to this day. But this is a consideration which does not of course affect the practical weight of it; and the Argument of Analogy involving the medium which we have mentioned, appeals to us like other substantial and practical truth.

Now here, on the other hand, is an argument which makes us reason *à priori* without this medium; makes us reason from the idea of a revelation to a conclusion with respect to that revelation, straight and directly. It says, the existence of a revelation at all is an independent ground of reasoning, from which by itself we draw a sure inference with respect to that revelation, viz., that it will continue and be a standing one. And when the Argument from Analogy steps in with the veto from nature, *i. e.*, the experience which nature gives us of our ignorance, and tells the arguer that he cannot so presume; the arguer replies, that a revelation being given is a new ground, which lifts him above this analogy of nature, and is of itself a direct intellectual basis for this conclusion. He tells us that revelation as such supersedes the appeal to nature, and from the fact that it is revelation, certifies to a standing revelation. That is to say, here is a view which does not allow the argument of analogy to perform its necessary functions, or work at all; for whereas that argument by its own nature intervenes between us and our presumptions with respect to revelation, this view cuts off that intervention.

The argument of analogy, in short, ends where revelation begins; in other words, there is no such thing as the argument from analogy. The very nature of analogy supposes two sides of it, which it argumentatively connects. The whole argument in Butler goes on the principle, that although revelation is a new and distinct line of proceeding on God's part from nature—it one thing, nature another—yet that we may and must reason from one to the other; must ever form our presumptions about the former under the veto and through the medium of the latter. But this essential argumentative connexion is dissolved if, as soon as revelation comes, analogy goes; and revelation itself supplies the presumptions about revelation. Nor will it alter the case to call revelation a new order of nature, and make its continuation analogous to that new order of nature so called: —to say, 'The case then stands thus: that revelation has intro-'duced a new law of divine governance, over and above those 'laws which appear in the natural course of the world; and 'henceforth we argue for a standing authority in matters of 'faith, *on the analogy of nature and from the fact of Christianity*;' —the analogy of nature meaning here exactly the same thing with the fact of Christianity, *i. e.*, revelation here being viewed as nature. For this new order of nature, if revelation be called such, is, in the Argument of Analogy, the very dispensation the view of which an analogy of nature regulates. It is not, therefore, by the argument, that regulating analogy of nature. It is the subject and not the basis of the analogy; and to call it by the name of nature gives it no new function, and makes it no more that course of nature from which the analogy proceeds, than it was under the name of revelation. Revelation then, in spite of the verbal change, still presumes about itself: the analogy of revelation to nature, is the analogy of revelation to revelation. The argument from analogy, with its parallelism, retreats before one member of it. One of the lines has become its own parallel; the stream has both banks on one side: revelation is its own analogy. And therefore when Mr. Newman speaks of his conclusion of a standing revelation 'being forced on him by analogical 'considerations,' he speaks of an analogy which he has explained away, and unsubstantiated altogether. The whole argument has evaporated under his distinctions, and left him an analogy which has no nature to make revelation analogous to; and which he has especially adopted because it has not. He has treated the argument of analogy as the Germans treat inspiration, and under the appearance of explaining it has dissolved it.

It is, however, important before leaving the subject to follow out these two bases of reasoning which we have been contrasting into their respective lines of thought and ultimate positions with respect to religious truth.

We have then, on the one hand, a great presumptive ground, asserting that if a revelation is given, it must go on; that human nature wants a present infallible guide; that 'Christi-'anity must, humanly speaking, have an infallible expounder.' Upon this original notion of what is necessary, arises immediately the assertion of what is; and with that assertion a whole corresponding view of the existing matter-of-fact church, and its established body of ideas, however and wherever derived. A whole—to use the word—perfectionist view of the historical progress of thought and growth of truth in the church earthly, and the Christian world, is ultimately imposed by an original basis of presumption, like the present one. The hypothesis of a standing revelation cannot afford to make any large established ideas in the earthly church erroneous, it would interfere with such a standing revelation to do so; a pledge for the absolute correctness of all that growth of opinion which the infallible guide sanctions, is contained in the notion of that infallible guide. Thus inevitably arises the great general view that whatever is is right. The fact of certain ideas getting established becomes itself the proof of their truth. We see this view immediately in the tone of the arguer. The arguer reposes in fact; he carries the sensation about with him of largeness, extent, numbers: a doctrine that spreads over a large surface, that is held *de facto* by a large mass, is its own evidence. His tone of reasoning is a perpetual memento of the *de facto* ground; it is almost a condescension for him to argue at all; he has the fact, that is his argument: that his use of the fact is an assumption, is lost sight of in the largeness of the fact itself: the authority of fact becomes itself a fact, and is ever seen in the background as the supreme authority, beyond which no appeal lies. The arguer is thus less occupied in proving than in simply unfolding his assumption. He explains how it was that such opinions arose, the need that was felt for them, their convenience in filling up certain chasms in the original revelation. It was thus, he explains, that their truth became known. This desire became, in course of ages, stronger and stronger, till at last it formally expressed itself: the mass of Christendom resolved that these opinions were true, and accordingly they became known truths, and have continued so up to the present day. Such is the account of the rise of this doctrine, of this article of faith: the arguer simply traces the progress of their discovery and adjustment from the very first dawn of the want to the climax of the supply. The completeness and rotundity of the formed system are then urged; the coincidence of the fact that such doctrines exist, with the fact that they were wanted; the coincidence of the various results and ramifications of developed doctrine with each other; the coincidence of the permanency of their reception with the fact of that profession of infallibility which first sanctioned it. 'When we are convinced that large develop-'ments do exist in matter of fact professing to be true and 'legitimate, our first impression naturally must be that these 'developments are what they pretend to be. The very scale on 'which they have been made, their high antiquity, yet present 'promise, their gradual formation, yet precision, affect the ima-'gination most forcibly.' We need hardly say that Mr. Newman, in accordance with the whole tone of his book, and his appeal to the living and real as opposed to merely historical and formal, of course understands by these developments of doctrine, not the simple statements on paper, but doctrine as generally understood and believed, the practical and energizing opinions of the Christian body. Here, then, is what may be called a perfectionist view of the progress of truth in the Christian world. The ideas which establish themselves time after time in the church, are *ipso facto* true. What exists is right: each successive stage of thought improves on the following one; truth advances with the certainty of a mathematical problem; an infallible centre produces a perfect, ever operating self-correction; and the present state of things, as regards our relations to truth, becomes all that, humanly speaking, we could wish it be.

The argument of analogy, on the other hand, gives a basis upon which a more qualified system erects itself. Its maxim that we are not judges of what a revelation should be, and consequent confinement of us to the fact of what revelation there has been, tends immediately this way. That there has been a revelation rests upon evidence of fact; its continuance rests upon presumption. That revelation, then, as far as it went, and as much as it said, the whole of it, in whatever mode communicated, everything for the institution and communication of which, as a fact, there is evidence, the argument of analogy gives us; but for the rest, it tells us that we have no revelation, and that we cannot, by any notion on our part that we ought to have one, make one. It leaves the revelation which God gave among them to whom he gave it, exposed to the same chances of abuse, perversion, or neglect, in the carrying out, which attend on the truths of nature, in all respects, except those in which it is, as a matter of fact, divinely guaranteed. The Christian revelation *is* divinely guaranteed against total corruption; it has the direct promise that the 'gates of hell 'shall not prevail against it,' and stands in a different position from natural religion, in consequence of this promise. With this safeguard, however, the argument of analogy sends it down exposed all the same to common degrees of corruption, and those changes which are consistent with the substance of the revelation continuing. It prepares us, in consequence, for such abuses, if they occur; it makes it most likely beforehand, that they will, in a greater or less degree, occur. To the divine truth, thrown into the imperfect human mass, a positive likelihood of distortion and discolourment of some kind attaches. Not to mention lower and rougher causes, the mere tendencies of the human mind to go off upon particular thoughts, refine upon the natural substance of the truth put before it, and idolize their own conceptions and points of view, are against the probability of a revelation which offered the materials and supplied the occasions for abuse, being carried out without it, and running through centuries of intricate and agitating contact with the collective Christian intellect, without any deflexion whatever from original soundness. If the rise of such deflexions, again, is probable, their permanency is no matter to be surprised at; for the same course of things which originally established them makes them also last: it was their adaptation to some large and prevalent tastes which caused them to spread at first; and the same keeps them going. Again, when they have been going on for a certain time, further accretions to them give them further hold: the appendages of poetry, ornament, association form around them: they colour art and literature, they have aids and alliances in a hundred departments around them, and interweave themselves with the life and sentiment of the mass. If the argument of a standing revelation can explain such facts upon its own hypothesis, the argument of analogy can do the same on its; and can do it with exactly the same appeal to coincidence, harmony, and wholeness in its explanation. If truth can systematize and arrange itself, error can do the same; once begun, it is seen going on by a kind of intrinsic force of self-evolving, self-adjusting growth.

To take, for example, the popular and authorized cultus of the Virgin. The argument of analogy can take an unfavourable view of this cultus; offering, in doing so, quite as complete an account, in one way, of the rise, spread, and permanence of it, as the argument of infallibility can in another. That the doctrine of the Incarnation, for instance, was likely, humanly speaking, to lead to it, falls in just as well with the former as with the latter argument; for we see, constantly, instances of great truths which slide quite naturally, unless narrowly watched, into error, and seem to produce their own misconstruction. Here, then, analogy tells us we need not be perfectionists, and uphold the whole growth of opinion in the Church as faultless. And it proceeds to give one or two natural answers to some claims and reasons urged on the latter side. It is asked, for example, how we can suppose that God would allow great saints and holy men to have joined in and promoted this cultus, if it was wrong? But surely it is not necessary to suppose that, a general tendency to error being granted in the Christian body, good men should not, in particular cases, go along with it, even actively. The general body suffers in its attitude toward truth. If God, with all His vouchsafed grace, has left frailty in the heart of every single member of the earthly Church, from the lowest sinner to the highest saint, you cannot tell what may be the consequences of this fact upon the attitude of the Church, as a body, toward truth. It is natural to suppose that truth and goodness go together; and that if the Church is not pure in one respect, it will not be pure in the other. Subtle evil is an awful mysterious fact, which must be expected to have its results. You cannot tell how it may operate in this respect. And this general tendency in the body may carry away, in particular cases, and even engage the activities of, good members of the body. Moreover, you may ask how God will allow this: but if He allows the element of evil to exist in these good members at all, it is no great additional wonder if He allows that element to do something, and make a real difference in what comes from them, and affect the actual external issues from their minds. Why should not they be subject to their own class of partialities and obliquities, be liable to take up ideas, and then be over fond of them because they have taken them up, and dwell upon them with something like mental luxury, and feel originality with the secret relish of a frail creature, and go on to mould and tune their minds to a favourite line of thought, as persons tune an instrument? Let no persons think we are doing injustice here to the minds of really holy men; the degree to which serious evil can co-exist with very high dispositions in the soul, is one of the mysteries of our present state. We may add, that apparent symptoms of some ethical unsoundness, and of a degeneracy from the purity and severity of Christian worship, are found in the particular tone which runs through this cultus; which, even in its best form, seems to show an element of what may be called false sweetness in it, and very soon runs out into palpable and unbecoming sentimentalism. Again, if it is such a difficulty that God should permit holy men to think erroneously, how are we to account for the plain fact that He has permitted multitudes, in all ages, of the best and noblest minds to do so, and to worship Him in faulty modes? We are concerned with a principle of Divine government here, and are not, for an instant, comparing Roman Catholicism and paganism. The human souls that have lived and died under pagan systems have had, as far as we can judge, tempers and natures as capable in themselves of the fullest saintly development, and as worthy of the correctest views of truth, as those that have lived and died under Christianity: but they were permitted to think and to worship faultily. Nor is it any answer to this fact to say, that God has distinctly pledged the possession of the truth to good Christians, and did not to good pagans: for it is not denied here that the holy men we are referring to possessed the truth, but only that they possessed it free from all intermixture of error. The general facts of this earthly dispensation show plainly that it is a part of God's providence to permit good men to err. And though it is true that He distinctly teaches that 'they who do 'His will, shall know of the doctrine,' this cannot be applied as a certain test of truth so long as men do not do His will perfectly. For so long as evil remains in good men, we cannot tell what may be the consequence of that evil, and how far their mental relations to truth may be impaired by it. The rule of doing His will is absolutely true as a practical rule to ourselves; but this rule must be acted up to before it can become an infallible test of the teaching of another; and we know that no human being does act up to it. Nor is this explaining away an obvious, but only excluding a forced, meaning, as regards this scriptural maxim: for its obvious meaning, in the way in which it is brought before us, is that of a practical rule; and the other is a subsequently appended one. The test of personal goodness, for deciding truth, though by no means made a useless or unimportant, because it is not an infallible one, nor reduced to nothing because it is not everything, is yet not infallible. If scripture appeals to it in some places, in others it warns us against it. And the simple fact that on some most important questions which divide the Christian world equal personal holiness is to be seen on both sides, disqualifies the test of personal holiness in general as an absolute one on the question of truth.

On the whole then, we say—according to the argument from analogy—an original creed or revelation thrown into the world of human intelligence, is exposed to all common chances of human discolourment in the carrying out; the substantial original creed remaining throughout notwithstanding; and secured, if there be evidence for this fact, against failure to the end. And however, in reasoning *à priori*, out of our own heads, respecting revelation, we might expect it to do more for us because it did much, and look forward to a progress of truth pure, divinely guaranteed against error; the argument of analogy on the other hand bids us expect no such thing, but take the facts as they stand. It tells us not to expect all must be truth because there is truth; or again, to think all must be error because there is error; but to expect both truth and error. It supplies a dogmatic basis on the one side, and it allows for uncertainty on the other; and bids us neither be unbelievers nor perfectionists. It says—this is a mixed world, and expect mixtures in it. Do not think that the progress of things will be wholly one way, or wholly another; that it will entirely submerge truth, or unfold it unimpeachably. There is much of both good and evil in it. The earthly Church partakes of the mixed character of the world in which it is placed, and which it has more or less received into its own pale. And its best members too are not perfect, but have their own undue biasses of intellect, temper, taste, sometimes more open and palpable, sometimes more refined and internal.

Thus much for Mr. Newman's presumptive argument for a standing revelation, on which he rests the proof of the Papal Infallibility. It only remains now to take a brief view of this line of proof, as distinguished from another line of proof for the same doctrine.

The whole argument, then, of a standing revelation, is a very different one from M. De Maistre's argument of simple church government. M. De Maistre argues for the simple necessity of a central government for the Church; the need for a universal empire of a universal head. The simple idea of government, he says, necessarily takes us up, step by step, to one central and supreme seat of government; for there must be some limit to appeal from subordinate authorities, if a question is to be settled at all: and wherever the power of appeal stops, you have, *ipso facto,* a supreme authority. Now, such an hypothesis as this has certainly the advantage, as an hypothesis, of covering the whole ground. It is, indeed, absurd to expect that the mind should be satisfied with it; because what the mind wants is to believe what is true; and this argument does not touch the question of truth or error in the doctrines themselves decided on by this ultimate authority. It tells us the fact that they are decided on, and no more. It views the Church simply as a polity, and professes to apply the same principles to it which belong to other polities; and wholly omitting its prophetical office of teaching the truth, makes it impose its dogmas on us on the same principle on which the state imposes acts of parliament. However, it has, as an hypothesis, the advantage of covering the whole ground: for every single opinion which is, or can be entertained, among Christians, is either authoritatively decided, or is not. If it is, it is authoritatively *decided;* and, if it is not, it is authoritatively *not* decided: so that, in either case, Christian doctrine has a perfectly complete basis provided for it.

Mr. Newman's argument, on the other hand, though much superior, in line, to M. De Maistre's, for he does address himself to a real internal craving after truth in the human mind, is not so complete, and does not cover the whole ground. The hypothesis of a standing revelation reaches a point where it ceases to apply, and confesses that it can explain no further. For however largely truth is revealed to us, after all we come to a point where truth is not revealed to us; and it is only a matter of degree whether we stop where an original revelation stops, or stop where a standing revelation stops. As a matter of fact, there are a vast number of questions, and some of them very important ones as regards their intrinsic truth or falsehood, which this standing revelation does not decide. There is the whole question, *e. g.*, of the attributes and position of the Virgin, which this standing revelation has scrupulously avoided deciding: and a person in the Roman Church may either believe, with Mr. Newman, that the Blessed Virgin is all which the Arians supposed our Lord to be, or only believe what the English Church believes about her. It has scrupulously avoided saying whether her conception is immaculate or not. If a standing revelation avoids deciding important questions which come before it, it stops revealing. And though Mr. Newman may say that it may in course of time, though it has not yet done so, turn into dogma or reject a particular view of the Virgin; still here is the fact before us of an important question which this standing revelation has had before it for ages, and has refused to touch: a result (if true) included in the idea of the original revelation, and consequently part of it, and consequently revealed in theory; which, somehow or other, has not been revealed in fact. It is needless pursuing this remark through the whole series of instances in which it would apply. It is evident that in multitudes of cases of theological opinion in the Church public, not to mention the innumerable daily cases in the private life of all Christians in the world, who have been, are, or will be, there is, as a matter of fact, no continuous revelation which decides for us. And wherever it stops, all the objections which apply to the original revelation's, apply in principle to its cessation too.

This defect, indeed, in the hypothesis, is so obvious, that the Roman controversialist attempts to answer it by confessing it; by showing, that is, that it is admitted into the *rationale* of the Papal Infallibility. The idea of a standing revelation which goes to the real extreme of its principle, and reveals everything whatever about religion that people can naturally desire to be told, has its unreasonableness, so far, granted; that the Papal authority voluntarily decides a great number of questions about religion without revealing, simply commanding, as the supreme authority, and claiming obedience on that ground only. All the questions which are decided in this latter way are defined, indeed, to be ones out of 'the province of infallibility;' but it is not explained why they should be out of the province; and the case is, simply, that infallibility has come to an arbitrary terminus which it does not choose to exceed, and that a standing revelation stops short. In these cases the Roman *rationale* supplies the defect of one hypothesis by ground from another, and where the profession of a standing revelation conveniently stops, introduces the appeal to mere authority. It constructs a position out of the argument of a standing revelation and the monarchical argument combined; and M. De Maistre and

Mr. Newman could only give a unity of hypothesis to its system by each confining himself to one side of it.

Accordingly, the latter, after drawing out his theory for a standing revelation, proceeds to join on to it, as an additional and subordinate one, the simple governmental or monarchial argument; to assert 'the impossibility that an infinite wisdom, 'in decreeing the rise of an universal empire, should not have 'decreed the development of a ruler;' a certain 'absolute need 'of a monarchical power in the Church; which is our argument 'for anticipating it;' and of 'a necessary centre of unity for 'preserving the sacrament of unity.' We have not space for a regular discussion of this further subject; and contenting ourselves with the general answer that all the arguments quoted above against the validity of *à priori* reasoning on the point of a standing revelation, apply to the same line of reasoning on the point of an absolute monarchical authority and necessary centre of unity in the Church, shall make but one or two reflections here.

With respect, then, to the direct proof of the existence of an absolute monarchical authority somewhere in the Church, drawn from the fact of the Church being intended to be one external society; of the proof of the existence of a local centre of unity, drawn from the idea itself of unity; we do not see the force of it. The idea of unity does not imply a particular local centre of unity. Take a drop of water, or any fluid substance; it is one drop, but there is no centre of unity in it. The particles of any substance can adhere together by some equal pervading adhesion; and do not involve the existence of a central force in it attracting them to itself, and preventing them from flying off. The Church might certainly continue, as far as the nature of the case is concerned, one external society, without a monarchical head over it, or centre in it. What if all Christians had from the first obeyed the spirit of unity, and kept together upon their own individual will? The idea, of course, implies much more perfection in Christians than there has been: but it shows that the Christian society does not, metaphysically, and in the nature of the case, as one society, imply a local centre and head. Indeed Christians *did* keep together for many centuries in fact, without any local head in fact. So much for the nature of the case, and the metaphysical reason. Nor does the practical argument, again, of the expediency of such a local head for preserving unity, prove such a necessary centre of unity as is wanted: for an expedient for preserving unity is not the substance itself of unity. Water cannot rise above its level: an argument cannot prove more than its basis supports. The argument here proceeds on simple expediency as its basis, and therefore cannot confer any sacramental character as its result. The Papal power is, on this argument, a means to an end; a practical instrument for making men keep a Christian ordinance—that of external unity. If it fails to do this, and does not secure the preservation of that ordinance, either from its own excesses or the fault of the material it has to do with, it fails just as any other instrument may fail in doing its work: the ordinance is broken, and there is all the evil, whatever that may be, of external schism in the Christian body. But it is the division in the unity of the body at large, and not the separation from the Papacy, which is that evil: and no sacramental virtue is conferred by this argument on special union with Rome.

Again, the necessity of the Church being one external communion is urged as a practical argument in this direction: and for that necessity the most common argument urged is a *reductio ad absurdum* one.

A *reductio ad absurdum* argument then, to prove that the Church can be but one intercommunicating body in the world, proceeds thus:—If there can be two branches of the true Church not intercommunicating, why may there not be a thousand? and why may not every single Christian diocese in the world split off from every other, and yet all continue real Churches? If two Churches can be Churches without intercommunicating, there can be no such thing as a schismatical Church. We must be allowed to say here that the *reductio ad absurdum*, as a whole form of argument, is in an unsatisfactory, we may say neglected state; there are no recognised rules for the use and management of it; and each side on every question, worldly or religious, wields it in a loose irregular way, as it serves a turn, and inflicts a temporary stroke. In the present instance we shall only ask, would it be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the extreme doctrine of the Papal Infallibility, to suggest that there is nothing whatever in the nature of things to prevent a Pope turning Gallican, and proclaiming the truth of Gallicanism by a formal bull? Such an argument would be considered puerile; and yet we see no difference in principle between it and the argument here advanced, respecting schism. Neither of these contemplated absurdities have occurred, and nobody expects that they will occur. It may be said that there is a tendency, an apparent beginning of the fact in one case, which there is not in the other: but what difference does this make, so long as in neither case the fact will actually take place, *i.e.* so long as the right to say that the fact will not take place is the same on either side? And this right is the same. For that evil exists to a certain degree, is no kind of evidence in itself that it will proceed to the greatest possible degree. There are multitudes of beginnings and tendencies in the world which are no sort of evidence, even to the remotest probability, that the extremes of which they are the abstract beginnings, and to which they do abstractedly tend, will follow. Every human being tends to diabolical and insane wickedness, if by saying so be meant that he has the beginning of that which, if followed out, would become so: but no one would say that an excellent religious man actually tends to such a character; for there is not the remotest prospect, from the fact of his having evil in him, that he will become evil to that amount. In the same way there may be a beginning of unlimited schism in the Church; but it does not at all follow from that, even in the way of the remotest probability, that such unlimited schism will ensue. There is a difference of degree, which is, for all argumentative purposes, a difference of kind: a difference of degree in which there is no actual sequence from the one extreme end of the series to the other extreme end. The Church ought by rights to be one external society; if she is split up into two or three large branches, she is so far divided, and there is so far schism: the principle of unity is violated. But this is one state of things. A state of things in which Christians, instead of loving one another, had grown to hate one another to such an extent, that no one single particle of the Church would cleave to any other, and which would seem to show that Christian principle, and with it the Church upon earth, had evanesced, is another state of things. And there is no actual sequence from the one to the other. And therefore in the two cases of *reductio ad absurdum* before us, one side has as much right to disown the hostile supposition which its opponent presses, as the other has. What we assert is that all division does not take away churchship; and that more than one external communion may be the Church. The proper mode of answering this is to prove, that all division *does* unchurch, and that the Church *can* only be one external communion. If the necessity of this external oneness is not established by direct proof, it cannot be established by this *reductio ad absurdum*: for because the fact of existing division has to be accounted for, we have not therefore to account for the fact of a vast amount of division which does not exist.

But we must go from these reflections on certain lines of reasoning on the subject before us, to the examination of a statement. Mr. Newman asserts that as a matter of fact all Christianity outside of the Roman obedience has been a failure, and that therefore there is the evidence of fact to the divine institution of the Papal Monarchy. 'Wherever the 'Pope has been renounced, decay and division have been the 'consequence.' 'The Church is a kingdom; and heresy is a 'family rather than a kingdom: and a family continually 'divides and sends out branches, founding new houses and 'propagating itself in colonies, each of them as independent as 'its original head; so was it with heresy.' And this observation is meant to be applicable to all that is outside of the Roman obedience. Now to bring this statement to the test of fact. There is a large and important branch of the Church, which, never having been under the Roman obedience from the first, refused about a thousand years ago to conform to it, and has, consequently, been separate from the Roman see ever since. This portion of the Church has not exhibited, since that separation, division or decay. With respect to division;—the Eastern Church—the portion to which we allude—was very fertile in division and heresy, *before* the separation of East and West; and when therefore not the East by itself, but the whole Church, East and West together, as one body, were responsible, so far as responsibility was incurred, for such events. It was very fertile in schism in early times, as the Western Church has been in later. But the Eastern Church has had, since the separation of East and West, comparatively no division or heresy rising out of it: the Nestorian heresy, and the Monophysite which subsequently split into the Armenian, Jacobite, and others, date prior to that era. The Eastern Church again has not exhibited decay. It was overwhelmed by Barbarians in its more Eastern domains, just as the African Church was overwhelmed by the Vandals; but it found other ground, and soon after its Asiatic reverses, shot up with marvellous vigour and success in the North of Europe. Its conversion of the North, the largest and most striking of all the conversions of the middle ages, took place, it is to be remembered, after the separation from Rome; and the result is now before us in the shape of the Russian Church, with its history, saintly names, and associations, and all the ecclesiastical accumulations of a thousand years. The Eastern Church presents us at this day the phenomenon of a Church, comprehending about eighty millions of Christians, in perfect doctrinal unity with itself, chanting the same creed and the same liturgies now which it has chanted every day of every year since the time of St. Basil, the Gregories, and St. Chrysostom, up to this present hour, at which we write:—a Church in full possession of the popular affection throughout its domains, and fertile in examples of the most holy, self-denying, and severe Christian life. Such is the Church which is asserted to have exhibited nothing but decay and division since the separation from Rome.

Mr. Newman's line with respect to the Greek Church is indeed a feature in the essay to be observed. His ordinary view supposes it not to exist; and the argument proceeding as if there were no such body, is of course not encumbered by the fact at all. But he is necessarily brought into contact with it occasionally, and then he supposes it as a totally different fact from what it is. He supposes Eastern Christianity to be an effete and stagnant superstition, showing no life, and producing no fruits. Its permanence confronts him as an obstacle to his theory of a corruption, which makes corruption 'the end of a 'course, a transition state leading to a crisis, and as such a brief 'and rapid process;' and the same theory which proved that corruption could not attach to Roman doctrines because they were permanent, has to be explained when it comes across the doctrinal permanence in the East. And the explanation is the one mentioned. 'Decay,' he says, 'which is one form of corruption, 'is slow. We see opinions, usages, and systems, which are of 'venerable and imposing aspect, but which have no soundness 'within them, and keep together from a habit of consistence, and 'from dependence on political institutions; or they become 'almost peculiarities of a country, or habits of a race, or the 'fashions of society. Such are the superstitions which invade a 'population, like some ingrained die or inveterate odour, and 'which at length come to an end because nothing lasts for ever.' 'Whether,' he continues, 'Mahometanism, external to Christen'dom, and the Greek Church within it, fall under this descrip'tion, is yet to be seen.' And so the case of the Eastern Church is dismissed. But surely upon this very statement, highly unfavourable as it is to Eastern Christianity, the case of Eastern Christianity cannot be so dismissed. For the only conclusive proof of the theory of decay, viz., dissolution, it confesses to be wanting here, and it allows that whether the Eastern Church 'comes to an end' or not, is 'yet to be seen.' It has not then, at any rate, come to an end as yet: and, so long as it has not, it is the phenomenon of a permanent Christian doctrine and society, outside of the Roman obedience; and is therefore a real difficulty which his theory has to surmount: a difficulty, we must add, which is but imperfectly covered, by coupling its permanence and that of Mahometanism (which is no difficulty to Rome whatever) together. The 'barrenness, if not lifelessness,' of the Greek Church, however, is the one idea taken for granted throughout the essay, and is aided by side remarks, here and there, such as the casual suggestion that it is mere accident that it did not fall with the rest of early heresy, contained in the quotation from Gibbon, that perhaps the 'Greeks would be still involved in the 'heresy of the Monophysites, if the emperor's horse had not 'fortunately stumbled. Theodosius expired, and his orthodox 'sister succeeded to the throne.'

With respect then to this assertion of lifelessness in Eastern doctrines, we do not know what particular standard of life in a Church may be implied here, but we will propose one to which there can be small objection. Doctrine is not barren and lifeless which produces good works. Other things may be wanting; but if they are there, after all they are the surest sign of life, of a Church having something in her, being a reality, being solid. They show that her doctrine is not mere sound, that it has a spirit in it: they show that she is animated, that she is not a corpse, a husk. Learning, science, intellectual refinement, and many of the human media by which a Church expresses and adorns its spiritual life, there may not be; but if the Christian type has worked, and an awful unspeakable moulding power has resided within her, seizing human souls, as if it were some physical principle, mastering and overwhelming weak and carnal nature in them, and making them new creatures, with thoughts and hopes estranged from earth, and passing through this world as through a wilderness; if some powerful mould within her has formed wonderful spiritual beings on whom the inhabitants of the earth have gazed in reverence and awe: this shows something more than the dead dry husk and shell of a Church. This presence of the Spirit, and these deep movements of grace, the Eastern Church can show. She has formed saints and holy men in all their various gradations; has produced great spiritual deeds, of self-denial, love, and fear: and, from the highest and severest ascetic down to the humblest of the Church's flock, has trained in every age, and does train now, souls for heaven. If she has done this she has been a living Church. We may be answered, perhaps, that a congregation of Baptists produces good men amongst them, and yet is not the Church. But this is no answer to meet the case. Here is a body that has the whole external form and system of a Church, which the early Church exhibited; and which is the representative, by uninterrupted descent, of the ancient Eastern Church. It believes, and teaches the self-same dogmatic Christianity, which the ancient Church did. There is not the smallest question, that the dogmatic creed of the Eastern Christian at this day is the creed of St. Basil and St. Chrysostom. Now this whole corporate and doctrinal identity with the ancient Church, the Baptist congregation wants; and those appearances of life are a mere isolated note in the case of the Baptist congregation, which come in to complete a whole body of other notes of a Church in the Eastern case.

Moreover, it may do very well as an off-hand answer to say, that all sects can produce their good men; but the note of sanctity which belongs to the Eastern Church, is a totally different one from what sectarian piety affords us. We are concerned with a question as to a phenomenon here—the apparent life of the Greek Church; and we say that Eastern sanctity is one phenomenon, and what we call sectarian piety is another: and one phenomenon cannot be put aside by identifying it with another, which is totally different from it.

Indeed, the controversial line taken upon this subject is one which we must notice. It is objected, on the part of the Roman controversialist, to the English Church, that she does not exhibit notes of sanctity. Her defenders reply that she has them, though in her own form, and though she cannot show the same extraordinary manifestations in individuals which some other churches can. And they are told that this is not enough; that the truth is, we have no saints, and that, therefore, we are not a Church. With this decision, the controversy steps over to the East. Now the Eastern Church on this subject produces what is something like evidence. The Greek points to twelve thick volumes, one for each month, containing the Hagiology of his Church. We open the volumes, and there, at any rate, are portrayed real saints. There is no distinction there between sanctity and its form to be offered and to be overruled: there are real saints, spirit, form, and all; men who lived literally in caves and dens of the earth, who passed life in spiritual contemplation, or in converting rude tribes to Christ, men who laid the foundation of the monastery in the wild forest, and whose cells, hollowed with their own hands out of the solid rock, or mountain, or lake side, far from human habitations, still collected disciples, attracted by the fame of their sanctity, to hear their voice, and crowds of simple folk to touch their garments. Here are the lives of holy monks, hermits, bishops, from a thousand years ago to recent times, the canonized saints of the Eastern Church, and as true and unquestionable saints as any church can show. And what does it gain to the Eastern Church in the controversy to show them? Nothing. The advocate of Rome as completely excludes the Greek Church from the universal Church of Christ, as if it had not one single saint to show. The line is the same with respect to miracles. The English Church is told she has not the note of miracles. But the Eastern Church has the note of them, upon quite as good evidence as the Roman; and it does her no good whatever to prove it. No wonder if some people think all controversy hollow and unreal, when they see arguers simply dealing out their arguments for the occasion, and allowing no weight to, and claiming the greatest weight for, the same evidence at the same time, according as others, or themselves, are to be benefitted by it.

But to return to what we were saying about the character of the phenomenon here before us; for our own part, we look in vain to discern any essential distinction as to the note of sanctity (including miracles in that note) between the Eastern and the Western Church. We see on each side a vast collection of wonderful saintliness, accompanied by a considerable amount of miraculous agency, asserted and recorded, and professing to be so upon evidence. It would disturb a devotional mind, and make the latitudinarian smile, to attempt to establish any solid distinction, either as to evidence or internal character, between the miracles of the Eastern and the Western Church. Moreover, at the Council of Florence, as the terms of the meditated reconciliation implied, the Church of Rome herself was quite willing to recognise this sanctity. She was willing to allow the whole Eastern Church to retain its calendar, and go on in future exactly as it had gone on, in this respect; to continue regarding as undoubted Christian saints, the self-same persons whom it had all along regarded as such, and paying them, to all time, the same honours; observing their festivals, chanting their praises, recording their miracles, invoking their intercession. In fact, the Roman Church was willing to receive the whole body of Eastern canonized saints. We must add that, to be willing to do so, was to be willing to allow the real Churchship of the Church of which they were members. How could they be made Christian saints, unless they were made members of the Christian Church: and how could they be made members of the Christian Church after their death, if they were not so during their life? How can a fact be created *ex post facto*, and a thing which was not, be afterwards made to have been? an act of power which, Aristotle says, the gods themselves are not equal to. It may be said that it is possible to suppose them members of the Christian Church in heaven, without supposing them to have been members of the Christian Church upon earth. But it is the latter of these two which the Church of Rome was willing to allow the Easterns to believe, and not the former only. It is the latter of these two beliefs which is involved in the act of a whole Church keeping up the memory of departed saints. You allow a whole Church to go on taking the same view of a certain body of saints, which it had done: but it *had* always regarded them as members of the earthly Church, therefore it is allowed to continue to do so. And really, without anything more being wanted, if you allow millions of Christians to go on reciting the holy deeds and miracles of their departed saints, observing their festivals, and dwelling in thought upon the examples of their earthly lives; to say that you need not allow them, in doing so, to regard them as members of the same earthly Church as themselves, would be at once inane and trivial. On the principle here mentioned, the Church of Rome could canonize the Hindoo saints, on converting a Hindoo population. You may suppose the Hindoo saints, as saints in heaven; 'for in every 'nation, he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is 'accepted of Him.' But you could not make them Christian saints; and why not, but because they were not members of the Christian Church upon earth. If then you *do* recognise a body of Christian saints, you *do* imply that they were members of such a Church.

The substantial subject, however, with which we are concerned throughout these reflections, is simply, the sanctity of the Eastern Church, as an ordinary and common sense fact discernible in it, without bringing in other aspects or considerations. All we want to say is, that there are discernible in the Eastern Church real, and high, and solid effects of some spiritual life, as we must needs suppose it to be; that its sanctity is upon the primitive and ecclesiastical type; that it holds up the standard of Christian mortification to its people ; and that that standard is not a practically unproductive one, but has had all along, and has now, its genuine fruits. If that Church exhibits the same spiritual marks which the Roman Church can, the latter cannot call her decayed, or her doctrine a dead and lifeless one: and such Christianity cannot be put aside under the designation of 'an inveterate odour.' Certainly, Eastern sanctity shows marks of the soil on which it grows: and the world is much mistaken if Roman sanctity does not do the same. Eastern sanctity, too, presents features of uncouthness, rudeness, strange simplicity—in a word, some barbarian features, to the European eye: but we have yet to learn that the Gospel distinguishes, so long as men love God and hate their own flesh, whether they are barbarians or not. Many a saint of the early Church must be rejected on such a rule. The Eastern Church has gone on, comparatively outside of the great movement of intellect, science, and civilization, in the world ; and, therefore, its Christianity is open to remarks on this head. But it is a small thing to be judged of by man's judgment. Mr. Newman must permit us to say that his judgment, on this head, has signs of being something very like 'man's judgment.' He refuses, in a certain case, to see and recognise the Christian type, because it does not come before him in the Latin shape, and with the accompaniments of intellectual grace and refinement which it has incorporated on its European area. It comes before him in the shape which antiquity, and not 'movement,' has attached to it; and he puts it aside under the name of 'an inveterate odour,' the 'venerable peculiarity' of a particular population, analogous, it might seem, to any case of old custom, law, or costume. This is 'man's judgment,' we must say. The early Church gloried in a religion which made all men equal—the refined Greek or Roman, and the barbarian, whose name had but just reached the threshold of the civilized world—absolutely equal. The genius of Christianity broke down the barriers of artificial types and standards in character, and with a holy violence levelled the formations of human genius, philosophy, and will, to make way for one substantial, fundamental character for man. That was love. Pervading all Christian natures, and running the same invariable substance through all outer character, and all modifications of human sentiment and feeling; the principle of love was his moral being and life; and one universal type converted all other distinctions into childishness and nullity. Rudeness civilization, ignorance science, uncouthness grace, were all one—for love was deeper than all, and men were new-formed, 'after the image of Him who had created them; where there 'was neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, 'Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but Christ was all, and in 'all.'

To return to our main subject.

We have examined the presumptive part of Mr. Newman's argument for the Papal Infallibility. It is not our intention to follow him into the historical, or examine how far his original presumption is sustained by the evidence of fact. That has been already ably, acutely, and in the most fair, candid, and tempered tone of controversy, done by a writer, whose work was noticed in the last number of this Review. Mr. Newman himself admits that his presumption is the strongest part of his argument; and alludes to the historical evidence for the Papacy, as a subordinate and secondary part of it. 'All,' he says, 'depends on the strength of that presumption.' 'The 'absolute need of a spiritual supremacy is at present the 'strongest of arguments in favour of its supply.' With respect to the historical evidence—the evidence, that is, of early Church history to its divine institution, as a matter of fact—he is content if it only gives a negative support: 'Supposing there is '*otherwise* good reason for saying that the Papal supremacy is 'part of Christianity, there is nothing in early Church history 'to contradict it.'

Having gone through these two stages of argument on the main question which Mr. Newman's essay brings before us;

we approach a third. It has appeared that the principle of development in itself, however enlarged upon, cannot be any pledge for absolute correctness in development, or secure the truth of a certain mass of developments which has grown up. It has appeared, that for the existence of what alone can secure this absolute correctness in developing, and alone can prove the absolute truth of certain developments as well as the right to impose them as articles of faith—for the existence of a constant, infallible, developing authority, or standing revelation in the Church, the argument advanced is an insufficient one; inasmuch as this argument is based on a presumption for which we have no warrant. The argument of the essay now takes another line, and one of a very different character to what it has hitherto. It adopts the line of a *reductio ad absurdum.* It asserts that the fundamental doctrines of Christianity are developments; and that therefore we must either give them up, or admit that continuing developing authority in the Church, which established them. It instances the Nicene creed. That, it proceeds, is regarded by both sides as essential; and that is a development: we are therefore committed already to the principle of development; and must either receive the whole cycle of Roman doctrine, or be prepared to give up Nicene. It says, in short, that we have no standing ground between Rome and Infidelity. Let us admit, then, though not logically required to do, the conditional truth of this argument, we then say—truth is the end of controversy, and this is a fair argument if its fundamental fact is a true one. At the same time it is not too much to say that considerable responsibility attaches to the use of such an argument as this.

Now here the first question to be settled is obviously, that of the sense in which the word development is used. The creed which contains our fundamental articles of faith is called a development; in what sense is it meant that it was one?

One sense of development makes it a simply explanatory process. Development is explanation; explanation is development. A man in conversation makes an assertion, which another misapprehends; in reply, he explains the meaning, or develops the meaning of his assertion. His meaning is exactly the same with what it was before; it is in order to show what it was before, that the explanation is given; the meaning before the explanation or development of it, and the meaning after, are, by the very nature and aim of the process, the same. It so happens that language, or the medium by which we convey our ideas to one another, is capable of misinterpretation; we have therefore often to alter or add to the language in which we expressed an idea, and express it anew; not because our idea itself was imperfect, or was different at all from what it is, but because some person has construed our language in a way in which we did not intend it to be construed. This explanation again, inasmuch as language still continues our medium, may be misinterpreted, and a second explanation become necessary for the benefit of some second objector. A third, a fourth, a fifth, an indefinite number of explanations may succeed on the same principle which produced the first. An idea may thus, in course of discussion, be said to be developed; *i. e.* may go through fresh successional stages of language, according as preceding stages are found not adequate to prevent it from being mistaken and confused with some other idea, different from, or short of it. Each misconstruction, as it shows itself, makes a fresh defence necessary; when three or four defensive explanations have been made, these again have to be reconciled to each other; and the creation of language becomes larger and larger. The case is not unfrequent of a single arguer having to maintain in conversation a particular point against a whole circle of opponents. He adheres firmly, consistently, and with all unity and simplicity, to the one point which he defends, and is only bent on defending it. But, with that one object in view, what a vast formation of language does he raise as he goes on! what distinctions accumulate, and what protests and safeguards grow up out of, and surround the original statement! He would be surprised at the end of the argument to see the edifice he had built. And yet nobody would say that his idea had altered, and was not just the same as it was when he began. It was for the very purpose of so maintaining it, that he explained it again and again anew, as misconstruction threatened it, and so formed all that body of expression around it; and a bystander will make the special remark on such an occasion, that the arguer has kept to his own point, amidst a varied and complex opposition. Cases of legal amplification illustrate the same principle. What a testator, or seller of an estate, wants to do, is able to be expressed in two words, for any fair man's understanding; but the law has the responsibility of guarding against all the possible constructions which may be put upon a statement, and not only that of satisfying an ordinary and simple construction. The case, in short, is a common everyday one, in which the idea in a person's mind is exactly the same, whether more shortly and simply, or more fully and guardedly expressed. It is not meant that it may not become clearer by such a process; but the additional clearness is an external argumentative one; not affecting its substance, or making it, as regards natural straightforward thinking, any other than the identical idea which it was before. Such is simply explanatory development.

On the other hand there is a kind of development, which is a positive increase of the substance of the thing developed; a fresh formation not contained in, though growing out of, some original matter. The developed substance here is not the same actual one with the original, but a very different one. Growth-out-of is a wholly different thing from identity-with. The development of a seed into a plant is one of growth, for example; and it does not carry with it identity. It is a pure metaphor by which we say the acorn is the oak; it is so, if by saying so be meant that the acorn is the thing in consequence of which (coupled with other causes) an oak will exist; but it is not identical with it actually. As things actual, things cognizable, an acorn is one thing, an oak is another; the one is a smooth oval piece of vegetable matter, about an inch long, and of that consistency and appearance of which it is; and the other is a large, wide-spreading tree, with rough bark, and thick branches bearing leaves. When one of these phenomena exists, indeed, the other does not; and this succession in two things is able to be called the existence of one and the same thing in different stages; but it is self-evident that they are not actually one and the same thing, and that, however intimate may be the relation of growth in the two, they have not the relation of identity. This is, perhaps, the most common and natural sense of development; the word, either from etymological or from conventional reasons, is suggestive of an actual enlargement of substance in the thing developed. Power develops, *i.e.* becomes actually larger; there is more of it. Rome was a small power at first; it developed into a larger one. The 'march of mind' development is of this kind; it consists of new ideas and forms of thoughts, new discoveries in science, new social comforts and conveniences arising. Philosophical development may be partly explanatory only, partly an actually enlarging one. Such are two sorts of development; that of explanation simply, and that of substantial growth. The one begins with what the other ends in; explanation starts with its substance, growth gradually arrives at its. In growth it is the ultimate formation of all which is the substance of the thing growing; the substance before that point only existing on a kind of antedating view. The oak is the grown oak, not the acorn; the Roman empire is Augustan, and not Romulean Rome. The original thing is not the real, the substantial thing, in this kind of development; it is only the imperfect, half-existing, ambiguous, and struggling element of future reality and proper being.

Now of these two kinds of development the former is of course conceded in the case before us. All allow that Christian fundamental truth has been explained. The whole of scientific theology is an explanatory development of it. To take the doctrine of the Incarnation, the truth that God became man. A whole body of Christian theology, from the short decrees of the earliest councils to the full volumes of the schoolmen, explain this truth. The former guarded it from misconstruction; the latter, besides this, brought out, in detail, the logical contents of the truth. There are inexhaustible logical contents in it. God comprehends all that God is; man comprehends all that man is. All that was logically comprehended under these two terms was brought out; and all that was logically comprehended in the idea of the union of the two was brought out. There is question upon question in Aquinas, *De Modo Unionis Verbi Incarnati,* extending from the most fundamental to the most distant parts of the truth:—'*Utrum Unio Verbi Incarnati* '*sit facta in natura vel personâ; Utrum Unio Verbi Incarnati sit* '*facta in Supposito vel Hypostasi; Utrum Hypostasis Christi* '*post Incarnationem sit composita; Utrum natura humana* '*fuerit unita Verbo Accidentaliter; Utrum Unio sit aliquid* '*creatum; Utrum idem quod assumptio; Utrum facta per* '*gratiam; Utrum merita præcesserunt; Utrum gratia Unionis* '*fuerit homini Christo naturalis.*' There follow questions, '*De* '*Modo Unionis ex parte Personæ assumentis;* and then questions, '*De Modo Unionis ex parte Naturæ assumptæ;*' the former runs out into the questions, '*Utrum Personæ Divniæ* '*conveniat assumere naturam creatam; Utrum Naturæ Divinæ* '*conveniat; Utrum una Persona sine alia possit assumere;* '*Utrum plures Personæ Divinæ possint; Utrum una Persona* '*Divina possit assumere duas naturas humanas;*' and many others. The latter runs out into the questions, '*Utrum Filius* '*Dei assumpserit personam; Utrum assumpserit hominem;* '*Utrum assumpserit humanam naturam abstractam ab omnibus* '*individuis, vel in omnibus individuis.*' Then succeed questions, '*De modo Unionis quantum ad ordinem; Utrum anima* '*à Filio Dei prius fuerit assumpta quam caro; Utrum tota* '*natura fuerit assumpta mediantibus partibus, vel partes mediante* '*toto:* Questions, '*De Gratia Christi; Utrum in Christo gratia* '*habitualis; Utrum virtutes; Utrum fides; spes, timor:*' Questions, '*De Scientia Christi; De Scientia Christi in Communi;* '*De Scientia Beata Animæ Christi; De Scientia Indita; De* '*Scientia Acquisita:*' Questions, '*De Potentia Animæ Christi,*'—all running out into their respective subdivisions. Here, in short, is a field of explanatory theology, which takes the idea of the Incarnation, and brings out all the possible inferences and aspects which can be elicited from it, some nearer and more obvious, others remoter and minuter, till the subject multiplies into a whole world of subtle, and, so to call it, microscopic theological science. But such manifold evolutions do not profess to add anything to the substantial idea of the Incarnation, the truth that God became man. There is a great difference in the clearness, accuracy, and circumstantiality, in the intellectual image of the doctrine, which such an explanatory development as this produces, and the intellectual image in an ordinary Christian mind unversed in scholastic divinity; but the doctrine entertained is the same identical one.

But it is the latter kind of development, that of growth, and not that of explanation only, which Mr. Newman's argument desiderates in the present case. His argument parallels the Roman doctrinal developments with the doctrinal development at Nice. The latter, therefore, to make the argument hold, must be a development in the same sense as the Roman ones. That is to say, that as the doctrines of purgatory, and the Papal Infallibility, are obviously positive substantial advances upon the doctrines of the early church on the subjects of the intermediate state and the Roman see; so the doctrine of the divinity of our Lord, as declared at the Nicene council, was a positive substantial advance upon the earlier teaching of the Church with respect to our Lord's nature. It is not enough for the consistency of this argument to say, that the doctrine as to our Lord's nature was explained, defended, and secured by additional language from misconstruction, at that council: it is necessary to say that the doctrine positively itself grew, was itself more than it had been, more at the Nicene epoch than it had been formerly. No instance of simple explanation, however extensive and copious, can afford a parallel case to that positive growth, to which Mr. Newman has to find a parallel. According to Mr. Newman, those Roman developments, to which he parallels the Nicene, 'though called developments, still are distinct doctrines,' from the elementary ones on the same subject; that is to say, other truths than what were known before, different pieces of knowledge from former ones; a person might know the former and not know the latter: when he comes to know them, he knows something which he did not know; he has positive fresh truth, a substantial idea in his head, which he had not before. Consequently to the Nicene doctrine of our Lord's divinity, for the parallel to hold, the same must apply. There is, first of all, a development which is identical with simply understanding a statement. 'When it is declared,' says Mr. Newman, 'that 'the "Word became flesh," three wide questions open upon us at 'the very announcement. What is meant by "the Word?" 'what by "flesh?" what by "became?" The answers to these 'involve a process of investigation, and are developments;' but this kind of development will not do here. There is then a further development which explains a statement, and carries it into additional and more formal statements—'a multitude of 'propositions, which gather round the inspired sentence of which 'they come, giving it externally the form of a doctrine.' And this development will not do here either. There must be more here. There must, in the case of the Nicene doctrine of our Lord's nature, be positive growth of, and such substantial addition as growth implies to, a former elementary doctrine of the church on that subject.

This kind of development and this basis of essential doctrine being necessary for Mr. Newman's argument in the present instance, it is to be observed that the line of thought which runs through his essay as a whole, does not keep back such a theological position, and that his language extends the hypothesis of growth to the fundamental articles of Christian faith, making them to be developments from some former elementary and seminal doctrines on the subjects to which they refer, just as the Papal Infallibility is made the development of the early respect to the See of St. Peter, and just as the doctrine of purgatory, of the deification of St. Mary, and others, are made the developments of former shadowy, primordial, and scattered anticipations of those doctrines. He puts both these classes of doctrines on the same ground with respect to development. 'That the hypothesis he 'adopts,' he says, 'accounts not only for the Athanasian creed, 'but for the creed of Pope Pius, is no fault of those who adopt 'it. No one has power over the issues of his principles; we 'cannot manage our argument, and have as much of it as we 'please, and no more.' Reverse the order of the two *credenda*, and the hypothesis he adopts accounts not only for the creed of Pope Pius, but also for the Athanasian creed. The same appeal to Church testimony, he proceeds, 'cannot at once condemn St. 'Bernard and defend St. Athanasius;' that is to say, that if the former taught what was new about the Blessed Virgin, the latter taught what was no less new, about our Lord's divinity. With this alternative, he boldly meets the use of the Vincentian rule, '*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.*' The Vincentian rule, as applied by English divines, claims for certain doctrines the evidence of early and general testimony; testimony to the fact that they were originally taught by the Apostles, and received through successive generations of Christians ultimately from their hands. It asserts this of the doctrine of our Lord's divinity taught by the Nicene and Athanasian creeds, and of other doctrines. Mr. Newman does not meet this application of the rule with a direct, but a conditional answer. He says, *if* the rule proves the one set of doctrines, the English, it proves the other too, the Roman; *if* it does not prove the latter, it does not prove the former either. He meets the rule itself with a demand for fairness and impartiality in its application, whether in the negative or affirmative, and protests against the 'Lesbian' use of it, upon which English divines have proceeded. This conditional answer, reduced into a direct one, is simply that the rule *does* not prove the later doctrines, and therefore *does* not prove the earlier either. His application of the rule is negative in the former case; and is therefore negative in the latter also. Indeed what he professes to supply in this Essay—it is his very object in writing it—is a basis for later Roman doctrines, which is not Vincentian; that is, which does not appeal to an original reception, but to a law of growth as their proof; and which does not assert the fact of an early belief, but gives a rationale for a later one. He applies, therefore, this law and this rationale to the case of earlier doctrines as well. He claims anticipations in the case of the Roman doctrines; and he will claim anticipations in the case of the Nicene; but his argument does not claim more for Nicene than for Roman; and asserts in either case the existence of a seminal elemental doctrine, anterior to that of the subsequently and now established one. How far indeed that early received doctrine respecting the nature of our Lord, for example, went, or what it was, his argument does not inform us: but its parallel does not require more than a very seminal elemental one. The seminal doctrine in the case, for instance, of the Papal Infallibility is confessedly very small and shadowy. In the case, then, of the Nicene doctrine of our Lord's divinity, it need be no more. But, without entering into the details of the parallel, the argument asserts with sufficient force the general point, that the Vincentian appeal to early reception cannot be supported in the case of the Nicene, any more than it can in the case of later Roman doctrine; and that the anterior and primordial idea with respect to our Lord's nature, is not, going by such evidence, the same with, but the seed of the Athanasian doctrine on that subject.

Thus commences and proceeds, then, the great course of doctrinal development which this Essay maintains. Starting from the small and seminal beginning of primitive doctrine, it gradually grows and enlarges, and goes through a career analogous to the progress of science, and the march of civilization. Truth gains fresh augmentations at Nice, at Ephesus, at Chalcedon, at the Lateral Councils, at Florence, at Trent: its first one is at Nice, where our Lord's divinity is declared; that step gained, in course of some centuries it proceeds, under the infallible sanction, to establish the cultus of St. Mary. 'Christianity came into the world an idea,' and an imperfect idea. In the case of such an idea arising, 'Its beginnings are no measure of its capabilities or its scope. At first no one knows what it is or what it is worth. It remains perhaps for a time quiescent; it tries, as it were, its limbs, and proves the ground under it and feels its way. It seems in suspense which way to go: it wavers. There will be a time of confusion, when conceptions and misconceptions are in conflict; and it is uncertain whether anything is to come of the idea at all.' 'The dogmatic principle was in the history of Christianity what conscience is in the history of an individual mind. . . . Conscience mistakes error for truth; and yet we believe, that on the whole, and even in those cases where it is ill-instructed, if its voice be diligently obeyed, it will gradually be cleared, simplified, and perfected. I would not (but he gives no reason why he should not,) imply that there is indistinctness so great as this in the knowledge of the first centuries.' 'The statements of the early fathers, we are told, are but tokens of the multiplicity of openings which the mind of the Church was making into the great treasure-house of truth; real openings, but incomplete and irregular.' 'The Church went forth from the world in haste, as the Israelites from Egypt "with their dough before it was leavened, their kneading troughs being bound up with the clothes upon their shoulders."' But out of this indistinct, vague, and chaotic state of the original Christian idea, at last 'some definite form of doctrine arose.' 'When one generation of teachers was left in ignorance, another generation completed their work, for the same unwearied anxious process of thought went on.' 'The doctrine of the Holy Trinity, found, at most, only in its rudiments in earlier writers,' grew up. 'When they had duly secured in the affections of the faithful the supreme glory and worship of God incarnate, they determined the place of St. Mary in our reverence.' 'The conduct of popes, councils, fathers, exhibited the slow, anxious, painful taking up of new elements into an existing body of belief.' This course of doctrine moved on, and time, which 'is necessary for the full comprehension and perfection of great ideas,' gradually brought out and substantiated the original idea of Christianity.

We are not at present engaged in disproving, but only in representing Mr. Newman's doctrine of development, and showing in what sense he uses the word. We will, however, just allude to one or two arguments used about it. The analogy of the development of the Mosaic dispensation appears to us then an obviously untrue one. The Mosaic dispensation was not a final, but a preparative one; it suggests its own want of finality: it ever prophesies its own issue in a higher revelation, and confesses throughout its own incompleteness and short-comings. The Christian dispensation, on the other hand, is a final one. As a dispensation which is not final proceeds, by the very force of the hypothesis, towards something which is, tends to an issue, and aspires to a development different from, and higher than itself; so a dispensation, which is final, by the very force of the hypothesis does not. The law was a shadow of good things to come. When those good things came, therefore, they and not things still further on and beyond them, were the substance. Otherwise one side of a relation is met by what is not its correlative one; and type is responded to by type, and not by antitype. Substance is the correspondent to shadow, as son is the correspondent to father, giver to receiver, ruler to subject: father does not generate father, nor shadow introduce shadow. The law's foreshadowings, the gradual evolutions of prophecy, anticipation strengthening, type becoming clearer, a preparation growing age after age more critical, and step by step approximating to that to which it led; this ascent to a climax, this slowness and solemnity in ushering in an end;—the whole course of development, in a word, in the Jewish Dispensation, so far from affording a parallel for the same in the Christian, makes us expect the very contrary: for it points to that Revelation as itself the development which that course of Judaism had developed into, and therefore opposes it, instead of paralleling it, to that course, on the development point. We do not argue from the length of the journey the length of the end of the journey, or from the time it takes learning the time it must take knowing, or from the gradual nature of acquisition the gradual nature of possession. We cannot argue from the development of the seed to the development of the fruit; nor from the growth of Judaism to the growth of Judaism's consummation, Christianity. It will be said that a Revelation may be the development of an anterior one, and may yet be developed itself into a further and larger one: but if so, it is not *the* development of that anterior revelation. It may be said that the Christian Revelation is only, as a whole, and including all subsequent growth, the development of the Jewish; but this is an ambiguous explanation here. The question is, was that particular Revelation which immediately succeeded to Judaism, itself the development of Judaism, or only the seed of a prospective grown revelation which was to be. If the latter, all we can say is, that it falsifies the whole process by which it was introduced. That whole course of preparation in which Judaism consisted, designed and adapted as it professedly was for ushering in something ultimate and perfect, certainly fell short of its obvious purpose, and baulked expectation, if it ushered in with so much pomp of gradual evolution, not a climax and end, but a small beginning, a seed and element of a future grown Revelation.—The same kind of answer may be given to another argument urged in behalf of this sort of development in Christianity, the argument, viz. that the Apostles brought out the truth by degrees in their preaching; for this kind of reserve is of its own nature, only temporary, and has reference to the individual addressed only, and not to the condition of the truth itself: the very fullest and most perfect knowledge of the truth being able to be coincident with the most gradual method of communicating it.

Again, there is a general argument which has considerable weight with some minds in favour of such a development of Christianity as we are speaking of; an argument which appeals to their intellectual prepossessions and aspirations. There is something imposing in the idea of a Revelation growing and enlarging: stationariness appears to them like stagnation, and to be tied to an original Revelation looks like adhering to 'beggarly elements.' They see an apparent poverty and meagreness, an antiquarian dryness and narrowness in the latter view; that of growth and development seems a larger one. Largeness, freedom, and depth of mind seem thus concerned in its reception, and mental qualities are appealed to, which we value and encourage in ourselves. We like the sensation of growth and progress in our own minds: we sympathize with such a progress in the system of truth to which we belong: we identify ourselves with the system, and like progress in both together. Of this feeling, then, there is a right side and a wrong. The love of progress, considered as the love of truth, is right. We ought to be glad of truth growing, provided it does grow: and if it was less yesterday, there is a disinterested pleasure and triumph in its being more to-day. But there is another feeling which mixes very subtly with this disinterested triumph, and that is the feeling arising from the consideration of that knowledge as possessed by ourselves, in favourable contradistinction to others. The tone of speakers who talk of the 'march of mind,' and the discoveries of the 19th century, for example, has obviously a considerable mixture of the flattery of comparison in it. An age likes to imagine itself on some highest ground, sharpens the vertex for itself to stand on, and dwells with complacency on the slowly unfolding knowledge of its predecessors. This is applicable to religion. The idea of a fixed, settled Revelation, simply continuing, impressing the self-same truth from century to century upon the human heart, and only guarding itself from time to time against misconstruction; applied to a thousand different cases, and meeting a thousand different positions as ages roll on, but itself standing still, and being neither more nor less than what it was eighteen centuries ago, does not satisfy the feeling we speak of, so well as the idea of its substantially growing up to the present day. And under this feeling the principle of progress may proceed to claim more ground than it has a right to, may begin to usurp, and make out a case of elementary commencement, in order that it may enjoy the sensation of subsequent growth. It may raise prejudices to the disadvantage of earlier times, in order that it may gain by the contrast, elevate unnaturally and untruly present thought and system; give sensations of largeness and height at the expense of humility; use truth as a material for mental exercise and prowess; and idolize movement and advance, because it feels itself the mover. On the other hand, the mind has another and counteracting line of thought to this; if it has a love for progress, it can also see through progress; it can see through the accumulation of the verbal reflections of truth into the substance which they reflect, and see that they after all only reflect it. It can say to itself —in surveying some highly, in appearance, developed department of Christian doctrine—certainly here is a vast machinery of language and apparatus of divisions and defences; here is much detail of thought and minuteness of evolution: I see that one idea has a quantity of questions and inferences contained in it, which issue out of it, just as all the mathematical aspects of a triangle issue out the triangle: nevertheless, I have only more expressions than the early Christian had, and he had quite as full and rich a substance, because the self-same one. The doctrine of the Incarnation, for example, the truth that God was man, and man God, furnished to his devout imagination all that the greatest multiplication of mathematical issues from it can give me. He had all those issues in the idea before him. He did not consciously apprehend them indeed: and no more do Christians now apprehend them. If an early Christian lived before the times of scholastic and controversial divinity, with the great body not of ordinary only, but of the most spiritual and deep Christians now, it is the same as if they did. Nay, the very theologian whose subtlety elicited them, could only, by a painful effort of his intellect, momentarily arrest his own eductions: his mind, like that of the primitive Christian, reposed in its natural devotional state, upon the one fundamental idea. His meditation carried that idea indeed into all those directions, where meditation could naturally follow it; could dwell on all the graces of our Lord's human, and the mystery of his divine, nature; and so could the meditation of the early Christian too. The same deep, rich, mental development of this truth was admissible to his devotion, which was to the schoolman's. He had the same devotional imagery, because he had the same doctrinal substance. Mr. Newman's argument of development indeed gives these inferential issues a sort of separate substantiality, and converts them into actual growth of the body of the doctrine: 'the treasure-house of truth' is opening to the Church's theological search, and she is beginning to enjoy, in these issues, the real substance of the doctrine, of which she has hitherto only had the element. Her 'unwearied process of thought' has at last brought her to the solid reality of that faith of which she has only had as yet the foretaste. But another view exhibits them as only the manifold reflections and aspects of that substance which existed one and the same all along; tells us that the devotional thoughts of St. Ignatius, and St. Polycarp, dwelt on the same identical perfect truth of an Incarnate God, on which St. Thomas Aquinas or St. Bernard dwelt; presents them following the mystery into all that region of awe and love into which it leads the highest Christian of to-day: soaring in contemplation as far as any Christian souls did after them; and enlightened by the selfsame mentally enlarging, expanding, enriching dogma, which has enlightened, and will enlighten, all saints past and present and to come.

Such a line of thought as this, we say, will not compel us to give an artificial elevation to mere additions of definition, to convert mere shadows of language into actual new knowledge, and so attach an unreal and mechanical character to truth. We will give a case in point. In the year 1215, an opinion of a certain Abbot Joachim on the subject of the unity of God, was condemned by the Council of Lateran. Joachim maintained, as the Council tells us, a 'Unity of the Divine Nature which 'was not a true and proper unity, but a collective and meta- 'phorical one: a unity in the sense in which many men are 'called one people, and many faithful one Church.' Joachim adduced the texts, 'the multitude of them that believed were of one heart;' 'He that planteth and he that watereth are one;' and others of the same kind: and especially the text—'That they may be one, even *as we are one.*' He said 'they,' the faithful, are not one thing—*('una res quæ communis sit omnibus,')* but only one in the sense of being one Church, and one kingdom: and thence argued that the Divine nature was not one thing either, but only one in the way in which one Christian society is one. For this the Council condemned him, and asserted that the Divine nature was one thing—'*una res.*' Upon this Mr. Newman's comment is, that the numerical unity of the Divine nature had, till the year A.D. 1215, only existed as 'an impression or *implicit* judgment in the mind of the Church;' and was now for the first time declared. Ideas, he says, go on in the mind of an individual often in a vacant, half conscious way: 'the impression made upon the mind need not 'even be recognised by the parties possessing it . . . Nothing 'is of more frequent occurrence, whether in things sensible or 'intellectual, than the existence of such unperceived impressions. What do we mean, when we say that certain persons 'do not know themselves, but that they are ruled by views 'which they do not themselves recognise?' Such an 'unperceived impression,' such an 'unrecognised view' on the subject of the unity of God does he consider there to have been in the Church up to the year 1215: when for the first time there was a direct and distinct ecclesiastical decision upon the numerical unity of the Divine nature. Now, we ask, what does the '*numerical*' unity or '*una res*' declared by the Lateran Council, mean or convey to us more than simple unity, as the Church had all along used the word? Here is a certain Abbot Joachim who gives a plainly evasive and polytheistic meaning to the word unity: and the Council asserts that it has not that polytheistic meaning. Any other Abbot Joachim who chose to contradict the plain meaning of a word, might explain 'numerical' unity, exactly in the same way in which his predecessor explained unity: nor in either case, the two being condemned, is anything more done by the Church than simply repelling an absurd meaning from the word. To speak of such a declaration as the coming to light of an 'implicit judgment of the Church' which had been indeed the '*secret* life of millions of souls' hitherto, but only as secret unconscious truth: to speak of it as an instance of the 'birth of an idea, the development in explicit form of what was already latent,' the realization by the Church of 'an unperceived impression,' 'an unrecognised view,' which had lain hidden in her from the first, waiting for this moment of emission; does appear to us, we must say, a very obvious case of making a great deal out of nothing. The truth which Abbot Joachim contradicted was not declared for the first time at the Council of Lateran: it was declared, long enough before, on Mount Sinai. No orthodox Jew or Christian ever dreamed of a unity of God which was any other than numerical unity: and the Lateran condemnation of the notion that the Divine Nature was only one Divine Nature, in an inclusive sense, as human nature, which contains all the individuals in it, is one human nature; was a simple assertion of God's unity, and no more. What we mean by God being one, is that he is one, as truly as one thing (res,) one man, for example, is one. 'Una *res*' is not mentioned indeed in the Nicene Creed, but has any Council yet defined that God is good? Yet supposing that formally declared, would it not be or would it be self-evidently absurd to say that an implicit unconscious judgment in the Church as to the Divine goodness, now became explicit and positive knowledge?'[1]

But to return, we have seen the kind of development which Mr. Newman means, and of which he maintains the Nicene Creed to be an instance; viz. a development of positive growth, parallel to the later Roman ones of Purgatory, the Papal Infallibility, and others.

Now a development of this kind the Nicene Creed was not. The Nicene Creed only asserted and guarded a doctrine which had been held from the first; viz. that of Christ's true and proper Divinity. The original Christian Revelation declared that Christ was God. If Christ was God, He was true God; He had true and proper Godhead. The Nicene Creed asserted this of Him, and no more; it expressed this truth, and no more, by the word, *Homoousion*. The word *Homoousion* declared that Christ was very God with God the Father. His oneness of substance with the Father was the term by which the Nicene Fathers declared His true Godhead with the Father. And this true Godhead was attributed to Christ by the original Christian Revelation, which declared Him to be God, and commanded Him to be worshipped as God. Should it be said that the word God is doubtful, and might mean secondary as well as true Godhead, let it be well observed to whom the Christian Revelation was given. The Christian Revelation was not engrafted on Paganism, which had not the belief, but on Judaism, which had the belief in the unity of the Divine nature. 'Hear, O Israel,' was the Law's voice, 'the Lord thy God is one Lord.' The unity of God was the great dogma of the Jewish dispensation; the Jews were separated from the rest of mankind, and made a peculiar people in order to preserve that doctrine amid the polytheism of the whole world around them, and be a standing protest against it. Christ, therefore, being revealed as God to the Jews, was revealed as the one God; for they had none other God but one. Had the Christian Revelation been made to Pagans in the first instance, and the Godhead of Christ been communicated to people whose notions of Godhead were altogether corrupted and polytheistic, we cannot say what additional safeguards would have been necessary in order to distinguish the revealed true Godhead from the false godheads of numerous other divinities. But to a Jew it was sufficient to say that Christ was God, to express the meaning that he was true God. The Revelation came to a people whose ideas of Godhead had been purified and preserved in strictness. Their education under the Law presented them guarded from the risk of misapprehending Christ's Divinity when it should be revealed, and the faith of the old dispensation was a security for the faith of the new. We can hardly, indeed, understand what Mr. Newman means by saying that there was little importance attached to religious opinion under the old dispensation. He says, 'that opinions in religion are not matters of indifference, but have a definite bearing 'on the position of the holders in God's sight, is a principle 'which, I suppose, had hardly any exercise under the Law; the 'zeal and obedience of the ancient people being employed in the 'maintenance of Divine worship, and the overthrow of idolatry, 'and not in the assertion of opinion.' Surely in overthrowing idolatry, in maintaining a certain worship, they asserted an opinion, and a belief, and that a strong one. Nor was Jewish thought in that neutral and indistinct state as to the nature of God which would fit it for being the receptacle of an indistinct shadowy doctrine of Christ's Godhead. The Apostles and first Christian preachers were Jews then, and came to the new truth of Christ's Godhead with the Jewish doctrine of the unity of God in their minds. And Christianity gave its own strict sense to the word God by the fact of its speaking to minds who understood it in such a sense. In this true sense, then, the Divinity of Christ, along with the Divinity of God the Father, and consistently with the unity of the Divine nature, (Christianity retaining all the truth of Judaism, while it added to it,) was handed down to the succeeding Church. But in course of time a heresy arose, denying that Christ was God, and asserting Him to be a creature. The Nicene Fathers met this heresy at the Council of Nice, and framed a test to exclude it. That test was the 'Homoousion.' The Arians used the word God in their own sense, and therefore the word God did not exclude in their case the wrong sense, and was not a test. But the 'Homoousion' was a test, and did as a fact answer in excluding their sense, and therefore the orthodox adopted it. And the Nicene Creed was an explanation, and not a growth of the doctrine of our Lord's Divinity.

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[1] Sermon on Development.

Moreover, this ground of development is a totally different and directly opposite ground, to that which the Nicene Fathers themselves professed in their enunciation of doctrine. A modern theorist may plead development for them, but would they have pleaded it for themselves? Would they have been thankful for the explanation, or would they have anathematized *uno ore* the broacher of it? A person must know very little of ecclesiastical history who does not see what they would have done. Imagine any one of that age, with a benevolent wish to extricate the Fathers from what he considered a difficulty, informing them that they were developers, and that their ground was perfectly good on that view. It appears to us tolerably certain that if such a person had maintained his theory after his publication of it, he would have maintained it outside the Church, and not inside. The Fathers would have been utterly astonished at his audacity; and they would have told him to communicate his assistance to heretics, for that they wanted none of it. To have called them developers would have been to take away, in their opinion, the very ground from under them, and to falsify their whole position. The hypothesis would have come into direct collision with the special declared ground on which the whole of their doctrinal teaching went, and would have just interfered with the very essence of their argument. Their argument, on every occasion of heresy arising, was one and the same thing, viz. that they had received a certain doctrine from the first, and that this heresy was contrary to it. They said, this is the old doctrine that we have, the old doctrine which the apostles delivered, which has been the doctrine of the Church ever since, which we received from our predecessors as they received it from theirs, and which we now here maintain as we received it. The same, the very same, they repeated; they professed to hold it because it was the same, and for that reason only. They would not receive or listen to any other, for the simple reason that that other was not the same. They shut their ears in horror, the very sound of novelty shocked them, and they seemed polluted by the mere contact of their ears with it. 'Who ever heard of such things?' was the universal cry of the orthodox on Arianism appearing; 'who is not astounded at them?' The Arians positively ridiculed the extreme and obstinate simplicity of their arguments; they taunted the Nicene Fathers with being *ἀφελεῖς καὶ ἰδιώτας*, poor unintellectual men, who neither had or put forward any reasoning whatever as the basis of their doctrine, but kept on one unceasing, unvarying, untiring appeal to simple fact. They would have drawn them by taunts from this ground, but the Nicene Fathers were not to be taunted off a ground of which they were sure. And they went on, and the whole Church with them, appealing *uno ore* to a simple fact; asserting *uno ore* that the doctrine they had, and which they now at the Nicene Council enunciated, was the same, very same, self-same, original doctrine which the Apostles had delivered and handed down. Compare, *e.g.*, the whole mode in which the doctrine of the 'Homoousion' was maintained against Arius, and the mode in which the doctrine of transubstantiation was maintained against Berengarius; there is just the difference which the fact of the one being an old fundamental received truth, and the other being a view of gradual later growth in the Church, would naturally make.

Here, however, Mr. Newman introduces a counter argument, and to the actual inference which would be drawn from this universal testimony opposes certain asserted deficiencies and ambiguities, in the expression of the doctrine of our Lord's proper divinity, in the documents of the ante-Nicene age now extant. He asserts that the ante-Nicene documents do not of themselves prove the reception of this doctrine in those times, and takes us upon the ground which Bishop Bull went over with Petavius. On this point, we have a word to say to begin with.

It does not, we conceive, devolve upon us then, in this state of the case, to refute a doubt which is a contradiction to the plain traditional testimony of the Church universal. The Church universal has had those documents before them since the time they were written, and it has from the time they were written, down to the present day, asserted the fact, that the doctrine of our Lord's true and proper divinity, was the received doctrine of the primitive Church, and communicated to it straight by the Apostles. As far as the unanimous testimony of age after age from the first, receiving and handing down in turn the report of a fact, can settle the truth of that fact, the truth of this fact is settled. The Church Catholic now at this moment in all her branches, Eastern and Western, from every authorized book of instruction, declares this fact. It does not devolve upon us to argue for the truth of a fact, under such circumstances, against an all but unsupported contradiction to it. Still less, when a view approximating to Mr. Newman's on this subject, was put forward about a century and a half ago in the Church by a particular writer, and was formally and with great weight of solid intellect and learning answered by another; of which answer no notice, worth the name, has been taken by Mr. Newman;—does it devolve upon us to repeat that defence of early belief which the latter writer made? When Mr. Newman puts forward an answer to Bishop Bull's arguments on this subject, it will then be proper time for somebody to reconsider Bishop Bull's arguments in connexion with Mr. Newman's reply. But as yet Bishop Bull has received no reply, and therefore as yet his arguments stand good. A note on the *πρὶν γεννηθῆναι*, showing that Bull has made a mistake (as what theologian, however accurate and solid, has not in some matter of detail,) in his interpretation of that clause; and a hint thrown here and there intended to create an imparaging impression of Bull's argument, but hardly tangible enough, or indeed sufficiently declaratory even of the objector's own meaning or purpose, to be able to be replied to, are not an answer to Bishop Bull. An objection must be made in a certain way to be properly fit for argumentative notice at all; and if indefiniteness makes it unanswerable, it makes it also nothing to be answered. When Petavius threw doubts upon the orthodoxy of the ante-Nicene period, Bull met him with a regular answer, in which he went in detail through the whole extant body of theology of that period, and first brought forward copious positive evidence from that theology of those writers having held the Nicene doctrine; and then, as another part of his treatise, brought forward arguments explanatory of certain passages in it, which appeared out of harmony with that doctrine. Now such a work cannot be thrown aside with such a notice as the following:—

> 'In the question raised by various learned men in the seventeenth and following century, concerning the views of the early Fathers on the subject of our Lord's Divinity, the one party estimate their theology by the literal force of their separate expressions or phrases, or by the philosophical opinions of the day; the other, by the doctrine of the Catholic Church, as afterwards authoritatively declared. The one party argues that those Fathers need not have meant more than what was afterwards considered heresy; the other answers that there is nothing to prevent them meaning more. Thus the position which Bull maintains seems to be nothing beyond this, that the Nicene creed is a natural key for interpreting the body of ante-Nicene theology. His very aim is to explain difficulties; now the notion of difficulties and their explanation implies a rule to which they are apparent exceptions, and in accordance with which they are to be explained. Nay, the title of his work, which is a "Defence of the Creed of Nicæa," shows that he is not seeking a conclusion, but imposing a view. And he proceeds both to defend the creed by means of the Fathers against Sandius, and to defend the Fathers by means of the creed against Petavius. He defends creed and Fathers by reconciling one with the other. He allows that their language is not such as they should have used, after the creed had been imposed; but he says in effect that, if we will but take it in our hands and apply it to their writings, we shall bring out and harmonize their teaching, clear their ambiguities, and discover their anomalous statements to be few and insignificant. In other words, he begins with a presumption, and shows how naturally facts close round it and fall in with it, if we will but let them. He does this triumphantly.'

That is to say—Mr. Newman puts aside the whole work of Bull's *ab initio;* and in order to justify that attitude to it, fixes a particular aspect upon the work. The writer of it, he says, 'imposes a view:' and shows 'how facts fall in with a presumption, *if we will but let them;*' in other words, colours facts according to an hypothesis; assumes without evidence a Nicene belief in these writers in the first instance, and then interprets their language to signify this belief. This view of Bull's work relieves an opponent of all necessity of going into the contents of it, and meeting his facts: he has only to deny Bull's hypothesis, and the erection upon it falls to the ground at once.

He can even afford to allow that Bull proves what he wants *upon* his hypothesis *triumphantly:* a thing, by the way, impossible for him in the nature of things to avoid doing on this view; seeing Bull's hypothesis, as thus made for him, *is* itself the exact thing which Bull wants to prove. But surely to answer Bull's work thus, is simply to avoid it. It is to answer an opponent's evidence by not hearing what he has to say; by assuming at starting, that his evidence is valueless, and that he gets his conclusion out of his own head. Instead of meeting what a writer's argument brings forward, his argument itself is assumed to be a totally different one to what he declares it to be; and metamorphosed into one which an opponent can afford to call 'triumphant,' because he has made it nugatory. The whole aspect here fixed on Bull's work requires wrong statements to support it; statements which are made here—'The one party argues that 'these fathers *need not* have meant more than what was afterwards 'considered heresy: the other (Bull) answers that there is '*nothing to prevent* their meaning more.' This is not Bull's answer. Bull's answer is that they *must* mean more, that there is satisfactory positive evidence from their own statements, that they *did* mean more. Again—'The position which Bull main- 'tains seems to be nothing beyond this, that the Nicene creed is 'a *natural key* for interpreting the body of ante-Nicene theology.' The position which Bull maintains is a great deal beyond this. He expressly tells us what it is in his preface to his work.— '*Duriora veterum dicta catholicum sensum non modo admittere 'sed et postulare, observato cujusque auctoris scopo et proposito, 'adductisque etiam ex singulis sententiis aliis, luculentioribus, solide 'probare conatus sum.*' And if it be objected that a writer gives a partial view of the nature of his own argument, it is sufficient in answer to refer to the work itself, which unquestionably does what the writer says it does. Bull, that is to say, does not explain the *duriora dicta* of these writers, by an appeal to subsequent doctrine, but by an appeal to other much fuller and clearer statements from, and to the whole pervading fundamental teaching of, those very writers themselves. The plain state of the case is that Bull asserts a fact and brings forward evidence for it. If books teach something, it is surely possible for them to show from their own language what they do teach: he asserts that the language of the books in question, shows that they teach the Nicene truth of our Lord's absolute Divinity. It is open to any one, to call proving a fact, 'imposing a view;' and a person who brings forward evidence for a particular fact in a court of justice, may be looked on as 'imposing a view' upon the evidential matter which he brings forward: but a judge would hardly interfere with an arguer on such a ground, and stop him *in limine* with the distinction that he must not 'impose a view, but seek a conclusion.'

There is no call then upon us, we repeat, to reply to an argument to which a reply has been already given and not answered. But as our readers may require some specimens of Mr. Newman's mode of arguing, we will subjoin one or two.

In the first place then, he maintains that there is not evidence enough in quantity, in these extant ante-Nicene documents, to show that certain now-considered fundamental truths, were held by the early Church. 'One divine is not equal to a 'Catena. We must have a whole doctrine stated by a whole 'Church. The Catholic truth in question is made up of a 'number of separate propositions, each of which, if maintained 'without the rest, is a heresy. In order then to prove that all 'the ante-Nicene writers taught it, it is not enough to prove 'that each has gone far enough to be a heretic, not enough to 'prove that one has held that the Son is God (for so did the 'Sabellian, so did the Macedonian), and another that the 'Father is not the Son (for so did the Arian), and another that 'the Son is equal to the Father (for so did the Tritheist), and 'another that there is but one God (for so did the Unitarian), 'not enough that many attached in some sense a threefold 'power to the idea of the Almighty (for so did almost all the 'heresies that ever existed, and could not but do so, if they 'accepted the New Testament at all); but we must show that 'all these statements at once, and others too, are laid down by 'as many separate testimonies as may fairly be taken to constitute a "Consensus of doctors."' Again—'The creeds of that 'early day make no mention in the letter of the Catholic 'doctrine at all. They make mention indeed of a three; but 'that there is any mystery in the doctrine, that the three are 'one, that they are co-equal, co-eternal, all increate, all incomprehensible, is not stated, and never could be gathered from 'them.' Again—'If we limit our views of the teaching of the 'Fathers by what they expressly state, St. Ignatius may be 'considered a Patripassian, St. Justin Arianizes, and St. 'Hippolytus is a Photinian.' Again—'It may be questioned 'whether any ante-Nicene Father distinctly affirms either the 'numerical unity, or the co-equality of the three persons.' One large class of statements, he decides, in early writings, is thus not sufficiently clear and explanatory. He adds that that class of statements which is sufficiently clear and explanatory, is not sufficiently large. 'We find the word Trinity used by St. 'Theophilus, St. Clement, St. Hippolytus, Tertullian, St. 'Cyprian, Origen, St. Methodius; and the Divine Circumin-

'cessio, the most distinctive portion of the Catholic doctrine; 'and the unity of power, or again, of substance, are declared with more or less distinctness, by Athenagoras, 'St. Irenæus, St. Clement, Tertullian, St. Hippolytus, Origen, 'and the two S.S. Dionysii.' 'This, he concludes with saying, is pretty nearly the whole of the evidence,' and this is not enough.

We will forestal our answer here so far as to say that unless the want of evidence from other quarters as well is shown, the mere insufficiency of evidence in ante-Nicene documents, were it even conceded, has nothing decisive in it: especially such a kind of insufficiency as is instanced here, which simply proceeds from the inability of writers to express all the aspects of the truth they are speaking of at once; and that perhaps when they are purposely giving prominence to some one or other aspect. To say that no one of the statements in these writers taken singly, would logically contain the whole, *i.e.*, all aspects of doctrine in question; that a Sabellian interpretation may be put upon one, a Macedonian upon another, an Arian upon another, a Tritheist upon another, an Unitarian upon another, according as each statement in succession does not of itself supply all the enunciations of truth which would be the contradictions to those errors, is not saying much. Who could possibly expect such completeness of them? Is it to be found in writers of the latest age even? Take up the last volume of sermons of ever so orthodox a divine, and could not just the same remark be made, that different statements in it were in themselves incomplete, and that the void might be filled up with Sabellian, Macedonian, Arian complements as might be? What human being ever could possibly write a single page, on the condition that he was to express the whole of the truth which he believed, in each sentence? To make such a demand as this of the ante-Nicene Fathers, would be as much as to say, do what you cannot do, accomplish some feat of language which the constitution of human thought makes impossible, and then you may command my attention.

But besides this negative ground of insufficiency, Mr. Newman has a positive one in the actual discrepancies of language in ante-Nicene and post-Nicene writers, which appears so great to him, that he infers an actual difference in their respective doctrines themselves, on the fundamental points in question; such a difference as is parallel to the primitive and later state of the doctrine of purgatory, the Papal Infallibility, and the like. Early Fathers reject expressions which later ones use, and use expressions which later ones reject, on the subject of our Lord's nature.

Now the question of certain discrepancies of language, and the inferences to be drawn from them, is evidently one that comes under the general head and department of language, and is to be settled in accordance with the rules and principles by which we decide on questions of language in general. And speaking generally, it is not, we hope, explaining away language, but simply and literally explaining it, to say that language, in the case of the persons using it, only means what they mean by it. Language, as language only, has no meaning whatever. A certain collection of sounds or marks, as such, no more means one thing than another. The question is, what people using them, understand by such sounds and marks? We are speaking here of the matter practically, the only way in which we are here concerned with it, and do not enter at all into the great and important metaphysical controversies on the subject of language. Mr. Newman himself says, 'Ideas may remain (remain the same ideas, we presume he means, not different ones) 'when the expressions of them are infinitely varied.' This common sense truth about language leads necessarily to a certain line of judging with respect to discrepancies of language. It is evident that it is not enough in such cases, for proving the discrepancy of the ideas, to point to the discrepancy of the language. In ordinary literature words alter their meaning often in the course of ages; and we do not infer, because one word is used in one age, and another in another, that therefore the ages had different ideas; but only that the words themselves have different senses. And this rule applies to the department of theological language, as well as that of others. It is not enough to say that the early Fathers, in particular instances, used language which later ones avoided, to prove a difference of doctrine in the two: it must appear that they used it in the same sense in which the others avoided it. It may turn out, on a reference to history, as the plainest matter of fact in the world, that they did not. A great deal may actually appear in history with respect to this matter of the meaning in which words were regarded, whether to use or not use them. Writers may tell us *totidem verbis* in some cases, in others by the context and whole drift of their writing, that they do not use or reject such a word or phrase in the obnoxious meaning in which it was regarded afterwards. Indeed, such language in them may often not only show no incorrectness of idea, but in the writers no incorrectness to the very smallest extent even of language. For the bad meaning, we see constantly in the history of theological language, arose after the use of the phrase. The early Fathers expressed themselves in language, such as suggested themselves in the act of writing, on certain sacred subjects: heretics afterward used this language in an obnoxious sense, and so the language itself became obnoxious; but the heretics, and not the early Fathers, made it so. Language is able to bear different senses; and you cannot, by using it in one sense, prevent others after you from using it in another. From such a law, as from a mathematical principle, proceeded inevitably some changes in theological language in the early Church; such changes proving simply, not that bad language was used, but that language was. Language was used; and having been used, was perverted. What was to prevent this course of things? Nothing, except that no language should have been used to begin with at all. Some persons must live before others, write before others: in language antecedency is enough to create perversion. Had the early Fathers never spoken, their words would never have been used in an unfavourable sense; if they afterwards were, it only proves that they spoke. Some limitation, in particular instances, theological language thus underwent as the necessary condition of its existence. It was more free at first, because it was then anterior to its misuse; and the early Fathers wrote more naturally and pliably, and were less afraid of venturing on some of the tender parts of doctrine, and shrunk less from some mysteries which later theology, though holding their truth, avoids; were less stiff, and trusted themselves nearer the verge. And who can say that the diminution of that freedom of language is in itself a privilege; or, while he respects the orthodoxy which subsequently avoided what was misinterpreted, elevate avoidance so caused, from a remedy for an evil, into an advantage in itself? Such facts are interesting ones in the history of theological language; but the history of language is one thing, and the history of doctrine is another. And to go up straight from modern language to ancient, and accuse the ancient of unsoundness because we ourselves bring with us associations of unsoundness to it, is not philosophical or just.

We have said thus much on the point of language, to show that words may be rejected at an earlier time and used at a later, or used at an earlier time and rejected at a later, without any difference of idea and doctrine being proved.

An instance of the former we have in the history of the word 'Homoousion.' Mr. Newman makes a point of the word 'Homoousion' having been rejected at the Council of Antioch sixty years before it was received at the Ecumenical Council of Nice. 'There was one and only one great doctrinal council in 'ante-Nicene times. It was held at Antioch, in the middle of the 'third century, on occasion of the incipient innovations of the 'Syrian heretical school. Now, the Fathers there assembled, 'for whatever reason, condemned, or at least withdrew, when 'it came into dispute, the word "Homoousion," which was 'received at Nicæa as the special symbol of Catholicism against 'Arius.' Now, we have, in what we have said, already answered this statement; for Mr. Newman says, 'for whatever 'reason,' as if it made no matter so long as the word was rejected, what reason it was rejected for; whereas, we have maintained that that makes all the difference.

It so happens, however, that we have an explanation of this fact from St. Athanasius himself, who expressly vindicates the Antiochene Fathers from having meant, in rejecting the word, any other than the same precise doctrine, which the Nicene Fathers meant in adopting it; and attributes the difference of their respective lines about it entirely to an accidental difference of view about the word itself. He says, 'If we examine their real 'meaning, we shall find that both Councils agree. The former 'was condemning the heresy of Samosata, the latter the Arian 'heresy. They who condemned the Samosatan heresy, took 'the word "Homoousion" in a corporeal sense. For Paul sophisticated, and said, if Christ was consubstantial with the 'Father, it necessarily followed that there must be three different substances, one which is prior, and two other sprung from 'that. To avoid that sophism of Paul, the Fathers said that 'Christ was not consubstantial, *i. e.*, that He was not in that 'relation to the Father which Paul said the word meant. On 'the other hand, those who condemned the Arian heresy, saw 'through the cunning of Paul, and considered that, in things 'incorporeal, especially in God, consubstantial did not mean 'this, and asserted the Son to be begotten of the substance of 'the Father, and yet not to be separate from the Father. . . . 'The more simple Antiochene bishops did not apply that nicety 'and discrimination in their treatment of the word consubstantial, but gave it the meaning which they were told it had. 'They wished to condemn Paul, and they were wholly intent 'on that.' Here is an explanation of the fact, then, from an authority which nobody can dispute. It appears that there was a heretic, Paul of Samosata, at that time, who held the modern Socinian view, or something near it, that Christ was only a man naturally, and was *made* God from being a man. They wished to test Paul by the word 'consubstantial,' and make him say or deny that Christ was of one substance with the Father. He had a subtler head than his judges, and perplexed them with an inference which he drew from the word, that if the Son and the Holy Ghost were of the same substance with the Father, the original substance of the Father was divided into three substances. The Fathers not seeing their way at the time, as to whether the word implied this or not, simply withdrew the word, and condemned Paul without it. Here, then, is no difference whatever from strict Nicene doctrine, though an abstinence from a Nicene word; and so far from abstaining from the word, because it went too far for them, the Antiochene Fathers actually wish to use the word for the very purpose for which it was used at Nice, viz., for expressing the proper divinity of the Son; and are only turned from doing so by the sudden suggestion of an unfavourable meaning which the word might bear in another direction than that in which they were then specially employing it.

We will add that, in other ways besides the one just exemplified, the word 'Homoousion' has a history of its own, as many words have; and that, when it is objected that it was sometimes bestowed in early times where it was afterwards withheld, just as we have seen it withheld where it was afterwards bestowed, it is saying no more than that the word 'Homoousion' is, as a word, recipient of different meanings, which it undoubtedly is. As far as the word itself is concerned, it does not tell us whether it means that oneness of substance with God, which the *Deus ex Deo* has, or such oneness of substance with Him, as might mean simply coming from Him, and which creatures might have; for we express creation sometimes as a kind of derivation, meaning nothing in so calling it more than creation. If instances then can be found in which as, says a modern reviewer of the Petavian school, angels and souls were called by early writers 'Homoousioi' with God, what does the fact prove? Simply that the word was sometimes used then in a vaguer meaning, than that to which it was afterwards confined. To argue from such a fact, that a certain doctrine, afterwards tested by that word, was then only partially held, would be to imply that the word itself made the doctrine which it tested. The Church had a doctrine which she wanted to preserve and guard: she had to choose from the words which language gave her for this purpose, and she took the word 'Homoousion.' It did not in itself necessarily convey that one exclusive meaning, which she wanted it to convey; but her own use of the word in that exclusive meaning in time gave it that exclusive meaning. But for this imposition of a meaning on the word 'Homoousion,' a modern Socinian might use it; there is nothing in the word itself to prevent him from putting his own sense upon it, and in that sense acknowledging our Lord to be 'Homoousion' with the Father. It is a great providential mercy indeed, that the church is thus enabled to conquer the essential uncertainties of language. Had the whole Arian party taken the test of the 'Homoousion,' her difficulties would have been greater than what they were. But this mercy is shown to her. By a course of steps which we cannot analyze or follow, a word gets to have a particular meaning so stamped upon and connaturalized with it, that it becomes an obvious hypocrisy and deceit for any one to take that word in a different sense of his own. The history of language, indeed, would, we doubt not, if accurately and deeply examined, exhibit in this very point of view, as signal proofs of the overruling providence of God, as any other department of history. The Church, by her use of the word 'Homoousion,' had fastened her exclusive sense upon it so strongly before the Nicene Council, that the Arians encountered it defined and pre-occupied, and were shut out by it. But all this belongs to the history of language and not of doctrine. The Church gave her own definite meaning to the word 'Homoousion;' that definite meaning, therefore, preceded her use of the word, and her doctrine must have been antecedently the same with that which the 'Homoousion' subsequently expressed, in order to have made the 'Homoousion' express it.

We have anticipated in these remarks the other point we are coming to. We have, then, in the second place, particular phrases and expressions rejected in after times, used in earlier. The expressions brought forward by a writer of the modern Petavian school, are such as St. Ignatius's, the Son of God, 'according to the will and power of God;' St. Justin's, 'Him who, by the will of the Father, is with God, as being his Son, &c.;' St. Justin's again, 'Derived from the Father before all creatures by His power and will;' Tatian's, 'The word springing forth from the Divine simplicity at His will;' St. Hippolytus's, 'Whom God the Father having willed, begat as He willed;' Novatian's, 'From whom, when He willed, His Son the Word was born:' that in the recognitions attributed to St. Clement, that 'God begat him, *voluntate præcedenti*:' Tertullian's, 'As soon as God willed:' that in the Apostolical Constitutions, 'At the pleasure of the Father:' the ὑπουργία (ministration) of the Son of God, found in St. Theophilus and St. Irenæus: St. Hippolytus's again, 'God over all, because God the Father has put all things under his feet;' St. Justin's again, 'called God from His being the first born Son of all creatures.' Now without entering into the question of the genuineness of all the passages in which these expressions are found, or the genuineness of all works in which the passages are, or the comparative authority of the different writers (for some names here are heretical ones, and other ones of unsound estimation from the first); it is evident that we have here a set of expressions on a particular subject, one of a most mysterious, incomprehensible, and awful character, the subject, viz., of God the Son's derivation from and subordinateness to, *qua* derivation from, God the Father. It is obvious that this is a subject on which it is most difficult to speak with perfect accuracy, so as to avoid, in expressing the idea of derivation and subordinateness, the ideas of posteriority in time, and inferiority of nature. Our natural and ordinary idea of derivation connects posteriority with it, and proceeds to connect a certain inferiority of nature with that posteriority. Here is a subject then, on which it would be most unfair to judge particular expressions on a standard of literal accuracy, and throw upon them the whole meaning which can be extracted from them by themselves, without alleviation or set-off. Persons in expressing one side of truth will sometimes express it too boldly, while, after all, they only profess it to be an expression of one side of truth, and not to contradict another. We have, accordingly, a set of expressions put before us, which, taken as a whole (though of some of them, we doubt whether even this can be said), are not what later writers would use; and they are extracted from the books of all their respective writers, and put before us in that collective insulation which tells upon the imagination. But what, after all, can any fair mind draw from this, which can seriously shake our confidence in the faith of the writers, if their works, as a whole, and any other valid evidence about them, exhibit them as sound? What if St. Ignatius says, 'The Son of God, according to the will and power 'of God;' we really cannot see the harm of the words, though such expressions may doubtless be perverted. If it is true that the Son is derived from the Father, it cannot be in itself wrong to say that He is derived from the Father in accordance with the Father's attributes; and will and power are attributes of the Father. He is not derived against the Father's will and power, and therefore He is derived in accordance with them. The idea of 'will,' indeed, carries one or two of the expressions before us into the idea of precedence in that will, because we naturally look upon will as precedent to what it wills: and so in the order of nature it is; though in order of time, the eternal will and eternal act are coeval,—a truth with which these expressions are compatible. However, the writers are here wishing to express a sacred truth most difficult to express; and if, before the experience of the perversion of such modes of speaking, by subsequent heretics, they do occasionally, and quite as an exception, carry such modes of speaking too far, it proves very little. Indeed, in some instances which are urged, it is quite obvious on the surface that the writer is really wishing to express the idea of the Son's generation being absolutely coeval with the eternal being of the Father, and is using the examples from the natural world, where the derivation is most immediately consequent upon the existence of the thing derived from, in order vividly to impress that idea of coeval upon the reader's mind. 'The Son,' says St. Clement of Alexandria, 'issues from the Father *quicker* than the light from the sun.'

Here, however, the very aim of the illustration to express simultaneousness is turned against it, and special attention is called to, the word '*quicker*,' as if we were to infer that the writer had only degrees of quickness in his mind, and only made the Son's generation from His source 'quicker' than that of light from it's, not absolutely coeval with it. We have no time, however, for dwelling on the frivolity of such criticism. We only want to have it understood what the task of these early writers was, and what the subject they had to deal with, in the instance of these casual expressions quoted from them.

In connexion, again, with these modes of speaking, and with the general doctrine of our Lord's derivation and subordinateness as the Son, is the view held by some of the early Fathers of the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *λόγος προφορικὸς*; which we will just notice, as an interpretation is suggested by Mr. Newman for it. Some early Fathers, besides the eternal generation of the Son, attributed a second and external generation to Him, on His going forth to create the universe. He had, from all eternity, resided as the Λόγος, the second Person in the Godhead, in the bosom of the Father. But He left the bosom of His Father, in a sense, when He went forth to create; and therefore the act of creation was described as a kind of second generation on the Son's part. He was thus spoken of, occasionally, as generated in time, just before the creation of the world—the Λόγος προφορικὸς; such generation, in reality, not at all interfering with His eternal generation and Personal existence from all eternity, as the Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος; to which the same writers perpetually testify. The doctrine is thus first stated, and then has an explanation suggested for it.

> 'Five early writers, Athenagoras, Tatian, Theophilus, Hippolytus and Novatian, of whom the authority of Hippolytus is very great, not to speak of Theophilus and Athenagoras, whatever be thought of Tatian and Novatian, seem to speak of the divine generation as taking place immediately before the creation of the world, that is, as if not eternal; though at the same time they teach that our Lord existed before that generation. In other words, they seem to teach, that He was the Word from eternity, and became the Son at the beginning of all things; some of them expressly considering Him, first as the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*, or Reason, in the Father, or (as may be speciously represented) a mere attribute; next as the *λόγος προφορικὸς*, or Word. This doctrine, when divested of figure, and put into literal statement, might appear nothing more or less than this,—that at the beginning of the world the Son was created after the likeness of the Divine attribute of Reason, as its image or expression, and thereby became the Divine Word; was made the instrument of creation, called the Son from that ineffable favour and adoption which God had bestowed on him, and in due time sent into the world to manifest God's perfections to mankind;—which, it is scarcely necessary to say, is the doctrine of Arianism.'—*Note upon Athanasius against the Arians*, p. 272.

With respect to such an explanation as this, whether Mr. Newman means to suggest it as a true or a false one, from whatever quarter it comes, we might make some obvious remarks; and say, that on such principles of criticism, it will be utterly impossible for any author to protect his meaning. If writers directly attribute personality from all eternity to the Λόγος before His going forth to create the world, and a critic interprets that personality into a metaphor, and leaves the λόγος a mere Divine attribute, he has taken the law simply into his hands. But we are calling attention now to the Patristic view itself, and the particular subject upon which it and the ambiguities of expression, likely to be connected with it, turn.

Here, then, is a whole line of expression before us, which is, be it observed, *the* line of expression which is urged against the early Fathers, and which has, as we see, reference to and gathers round a particular doctrine. It is to be remarked next that that doctrine is one which has been allowed by the Church, since their time, to fall into the shade; and so been made, with all the language connected with it, comparatively strange to modern ears. The doctrine of the subordination, *qua* origination, of the Second Person of the Trinity, with all that mode of viewing and speaking of it which went along with it, has been thrown into the back ground in later ages; and the Church has, since that day, avoided all verbal dangers on this subject, by avoiding the subject itself altogether. 'As the Arian controversy proceeded,' says Mr. Newman, 'a tendency was elicited to contemplate our 'Lord more distinctly in His absolute relations, than in His 'relation to the First Person of the Blessed Trinity. And 'whereas the Nicene Creed speaks of the "Father Almighty," 'and "His only-begotten Son our Lord, God from God, Light 'from Light, Very God from Very God," and of the Holy 'Ghost, "the Lord and Giver of Life," we are told in the 'Athanasian of "the Father eternal, the Son eternal, and the 'Holy Ghost eternal;" and that none is afore or after the other, 'none is greater or less than another.' 'The doctrine of the 'Son's subordination to the Eternal Father, which formed so 'prominent a feature in ante-Nicene theology, comparatively 'fell into the shade.' By 'having fallen into the shade,' we suppose he does not mean ceased to be true: for once true, it must be so always; and we recite it in the Nicene Creed at this day. And therefore what such a statement of the case on the whole amounts to, is little more than this:—that a very mysterious and awful doctrine, connected with our Lord's nature, was contemplated and treated of by theologians of the early Church, but that though a perfectly true and sacred doctrine in itself, its tenderness as a matter of theological handling led to expressions, occasionally, among theologians, which Arians and other heretics took advantage of; and that therefore the Church thought it wisest to discourage further dwelling upon it. Such a statement of the case as this, we say, does not make the real doctrinal meaning at the bottom of all these expressions an erroneous and unsound one, but only one which has been thrown into the background and not attended to in later times; and, therefore, at the worst, make such expressions overstatements of real truth, and not statements of error.

Upon objections, then, in general to the orthodoxy of the ante-Nicene Fathers, on the ground of this whole line of expression which is found in them, there is one very obvious remark, suggested by what we have been saying, to be made: and that is, that the modern objector forgets, in making such a charge, that those Fathers held a deep view on this subject, which is not put forward in the Church now, and with which the objector himself is not familiar. He comes to a particular part of their language, without carrying their idea to it, and says, what strange language! But carry their idea to it, and the language is not strange. It is just like any other case of theological difference of view on a subject. One theologian charges another with unsound language: the latter says, you accuse my language because you do not understand my idea: let me acquaint you with my idea, and if you think that wrong, then you have a good and solid ground against me: but do not go on assailing fragments and outsides, this word, and that phrase, blindly, and without having the key to them. The ante-Nicene Fathers may make the same answer to their modern interpreters. They may say, you are judging our language, and yet, in the same breath, you confess, that you have allowed the idea which animated and explains it 'to fall into the 'shade.' You come to us, you confess, without the key to us, and then judge us as if you had it. You attack our language, here and there, in this and that word, half word, half sentence: is not this poor work? What if you can pick a hole in our mere language, here and there? you prove nothing more in our case than what, in the full light of all post-Nicene doctrine, happens in your own every day. Condemn our idea, our doctrine; and that is a fair, solid, argumentative line to take. But if you cannot do this: if that idea and doctrine confronts you in the Nicene Creed, and you can only say that, though perfectly true, 'it has fallen into the shade,' it is trivial and frivolous work, carping at particular expressions of it. Such appears, we say, to be the state of the case with respect to ante-Nicene writers. The modern interpreter comes, and sees occasional language there which he is not accustomed to. He instantly assumes that such language expresses a rude, incipient, and elementary state of Christian truth; and forgets that it may only express, after all, a particular truth which he is not familiar with: he assumes that it expresses the absence of a doctrine which has been now arrived at; and forgets that it may express the presence of a doctrine which has been laid aside. Mr. Newman is constantly referring to the 'Catholic doctrine of the Trinity,' as not having been held by the early Fathers, *i. e.*, being then only in process of formation, in an incipient and elementary state. But would it not be much truer to say, that they held it just as much as he himself does, but held a particular doctrine in connexion with it, which, with him, 'has fallen into the shade.' He has one mode of holding the doctrine of the Trinity which puts aside the doctrine of the subordination of the Second Person; the Fathers had another mode of holding it, which put forward that doctrine. Their theology on the subject was different from his. But it is a further question, if this doctrine is true, as it undoubtedly is, and the Fathers held the doctrine of the Trinity with, and the modern interpreter without the appeal to it, whether their theology is, therefore, less sound and less perfect than his.

Thus much for the alleged insufficiency, arising either from defects or difficulties of ante-Nicene documentary evidence; and now for a concluding remark upon this argument as a whole. The argument then is, that coming to the ante-Nicene documents, with no other evidence to depend on for the fact in question but those documents themselves: coming to them with nothing to prepossess or guide our judgment from any other quarter, coming to them as simply so much extant covered parchment, with our minds blank, we could not gather the fact from them, that the writers held the true orthodox belief which the church held afterwards. Now to this we might answer that we did not admit such insufficiency in those documents even upon this isolated basis; that if the new Testament would as a whole, without other aid than its own letter, prove to a really candid and religious mind the proper Divinity of the Son of God, the ante-Nicene documents would do the same. And we might appeal to statement upon statement of the doctrine of the *Deus ex Deo*, as accurate, subtle, and unquestionable as could be found in any post-Nicene writer. But it is not necessary to recur to such a ground as this.

For, be it observed, the whole line of argument which we have been dealing with here, simply omits the strong positive historical testimony there is, before we come to examine the documents of the ante-Nicene Church, to the fact of what the doctrine of that Church was. We have the unanimous testimony of the whole body of Nicene Fathers to the fact that they had received the doctrine they asserted from their predecessors in the Church, which predecessors had asserted that they had received it from their predecessors, and so on up to the age of the Apostles. It was the full historical belief of the Nicene Church that its doctrine had been the doctrine of the ante-Nicene up to the commencement of Christianity. Mr. Newman appears, indeed, to acknowledge this evidence, but does not; for though he maintains the 'subsequent *profession* of this 'doctrine as a presumption that it was held before,' he only means the presumption from the subsequent profession of a truth that there were previous elementary anticipations of it, and makes no mention of a declaration ever *accompanying* that subsequent profession, which spoke to that truth's antiquity and existence as the same identical truth as then professed from the first. So here is a body of plain, historical evidence, before coming to ante-Nicene documents, which the argument before us simply omits. And whereas Mr. Newman invalidates all explanation of difficulties in the ante-Nicene Fathers, on the ground that to enter upon it 'is to assume that they are all of 'one school, which is the point to be proved;' here is this very point proved upon unanimous historical testimony: that is, if as orthodox members of the Church of their day, to have all one creed is to be 'of one school.' We have, we say, this positive evidence as to what the creed of the ante-Nicene church was, prior to coming at all to the examination of the documents of the ante-Nicene Church. We come to the examination of them, as we do to that of the Scriptures, with the rule of historical tradition to guide us; a tradition speaking directly to the fact of what the belief from which those documents issued was. Every rule of proof requires that the insufficiency of evidence in one quarter should be no obstacle whatever to the weight of evidence in another; and not only permits, but compels the weaker and obscurer part of evidence to receive light from the stronger. Granting, then, ever so much insufficiency in the ante-Nicene documents, taken by themselves, to prove the point of ante-Nicene belief, here is positive evidence from another quarter, on that point, which only requires the absence of positive counter-evidence to be of force and hold its ground. Let but the ante-Nicene documents not positively contradict the historical testimony which accompanies us to them; let them but simply fall in with, and negatively coincide with it, and that negative coincidence becomes at once a confirmation of the positive proof, instead of that positive proof being weakened by the negative one. It is a case which we meet with every day in questions of evidence. How much more than this negative proof there is in the ante-Nicene writings we are not, as we say, concerned with proving here; it is sufficient that they only bear out this universal and undoubting testimony with respect to the faith which produced them, and that the tradition of the Nicene age on that point is clear, unanimous, and uncontradicted.

It will be said, perhaps, that this argument is, after all, only an appeal to the later doctrine as a key to the earlier one, and that is just what the doctrine of development does. It appears to be thought by some impossible to refer to subsequent evidence with respect to early belief, without referring to it as a proof of the elementary state of that belief prior to the age of this subsequent evidence; and, accordingly, they meet all appeal, of whatever kind, to evidence of a later age, with the general assertion that we are implying an after-growth by appealing to it. But this is to confound two totally distinct things; later evidence may prove what was early doctrine, without later growth having formed it. An historian does not create by relating; evidence does not make by proving. Nicene testimony can appeal to ante-Nicene fact as its subject simply, and not as its work. If it *is* testimony it must do so. For testimony must act as testimony, and cannot possibly act in any other capacity.

Such is the fact, then, which the argument before us omits. We will add that Mr. Newman does notice it in another place, and out of this argumentative connexion, and we will give first his notice, and then his explanation of it.

> 'Christians were bound to defend and transmit the faith which they had received, and they received it from the rulers of the Church; and, on the other hand, it was the duty of those rulers to watch over and defend this traditionary faith. It is unnecessary to go over ground which has been traversed so often of late years. St. Irenæus brings the subject before us in his description of St. Polycarp, part of which has already been quoted; and to it we may limit ourselves. "Polycarp," he says, when writing against the Gnostics, "whom we have seen in our first youth, ever taught those lessons which he learned from the Apostles, which the Church also transmits, which alone are true. . . . . . ." Nor was this the doctrine and practice of one school only, which might be ignorant of philosophy; the cultivated minds of the Alexandrian Fathers, who are said to owe so much to Pagan science, certainly showed no gratitude or reverence towards their alleged instructress, but maintained the supremacy of Catholic tradition. Clement speaks of heretical teachers as perverting Scripture, and essaying the gate of heaven with a false key; not raising the veil, as he and his, by means of tradition from Christ, but digging through the Church's wall. . . . . . . "When the Marcionites, Valentinians, and the like," says Origen, "appeal to apochryphal works, they are saying, 'Christ is in the desert;' when to canonical Scripture, 'Lo, He is in the chambers;' but we must not depart from that first and ecclesiastical tradition, nor believe otherwise than as the Churches of God by succession have transmitted to us." And it is recorded of him in his youth that he never could

be brought to attend the prayers of a heretic who was in the house of his patroness, from abomination of his doctrine—"observing," adds Eusebius, "the rule of the church." Eusebius, too, himself, unsatisfactory as is his own theology, cannot break from this fundamental rule; he ever speaks of the Gnostic teachers, the chief heretics of his period (at least, before the rise of Arianism) in terms most expressive of abhorrence and disgust. The African, Syrian, and Arian schools are additional witnesses; Tertullian, at Carthage, was strenuous for the dogmatic principle, even after he had given up the traditional. The Fathers of Asia Minor, who excommunicated Noetus, rehearse the creed, and add, "We declare as we have learned;" the Fathers of Antioch, who depose Paul of Samosata, set down in writing the creed from Scripture, "which," they say, "we received from the beginning, and have, by tradition and in custody, in the Catholic and holy church until this day by succession, as preached by the blessed Apostles, who were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word." "Who ever heard the like hitherto?" says St. Athanasius, of Apollinarianism; "who was the teacher of it? who the hearer? 'From Sion shall go forth the Law of God, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem;' but from whence hath this gone forth? What hell hath burst out with it?'" The Fathers at Nicæa stopped their ears; St. Irenæus, as above quoted, says that St. Polycarp, had he heard the Gnostic blasphemies, would have stopped his ears, and deplored the times for which he was reserved. They anathematized the doctrine not because it was old, but because it was new.'

Now, such a passage as this appears to, and to an ordinary reader, would convey the notion that Mr. Newman thoroughly estimated the testimony we have been alluding to, for the perfect identity of Christian doctrine in subsequent and in earliest times; for the antiquity, in the obvious sense of the word, as opposed to the after formation of Christian fundamental knowledge. But on coming to what immediately follows it, we find that all this acknowledgment of early testimony has been introduced for the very purpose of stopping this natural inference from it. The writer proceeds immediately to turn this very testimony against itself, and to draw by an ingenious turn of reasoning, from that express witness to the fact that such doctrine was old, the immediate inference that it was new. Let us see, Christians were very much startled at the contrary doctrine, as soon as ever taught by heretics, and shut their ears in horror. The obvious inference from such a fact would be, that this doctrine contradicted some old known familiar truth. But no, says Mr. Newman, it shows just the contrary: 'the 'doctrine in question being strange and startling, it follows that 'the truth which was its contradictory had also been unknown to 'them hitherto.' We must really say that we hardly know how to reply to such reasoning as this. There is something so strange in inferring from the intensity with which men felt a contradiction the fact that they had never known that which it was a contradiction to. Ordinary people would ask with some surprise, how the contradiction could be seen before the truth was; but Mr. Newman asks, with equal and quite as sincere surprise, how the truth could be seen before the contradiction was. Is no truth, however, seen till it is contradicted? And is it in the power of shameless and unlimited paradox to create at any moment the new truths, that fire burns and water flows, that the eye sees and the ear hears, and that we have bodies and souls? Contradiction certainly cannot do this. And if it cannot, we do not see how it could create and make known the great Christian dogmas. The dogma, as plain, simple, and matter-of-fact to the belief, as it is incomprehensible to the intellect, and unfathomable to meditation, the early Christian knew, as he knew a fact, because he was told it;—just as persons know other things, because they are told them. You tell a person a thing: he apprehends what you tell him: then he knows that thing. It is not necessary that somebody else should come and contradict it, in order that he may know it. There is something indeed which contradiction does do, but will what it does do be much to Mr. Newman's purpose in this argument?

Contradiction, undoubtedly, has the effect of sharpening our logical view of a truth, and we gain in the process of answering a contradiction a more definite and fuller logical image of the truth we defend. Contradiction to what we know elicits new expressions of that knowledge, and new aspects and inferences of that class which is identical with it. But to do this is not to give us that knowledge in the first instance. All that it gives us, which we had not before, is that series of aspects and inferences, that argumentative and mathematical issue from the substance, which is identical with the substance. As we find ourselves only taken back, however, here to an old subject, and have in this view of the powers of contradiction only another name for the view of development itself, we need not repeat arguments which we have already given, and need only say that the new expressions of truth which contradiction elicits, just as the expressions which explanatory development, *i. e.* explanation makes, being one and the same thing, are neither of them additions of substantial truth; that there is an inference from truth which the precise answer to contradiction expresses for the first time, and that there is a truth itself which it does not; and that to perceive one of these inferences from the truth for the first time, is not to perceive the truth for the first time; and that it must be shown that it is the truth itself which is so seen, in order to answer the purpose of the arguer in the present case.

One remark, however, before leaving this subject. It appears that the unanimous testimony of the early Church, age after age, asserts that the doctrine it taught was the same identical doctrine with the doctrine which was delivered by the Apostles, and was received in the most primitive days. It appears there was a doctrine so strong, so decided, so familiar, that it was able on the very first rise of any contradiction instantly to see and reject it. The process of actual rejection was long, because heretics argued and explained, and it took time to expose their sophistries. But the feeling of rejection was full and immediate. Orthodox Christians closed their ears in horror at the plain contradiction to plain known sacred truth. Here then is strong, plain, unanimous testimony to what was early doctrine. An ordinary thinker would certainly say—here in the first place is so much deliberate testimony to that point: and here, moreover, is the *ipso facto* unconscious testimony which the doctrine itself gives to its own antiquity, by being able from the very first to reject immediately anything contradictory to it. We argue the existence of substance from what comes against it being immediately cast off: we argue the existence of the truth, from its immediately casting off the error opposed to it. How could anything but the idea that the Son was Very God, ever exclude the idea that He was not Very God: and this latter was immediately excluded as soon as it arose, and nobody can doubt that it would have been immediately excluded from the first. Nicene doctrine's antiquity and simple identity with the truth of original revelation, is thus what these facts naturally take us to. But here comes an argument which does not bring counter-evidence—a different step altogether, and quite a legitimate one; but which explains away this very evidence itself into meaning something quite contrary to what upon a plain common sense view it does mean. For here is an argument which proves that this very testimony of the Church to the fact of its doctrine being old, is a testimony to the fact of its being new; and infers from early Christians being astonished at error, that they did not know the truth. Here is an argument which explains away, and turns against itself, the very fact of that universal testimony to its own antiquity, by which the Church's teaching, to a natural view, establishes that antiquity. An esoteric interpretation explains the loud assertions of the Nicene Fathers and all the after Church as to this fact, to mean something different to what one would naturally understand from them; or says that the assertors themselves did not really mean what they thought they meant, and that thinking they meant that they had exactly the same doctrine with the early one, they only *really* meant that that early doctrine was the seed and rudiment of their own; it having grown so imperceptibly that they did not perceive the change. A philosophic criticism, that is to say, refines upon the facts of history, analogously to the way in which one school of speculation refines upon the idea of Inspiration, and another upon the idea of Conscience. And the plain witness to the absolute identity of later doctrine with early, melts away.

What we maintain then is, that the Nicene truth is not a development, in the sense in which Mr. Newman uses the word: that the whole testimony of antiquity declares the contrary, and that Mr. Newman's arguments to prove that it was not held, but only some rudiments of it, in ante-Nicene times, are forced and unsatisfactory.

Our argument has now to take another direction, and to call Mr. Newman's attention to a certain result of his theory, if true, which we cannot see how it can avoid. If it be really true, as his theory implies, that the doctrine of the Divinity of our Lord maintained at Nice, was not the received doctrine of the earlier Church; we cannot, for our own part, understand how he can believe that that doctrine was an original doctrine of the Christian revelation, and one which the Apostles and first promulgators of Christianity taught. We are of course dealing with Mr. Newman's argument here, and not for an instant with his personal belief. His argument appears to us to run, distinctly and quite inevitably, into the denial of the doctrine of our Lord's Divinity as an original doctrine of revelation. For if that doctrine was not the received one of the early Church, and of the age of the ante-Nicene Fathers, it could not possibly have been communicated at the Apostolic era. If it had been, it would have been preserved, and been the received doctrine; not being preserved, the necessary inference is that it had never been delivered. The argument throws us back upon an early Christianity, of which the doctrine of our Lord's Divinity was no part, and denies that doctrine to be a revelation from the mouths of the first teachers of Christianity; in other words, to be an immediate truth of inspiration at all.

Indeed, Mr. Newman is himself not insensible to this tendency of his theory, and he endeavours to ward it off. He does this by occasional disclaimers; by the balance of clauses; by protests in a succeeding sentence against the obvious meaning and necessary force of the immediately preceding one; and he endeavours to counteract the substantial tendency of the argument by arbitrarily putting aside its result, when he comes across it. His whole mode of arguing here shows the uneasy and conflicting position. He glides out of one statement into another, and glides back again, as the argument itself, or as its check, requires; he leaves the reader in doubt what he really means to say: he asserts, he denies: though how the denial is reconcilable with the assertion does not appear, and which of the two he means to stand does not appear. Under the general haze and ambiguity which conflicting sentences create, he admits what he wants to admit into his development theory, and excludes what he wants to exclude: and while he makes Nicene truth the development of something before it, does not fairly face the result that what was before it was not Nicene truth. For example—the ambiguity between denial of the fact, and denial of the evidence for it. He leaves us in doubt whether he means to say, that the Nicene doctrine was really not received in early times, or that it was received, and that there is only not *evidence* for its reception. For after a refutation of the evidence for that doctrine, of which the apparent effect is to prove that there really was not that doctrine: he adds: 'It 'is true that the subsequent profession of the doctrine creates a 'presumption that it was held even before it was professed;' and of certain early Church documents, he says:—'The creeds of 'that early day make no mention in the letter of the Catholic 'doctrine (of the Trinity) at all. They make mention indeed 'of a Three; but that there is any mystery in the doctrine, 'that the Three are One [even] is not stated, and never could be 'gathered from them. Of course we believe that they imply it, 'or rather intend it. God forbid that we should do otherwise:' as if he meant to say that the doctrine was held, but only that certain evidence was wanting. And after arguing against the ante-Nicene Fathers, he adds in the same way—'I must not be 'supposed to be ascribing any heresy to the holy men, whose 'words have not always been sufficiently full or exact to preclude the imputation.' 'Let it not for an instant be supposed 'that I am impugning the orthodoxy of the early divines.' Again we have the old ambiguity in the meaning of the word development itself; as to whether development affects the substance, or only the expression and mode of representing a doctrine. In the latter sense it does not, of course, prove that the doctrine did not exist before; and he leaves it doubtful on particular occasions, whether he does not use it in the latter sense only: calling the 'developments in the doctrines of the 'Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, mere portions of the 'original impression and modes of representing it.' Again, a general distinction between explicit and implicit doctrine, suggests that doctrine may be held implicitly before it is held explicitly, held latently and unconsciously before it is held distinctly and positively. Mr. Newman's Roman Catholic opponent in America describes his theory here powerfully and accurately. Mr. Newman, he says, maintains

> 'a slow, painful, and laborious working out, by the Church herself, of dogmatic truth from implicit feelings,—though what kind of feeling an *implicit* feeling is, we are unable to say. "Thus St. Justin or St. Irenæus might be without any digested ideas of Purgatory, or Original Sin, yet have an *intense feeling*, which they had not defined or located, both of the fault of our first nature and of the liabilities of our nature regenerate." (P. 44.) It is obvious from the whole course of Mr. Newman's reasoning, that he would predicate of the Church, in their time, what he here predicates of St. Justin and St. Irenæus. The Church had a vague yet intense feeling of the truth, but had not digested it into formal propositions or definite articles. She had a blind instinct, which, under secret supernatural guidance, enabled her to avoid error and to pursue the regular course of development. She had a secret feeling of the truth, as one may say, a natural taste for it, and a distaste for error; yet not that clear and distinct understanding which would have enabled her at any moment, on any given point, to define her faith. She only knew enough of truth to preserve the original idea, and to elaborate from her intense feelings, slowly and painfully, as time went on, now one dogma, and now another. What in one age is feeling, in a succeeding age becomes opinion, and an article of faith in a still later age. This new article gives rise to a new intense feeling, which, in its turn, in a subsequent age becomes opinion, to be finally, in a later age yet, imposed as dogmatic truth. This is, so far as we can understand it, Mr. Newman's doctrine of development, and what he means by "working out dogmatic truth from implicit feelings."'—*Brownson's Quarterly Review, No. XI. for July*, 1846, *Boston, U. S.* (a Roman Catholic periodical.)

Such is the mode of explanation which would reconcile the fact that the Nicene doctrine of our Lord's Divinity was the development of anterior doctrine, with the fact that it had been the doctrine of the Church from the first; and denies its primitiveness at one argumentative call, and allows it at another.

Now with respect to these ambiguities, and modes of warding off the plain consequences of an argument, we have one answer, and that is the argument itself. Here is an argument before us, and the question is, what does that argument go to prove? For example, with respect to the ambiguity first mentioned: does that argument allow Mr. Newman really to oscillate between denying the reception itself of a certain doctrine in those early times, and only denying the evidence of it? Certainly not. However, he may alternate himself between both grounds, his argument stands upon one. His argument requires that really, and as a fact, the belief entertained by the Nicene Fathers should not have been held by the ante-Nicene. For his argument wants a parallel case to the growth of later doctrines, such as Purgatory and the Papal Infallibility. It must, therefore, maintain that there *is* that parallel case, and not only that there is no evidence that there is not. It urges a case in point, viz., that of Nicene growth as sanctioning Roman growth: it must therefore maintain that there *is* Nicene growth, and *is* ante-Nicene short coming. Moreover, where is the difference between saying that there is no evidence at all for, and that there was not, the belief of Nicene doctrine in those times? An arguer, indeed, who maintains the existence of any positive evidence, in *one* channel, for a fact, can, in proportion to the strength of that evidence, afford the silence or neutrality of another channel; for that silence or neutrality does not negative that evidence; but an arguer who comes with no evidence from any one channel, to no evidence in any other too, has no evidence at all for a fact: and therefore, that fact does not exist in his opinion. A person who takes the unanimous witness of the Nicene Fathers to the early belief in Nicene doctrine, as decided evidence for that early belief, can afford silence or neutrality in ante-Nicene quarters, without displacing that fact; but Mr. Newman, who does not do this, and comes with his mind blank to the ante-Nicene region of evidence, if he disallows the evidence there for the early belief in question, disallows all evidence for it at all, and therefore must hold that there was not such early belief. However, we need not go into such considerations as those. Mr. Newman's parallel requires Nicene doctrine to be a real substantial development of an earlier doctrine as to our Lord's nature. Requiring the fact of an earlier doctrine, he cannot possibly have the right to take the tone of allowing the then reception of the later one, in spite of want of evidence for it. His argument does not regret the veil over a complete truth, but demands the existence of a seminal one.

So, again, with respect to the ambiguity of the meaning of development; which makes Nicene development mean substantial growth when it has to bear out Roman, and only explanation when it has to guard itself; the answer is the same. Here is an argument before us. That argument proceeds upon a parallelism,—that parallelism is the parallelism of Nicene growth to Roman growth. Let the arguer then choose whichever he likes of these two meanings of the word development, as far as himself is concerned; but if his parallel commits him to one, that one he must take, and he must keep to it. He says that the Doctrines of Purgatory, of the Papal Infallibility, of the cultus of the Virgin, are the developments of the primitive ideas on those subjects. Does he mean to say that they are simple explanations of those ideas, and that if an intellectual primitive Christian had explained to a simple one the Church's then-idea of the authority of the Bishop of Rome, and had said—the Bishop of Rome is the absolute Monarch of Christendom, and has the power himself of imposing articles of faith; that the simple one would have replied, that that was what he believed, and that the explainer only expressed his belief accurately and scientifically? If Mr. Newman does not say this, and by the argument of his book he does not; if the Roman development is a vast solid substantial change upon the primitive rudiment; then those Roman doctrines are more than explanations of the primitive ideas on these subjects, and therefore Nicene doctrine, to support the parallel, must be more than an explanation of the primitive idea on its subject.

So again with respect to the distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge:—the answer is the same. Here is an argument. Here is a parallelism. We must go where they lead us, and take what they give us. Mr. Newman may allow an implicit knowledge of the truth of our Lord's proper Divinity in the primitive Church; but it makes no difference calling it by a particular name, if whatever he allows can only be what his argument allows, and just as much and no more. Indeed, to allow an implicit knowledge, is not to allow much: because implicit knowledge in multitudes of cases is no knowledge at all; and there is no saying what a man does know and what he does not, in the sense of this implicit knowledge. A man may be in time present, and as far as any actual perception and all that we mean by knowledge goes, totally ignorant of a truth: and yet when the truth afterwards is brought to him, he may discover on looking back into the state of his own mind, some implicit unconscious idea of it before; some knowledge which did not know, and some perception which did not perceive. In this sense the world has from its commencement known the theory of gravitation, the theory of the arch, the principle that water finds its own level, and numberless other scientific laws. But such implicit knowledge as this is not what we mean by knowledge. Knowledge is a definite perception of something: we go on for a long time not knowing; then there is a positive change from this not knowing to knowing: we know a thing then, and before we did not. No mental analysis can penetrate to the point of transition, but practically a point of transition there is, where the mind passes from ignorance to knowledge. The world went on for ages with the phenomena of water and its movements before it; and men knew that water moved, and that it moved in the way in which it did; and their mental eye gazed sleepily and vacantly on it, and there were some inert tendencies, which they could not help having by the fact of seeing such phenomena, to the knowledge of a law about them: at last the law struck some one in whom the tendencies were rather less inert than in the rest; and a spring in his mind was touched; something was lit up, and knowledge took place: he caught the point; he knew the principle that water finds its own level. Then as soon as he had made the discovery, the rest of the world might say that they had had implicit knowledge of it all along. But it is evident that the knowledge which they had, was not what we mean by knowledge: it was ignorance with the capacity of knowledge. A mere implicit knowledge then attributed to the primitive Church of subsequent truth, need not amount to much. However, if we were left to words to guide us in the present case, we could not extract any plain result from them, however their obvious meaning might seem to contain it: for the arguer frequently says under such circumstances that he means more than you mean by the word. The mere words, we say,—seed and growth, elementary doctrines and developed, implicit and explicit knowledge, and other modes of expressing a certain relation of primitive truth to Nicene, ought not simply as such, however naturally they may convey a particular meaning to our minds, to have that meaning imposed upon them, if the writer gives us to understand, by his argument, that he does not use them in that meaning. Nay, and if a writer's argument is not attended to to interpret his words, it will very frequently happen that much injustice will be done him in giving meanings to his words which they do not according to the argument bear. And one writer will under such circumstances sometimes go on for a whole controversy, totally misunderstanding another, and arguing upon a supposed meaning in his adversary's words, which his real line of thought does not give them. But, as we say, we are not left to words here. We have a parallel to guide us to the meaning of them: we have an illustration from fact of the kind of knowledge which implicit knowledge in the present case is; of the kind of relation which doctrine implicit has to doctrine explicit. Nicene development is made to sanction Roman; Roman development appeals to Nicene as its parallel. Whatever relation therefore the explicit doctrine has to the implicit in the Roman development, that same relation must it have in the Nicene. Now in the case of the Roman development it cannot possibly be asserted that the ultimate doctrines on the subjects it is concerned with are what could, upon any common sense and natural standard, be called the same doctrines with the primitive ones. It could not possibly be asserted that the Roman doctrine on the intermediate state is the same with the primitive one; that the Roman view of the sedes Petri is the same with the primitive one; that the Roman regard to St. Mary is the same with the primitive one. To speak of the primitive Christian holding the Roman Purgatory, Papacy, and Cultus of the Virgin, would be a solecism, which would have immediately to be explained into meaning quite another thing than the words naturally suggest. It is obvious that in these instances the development has been of a kind which leaves the primitive doctrine a mere element and seed, compared with the real substantial later one. Who would deny that in the instance of the Papal Infallibility, to fix our eye upon one, the growth had not been so enormous that the ultimate grown doctrine was, as far as anything cognizable goes, literally one thing, and the asserted primitive element of it another thing? Indeed, as we have said, Mr. Newman does not call these the same doctrines: for the very object of his Essay is to dispense with the necessity of this identity, and give a rationale for change. Thus on the Roman side of the parallel, the implicit doctrine has the relation to the developed, of no more than a seed or element. Then on the Nicene side it must be the same. The Nicene doctrine of the proper Divinity of our Lord, must be the development of an early doctrine as to our Lord's nature, as truly seminal and elementary, as the early asserted anticipation of Roman doctrine is. And if it be argued that the Nicene growth was only the first sample and beginning of a course, and need not be equal in amount to, in order to sanction, later growth: the same thing has still to be repeated: if it sanction the latter it must be real growth: now the Nicene doctrine as to our Lord is no more than that He was very God: the primitive doctrine then must have been less. The conclusion still is that as an anterior doctrine preceded the Roman one of the Papal Infallibility, which was substantially a different one from that of the Papal Infallibility; so an anterior doctrine preceded the Nicene one of the proper Divinity of our Lord, which was not the doctrine of His proper Divinity.

Such is the result of an argumentative parallel: though far be it from us to press it in any other than this connexion, or to impose the result, if the parallel is not imposed. But if Mr. Newman has the advantage of the parallel, he must take the disadvantage of it. He has, on the one hand, the option of allowing the Nicene development to be of a different sort from the Roman; and if he takes that, he escapes this result with respect to Nicene doctrine, but has no benefit of parallel with respect to Roman. He has, on the other, the option of saying that they are the same sort of development and of asserting the parallel; and if he takes that, he has the benefit of it with respect to Roman doctrine, and the disadvantage of it with respect to Nicene. We are unable to see any middle ground between these two.

It does, then, as we have said, appear to us to be a necessary result from this line of argument, that the doctrine of the proper Divinity of our Lord, was not a doctrine of inspiration. If it was not the received doctrine of the primitive Church, the first inspired teachers of that Church could not have communicated it to her. For to say that it was communicated and not at first understood by the Church, or anything of that nature, would be so much mere hypothesis. We can only know of its original communication by the fact of its early reception. Moreover, if it was not communicated, we have no ground for saying that the Apostles themselves knew it, and were inspired as to that truth. For vain would be the distinction, if attempted to be urged, between what inspired men might know from God, and what they communicated to men. We have no presumption for saying that they knew from God any other doctrines than what they were commissioned to communicate; or that inspiration had esoteric dogmas, for the individuals inspired to keep to themselves. It follows that, on this theory, we have no reason for saying that the Apostles themselves were believers in, *i.e.*, knew this doctrine; or therefore that, as far as any conscious meaning in the minds of the writers is concerned, the New Testament, from beginning to end, contains it. A great number of texts, which Arians and Socinians have taken advantage of, receive as a consequence, a very different interpretation to that which we have been accustomed to give them. The New Testament becomes an ante-Nicene document, containing those errors and short-comings which are charged upon the ante-Nicene Fathers, and containing them in the same sense; not simply in the sense, that is, that the words of the writers are to be explained to mean what universal tradition witnesses that they did, as a fact, mean; but in the sense that the actual doctrinal *meaning* of the writers was a rudimental and defective one; that what St. Paul, St. John, St. Peter actually meant in what they wrote, was not the Nicene truth of the proper Divinity of our Lord, but an earlier truth; the truth of that day as to our Lord's nature, whatever that was; an elementary truth indeed, which was capable of being expanded in the course of centuries by the 'unwearied thought' of the Church and her theologians into that truth, but which was not that truth itself, any more than the acorn is the oak. In short, if a doctrine of inspiration means, as every body supposes it to mean, a doctrine of which the Apostles were informed by inspiration, and being informed of, taught; the doctrine of our Lord's Divinity is, upon the theory we are dealing with, not a doctrine of inspiration; and a whole view of early Christianity, and apostolic teaching, different from what we have been ever taught, goes along with that fact.

And now it is time that this article should draw to an end: a prospect which affords as much satisfaction to ourselves, as it will to our readers. We have trespassed almost unprecedentedly upon established limits; and the task of the arguer, hard, cold, and hostile, and though lengthy enough to be tedious, short enough to oppress him with the continual memento of points wholly omitted and thought just begun and left off, has not been relieved by the consideration of that name, which the Essay he has been examining bears; and which he has had so often to repeat, in a very different tone and connexion to that in which the pages of this Review have mentioned it in former times.

What we have to say now is little more than what the reader will gather for himself, if he has gone along with us. We have to say, that having followed Mr. Newman's argument through the three stages through which it has taken us, we do not feel ourselves convinced by it. His tests of a true and false development did not convince us in the first place; his argument for the Papal Infallibility, the only logical hypothesis which could then settle that question of development in his favour, did not convince us in the second place; his argument of *reductio ad absurdum,* which imposes that development upon us as a thing to which we have already committed ourselves, in the acceptance of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and thrusts upon us the alternative between Rome and infidelity, does not convince us in the third place.

Some obvious reflections, first upon the way in which this theory of development affects the Roman controversy in general, and then upon this theory of development itself, in particular, shall follow in conclusion.

With respect, then, to this whole theory of development, we have to observe that its propounder introduces it into the theological arena with this assertion: 'this is an hypothesis to 'account for a difficulty.' There is, then, a difficulty, acknowledged in the Roman development of Christianity; and an hypothesis is said to be wanted to account for it. The phenomenon does not explain itself; it has to be explained upon an hypothesis. We recommend this observation, in the first instance, to the attention of some who appear to think that they decide the question against the English Church, if they can appeal to obvious difficulties on her side. It seems that there are difficulties on both sides; and that if one side has to explain, the other has to explain too. Christianity has now run through eighteen centuries, says Mr. Newman, and has a history. 'Christianity,' therefore, 'may now *legitimately* be made the subject matter of 'theories.' 'It has been long enough in the world to justify 'us in dealing with it' in this way. Moreover, that history has brought along with it difficulties; for them an hypothesis is absolutely *demanded.* The writer of this Essay, then, does not give much encouragement to what may be called the simple method of deciding the question between the Roman and English Churches. He gives the Roman Church a 'theory;' 'an hypothesis,' which accounts for 'her difficulties;' but he does not profess to say that she has a position free from them. We might suggest a comparison between the Roman Church with this ground, and St Augustine's Church with its: the latter had a good deal more simple a position, if we are to judge by the greater simplicity of the argument, which was, if we mistake not, a simple appeal to people's eyes. The phenomenon of St. Augustine's Catholic Church explained itself: but the phenomenon of the Roman Catholic Church, it seems, does not explain itself, but requires an hypothesis. But we must proceed.

Having observed, then, that the thing before us is an hypothesis, our next observation is that it is an additional and a directly counter hypothesis to another which has always had, and has now, the general, public, and authoritative acknowledgment of the Roman Church. The public and authoritative hypothesis of the Roman Church is that the whole of the Christian faith was revealed entire from the first: Mr. Newman's hypothesis is that the whole of the Christian faith has been a development from the first. It is wholly needless for us to cite the names of all the Roman divines who have, without hesitation or qualification, maintained this as the regular hypothesis of their Church: it would be, with hardly an exception, simply transcribing the whole index from beginning to end. It is enough to say that it is the ground of Bellarmine. The list exhibits at the end some distinguished names of the present day; and the present representatives of Roman theology at Rome and in England appear as the undoubting and dutiful supporters of it. 'We believe,' says Dr. Wiseman, 'that no 'new doctrine can be introduced into the Church, but that 'every doctrine which we hold has existed and been *taught* in it, 'ever since the time of the Apostles.' 'The Apostles,' says the Jesuit Perrone, the present Professor of theology at Rome, 'having been instructed by Christ in the truths of the faith, 'delivered these same truths to successors chosen by them, that 'they in like manner might transmit them entire, even to the 'latest posterity, *such as they had received them.*' 'I admit [pro'gress] he says, *i. e.* greater elucidation *of the doctrine already 'received;* I deny [progress] by the introduction of new dogmas.' 'The doctrines of the faith are so many truths divinely revealed, 'which the Church received from Christ to be transmitted to 'posterity, and inviolably preserved from the gnawing tooth of 'innovation.' 'The Pontiffs and Councils never obtrude any-

'thing of their own, but are witnesses of the doctrine which 'Christ taught, and the Apostles delivered.' 'It is the con'stant rule of Catholics,' says another living theologian of the Roman Church, that 'no change can take place in what con'cerns the doctrines of revealed religion.' With respect to Purgatory, says Dr. Wiseman, 'Nothing can be more simple 'than to establish the belief of the universal Church on this 'point. The only difficulty is to select such passages as may 'appear the clearest. These passages contain *precisely* the same 'doctrine as the Catholic Church teaches.' With reference to Indulgences, the same writer says, 'The Church in the earliest 'time' claimed and exercised this power. With reference to the Invocation of saints, he says, 'I can have only one fear in lay'ing before you passages on this subject. It is that in the 'authorities from the Fathers, their expressions are so much 'stronger than those used by the Catholics at the present day, 'that there is a danger, (if I may so speak,) of proving too 'much; they go beyond us.' In a word, the ground of the Roman Church hitherto has been, that all the Roman doctrines were actually revealed to the Apostles, and really in the Church from the first, though some were not taught publicly. This hypothesis Mr. Newman denies. He says of the 'hypothesis 'put forward by divines of the Church of Rome, called the *Dis'ciplina Arcani*, which maintains that the doctrines which are 'associated with the later ages of the Church were *really in the 'Church from the first*, but not publicly taught;' 'This is no 'key to the whole difficulty:' that is to say, it is not a true hypothesis; and he puts forward the hypothesis of development expressly to supply its place. So then here are two directly conflicting hypotheses put forward in the Roman Church as the account of her faith.

Now upon this state of the case, one reflection which necessarily arises is, that with regard to general antecedent claim upon attention and respect, both hypotheses are considerably weakened by this opposition. So long as one account of her creed is put forward by a whole Church, that account comes with a certain imposing introduction to us; but if another account is put forward which directly conflicts with the old one; it is natural for a person to say—you come to persuade me, and yet you are fighting among yourselves as to the very foundation upon which your own whole belief rests. The early Church had one account, but you have two contrary ones. You must really make up your own mind, before you come to persuade me. Choose which of the two you please, but, if they oppose each other, do let me have one of them, and not both together. Otherwise you simply puzzle me. The Roman Church, we say, if she admits two contrary hypotheses, ceases, *ipso facto*, to argue at all. Schools and individuals in her argue, but the Church does not. As a Church she abandons the field of controversy, because she contradicts herself. For, be it remembered, this is not an affair of simple phenomena, the truth of which is visible to the eye, and does not depend at all on the hypothesis which explains them; such as the fact that matter falls to the ground, the truth of which does not at all depend on the hypothesis of gravitation; but it is a case where the hypothesis is appealed to for the truth of the fact itself. We want to know why we are to believe a doctrine, say Purgatory or any other. Bellarmine gives one reason, and Mr. Newman a totally contrary one. Nor would the remark that it was the Church's teaching all the same in either case, be to the purpose; for the reason of the Church's teaching is the argumentative ground on which we believe the Church's teaching; and this reason is a contrary one as Bellarmine and as Mr. Newman give it.

We must add, that Mr. Newman's hypothesis is especially affected by this state of the case. We have naturally and reasonably so little confidence in our own private judgment, that when an individual writer comes before us with the information that he has an hypothesis for, a rationale to give of, the whole of Christian doctrine; we first ask him whom he represents, and what testimonials he can give *primâ facie* recommendatory to it. And when he says that it is a new one, that it is only his own, or that of a particular circle of thinkers, and that it is not only not borne out by, but opposed to, and intended to supplant the whole account of the Christian faith, maintained by the Universal Church from the first; it is then natural to say that we should not trust our own reason enough to accept such an hypothesis, even supposing it to exhibit, upon examination, great argumentative force. Nor are we surprised at Mr. Newman's Roman Catholic opponent putting the question to him rather sharply:—

> 'In regard to all this, we simply ask, Does the Church herself take this view? Does she teach that she at first received no formal revelation,—that the revelation was given as 'unleavened dough,' to be leavened, kneaded, made up into loaves of convenient size, baked, and prepared for use by her, after her mission began, and she had commenced the work of evangelizing the nations? Does she admit her original creed was incomplete, that it has increased and expanded, that there have been variation and progress in her understanding of the revelation she originally received, and that she now understands it better, and can more readily define what it is, than she could at first? Most assuredly not. She asserts that there has been no progress, no increase, no variation of faith; that what she believes and teaches now is precisely what she has always and everywhere believed and taught from the first. She denies that she has ever added a new article to the primitive creed; and affirms, as Mr. Newman himself

> proves in his account of the Council of Chalcedon, (p. 145,) that the new definition is not a new development, a better understanding of the faith, but simply a new definition, against the 'novel expressions' invented by the enemies of religion, of what, on the point defined, had always and everywhere been her precise faith. In this she is right, or she is wrong. If right, you must abandon your theory of developments; if wrong, she is a false witness for God, and your theory of developments cannot make her worthy of confidence. If you believe her, you cannot assert developments in your sense of the term; if you do not believe her, you are no Catholic.'—*Brownson's Quarterly Review*, p. 352.

We say if any person maintained that he did not feel a logical call even to give a consideration, in the first instance, to an hypothesis coming before him as this does, we should not be prepared, for our part, to contradict such a view. If the bare possibility of turning out true gave an hypothesis a claim upon our consideration, we should be living every hour of our lives in the greatest possible neglect of our duties as rational beings; inasmuch as many a theory comes before us daily, of which we cannot say that it is self-evidently false, and which we yet do not feel called upon to consider; and these theories too upon important subjects. To draw the line between hypotheses which have a claim upon our consideration, and those which have not, appears to be an important part of practical logic; and one perhaps which, however intimately depending upon each man's common sense, might be brought, to a certain extent, under rule, as ordinary logic is.

To proceed. There being then now two contradictory hypotheses put forward by the Roman Church, or schools in her, each of which is weakened, and especially the latter, as far as the *à priori* claim upon our attention goes, by this contradiction; what we thirdly observe is, that, on an actual examination and comparison of the two hypotheses, we do not see that the new one is more free from difficulties than the old one. Its difficulties indeed have another character, and lie in another quarter; but they are as real. The old one lies under a great disadvantage with respect to the department of later doctrine; for it has to assert of such doctrine, that it was actually revealed to the Apostles, and communicated by them to the Church; an assertion which is contradicted by all history. The new one, on the other hand, is able to take a natural view, as far as history is concerned, of the origin of later doctrine, and fairly to face and acknowledge the fact of its lateness; but it compensates for this advantage when it comes to the department of earlier; and the necessity of proving growth becomes as onerous to it as the necessity of proving antiquity was to the old one. It is now its turn to falsify history, to be unreal and artificial, to make much out of nothing. It has to convert explanation into growth, new expression into new substance; to raise the definition of a truth, because it moulds it into more verbal accuracy, into truth's rising manhood, compared with former infancy, the plant compared with the seed; it is to be obviously hollow and bombastic. Nor is this all which the new hypothesis has to do; for it has to explain away the loud, clear, unanimous assertion of the whole Nicene Church, that its doctrine was not a development. It has *not* to see a whole body of evidence on this subject, which stares it in the face; or to put ingenious aspects upon such evidence when it does come across it; and make out that it is evidence for the very contrary of what it professes to be evidence for. Nor is this all; for arriving at last at the era of Revelation it has to face the awkward result of its own argument, that the fundamental doctrines of Christianity were not in existence then; and a whole Socinian view of early Christian theology meets it. Such are the two hypotheses; and if the old has difficulties on the later ground, the new one has no less on the earlier.

To this new hypothesis, then, a member of the English Church has the same answer to make that he had to the old one. He has only to take his stand on the old ground. As a matter of evidence, he maintains that there is a distinction between these two classes of doctrines, between Nicene doctrines and Roman, between primitive and later; and whereas here are two hypotheses, which, in different ways, one by making the whole an original revelation, another by making the whole a development, attempt absolutely to identify the two: he says that, looking to facts and history, he cannot do so. He observes that each of these hypotheses falsify fact according as they maintain their respective modes of identifying these two classes of doctrines; according as one makes Roman doctrine originally revealed, and the other Nicene doctrine subsequently developed. And he accordingly adheres to his ground which distinguishes between them, and avoiding the unnatural, takes the natural part of both hypotheses. Upon this distinction of evidence, again, it necessarily follows, that he makes a distinction in his belief as to the two respectively, and accepts the one class of doctrines as articles of faith; and not the other. And whereas each of these hypotheses presses the charge of illogicalness upon him, for making this distinction in his belief; calling upon him to accept all or none, and denying a standing ground between Rome and infidelity; he naturally replies that, supposing he took that view of evidence which they take, it would be very illogical for him not to accept all; but that making a distinction in evidence, it would be very illogical for him not to make a distinction in belief.——Again: if he is taken off the ground of evidence, into the only other one, the *à priori* ground: he takes his stand upon the argument of analogy; and whereas his opponents argue *à priori* that there must be an Infallible Authority always at hand in the Church, and therefore that there is one; he does not allow the presumption, and therefore does not allow the fact built upon it. And here again he considers he is logical; for though if he allowed the necessity of a Standing Infallible Authority, it would be illogical for him to deny the fact; not allowing that necessity, it is not illogical for him to deny it. But the denial of the *à priori* ground leaves him perfectly at liberty with respect to other grounds. And, therefore, if an Authority presents itself to him claiming on other grounds to be an Infallible Authority, he may on consideration of such grounds accept it as such, and for the purpose for which there are grounds for thinking it Infallible. And such an authority he admits in the Universal Church, accepting all those definitions of the faith which it has given, or may hereafter give. But this does not commit him to the decrees of the Roman Church, because he believes, upon evidence, the Roman Church not to be the Universal Church.

But after making the comparison between Mr. Newman's hypothesis and the old one, and deciding that the former has equal difficulties with the latter: the fourth and last observation we shall make is one which we should not like to omit on taking leave of the present subject.

For we must confess, that after the most attentive consideration which we have been able to devote to this Essay, viewing it as a whole, we are unable to discover that Mr. Newman has any regular hypothesis at all. We have supposed him indeed to have one; because he tells us he has one, and has given it a name and called it a Theory of Development. If a person comes forward with a theory, it is right to presume that he will fairly go upon it, and fairly make it his theory, by argumentative consistency, till we find the contrary. And therefore we suppose beforehand, Mr. Newman will do so. But on coming to inspect his own argumentative relations to his own theory, we discover a looseness and inconsistency which seems to break up his theory as a theory altogether.

Mr. Newman's professed theory is indeed a simple one. All grows out of one seed. Christianity came into the world an elementary idea; and from that idea all that it subsequently gained of belief and organization grew. So—first on the point of belief—here is a theory which commits the holder of it to a certain elementary exordium of Christian belief. Now ask a

Socinian what was the exordium out of which Nicene belief grew; and he will give you an exordium and a very simple one; he will say that Christians began with thinking our Lord a mere man; and that the idea of his nature then grew, till at the Nicene era it arrived at the idea of Godhead. This is an intelligible exordium of Christian doctrine; supposing Christian doctrine is really a growth. But going into the substance actual of Mr. Newman's theory, we cannot discover what exordium it makes, or if it makes any exordium at all, which can be said legitimately to answer to the assertion of growth. If the theory of development enlarges forward, it must diminish backward; if you say that such a doctrine is a growth, then you imply that it was a seed: you must make it less as you trace it to its beginning, till you come to some ultimate atom which it originally was. Such should, according to the theory, be Mr. Newman's original 'Christian idea:' when he says 'Christianity came into the world an idea, and develops all doctrine and institution whatever out of that idea.' We naturally say—here must be the original atom of Christianity: and what is it? Your theory demands a real *bona fide* exordium: show it. But we make the demand in vain; we try in vain to find out what this original idea is; it nowhere appears; we can make out nothing of it. As soon as ever Mr. Newman's theory approaches its elementary region, it disappears, and we are left, without any theory at all, to make out the original idea of Christianity, to as much or as little as we like. We may make it out to be full Nicene doctrine if we like; he does not prevent us: he scrupulously abstains from preventing us; and says he has only meant to say that there is not *evidence* for that doctrine having existed then, but that we may believe it did if we like. In fact, this exordium, on the elementary nature of which we have, in accordance with the theory, counted all along, turns out to be a regular dogmatic creation when we approach it. After all the assertion of the Nicene 'Homo-'ousion' being a growth, he actually allows us to assume 'that 'there is a consensus in the ante-Nicene Church for the doctrines of 'our Lord's Consubstantiality and Co-eternity with the Almighty 'Father.' He says 'there is not an article in the Athanasian 'creed concerning the Incarnation which is not anticipated in 'the controversy with the Gnostics; there is no question which 'the Apollinarian or the Nestorian heresy raised which may not 'be decided in the words of Irenæus and Tertullian.' Why then, he has taken us as far back as he can in the Christian history, and instead of an elementary idea, we have a full dogmatic Nicene belief. Nor is the expedient by which he tries to make this dogmatic belief a seminal one again, and restore consistency to his theory after he has destroyed it, a very fortunate one. What does he say?—'Let us allow that the whole circle of 'doctrines of which our Lord is the subject was consistently and 'uniformly confessed by the Primitive Church, though not 'formally ratified by council. *But it surely is otherwise with the 'Catholic doctrine of the Trinity.*' But what is the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, but that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are each God, and all three but one God? So, on Mr. Newman's view, the Godhead of the Father and the Godhead of the Son being acknowledged as the doctrine of the early Church, and the doctrine of the Trinity not acknowledged, we have for the belief of the early Church, Dualism. But surely Mr. Newman will not assert the absurdity that the creed of the Church was ever a Dualistic one. If the doctrine of the Trinity is defective in such circumstances, it can only be by the non-acknowledgment of the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, or by His oneness with the Consubstantial Father and Son not being acknowledged: in either case there is Dualism. Or if we have not Dualism, what is it that we have? And this is the elementary idea of Christianity which the theory comes to after all:—a full dogmatic belief as regards one doctrine, arbitrarily made to stop short of another, which it is quite absurd to suppose it should stop short of, if it existed at all. We naturally say, let us have one thing or another; a seminal origin fairly agrees with your theory; a full dogmatic origin fairly disagrees with it. But here is neither a genuine dogmatic, nor genuine seminal origin for Christianity; but an artificial arbitrary grotesque unmeaning medium between the two. Such is the course which the theory takes when it has to make itself actual, and embody itself in fact.

So then we ask Mr. Newman what is his theory? For we confess we are unable to make it out. He calls upon the member of the English Church for his theory: what is his own? As far as he has explained it hitherto, it is a theory of growth without a seed; development without an exordium. We come to what is his original idea of Christianity, and expect to find a philosophical elementarity in it; but we find nothing of the kind. The truth is, the author is afraid of his own theory as soon as ever it comes to its trying part, he finds it—it is not a grave word, but we use it gravely—beginning to pinch him, and he drops it. He then begins, as we said before, arbitrarily to balance, and qualify, and do what he has allowed none of his opponents to do in his whole Essay—explain. His theory goes on with an easy swing enough over its easy ground; but it comes to its difficult ground, and it begins to halt. Now is its turn to be lame, feeble, confused, and unnatural; to be as impotent as it is arbitrary, and expect to be believed for no kind of reason. The theory of Development gets over the ground of later doctrines with a bold assurance; but when it comes to fundamental ones, it stops and wavers. It dares not face its own result. But surely it does not deserve the name of a theory if it does this. Any theory can get over its easy ground well: it is the difficult ground which tries it. Theories geological, chemical, astronomical, all go on successfully enough over their easy ground, and nobody thinks anything of them for doing it.

Again, with respect to the ecclesiastical question. We must confess ourselves unable to see how Mr. Newman can get a Church at all; much less a Papal Church, with its local centre and monarchy, out of an 'idea.' To quote Mr. Brownson:—

> 'Mr. Newman evidently proceeds on the assumption, that Christianity can be abstracted from the Church, and considered apart from the institution which concretes it, as if the Church were accidental and not essential in our holy religion. "Christianity," he says, "though spoken of in prophecy as a kingdom, came into the world as an *idea* rather than an institution, and has had to wrap itself in clothing, and fit itself with armour of its own providing, and form the instruments and methods of its own prosperity and warfare." . . . . Its divine Author, then, sent Christianity into the world a naked and unarmed idea. By its action on us, and ours on it, it gradually develops itself into an institution, which, feeble at first, as time and events roll on, strengthens and fortifies itself, now on this side and now on that, pushes deep its roots into the heart of humanity, sends out its branches, now in one direction and now in another, till at length it grows up and expands into that all-embracing authority, those profound and comprehensive dogmas, those pure and sublime precepts, and that rich and touching ritual, which together make up what we to-day call the Roman Catholic and Apostolical Church.'—Pp. 354, 355.

All this is to come out of the 'idea;' but, adds Mr. Brownson,

> 'Ideas, not concreted, not instituted, are not potencies, are not active, but are really to us as if they were not. The ideal must become actual, before it can be operative. If Christianity had come into the world as an idea, it would have left the world as it found it. Moreover, if you assume it to have come as an idea, and to have been developed only by the action of the human mind on it, the institutions with which it is subsequently clothed, the authorities established in its name, the dogmas imposed, the precepts enjoined, and the rites prescribed, are all really the products of the human mind; and, instead of governing the mind, may be governed, modified, enlarged, or contracted by it at its pleasure. The Church would be divine only in the sense philosophy or civil government is divine.'—P. 356.

We do not see how Mr. Newman can escape this reasoning; so far as the point, for which we have quoted it, is concerned. He educes all Christianity whatever out of an 'idea.' Then how can that idea become ever more than an idea? It may expand indefinitely, but it must expand as an idea. It was that to begin with, and that it must continue. Whenever it becomes an 'institution,' something arises quite additional to the idea; and the philosophical simplicity of the theory gives way. It may be said that an idea can clothe itself with such an institutional body in course of time; but an idea can do no such a thing. What is wanted is an external institution, or society, membership of which is necessary on its own account, and not merely as expressing agreement in certain ideas. It is not enough for a man to think with the Church: he must be in it. An idea cannot develop into an institution such as this;—into a body of which membership is, as membership, sacramental. It may form an association certainly, such as the Platonic philosophy did, the virtue of belonging to which was no more than that of agreement in the philosophy. But this would be a school and not a Church. As soon as ever the principle of a Church comes in, and there is a body which it is necessary to belong to, as such, there is something which the 'idea' does not give us. The ideal exordium which Mr. Newman assigns to Christianity must, unless added to from without, make Christianity continue to all time a philosophy and not a Church. This is what the German Rationalist educes from it; and it is the fair legitimate issue of it. But Mr. Newman brings it to another issue, and contrives to incorporate with it, as he works it up, the adventitious principle of a Church.

What we say then is, that Mr. Newman has no consistent theory whatever. He professes a theory, but admits, as circumstances require, into it, things which contradict it, and things which it does not account for. He has a theory on paper, and none in fact: he begins with philosophical simplicity, and ends in arbitrary mixture. His theory is an inclusive one simply, and not an explanatory one; embracing a great number of heterogeneous facts within one pale, but leaving them as far as ever from making one whole. We expected on opening this Essay to find Mr. Newman's theory for Roman facts, but we find nothing of the kind. What he does is to assert the old ultra-liberal theory of Christianity; and to join the Church of Rome: but he does not show—what it was the object of his Essay to show—the connexion of the two; the accordance of his theory with his act. And after professing to give us an hypothesis which accounts for and fits on to the facts of Ecclesiastical History; he ends with having an hypothesis indeed, and having facts, but having his hypothesis and his facts in separation.

NOTICES.

Dr. Todd has published 'Six Discourses on the Prophecies relating to Antichrist in the Apocalypse,' (Hodges and Smith,) being a course delivered at the Donnellan Lecture. We trust that the author's design of the proposed examination of the whole Book of the Revelation is only postponed. Dr. Todd's learning, and his principle of prophetic interpretation, are so well known, that it will be sufficient to say that the present volume sustains the high reputation which its kindred predecessors have received. It is, to our readers, superfluous to remind them that Dr. Todd advocates the strict literal, without excluding a symbolical, sense of prophecy—that he is a fellow-worker with Mr. Maitland against the school of Mede and Newton, and, in our own days, against Cunninghame and Elliott. Were not the subject too awful for a smile, a most amusing volume might be constructed out of the 'variations' in the interpretation of the Apocalypse. We were aware of, but had mislaid the reference to, the following specimen which Dr. Todd, p. 217, recalls. Mr. Cunninghame tells us of 'seven blasts of the 'seventh trumpet, (one being sounded every seven years since 1792,) 'besides a second septenary of the seventh blast, sounded in 1841, and signifying Sir Robert Peel's motion of want of confidence in the Whig ministers—the formation of Sir Robert Peel's ministry—the establishment of 'the Anglican Jerusalem Bishopric, and Bishop Alexander's sailing for 'Palestine in the *Devastation* steamer, December 7, 24th Chisleu.'

A second volume of 'Brogden's Catholic Safeguards,' (Murray,) has appeared: this selection from the standard English writers cannot fail to command attention at this time.

An endeavour to bring Science within the sphere of Revelation must always command our good will, and a laborious collection of evidence has a fair claim to a respectful attention. On these grounds the anonymous author of 'Scriptural Evidences of Creation,' (Seeley,) may obtain a hearing for a theory, the success of which will certainly not be due to any adventitious auxiliaries of style, method, or selection. It is not, however, devoid either of ingenuity or thought; and no slight praise should be awarded to the moral character of the writer, who, avoiding the common asperities of scientific controversy, preserves so temperate a tone even when surrounding himself with the fancied glories of triumphant refutation. His object is to disprove the necessity for those vast periods of time which geologists are wont to interpose in, or prefix to, the Mosaic history of the Creation, in order to account for the existing phenomena of the earth. For this purpose he has drawn, chiefly from Lyell's materials, a picture of the changes which are even now affecting the arrangement of the globe, and which, he argues, would have formed the several strata in much less time than is commonly admitted. The argument from extinct species is met, ingeniously enough, by the plea, that, as it is admitted on all hands that the secondary strata, in which their fossils are now discovered, must have been the bed of the sea when they were deposited there, their species may very well seem strange to our eyes, without disproving thereby the contemporary existence of known species, and even of man himself, on the dry land of that day, which is now reposing beneath our present ocean, far beyond the reach of the geologist's hammer. This book may do indirectly considerable service, by reminding us of the yet uncertain state of geological science, the small portion of the globe which has yet been thoroughly investigated, and the consequently narrow foundation on which all theories of the earth must at present rest; and though we cannot acquiesce with any confidence in the results of the reading of an amateur, yet we ought not to refuse our thanks to his good intentions and apparent laboriousness.

'The Psalms in Hebrew; with a Critical, Exegetical, and Philological Commentary,' by the Rev. George Philips, B.D. In two volumes. (J. W. Parker.) There is much to be thankful for in these volumes. The author is at least sound in his interpretation of the Messianic Psalms. He protests vigorously, not merely against De Wette and Ewald (which Englishmen feel little difficulty in doing), but also against the pseudo-criticisms of Lowth (i. 212, 218, &c.), Kennicott (ii. 284), and especially Horsley (i. 186, and 220, 221), 'by what strange infatuation the learned prelate was induced to think that 'all the world had gone wrong,' &c.) At the same time the Commentary is very far from being what we could have wished. We scarcely anywhere observe that warmth of spirit and depth of feeling which are among the first requisites for the exegesis of Holy Scripture. He is afraid of applying the higher Christian mode of interpretation beyond what the quotations in the New Testament actually *necessitate:* and this, apparently from two causes,—an unwillingness to state anything that cannot be demonstrably *verified,*—and a love of philological research, which has led him to sympathize mainly with such interpreters as Rosenmüller and Mendelssohn. S. Athanasius, S. Augustine, and S. Hilary are referred to only once or twice. The explanatory matter is often commonplace, such as would suit a parochial sermon rather than a Commentary on the 'Psalms in Hebrew.' Mr. Philips's method of treating grammatical phenomena, too, is somewhat hard, and cumbered with the old machinery of enallage, metonymy, pleonasm, &c. The scholarship is generally correct; yet we meet with such mistakes as *nigdòl* (i. 141), *rùm* (202), *lemághan* (211), and *motsè* (ii. 66), for *negaddèl*, *harìm*, *yághan*, and *nimtsà*.

The 'Prometheus Vinctus' has been once more translated into English verse by Mr. Prowett of Caius College. He has succeeded in a task the more difficult because often attempted. The condensed nervousness of his language will strike the mere English reader; the scholar must observe and commend his closeness to the original. At the risk of being hypercritical, we venture the remark, that his style is almost too idiomatic for a version from the Greek. We start, as at an anachronism, when some well-known Iambic appears in the phrase of our older dramatists, or the modern-antique terminology of Sir Walter Scott stands as a substitute for the archaicism of an Æschylean chorus.

'The Church and the Meeting House,' (Rivingtons,) is a fair manual of the argument for Episcopacy, in the form of dialogue.

'Cressingham; or, The Missionary,' (Masters,) is a tale meant to call up feelings of high self-devotion: it is written with facility, but there is nothing above commonplace, either in the characters or story.

'The Court, the Crosier, and the Cowl,' (Batty,) is the title of a volume of lives of 'St. Louis, Gregory VII., St. Chrysostom, and St. Ignatius Loyola.' They originally appeared in the North American Review, and have been collected and republished by an admiring English Editor, whose taste was not proof against the allurements of the above flowing piece of alliteration. The lives themselves are written with much vigour, considerable knowledge of the subject, and strong sympathy with the great characters described: but the author's opinions must not be mistaken; it is a sympathy, very warm and hearty, as it appears, with the individuals, but by no means with their principles, or those of the Church. He is a genuine, fair-minded Protestant, with a very strong hatred to priestcraft, and a thorough conviction that the system of the Church is, on the whole, one of bigotry, stagnation, and feebleness; but he finds, apparently without surprise, that the heroes and champions of the Church and the priestly system have been some of the best and noblest of mankind, and throws himself for the time into their ideas and aspirations, with the freedom and elasticity of a perfect liberalism. We observe that these articles, with a number of other biographical ones from the same American Review, are introduced to the English public under the patronage of Messrs. Chapman Brothers, of Newgate-street. The title of this collection is 'Characteristics of Men of Genius:' and when we say that it is part of the so-called 'Catholic Series,' readers may be on their guard.

'Florentine History,' by Captain H. E. Napier, R. N., Vols. I. and II. (Moxon.) The success of the historian of the Peninsula and Scinde has fired another Napier to try his hand on history. Captain Napier deserves credit for conceiving the idea of the work of which we have the first volume. Florentine, like other Italian history, is a new mine to most of us English readers, and one that will bear working: but as it is a history of the old Greek sort.—of the proceedings and struggles of a small number of men of very excitable minds, and very original and strongly marked characters,—instead of being on the vast modern European scale, the only way to do it justice is to bring out its men and incidents with as much minuteness as would be done in a play or a novel. Its interest arises from its being so curious and strange a picture of the workings of character. Captain Napier is aware of this. He proposes to write the history of the republic at full length, and is not afraid of spending six closely-printed volumes on it. And he is right:

full detail is the condition of all interest, in such a history; but the execution of the plan requires higher gifts than Captain Napier seems to possess. He has read the Italian histories of Florence with industry; he takes great interest in his subject; he is liberal and anti-tyrannical enough for the most thorough-going republican who ever lived in Florence, and he is full of the peculiar Napier *fougue*, and evidently takes the style of the 'Peninsular War' as his model of English. But with all this, Captain Napier wants many other important things. He wants scholarship;—we rather doubt whether he has troubled himself much with any but *Italian* documents on his subject: he wants the faculty of order, and of holding his subject well in hand,—a faculty most indispensable in so minute and complex a history as that of Florence: he is apt to mistake boisterous declamation for philosophy; and he seems to think that to take all kinds of liberties with taste and grammar is essential to a forcible and manly style. These are fatal defects. There is a considerable quantity of materials brought together in the first two volumes; and there are pictures and scenes in them drawn with much effect, though even in these the writer's enthusiasm is an over-match for his real power; but, on the whole, the 'Florentine History' is a good idea, ill-worked out, and a good subject not done justice to.

Reading and writing are the great obstacles to the advancement of learning. Such at least is the decision of the Phonographic Society and the Rev. Edward Groves. The former, however, (whose multifarious productions we introduced to our readers last year,) content themselves with a reconstruction of our perverse alphabet on the principles of acoustics; the latter, more daring and as euphonious, has published a 'Pasilogia: an 'Essay towards the Formation of a System of Universal Language, both 'written and vocal; with Suggestions for its dissemination throughout the 'world; including a succinct review of the principal systems of similar 'character heretofore published.' We could not bring ourselves to omit a word of so pregnant a title-page: but the more modest enunciation of the last sentence is all that really deserves attention; unless indeed the mental condition which could entertain the former propositions should be deemed a fit subject for the investigation of the metaphysician. But the historical part is really interesting and carefully executed. Almost from the revival of literature there have been a succession of philosophers, who have entertained the idea, if not the project, of a universal language. Among these the most elaborate scheme belongs to Bishop Wilkins of Chester (1668); the most celebrated names are those of Descartes and Leibnitz; though neither of these last hazarded any direct proposal on the subject. The universal use of the Arabic numerals, of musical notation, of Algebraic symbols; all of which present the same meaning to the eye, though not to the ear, of many different nations, is the basis of this idea; while the existence of a *written* language in China, intelligible by all the tribes whose varying dialects render oral communication impossible, is continually alleged as a proof of its practicability. The symbols of an universal language must of course represent *thoughts* and not *sounds;* and Leibnitz appears to have conceived a magnificent plan for the classification of all possible human conceptions, by means of which every act of thought should be reduced to a process of calculation. After these transcendental reveries we were somewhat surprised to find Mr. Groves suddenly drop down into the human atmosphere of ordinary alphabets, and simply propose a new notation for our old acquaintance, a, b, c; slightly modified, it is true, but still a mere alphabet. But nothing is too small or too great for the genius of a true projector; the very types have received their share of Mr.Groves's attention, and two octagonal matrices, neatly dovetailed together by means of corresponding indentations, invest his sheet of illustrations with an air of geometrical mysticism. That we may not be accused of refusing 'justice to Ireland,' we must not omit to state that the residence of the publisher (J. M'Glashan, Dublin,) and the date of the Preface, establish the title of the Emerald Isle to the glory of all the success the project may meet with.

'On Man's Power over himself to prevent or control Insanity. By the Rev. J. Barlow.' (Pickering.) We heartily commend this excellent little book to the attention of our readers. It deserves the careful perusal of all thinking persons; but especially of those who inherit an excitable nervous system, or have any hereditary taint of insanity in their families. The writer clearly shows that God has implanted a moral power in man, which, if exercised, would prevent *very many* cases of this fearfully increasing malady.

Lord John Russell is a nobleman sincerely to be pitied on many accounts, but not the least because everybody thinks it fair to propound his views of Church Reform, epistle-wise, to him. And certainly to have a safe correspondent, who is sure not to contradict you, is a great temptation to a letter-writer. We have before us:—1. 'The Supremacy Question, &c.: an Appeal to remove the difficulties which impede the exercise of the Royal Supremacy, and the necessary work of Church Reform: with a Dedicatory Epistle to Lord John Russell, &c. By Dr. Biber.' (Rivingtons.) 2. 'The Discipline and Government of the Church of England, and the disadvantage at which the Church is placed as compared with Dissent, by her existing connexion with the State: a letter to Lord John, &c. &c. By K. M. Pughe, Clerk.' (Painter.) 3. 'A Letter to Lord John, &c. &c. on Bishops.' (Hamilton.) Nos. 1 and 2 group themselves naturally: they are antistrophic: spontaneously they fall into the amœbæan shape. Dr. Biber thinks everything wrong because we have not enough State; ditto, ditto, echoes Mr. Pughe, because we have too much State protection already. A little more of the Sovereign's supremacy, cries No. 1; a little more of the Dissenters' liberty, responds No. 2. And here we might leave the parties safely to dialogize with each other, were there not something very significant in these contradictory suggestions. Dr. Biber is an exhausting writer—we mean, of course, that he exhausts his subject, not his readers; and with considerable research, he has shown us what a beautiful theory it is for a Christian sovereign—God's anointed Vicegerent, entrusted with an awful and Divine sanction of delegated authority and rule—to exercise it in and for the Church. Nay, he carries us back to the example of Constantine;

and he cites the ecclesiastical constitution of King Alfred, and complacently quotes Edward the Confessor; neither does he forget the Heptarchy. These are facts of course, and they have their value. So have other somethings of which we, perhaps, have an opinion not very different from Dr. Biber's; we mean, certain Glorious Revolutions, and Reform Bills, and Bills of Rights, and so on. Now Roehampton, Dr. Biber's cure, is, we suppose, *inter quatuor maria;* if not yet, it soon must become accessible to the penny post and the 'Times.' And when Dr. Biber really becomes aware of the sort of nineteenth-century England which it is his fortune, good or bad, to live in, does he seriously think that there is, as a fact, any such sovereign authority existing, or likely to exist, as that with which he should like to entrust such a supremacy as he desires? If Dr. Biber had written a letter to Lord John Russell, proposing to revive the Anglo-Saxon constitution itself, we should have been prepared for the present Epistle; it certainly wants some such by way of introduction. Besides, somehow or other, the Royal Supremacy has had every chance: good kings and bad kings, the Euergetæ and the Physcons, the Beau-clercs and the Sans-terres, have all had a hand at it; and, with a tolerable unanimity of result, the Church has had ample opportunity of testing *this* principle. This Supremacy is over and done with. We have no desire to force it into a galvanic resuscitation. It is at work just now in Russia most mediævally: does Dr. Biber accept the omen? On the whole, if we were forced to the alternative, we think Mr. Pughe takes a much more practical and business-like view of the matter. Though we are not disposed to advocate any violent change: neither more Bishops, nor Convocation, nor the Supremacy, nor the formal Dissolution of the Alliance, n r Deacon-schoolmasters, nor Church Extension by a Parliamentary Grant; not one of these things singly is to be looked on as a panacea. There is that at work in the Church which, with God's blessing, will enable her to take her own remedy in her own hands; and this without reviving obsolete, or attempting anomalous, institutions and theories. The Church's Mission is to cope with the world as it is; neither to recal the dead past, nor to anticipate the doubtful future. 4. 'The Development of Anglicanism, the hope of the Church of 'England,' is also a 'Letter to Lord John Russell, by a Churchman.' (Ridgway.) It contains the author's notions and suggestions on Church Reform, which are neither new nor strikingly put.

With somewhat more of the practical estimate of present facts, has been republished from the 'Guardian,' 'A Letter on two present Needs of the 'Church: viz. Increase and Education of the Clergy.' (Burns.)

We have expressed so decidedly serious differences with Dr. M'Caul, that we are glad to mention our satisfaction with much of his 'Sermon 'preached at the Bishop of London's Visitation.' (J. W. Parker.) The subject is the authority of the Old Testament Scriptures: and it contains serious warnings on the danger to be apprehended from the introduction of German philosophy and theology, in connexion with 'that great and fearful 'struggle concerning the very foundations of Christianity which nothing 'can now avert.' (P. 19.)

Attached to our present number will be found a report of the valuable progress already made towards publishing the original Texts of the 'Library of the Fathers.' We ought to remember that the plan comprises much more than the Translations. There must be a mistake widely prevalent to account for the very scanty list of subscribers to the Texts. As it at present stands, this deficiency is quite discreditable to English scholarship.

Of Serials, as they are we believe called, we have received:—1. The continuation of the 'Juvenile Englishman's Library' (Masters), of which a cloud of pretty volumes has appeared at once; among which we have particularly to notice Mr. Gresley's 'Colton Green,' and Mr. Neale's 'Poynings.' 2. 'The Select Library' (Burns); of which three volumes have come out: 'Don Quixote, divested of cumbrous matter'—we had antecedent suspicions of all these 'family' editions, but this revision seems usefully executed;—'Stories of the Crusades'—clever, but rather too ambitious; and 'Tales of Female Heroism'—simple and affecting, as well as varied in the selection. 3. And a 'Devotional Library,' edited by Dr. Hook—very cheap, and fit for parochial circulation; an estimate which we have already passed, and desire to repeat, for the 'Practical Christian's Library,' which is going on regularly, and deserves every encouragement.

Mr. Burns has published a second edition of his noble gift-book, 'Poems and Pictures.' The errors which we pointed out last year have been corrected.

The first part of a new 'Translation of Josephus, by Dr. Traill' (the name is new to us) has just been published. The illustrations are very handsome, and, as we find, are from views taken expressly for the present work. We have had no time to examine it sufficiently to pronounce an opinion on its literary character; but about its pictorial merits there can be no question. It will appear monthly under the auspices of Messrs. Houlston and Stoneman.

Of Charges, we have to record the Bishop of London's (Fellowes);—and one by the Bishop (Short) of Sodor and Man (Davy). And of Sermons, a useful volume by Mr. Prynne, late Curate of Clifton (Burns); Dr. Pusey's 'Entire Absolution of the Penitent,' Sermon II. already in everybody's hands (J. H. Parker); a very sensible and plain-spoken one, 'Firmness and Charity,' by Mr. Wilkinson, of Marlborough (Rivingtons); and a good Sermon, 'The Day of Small Things,' by Mr. Ridley of Hambleden (Burns).

We have been disappointed in our wish to give an article in the present number on 'Church Choir Music;' more especially as it would have enabled us to speak favourably of the series of 'Anthems and Services' (Burns) now in progress. This paper and some notices are only postponed.

THE

CHRISTIAN REMEMBRANCER.

APRIL, 1847.

ART. I.—1. *A Charge delivered at the Ordinary Visitation of the Archdeaconry of Chichester, in July,* 1846. *By* H. E. MANNING, M.A. *Archdeacon of Chichester.* London: Murray, 1846.

2. *A Letter on two present Needs of the Church, viz. Increase and Education of Clergy. Reprinted from Letters in the* GUARDIAN. London: Burns, 1846.

THE need of a greatly increased amount of church accommodation has been so fully established, and such extended efforts are being made to supply it, that there is some danger lest the want this very increase occasions should be overlooked, and that in our zeal to provide churches for the people, we should forget the necessity of educating a much larger number of men who may be qualified to officiate in them. How far there is real cause for apprehension that this has already been done can be shown only by an appeal to facts, by comparing the relative increase of churches and Clergymen. With this view the statistics[1] of this subject have been collected, and it is our object to bring them under notice, together with some of the causes that, it is thought, have greatly contributed to the existing state of things.

Great as have been the efforts to build churches, it must be apparent to every one that no efficient steps have been taken as yet to provide additional places of education for men intended for Holy Orders. This is one of the most remarkable features of the recent revival of zeal and activity in our Church, and distinguishes it from all that have preceded it. Hitherto all great movements have originated with, or at least been directed by, the throne and the hierarchy. But in Church matters, as in political ones, the power has been changing hands, and is now, more or less, with the inferior orders of the Clergy, and the people. The very limited number of Bishops, removing them to so great a distance from the Clergy and people over whom they preside, may in some measure account for this. But, whatever may be the cause, certain it is that our position is a singular one, as may be easily shown by testing it with other periods. Take the æras of the Reformation, and of Archbishop Laud, *e. g.* and compare them with what is happening in our own day. At the Reformation the people seemed, comparatively speaking, of but little account in the movement that was going on. Whatever was done was directed by Convocation and the king. Changes were made, quickly or slowly, at their bidding. These were certainly in accordance with the rising spirit of inquiry and research among the people, but that spirit was not sufficiently independent or extended to move without the guidance of its natural leaders, or even to exert much influence over them; it showed itself by occasional outbreaks, but these were confined to a very small portion of the nation, and did not penetrate the masses. Had it been otherwise, the history of Queen Mary's reign would have been different to what it is. The insurrections during the more than five years it lasted were so disjointed and feebly supported, that they serve only to show how novel a proceeding it was for the people to consider what was happening about them, or to take any side different from their rulers.

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[1] It may be as well to mention that all the tables of statistics have been made up to the end of 1845. They required so much time to collect, that it was found impossible to have them corrected by authority to a later period without postponing their publication. Had 1846 been included, it would only have strengthened the weight of evidence here brought forward.

In Archbishop Laud's time the scene was very different. His was an attempt to bring an unwilling people into subjection to the Church. To quote a description of that period which appeared in this Review:[1]—'When the Church has once lost 'her hold upon the mass, and fallen from her power, she must 'be restored from below and not from above. She has to begin 'from the bottom again, and must be raised by the slow advance 'and gradual inoculation of the mass. She must rise again by 'a popular movement, and by influences and efforts upon the 'open area and level. Laud's movement was not a popular 'one, and we know not whether it could have been made so. 'The age was set one way, and he took perhaps the only engine 'that there was for him.' Now, however widely these two periods may differ in other respects, they agree in this, that the rulers of the Church occupied their natural position: they guided the movement; the consequence of which was, that the wants of the Church in general were attended to, the required institutions were provided as the necessity for them arose. A more learned body of Clergy was then needed, as much as a more numerous one now is; and at both periods vigorous efforts to revive learning were made; new Colleges were built and endowed, and the Foundations already existing were considerably enlarged. In our own day the movement in the Church wears a different aspect; it is a popular one. This is, on many accounts, a cause for great joy and thankfulness; though it is one chief reason why additional places of education have not been provided now, as they were at the two æras to which we have just alluded. Our own generation has seen efforts in the service of the Church springing up on all hands, from apparently independent sources: and these efforts have naturally been directed first of all to supplying the more pressing wants of particular localities. Churches have been raised in great numbers, as the building them is within reach of the exertions of individuals; but the founding Colleges has been all but entirely neglected, as that is a work few persons are able to accomplish; in fact, none, without the aid of the hierarchy or one of the Universities. We have therefore a vastly increased amount of church accommodation, whilst all that has been hitherto accomplished towards providing additional means of education for candidates for Holy Orders has been the erecting one College at Cambridge, where none but undergraduates *superioris ordinis* are, at present, admitted, one College at Durham, one at Lampeter, and the establishing some Professorships of Divinity at King's College, London.[1]

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[1] Vol. IX. No. 47, p. 299.

The history of the present movement shows how little our rulers had to do with originating it. Little more than ten years ago the Bishops abandoned, without a contest, an ancient See, which the popular voice has not only preserved, but successfully turned into a ground for demanding an increase to the Episcopate.

So has it been, in some measure at least, with the cause of church extension. At first it owed but little to the hierarchy: in fact, the spreading of those distinctive Church principles to which it may fairly be attributed, has been looked upon but coldly by those in high places. It was not until the spiritual destitution of the country had been set forth by men of little or no celebrity, and a few churches built, as it were by way of example, to show what might be done, that the cause of church building was taken up by any of the Bishops; though it has since, in many dioceses, been most zealously and efficiently nurtured by them, and the success of the present well-directed and earnest labours in behalf of church extension is owing, in no small degree, to the fostering care of several of our Prelates. But still the fact remains, they were not the originators of the efforts that are being made; they neither implanted the principles from which they spring, nor were the first to point the way in which, when aroused, they should be directed. The need of additional church accommodation was pressing, was clamoured for, and they followed the course thus marked out, and have not yet set themselves to consider the second want—more Clergy—which this increase of churches necessarily involves,—a want which is beginning to be most seriously felt. With reference to this important topic, we would earnestly call the attention of our readers to the charge delivered last year to the Clergy of the Archdeaconry of Chichester; in which, where all is valuable, we would particularly recommend for attention the remarks on the need of an extended University education.

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[1] We do not include in this list St. Augustine's College, Canterbury, though one of the greatest and noblest, if not *the* noblest, of the undertakings of our day, because it is exclusively a *Missionary* College.

It can occasion no surprise that those persons who have been so zealous in the cause of church extension should have attempted little in behalf of clerical education. Few have either the energy or the ability to adopt measures of usefulness which are fraught with unusual difficulties, or the perseverance necessary to overcome the opposition every good scheme must expect to have to encounter at the outset. It is only natural, and to be anticipated, that the bounty of the rich and charitable should flow into those channels which are evidently good, and about which there is no dispute. Few will take the trouble to master an argument, when the end contemplated, or the means by which it is to be attained, is clamoured at; or where a charge of novelty and innovation may be laid against a project. Every plan of improvement or usefulness in the Church has had to contend with this at first. Extended education, church building, church restoration, have all had to win their way against opposition; and now that the subject of furnishing increased facilities for educating persons intended for Holy Orders has been broached, it can occasion but little surprise that it has met with a cold reception, if not more direct hostility. The subject itself is one of very great difficulty, and belongs more immediately to the Bishops than to any other persons. It is no hard matter to determine that a particular neighbourhood needs a church or a school; and where the chief points to be arranged are the style of architecture, the size of a church or school, and so forth, the argument cannot fail of being speedily settled. The want of Clergy can be as easily shown as that of churches; but how they are to be obtained, how educated, how supported, are questions of much greater difficulty, which cannot be fully determined by any but the Bishops, as they have the most unlimited power of rejecting candidates for Holy Orders.

It cannot, therefore, be expected that any great or general efforts will be made in behalf of clerical education, until the Bishops or the Universities propound some well-digested plan. If this were once done, there can be little doubt that abundant funds would speedily be provided for carrying it out. The memorial presented last year to the Hebdomadal Board at Oxford, on this subject, proves this. It would seem impossible that a project should fall to the ground for want of money, where such names have been united in its support. The same agitation that is producing such wonderful results in the cause of church building, may have its effect on clerical education, may make itself heard by the Hebdomadal Board, who, from living in a University, where there is necessarily so large a body of Clergy around them, seem to find it difficult to understand how there should be a deficiency elsewhere. The question is one that needs immediate attention, and cannot be too frequently urged on those whose duty it is to consider it. It is not the work of a day or a year to provide suitable persons and train them for Holy Orders. It would require three years, at the least, before we could hope to see any fruits, and it must be many more before we could expect any great amount of assistance from places of education not yet determined upon, and where previous training is requisite to prepare men to derive any sufficient benefit from them. And supposing it proved that the Universities, on which the Church has hitherto relied for educating all the Clergy she needed, are not capable of supplying our present wants, what must be done until new Colleges are built, or men prepared elsewhere? There are but two courses: the one is, to have a miserably insufficient supply of Clergy; the other, to have uneducated, or at least indifferently educated men admitted to Holy Orders. The probability is, that both these plans, or rather no-plans, will be acted upon. The proportion of Clergymen to churches will be diminished, and persons who have had no training at a University, or elsewhere, will be ordained.

The most painful consideration is, that these imperfect and most injurious measures will not necessarily compel our rulers to review the whole subject, and adopt some plan to protect us against their continuance. The evil will creep on gradually, and its magnitude will not be perceived till there is some intention of removing it: and then, the longer the remedy has been deferred, the more difficult of application it will become; for not only will the number of persons in Orders, who have been thus imperfectly educated, have been continually increasing, but an *esprit de corps* will be engendered, which will lead those who are thus circumstanced to make an outcry when more stringent measures may be proposed in order to render the access to Holy Orders more difficult: whilst the people, ever ready to defend laxity that falls in with the prevalent notions of the day, will probably take their part, and to prevent illiterate men entering the priestly office will be railed at as an innovation. If things are left to take their course, we shall find in the more populous places there will be as many Clergymen as are requisite to perform the Sunday services and the occasional duty, and their lack of learning and education will be unregarded, provided their doctrine and delivery be popular; whilst in the rural districts the solitary Sunday service, alternating between morning and afternoon, will content the inhabitants, who, it is to be feared, will vibrate between the church and the meeting-house in still greater numbers than at present. And thus, with a greater appearance of energy and zeal, we shall return to those miserable practices for which we so justly condemn a previous generation.—We are, in short, in danger of erecting churches, providing buildings for the religious instruction of our increasing population, and of resting there. And churches in which the services are unfrequently performed cannot but be productive of most serious injury to the minds of the people, as they foster that too prevalent delusion, that religion is a subject which needs only occasional consideration; and even were there no fear of this, we must remember another danger to which we are exposed:—we are not yet, as a Church, fully alive to the great blessing, to the absolute need, of a pastoral supervision of the people by their Clergymen; we are too apt to confine our notion of a Clergyman's duty to the weekly service, and to consider all who come to his church, and hear him preach, as under his care. It is only very recently that the opposite opinion has been acted upon to any extent; and now that it has gained a firm footing, we hope to see it fairly carried out and universally adopted. The Church cannot be expected to put forth her vigour, to be the guide and teacher of the nation as she ought to be, until her Clergy are sufficiently numerous to perform all her offices, to exercise a personal influence over the people under their charge, and to superintend the education of the children in her schools.

But it may be thought, an impending evil may be met when it has actually shown itself, and been felt:—in matters relating to the Church this is the usual course of procedure; people will not bestir themselves for good purposes before they are obliged. Let us examine, therefore, how we are at present supplied with Clergy. The Clergy themselves would have no difficulty in solving this. It would be far from easy to find a neighbourhood, at least in the rural districts, where it is not necessary for a Clergyman to look about for assistance many days before he can be from home on a Sunday; and it is no unfrequent occurrence in country places for the hours of service to be so altered, that the Clergyman of some adjoining parish may perform the duty in addition to his own. And if a Clergyman is prevented from officiating by illness coming upon him late in the week, it sometimes happens that the church has to remain closed altogether, even on the Sunday; and any one who has had to provide a curate for a parish, where the advantages are not peculiarly great, can alone be aware how hard a task it is,—what a scarcity there is of properly qualified Clergymen. But these are arguments that appeal chiefly to the Clergy; and wherever they are admitted, they must prove, at all events, that there are no superfluous Clergymen: they show this at the least, perhaps a good deal more.

But the same fact may be proved by an examination of the numbers who perform the clerical office in every part of the Church. In the cathedrals, as well as in town and country parishes, we find the number of Clergymen reduced to the minimum allowable; their services are made to go as far as they can; there is nothing wasted upon appearances: how rarely is the long array of stalls occupied by its right possessors! the solitary residentiary, and in some cases the dean, and the minor canon, constitute the working staff of the greater number of our cathedrals; the service could not be statutably performed by fewer, or perhaps it would be left entirely to the minor canon. So far as their connexion with the cathedral itself is concerned, the greater part of the prebendaries might as well live in New Zealand or the East Indies; and this probably, in most instances, arises from no culpable indifference on the part of those who hold these dignities, but from an impossibility that it should be otherwise: every Clergyman connected with a cathedral most likely has more pressing duties elsewhere; how few can occupy themselves with those labours that seem to belong so naturally to their position! A multitude of Priests, living at the cathedrals with which they are officially connected, assembling daily in those glorious edifices for prayer and praise, superintending every part of the service, and seeing it performed in a befitting manner, would be a practical lesson of inestimable value throughout the different dioceses; it would not be vain pomp or show, but a solid blessing. And beside this, what need is there of some more learned Clergymen in each diocese, to assist by their counsel and knowledge in cases of difficulty, and occasionally to lighten the labours of those who have the charge of large parishes. But instead of this, each dignitary has one or more benefices in the country, each minor canon has one or more smaller pieces of preferment in the neighbourhood, and all are absent from the cathedral as much as they can be.

And if we look at the different parishes throughout the country, we shall find the same thing, in a measure, hold good, that in most cases the very smallest number of Clergymen is employed. In many parishes containing upwards of ten thousand inhabitants there are not more than two Clergymen, in some only one; the ordinary routine services—weddings, burials, &c., occupy nearly half their time; it is quite out of the question that they can have any effective supervision of their people, or devote much time to their schools; the old and infirm, who are unable to come to church, they can visit only very rarely, and even to the sick and dying their ministrations must be comparatively seldom. Generally placed in districts where the work of a missionary is needed, they have no time to perform its duties; the Sunday sermons are the only appeals they can make to the consciences of the people. In many country parishes the case is much better: where there is one Clergyman to a parish of not very large dimensions, it is possible for him to perform all the offices of the Church; but how very often does it happen that two churches are entrusted to the same Clergyman, one of which is at a considerable distance from his home,—and then all the evils of a solitary Sunday service, and neglected people, follow, in a greater or less degree, almost as a matter of course.

And even at the Universities we find by no means a superfluous number of resident Clergymen. There cannot have been many ages of the Church in which there were so few Clergy resident in them for the simple purpose of study and meditation. The College tutors are by no means too numerous; residence has been to a great degree dispensed with; and, in fact, the numbers of those residing could not be much further reduced. Production has been the cause of a great fault of the age, and the evil of it has been felt at our Universities. The immediate effect there has been that each College tutor has as many men put under his care as he can find time to lecture; the men come to him in classes, and he can necessarily know but little of them individually, and can rarely exercise much influence in moulding their character. In the present system we recognise none of that paternal solicitude for the under-graduates, which actuated the Founders of some of the Colleges. There are not sufficient resident tutors to render it practicable. In the statutes of Corpus Christi College at Oxford, *e. g.* the beneficent Founder provided that in each bed-room there should be two beds, in one of which a fellow shall sleep, in the other a student; and one reason for this provision is,[1] 'that the seniors may study the 'good of the juniors, who are their chamber mates, give them 'good advice, and show them a good example; instruct them in 'learning, tell them of their frequent faults and errors, rebuke 'them for them, and set them before them.' The present age would reject such a system with scorn; it would seem mere trifling to allot one or even six students to one fellow. In fact, we see the condition of the Clergy in large parishes, reproduced in a measure under rather an altered aspect at our Universities. In the former, the Clergy meet the people in church on Sunday, and their direct influence depends in a great degree on the advantage they make of that opportunity. In our Universities, in many of the larger Colleges at least, the tutor meets his men in the lecture room, and knows but little of them till they meet him there again, except they should transgress the rules of the College. In neither case has the instructor that hold of those he is teaching, that could not fail, in many instances, to be for their good. It is not the fault of individuals that this is the case, so much as of the system under which we find ourselves. Neither our Colleges nor our Clergy are sufficiently numerous to afford these advantages. To show how inadequate they are, we may quote the words of Archdeacon Manning, 'It is notorious that a large proportion of graduates do not 'take orders. And yet so many are absorbed by the priesthood 'as to leave a fearfully small proportion for other classes and 'professions. But if this be so now, how shall it be when the 'Clergy of the Church are so increased in number as to meet 'the necessities of the population? Certainly not less than '4,000—probably 6,000—additional Clergy are needed to provide pastoral care for our people. And how shall a priesthood 'of 16,000 or 18,000 be drawn from sources which even now 'do not yield the proportion necessary to sustain a priesthood 'of 12,000 or 14,000?'[2]

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[1] Statutes, p. 166.

[2] Charge, p. 41.

But, upon this whole subject, an appeal to statistics may perhaps be thought more satisfactory. It will most abundantly confirm all the results that have been drawn from the *prima facie* appearance of the condition of the Church, and, in fact, show the deficiency of Clergy to be far greater than would be supposed by any one who was not acquainted with some of our more neglected dioceses.

There are altogether in England and Wales 13,154[1] churches and chapels, which are divided among the different dioceses in the following proportions:—

Canterbury	386	Chester	746	Llandaff	280
York	604	Chichester	336	Norwich	1115
London	369	Ely	577	Oxford	648
Winchester	603	Exeter	748	Peterboro'	624
Durham	270	Gloucester and Bristol	491	Rochester	605
St. Asaph	154			Ripon	376
Bangor	200	Hereford	407	Salisbury	540
Bath and Wells	531	Lichfield	592	St. David's	455
Carlisle	134	Lincoln	901	Worcester	462

These numbers do not, of course, include the many buildings licensed for public worship, which, in estimating the relative proportions of Clergy and churches, cannot be safely lost sight of: more particularly since the act has come into operation, authorizing stipends to be allotted by the ecclesiastical commissioners to certain districts, to provide Clergymen, where there are no churches, and under the provisions of which eighty-seven[2] Clergymen have been already so appointed.

There are in all 16,010[3] Clergymen. But of this number 1,568[3] have no duty at all; 1,147[3] are dignitaries in the Church, heads or fellows of Colleges, chaplains, &c., without any parochial duty; and 372[3] are engaged as chaplains to men-of-war, or on foreign stations; leaving 12,923 as the actual number of the parochial Clergy.

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[1] These numbers are taken from the Clergy List for 1846.

[2] The report recently issued by the ecclesiastical commissioners, made up to 31st December, 1846, shows that 194 new districts have been formed under the Act here alluded to, or Sir Robert Peel's Act, as it is generally called (6 & 7 Victoria, c. 37). Of these, seventy-six were gazetted in 1846, and of the remaining 118, thirty-one have been constituted independent parishes, churches having been built in them: the actual addition, therefore, of places to be ministered in, made by this bill, previous to 1846, will be eighty-seven.

[3] These numbers have been gathered from the Clergy List for 1846. This book, almost as a matter of necessity, cannot be depended on for strict accuracy. But the mistakes, though numerous, would not, it is presumed, materially affect these calculations, as some names are inserted that should not be, whilst others are improperly omitted.

But from this number most serious deductions have to be made before we arrive at the really available strength of the parochial Clergy; as it includes all who are beneficed, or licensed to any cure. There are reckoned amongst the parochial Clergy, though unable to perform any functions of the office, the dignitaries, heads of Colleges, &c., who hold benefices, together with higher preferments, which latter occupy the whole of their time; those disabled by permanent illness, or imbecility, or old age, who must amount to a considerable number out of so large a body; those who have licenses for non-residence from other causes, now happily reduced to a much smaller number than was formerly the case; and those who have been suspended from their spiritual functions, though they still retain their benefices. And beside the many who may thus be considered as permanently incapacitated from discharging any of the duties of their sacred office; a large allowance ought to be made for those temporarily laid aside by some one or other of the above causes.

It may, perhaps, be thought, that these deductions may in a great measure be made up by the large number described as Clergymen without duty. But though these may afford some assistance, it is very much to be questioned whether it is of that kind that can be much counted upon. It consists rather in taking an occasional service, than in rendering any regular help in parochial duties; and, in all probability, would not more than counterbalance, if it would do so much, the allowance that ought to be made for parochial Clergymen who are engaged in teaching schools or private pupils, or as chaplains to gaols, infirmaries, or other public institutions, and who are in many cases prevented by these occupations from taking much part in the superintendence of daily schools, or in the every-day duties connected with a parish. The number of Clergymen without duty certainly appears large: one unoccupied man in ten is a high average, where labour is so much needed. As a body, it is to be presumed, it consists of those who have resigned clerical duty in consequence of age, or sickness, or from preference of a literary or retired life, and in many cases from unexpectedly succeeding to large estates, or from distaste to the duties of the clerical office.

Practically, therefore, it is impossible to lose sight of these very serious deductions that have to be made from the apparent strength of the parochial Clergy; but, as it is from the plain statistics we are now attempting to show that there is a very great need of more Clergymen, these considerations may for the present be laid aside. Take the numbers as they stand, and still the Church is insufficiently supplied with Clergymen.

There are, as it has been already said, 13,154 churches and chapels, and 12,923 parochial Clergymen, or not quite one Clergyman to each church: but this proportion is most materially altered, when we take into the account the great number of churches where there are two Clergymen employed. Wherever such is the case, it must necessarily throw two churches upon one Clergyman, so that, before each church can have its full quota of services, we must have an addition to the parochial Clergy, at least equal to the present number of assistant curates. And this number is by no means inconsiderable: it amounts to 3,024,[1] and this does not include those many parishes in which there are more churches than one. It contains only those places where there are two or more Clergymen licensed to officiate in the same church; the calculation has not been made in order to distinguish between incumbents and curates, but simply to ascertain how many churches were provided with two ministers, in order to discover how many churches had only a portion of the labours of one Clergyman. But it would not be fair to suppose that the number just mentioned at all accurately shows this. There are several points to be taken into consideration that materially reduce it. Wherever a Clergyman is a pluralist, his name will appear to each of his benefices, and his curate's as well. Besides this, there are many Clergymen who, being unable to reside on their own livings, take curacies elsewhere, and provide curates to perform their own duty. If a deduction of one half from the number just named be allowed for these causes, it cannot be thought that the remainder will exceed the truth, or exhibit an exaggerated statement. In fact, there can be little doubt it falls short of the fact; 1,500 seems a small number to represent all the assistant curates in England and Wales. But assuming this to be correct, it leaves 1,500 Clergymen with two churches each, and if we add to this the small excess of churches over Clergymen in the gross calculation, it shows that about one-fourth of all the churches in this country have only a portion of the labours of a Clergyman; or, to put it more plainly, and in a way that, it is to be feared, exhibits too true a picture, in one-fourth of our churches, one service a week is all that is provided by the Church for the unfortunate inhabitants.

If we compare the total population with the number of Clergymen, the disproportion is not so great as might at first sight be expected: but this is owing to the very unequal size of the parishes. The population, according to the census of 1841, was nearly sixteen millions. This would give about 1,230 people to each Clergyman, by no means so excessive a number as might have been expected, when the dissenters are deducted from it, though still more than one person could properly attend to. But if there would be as much, or more, than each Clergyman could accomplish, if the whole was equally divided, it proves what multitudes must necessarily be neglected where the division is as unequal as it can be; where there are more than 700 parishes with a population below 100; and where nearly, if not quite, one half of the parishes throughout the kingdom contain less than 500 people each. It may be thought that these returns relative to the size of the different parishes materially affect the argument respecting the number of additional Clergymen needed; for it may be said, where there are so many very small parishes, it surely would be no difficult matter for one Clergyman to take charge of two of them. But this argument appears to go upon this wrong assumption, that where the population is small, all the services in a church may be curtailed. Surely a very false conclusion. In many respects a few people require as much attention as many; that is to say, wherever the Church system is attempted to be carried out. They surely need as many services, for who will venture to say that less frequent prayers are to be offered up when there is a population of 100, than when it amounts to 10,000? In fact, whatever the population of a place may be, it is scarcely possible that the same Clergyman can fully perform the offices of the Church in more churches than one: daily prayers must necessarily be omitted in one church, where it is otherwise; and the Sunday services can only be partially performed, as it would be nearly out of the question for any one, however strong, to undertake four full services in a day for a continuance, even were it possible for him to arrange them at hours when the people could be present: and beside this, the parishes might be several miles apart, and thus one of them must, as a matter of course, lose all the advantage of a resident Clergyman. And moreover, it does not follow, though there are so many small parishes, that they are so situated that two of the smallest could, generally speaking, be joined together under the superintendence of one person. The contrary to this must very often be the case. A very small parish will often be found surrounded by large ones, and if it has not a resident Clergyman, a neighbour comes over at some interval between his own services, and the evening prayers, and an occasional sermon, are all that are ever heard within the walls of its church.

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[1] This number was collected from the Clergy List for 1846.

The next question naturally is, what is being done at present? Are the numbers of the Clergy relatively increasing or decreasing? The first point in answering which will be to show what is the yearly increase of churches and Clergy, as the comparative additions to their numbers must determine the reply.

During the last ten years 773 churches have been consecrated in England and Wales, of which the following is a list.[1]

	1836.	1837.	1838.	1839.	1840.	1841.	1842.	1843.	1844.	1845.	Total.
Canterbury	—	—	1	1	1	3	1	—	2	2	11
York	1	1	1	—	6	3	3	4	2	5	26
London	2	4	10	10	3	11	15	4	9	9	77
Durham	2	4	3	1	1	7	2	5	3	7	35
Winchester	4	7	10	11	5	8	9	9	8	9	80
St. Asaph	2	2	6	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	18
Bangor	—	1	—	—	2	2	3	2	—	1	11
Bath & Wells	—	1	7	1	6	3	1	2	6	—	27
Carlisle	—	—	2	—	—	2	2	—	1	1	8
Chester	6	16	22	23	21	11	7	9	17	9	141
Chichester	5	—	4	4	4	—	1	2	2	2	24
Ely	—	—	—	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	8
Exeter	6	—	5	3	3	1	8	1	3	8	38
Gloucester & Bristol	1	3	—	2	3	5	2	2	5	3	26
Hereford	—	1	—	—	2	2	—	4	2	2	13
Lincoln	1	4	2	3	4	3	1	3	6	2	29
Llandaff	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	1	1	2	7
Norwich	3	—	—	1	1	1	—	2	2	1	11
Oxford	2	3	—	4	2	1	4	—	3	4	23
Peterborough	—	—	—	3	3	1	1	—	—	1	9
Ripon	—	2	7	5	10	9	10	8	3	10	64
Rochester	—	—	—	—	1	1	3	—	2	1	8
Salisbury	1	1	2	—	8	5	3	2	2	2	26
St. David's	—	—	1	1	—	2	2	1	1	—	8
Worcester	2	3	4	2	7	9	4	5	7	2	45
Total	38	53	88	78	97	92	85	68	89	85	773

Of these sixty-two were churches rebuilt, so that the actual increase is 711.

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[1] It will be observed that this list includes only twenty-five of the dioceses. It was found impossible to procure any return from the diocese of Lichfield. The other numbers have been kindly furnished by the different registrars. The only information about the increase of churches in the diocese of Lichfield that could be obtained, is included in the list of grants voted by the Church Building Society. From that it appears that grants were voted towards building six new churches in that diocese in 1837, six in 1838, one in 1839, three in 1840, one in 1841, two in 1842, four in 1843, five in 1844, and seven in 1845, in all, thirty-five in nine years. These numbers will represent only a portion of the churches built, as some have been erected at the expense of individuals; whilst others, from having the patronage vested in Trustees or private persons, or from some other cause, have obtained no grant from that society.

During the same period the number of deacons ordained is as follows:[1]—

	1836.	1837.	1838.	1839.	1840.	1841.	1842.	1843.	1844.	1845.	Total.
Canterbury .	9	13	7	18	13	5	14	12	14	13	118
York . . .	24	28	20	29	19	24	18	20	18	26	226
London . .	8	28	19	27	28	27	46	32	49	20	284
Durham . .	9	11	17	12	23	18	17	18	15	12	152
Winchester .	19	10	18	25	26	21	26	26	23	22	216
St. Asaph .	3	3	2	6	6	—	5	4	7	6	42
Bangor . .	5	6	3	4	1	3	4	2	4	—	32
Bath & Wells	29	21	24	25	29	24	18	22	13	19	224
Carlisle . .	13	2	3	5	2	6	5	3	3	3	45
Chester . .	58	39	75	61	77	65	63	67	90	73	668
Chichester .	7	2	11	13	15	23	10	11	16	12	120
Ely	5	10	17	17	19	19	20	15	22	28	172
Exeter . .	25	9	19	24	26	26	19	24	30	28	230
Gloucester & Bristol	13	14	14	14	26	24	19	26	15	21	186
Hereford . .	2	10	6	6	17	11	10	8	8	9	87
Lichfield . .	29	15	37	24	29	59	31	37	32	46	339
Lincoln . .	42	38	28	35	36	36	40	30	45	31	361
Llandaff . .	11	10	6	15	9	12	14	15	16	11	119
Norwich . .	40	19	32	27	33	33	31	39	33	36	323
Oxford . .	44	48	55	43	36	47	42	40	41	34	430
Peterborough	9	13	7	14	27	37	22	37	35	33	234
Ripon . . .	—	15	28	29	31	18	25	30	29	33	238
Rochester . .	7	6	9	10	15	15	8	5	12	13	100
Salisbury . .	19	21	15	14	8	12	15	17	22	17	160
St. David's .	12	11	10	12	5	10	8	7	12	15	102
Worcester .	11	22	12	18	25	31	20	25	23	40	227
Total . .	453	424	494	527	581	606	550	572	627	601	5435

The first step towards comparing these numbers, and ascertaining the relative increase of churches and Clergymen, must be to discover the average number of vacancies occasioned by death, that have to be filled up out of the ordinations of each year. As it is our wish to state the case at the best, rather than to draw an exaggerated picture, let us assume twenty-four as the average age at which men are ordained deacons. Few are ordained earlier—many several years later. At this age it is reckoned men have 36.39[2] years to live. Calculating by this average, we find there has been an increase, within the last ten years, of 1264 Clergymen, that is to say, the number ordained exceeds the deaths so much. But from this very serious deductions have to be made. There have been 711 new churches built, each requiring at the least one Clergyman; there have been 87 new districts formed and incumbents appointed, under Sir Robert Peel's act, where no churches have, as yet, been built; the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel has sent out as missionaries[1] 61 Clergymen. These deductions together, with others which there is no occasion more particularly to specify, and which we may reckon at 100, amount to 959, thus leaving a surplus of 305; and we have still to make allowance for the new churches consecrated in the diocese of Lichfield, which would probably be about 50; for a much larger number of chaplains licensed to foreign (not missionary) stations, for an increased number of chaplains employed by the East India Company, and for the curates necessarily required in the many[2] large new churches that have been built.

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[1] All these lists have been corrected by the kindness of the Bishops' secretaries.

[2] This calculation is taken from the Appendix (B 1, p. 125) of the Report on the Laws respecting Friendly Societies, ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, 5th July, 1825. (Parliamentary Papers, No. 522.) The paper is headed, 'A Statement showing the Expectation, or Mean Duration of Human Life, from and after every Age, and for either Sex, which Results from the Tables of Mortality constructed by Mr. John Finlaison, Actuary of the National Debt, from very Extensive Observations on the Durement of Life, prevailing among the Tontines,

These numbers plainly show that the proportion of churches to Clergymen is really greater now than it was ten years ago, and that as a matter of fact there are more churches at this present moment left to the divided care of the same pastor, than there were in 1836. This surely ought to arrest the attention of those who possess the power of remedying the evil, and lead them, before it is still further increased, to adopt some measures towards founding additional places of education for men intended for Holy Orders, or, at all events, induce them to propose some plan for the guidance of others who may be willing to erect and endow such institutions. For so long as it remains uncertain what our rulers are willing to sanction, whether Colleges may be founded on the same terms as formerly, we need not wonder that the laity do nothing, and that the dread of the popular clamour and misrepresentation that would be raised, and the anticipation of the merely lukewarm support that might be

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and other Life Annuities granted by Authority of Parliament during the last forty years.' This shows the expectation of life for a male to be,—

At the age of 23	36·87	Years.
24	36·39	„
25	35·90	„
26	35·41	„

[1] This number has been kindly communicated by the secretary of that society.

[2] It appears from a list of the churches, towards which the Incorporated Society for Building Churches and Chapels has voted grants since 1837, that out of 419 churches thus assisted, 42 were intended to accommodate not more than 200 people; 80 from 200 to 300; 79 from 300 to 400; 57 from 400 to 500; 33 from 500 to 600; 26 from 600 to 700; 27 from 700 to 800; 17 from 800 to 900; 18 from 900 to 1000; 40 upwards of 1000. The common calculation is, we believe, to provide church room for one in three of the population; about a third, therefore, of the new churches may be considered to have been built in districts where there are more than 2000 people, and where a curate would be needed to carry out any effective parochial system.

looked for from those in authority, deter even the most zealous from maturing any plans towards alleviating or removing this crying want. Party motives and sectarian objects, there can be no doubt, would be most unscrupulously ascribed to any who were bold enough to grapple with the difficulty, and propose some scheme to rescue us from the impending danger of an uneducated and illiterate Clergy; and it is to be hoped that the Bishops will not shrink from the performance of a duty which is so peculiarly their own. They cannot be ignorant of the want. The number of curacies in every diocese vacant because no one can be found to fill them, must bring the fact continually under their notice; and in one diocese, so severely has the scarcity of candidates for Holy Orders been felt, that the Bishop has offered to ordain any Scripture reader, after he has filled that office for two years. A dangerous[1] expedient, but one that the pressing emergency of the time may probably justify. But if no measures are taken to obviate the necessity for such an unusual step, we have surely a right to hold those who adopt it responsible for all evil consequences that may flow from it.

And in addition to this scarcity of candidates for Holy Orders, we must notice that only a portion of the increased number of men ordained have been educated at our old Universities. But this will be best shown by the following list. There were ordained of in—

	1836.	1837.	1838.	1839.	1840.	1841.	1842.	1843.	1844.	1845.
Oxford . . .	203	191	189	218	234	242	219	203	229	208
Cambridge. .	199	188	224	229	258	270	240	273	288	265
Durham . .	3	5	12	6	14	13	14	11	10	16
Dublin . . .	24	18	40	31	53	33	35	33	37	43
St. Bees . .	8	3	4	12	4	17	14	29	33	36
Lampeter . .	9	10	10	15	10	11	13	9	18	17
Literate . .	7	9	15	16	8	20	15	14	12	16
	453	424	494	527	581	606	550	572	627	601

A glance over these figures will show that our elder Universities are at present unable to supply the additional number of Clergy that are needed. Oxford sends forth scarcely any more candidates for Holy Orders now, than she did ten years ago; whilst the increase from Cambridge falls far short of what is required. The number ordained in 1845 exceeds that in 1836 by 148; and more than one half of these did not belong to Oxford or Cambridge. This is not mentioned with any thought of disparaging the clerical education given elsewhere, but to show to how great an extent the training of candidates for Holy Orders is being taken out of the hands of our ancient seats of learning. And even the other institutions for clerical education are incapable of providing many more men than they now do. Trinity College, Dublin, is quite full, and can only increase its number of students by permitting them to be non-resident.[1] At St. Bees there is no College for the men to live in, though, we believe, it is intended to build one: whilst at Durham and Lampeter, the accommodation must necessarily be limited. The question, therefore, really is, not whether we will found Colleges at our elder Universities, in order that they may train candidates for Holy Orders, as they have done in times past, rather than that this duty should be performed by other institutions; but, whether any sufficient instruction and discipline shall be provided by the Church for those intended for her ministry, or the education of her Clergy be left, to a great extent, to the mercy of accident, which must lead, in very many cases, to illiterate and uneducated men being ordained.

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[1] Dangerous, on account of the scanty education of those who sustain this difficult office. In the papers of one of the most respectable Scripture-Readers, which lately came before us, the spelling would have been discreditable to a National-School boy.

Whatever steps it may be thought wise to take with reference to this subject, it must be borne in mind that the question of expense is really one of primary importance. This our present condition plainly shows. For, however full Oxford may be, it is capable of containing more men than it has at present; whilst at Cambridge, as residence beyond College walls is permitted, the numbers may be increased to any extent. New Colleges, therefore, at either place, possessing no great pecuniary advantages over those at present existing, would not materially increase the number of students. Those who can afford to pay the present high price of a University education, find no difficulty in obtaining it; and as it has been shown, that those who seek it on these terms are[2] not more numerous now than they were ten years ago, whilst the Church demands a much larger supply of ministers, we have only this alternative left, to provide education at our Universities, or elsewhere, at so much cheaper rate than at present, as to induce poorer people, which would necessarily include those of a lower rank, to avail themselves of it, or else to have men admitted to Holy Orders without any regular training at all. It cannot be doubted that there are numbers who would gladly serve the Church as ministers if they could procure the requisite education. Why then should we lose assistance we can so ill afford to dispense with, through the misplaced, and to us unintelligible, desire of drawing our Clergy exclusively from one rank in society? If we continue to attempt this apparent impossibility, we must necessarily suffer most grievously, and we shall find the more ambitious men of a lower rank in society forcing their way into Orders, without any preparation of previous education, whilst the more excellent and modest, feeling their need of far more instruction and training than are within their reach, will shrink from taking upon them the responsibilities of the sacred office.

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[1] The term non-resident, as applied to students of Trinity College, Dublin, bears a very different meaning to what it would naturally convey to members of our other Universities. It is used in the strictest sense of the word. No residence at all is required in order to graduate there: all that is necessary is to pass twelve examinations in four years, not one of which need occupy more than a single day. So that it may happen, and as a matter of fact does happen, that persons occupied as schoolmasters, or in other ways, in the country parts of Ireland, or in England, place their names on the books of this College, appear at the requisite number of examinations, *i. e.* are twelve times within the walls of the University of which they are members, and without attending a single lecture, perhaps without knowing more than the name of one of the tutors, obtain a degree. We ought to add that Divinity lectures, in courses of one or two years, are provided for such students as intend to enter Holy Orders; and that some Bishops require from candidates for ordination a certificate of having attended these.

[2] 'According to a late report of the Oxford Hebdomadal Board, the annual 'number of the matriculations of that University, have not increased within the 'last twenty years; and at Cambridge, the number of B.A. degrees in 1845, was 'about the same as in 1831.'—*Guardian, December* 23, 1846.

But it may be thought that the present deficiency of candidates for Holy Orders, arises rather from the suddenness of the need for them, from the hasty awakening of zeal for church building, than from any permanent cause; and that, in a few years, we shall find matters righting themselves, and the additional Clergy required furnished by the same rank in society which has hitherto supplied nearly all that were wanted. There are many causes, we think, which will prevent this being the case. The worldly inducements to enter Holy Orders are less now than ever they were: and it is impossible to lose sight of this consideration, for even were we to suppose all the candidates for the sacred ministry indifferent to this motive, which it would be ridiculous to do, human nature being such as it is, still their parents could not be expected to be uninfluenced by it; and it happens, generally speaking, that the parent, by training or more direct influence, determines his son's calling in life. Viewed simply as a profession, we think there can be no doubt the clerical one is the poorest there is, and it is daily assuming this position more decidedly. The new offices created in other professions are, at all events, equally lucrative with those already existing, whilst the stipends to nearly all new churches, are the very lowest the Bishops will permit of. We suppose it would not be exceeding the fact to say, that during the last ten years from 150 to 200 new places, at home and abroad, have been made, that can be held only by members of the bar, and that their average income would not be less than £1,000 a-year; out of the 711 new churches erected during the same period, the greater part have an endowment not exceeding £150 a-year, whilst in many instances it is very much less. If we include pew-rents, this amount would, in some cases, be of course larger. But this source of income is so uncertain, to say nothing of other objections, that it can hardly be regarded as materially increasing the fixed stipends of the Clergy. But if we suppose it otherwise, and assume that the revenues thus derived may be counted on as permanent, a large proportion of our new Churches will still be left with no better income than we have stated; as it is impossible that any considerable sum should be raised from pew-rents, where the population is not very large, or where it is poor, or widely scattered.

And beside the increased number of men that may be expected to prefer the study of the law to the clerical office, from a consideration of their relative pecuniary advantages, we must not forget the very many more situations held both at home and abroad by men of education than used to be the case. The increased efficiency in all branches of the colonial administration, together with the much larger number of men of education and family who are engaged in trade, and engineering, and in filling the many places created by the railways, draw off many to these lucrative occupations, who would otherwise have entered one of the learned professions.

And in addition to these more stirring engagements, that have already enlisted a large body of men in their service, we seem to be on the eve of great changes in the agricultural management of the country, which will probably have a similar effect. The more scientific system of cultivation which is beginning to be adopted, appears to render it far from improbable that the next generation of farmers will be a very superior race to the present one, and that many gentlemen will devote their sons to agricultural pursuits, as being both pleasant and profitable occupation.

We think none of these considerations can be safely disregarded in estimating our present position, and in determining the class to which we must look to a great extent for supplying the requisite number of candidates for Holy Orders. Any great change is naturally attended with great difficulties and dangers, and the change of which we are here speaking must be expected sooner or later, whether we will or no, to affect our Clergy in a great degree, as the natural tendency, to judge from other countries, seems to be for the revenues of the Church to grow comparatively less, and for the Clergy to be raised, to a considerable extent, from a poor class in society. At present we have the power of turning this change to good account, of making it safely, and causing that it shall prove anything but a disadvantage to the Church. It will give an opportunity of supplying that great and pressing need, a good clerical education, of which we are at present so destitute, and which it would be very difficult to begin to enforce in ordinary times, when there is no strong apparent reason for an immediate change, and when the feeling naturally is in favour of things as they are. That we have no system of clerical education is obvious: but on this point we cannot do better than quote the words of the very able letter the title of which appears at the head of this article:—'Put our 'present University education before any candid person, and ask 'him, whether it is a suitable and sufficient one for ministers of 'the Gospel. There is but one answer which he could give. He 'will say, all trades and professions have their appropriate educations in the world. Tradesmen go through their apprenticeships, lawyers through their clerkships; but the ministry of 'the English Church has positively no education appropriated 'to it. It takes its chance upon a promiscuous field. Her 'ministers pick up what divinity and knowledge of their profession they can, in a system devoted to general and classical 'reading. The Clergyman is brought up in a public, promiscuous place of education, with lawyers, medical men, and 'squires that are to be. Those who are preparing for political 'life, country gentlemen, future men of fashion, all come up 'to the University, attend the same lectures, read the same 'books, and go through exactly the same education with men 'who are preparing to be country curates. All professions, I 'repeat, amongst us have their appropriate educations, except 'the clerical one: that has none.'—*Letter on the present Needs of the Church*, pp. 60, 61.

Whatever may have been the results of this system hitherto, it is too much to anticipate that it can answer when applied to men of a lower rank; and of such we have shown that a great body of our Clergy may be expected ere long to be made up. It would, doubtless, have been far better for the present race of Clergymen had they been subjected to a much severer discipline preparatory to their entering Holy Orders: but it will be absolutely indispensable, when the men to be ordained have been accustomed to none of the refined tone or feeling by which most of our present Clergy have been surrounded. To quote again from the same pamphlet,—'The truth is, if a 'stricter ministerial education than our present one is needed 'for our existing ministerial class, it would, *à fortiori*, be needed 'for a new and poorer one. If it would be a gain in the one 'case, it would be a necessary in the other. The difficulty, in 'the case of a poorer class of Clergy, is how to ensure them 'that respect which they ought to be able to command as Clergy. 'The present body have the advantages of birth and connexion: and their rank as gentlemen obtains them respect in 'many quarters where their ecclesiastical station would not. 'But when these advantages are not to be had, what is to 'supply their place? What is to make up for the gentlemanly 'element? What is to raise poor men at all to the level of our 'present Clergy? The answer is, A strict and ecclesiastical 'education, and that only. In order to give them a character; 'in order to turn them out at all the kind of men that the 'Church wants,—men able to occupy a position, confront 'criticism, and repel contempt, that is essential.'—P. 73.

With the facts of the case before us, and the anticipations that may naturally be drawn from those circumstances by which the supply of ministers for the Church must be affected, we do not think it is too much to assert that some new system of training must be adopted, or the Clergy be, to a great extent, degraded, in respect of learning and education, to a level with dissenting preachers. The question before us is not, strictly speaking, a University one: no extension of the present system can be permanently sufficient, neither can it be made to act with sufficient force upon the men who will have to be subjected to it. The discipline required is rather such as the statutes of some of our stricter Colleges demand, than what the present laxer University system affords. And the benefits of such a system we hope and believe will ere long be exemplified to us in the Missionary College of St. Augustine.

But it is not our intention to discuss this part of the subject. Our object is simply to show by statistics the extent of a want which would in some measure be generally admitted, that our church building, to say nothing of what is demanded by the miserable state of spiritual destitution of vast masses of our people, is creating a need for a greatly increased number of Clergymen, whom we are taking no active measures for providing means to educate; and to point out a difficulty which meets us at the outset, the impossibility of providing a larger body of Clergy from the same rank in society which has hitherto furnished nearly as many as have been required. To see our position clearly and accurately is one step towards the removal of the evil. And we most heartily hope that those whose especial province it is to consider this question will not suffer the Church to be overrun by an ignorant and uneducated body of Clergy, but will apply some healthful and sufficient remedy before it is too late.

Since the foregoing was written, the following very important announcement has appeared.

> 'At the annual meeting of the Exeter Diocesan Board of Education, held at the Chapter House, on the 23rd ult., the Bishop of Exeter expressed his firm purpose of admitting to the diaconate, for an indefinite, but certainly long period, any schoolmasters duly qualified and recommended by the training school. His Lordship said, that he should not bate in the theological qualifications of the candidates, but only Greek. Latin he should require, as it was required by the canons. They must, after such ordination, continue to hold the office of schoolmaster, and in some large and important school. He did not preclude them from the hope of admission to the Presbyterate. He commended the subject to the early consideration of the board, whom he recommended to enlarge their establishment, and requested to put the training school under Government inspection. He impressively stated that he regarded the present as a crisis which would decide whether this were to continue a Christian country or not.'—*Guardian*, March 3, 1847.

It is needless to say that the opinion of so eminent a Prelate on such a subject is always to be highly valued. But still we venture to express our apprehensions that his Lordship may not have thoroughly weighed the consequences of his proposal, in its present form.

It is unquestionably a great step to have the third order in the Ministry restored, to have Deacons in reality, and not in the merely formal way in which they exist at present. We are also glad to observe that the Bishop of Exeter grapples with the difficulty we have already spoken of—that of providing a portion of the Clergy from a poorer class in society. Beyond this we fear his scheme will prove injurious, unless it be considerably modified. He lowers the standard of learning to be required from the candidates for Holy Orders: and thus to the original disadvantages of want of birth and education, he adds that of lower attainments in literature and classics. And this he does, in consequence of what we conceive to be the fundamental error of his plan. He wishes to make the present machinery serve his purpose, without creating new. He would make the training school answer a double end, educate both Clergymen and schoolmasters. And this it cannot do: for either acquirements must be made the standard by which to judge of a man's fitness for the sacred office, and then the quickest, though frequently the most ambitious and least suitable men will be ordained; or else, if they are not, and a more judicious selection is made, those who are refused ordination will think themselves injured, and will inevitably seek some other employment than that of a schoolmaster: and thus the primary object of the training school will be defeated. And to this objection might be added that of placing an institution devoted, even in part, to educating the Clergy, under Government inspection.

Besides, if we consider the men who go to the training schools, it can scarcely be expected that in two or three years they will be prepared for entering Holy Orders. And if not ordained at once upon leaving the training school, it must be supposed that their ordination is delayed in order that they may improve themselves elsewhere. But how will this be possible, at least, in any sufficient manner, whilst they are actively engaged as schoolmasters? And the Bishop especially provides that 'They must, after such ordination, *continue* to 'hold the office of schoolmaster, and in some large and impor-'tant school.' Thus implying that they hold such onerous office at the time of their ordination. In addition to the hours they must be engaged in school, the pupil teachers will occupy their time at least an hour and a half a day, as his Lordship evidently contemplates these large schools enjoying the benefits of the new Education scheme: and then where is the leisure to be found for the necessary study and meditation? Where the instructors to guide and train? And if they are to be ordained with only the very small amount of education and moral training that seems possible on a *prima facie* view of the case, then, we fear the whole scheme must prove something worse than a failure. The history of the Church in Archbishop Laud's time shows us some of the evils of an illiterate Clergy. Surely we are not going to run the risk of seeing these repeated in an exaggerated and systematized form. From one evil we are now suffering—a lack of Clergy; it will not mend matters to exchange it for another, and have an illiterate Clergy.[1] By slightly modifying the plan, and increasing the machinery, it seems as though the whole might be made to wear a more promising appearance. Why not erect a College at Exeter, or elsewhere, for educating men designed to take Deacon's Orders; where a strict course of training might test the sincerity of the candidates for the Ministry, and form the best preparation for those who submitted to it; and to which those who were considered suitable might be sent from the training school, or after they had been engaged for a time as schoolmasters? Such an institution might be made available for educating its men in the higher branches of learning and theology, and in those habits of self-control that command respect. Were the expenses of such a College made as light as those of the training school,—and there is no reason why they should not be,—many of the same men might, and in all probability would reap the benefit; but there would be this difference, instead of the qualifications for the diaconate having been lowered to those necessary for teaching a school, the attainments of the schoolmasters would be raised to those required at present for entering Holy Orders. We may sum up the whole argument in the eloquent words of Archdeacon Manning: 'Is it not manifest, that what is needed for Holy 'Orders is *not only* the learning of a scholar, but a mature and 'exact knowledge of sacred truth? And yet the intellectual 'training is the least momentous part in preparing for Holy 'Orders. What is required is *not only* a professional course of 'lectures, but a collegiate life of spiritual discipline—an order of 'devotion wherein to subjugate ourselves and to unite our whole 'will with the great laws and realities of our Master's Cross and 'Kingdom. Exact theology is most necessary; but a life 'moulded upon a discipline higher than the academic rule is still 'more absolutely needed.'[1] Could the Bishop of Exeter's proposal accomplish any of these requirements? We think not. A new College under the eye of the Bishop might. We would suggest to his Lordship to meet the difficulty at once, and commence a system that would soon win its way into every Diocese, and by God's help prove a blessing to His Church.

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[1] As an instance of the importance attached to a *learned* Clergy, by those who have been most eminent for sanctity, we might mention the words of Bishop Wilson, who prays for 'the blessing of a regular, *learned*, and pious ministry.'—See Works, &c. Bath, 1781. vol. i. p. 307.

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[1] Charge, p. 42.

Art. II.—*The Poll at the Election of a Chancellor of the University of Cambridge.* Cambridge: Deightons. London: Painter. 1847.

Contested elections are often the most miserable, the most contemptible, exhibitions of bitter passions and unreasonable spite; the very dregs of the world's history. But some there are of a far different stamp, which stand out prominent landmarks of eventful times, sure indices of deep energizing feelings, the bloodless battle-fields of times, which have forsworn the sword for the pen; the tilted lists for the public meeting; the affronting challenge for the newspaper; the trusty messenger in deep disguise for the electric telegraph. They are the romance of the nineteenth century; and who shall dare to say that the nineteenth century is not romantic, if only we grasp its spirit aright, and do not shrink from believing that we too live, and are real and true men as those of old were. Such an election we have lately witnessed—an election, which it is not too much to say is without a parallel in the circumstances with which it was accompanied. The prize, no political distinction, but the first office of an English University, the Chancellorship of one of the two great and ancient seminaries of sound learning and religious education, famous throughout Christendom. The candidates, how different in all their attributes;—on one side, power, and influence, and worldly pomp, and self-interest, and courtly favour, and collegiate authority; the dignity of the mitre, and all the prestige of an imperial throne; and a fair vision of crowned beauty gazing eagerly, and inquiring anxiously after the result of the unwonted strife. On the other side, stern necessity and self-denying duty; the responsibility of an ancient heritage, privileges to defend, and half-forgotten principles to uphold, gratitude for good deeds done, carefulness for the future, indignant rejection of expediency, truth above profit, determination rather to fall nobly, than to purchase dishonourable and useless life—

> 'Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas;'

the competitors—on the one hand, a young prince, the beloved consort of a Queen—that Queen, Britanniarum Reginæ, Fidei Defensoris, the progenitor, we trust, of a long line of puissant monarchs;—on the other, a simple peer, Edward Herbert, Earl of Powis.

Friday, February 12th, opened upon Cambridge just as every other day had done. That University, free from those distressing contests which have for so many years disturbed the peace of Oxford, had gone on with hardly a breeze to disturb its peacefulness; diversified it may be by a contested election for the University Librarianship, or moved to controversy over its hall tables, by the unexpected rejection of a Grace for a new University Scholarship; but still to the outward eye affording an appearance of immoveability, to which its friends pointed with a rash exultation as a proof of its unity, while its enemies treated it as the proof of its apathy, its deadness of heart. And so it was on that same Friday,—the chapel bells duly rang, and seven o'clock beheld the worshippers in seemly array, grouping to the Chapels of Trinity and St. John,—a little later to those of the other Colleges. Later the College lecturers plied their accustomed tasks, and freshmen congregated with enquiring looks, while graduates and senior men *in statu pupillari* discoursed—it may be of Lord George Bentinck's bill, or of the classical Tripos which then was pending. Later came hall, and then evening chapel, and at the end of the day a few persons congregated at the reading-room to see the evening papers lately arrived. In them they found sad and unexpected tidings for the academic body;—its Chancellor, the munificent Duke of Northumberland, was no more, found dead in his bed on the preceding morning. By the statutes of the University, this important vacancy had to be supplied by an election within fourteen days of the avoidance being certified to the Vice-Chancellor.

No time, therefore, one would think, would have been lost, whoever was to succeed; but, strange to say, these persons shook their heads and said, ' 'twas strange, 'twas pitiful, 'twas wondrous pitiful,' and went to bed. No one took the trouble of announcing the news to Dr. Tatham, the Master of St. John's, the Head of the College of the deceased Chancellor, (the first of that College who had filled that high office for many a long year,) who was ignorant of it, till he read it in the Cambridge paper of the following morning. Then several visitors dropped in, among whom, universal report asserts, were more than one Head of a House, to tell him that there was one only person fit to succeed—a noble Earl, also a member of his College, and urging him to take steps towards promoting his election. Accordingly he summoned a meeting of the Fellows of his College, for twelve o'clock that day. At this it was decided, that the one most worthy to succeed to the Chancellorship was the Earl of Powis, one with whose good deeds the whole English Church and nation were ringing; one whose spirited and persevering defence of an ancient Bishopric had gained him more universal and unsectarian praise and sympathy, than perhaps had been for a long period manifested to the single action of any individual, one who had been supported by High Churchmen and by low Churchmen; by the unbending Catholic and the shrewd Latitudinarian; by the unworldly priest, and the sensible calculating man of the world: whose firmness it was that had just won for the Church of England a blessing as eagerly longed for, as its consummation was thought hopeless—an increase in the number of her Episcopate. Without delay, a Fellow of the College was despatched to Powis Castle with direction to track his lordship, and to solicit him to present himself as a candidate for the honour. An announcement that Lord Powis would be put into nomination was likewise sent off by telegraph, and appeared in the London papers of the same evening. So passed Saturday. We are not of those who blame the Fellows of St. John's for this proceeding; we think, considering the shortness of the time allowed before the election, that speed was of the first moment, and in reality some time had already been trifled away; and we can hardly imagine that the charge of indelicacy which it is sought to affix to the affair, from the connexion existing between the noble Earl and the late Chancellor, would ever have been thought of, had he been the favourite candidate in Cambridge. But here we must restrain our vindication. Having struck so decisive a first blow, having taken so bold a step, common prudence merely—not to speak of higher considerations—ought to have dictated to the Fellows of St. John's, that they should take every precaution that Lord Powis should not appear before the world as if he were the candidate of one College alone, that they should do all they could to secure for him and for his cause the general sympathies of the University. This, unhappily, they quite neglected to do, and let the remainder of Saturday pass by, without calling on the members of any other College to participate in the honour and gratification of so worthy a choice. We cannot express how fatal this inexplicable mismanagement proved to Lord Powis's cause. Subsequent events, indeed, entirely changed the face of affairs, and brought him to the poll, the chosen candidate of a mixed body of independent members of the senate, belonging to various Colleges, and mostly Trinity; but this arose from almost totally distinct proceedings, entered into elsewhere, and by other persons. But still no subsequent energies could make up for the fatal loss of time, wasting of resources, and breeding of invidious feelings, which this short-sighted policy occasioned.

In the mean while, from the temporary absence of the Master, Trinity College was till Saturday evening precluded from corporate action, but, of course, the minds of her members were far from inactive; the unfortunate policy of St. John's stirred up all those sad feelings of Collegiate jealousy, which so worthy a choice as that of the Earl of Powis ought to have entirely checked, and the question seemed to resolve itself into this tangible shape, Who is the candidate that we can bring forward who will beat Lord Powis? Previous events had shaped the answer to this inquiry. In the autumn of 1843 Her Most Gracious Majesty and her august Consort had honoured the University with a short visit, during which, as might be supposed, His Royal Highness was dignified with a Doctor's Degree, and entered at Trinity, the Royal College. Of course, in an elective state like the University of Cambridge, the prospective Chancellor must always be a matter of more or less discussion, especially when, as was the case in those days, that office was filled by a nobleman, already somewhat declining in years and still more so in health. There was then a dread that the dignity might be claimed by a learned Lord who filled the second office in the University; but who, there was no doubt, would have been vigorously opposed had he aspired to the higher place. To elect the Prince Consort, seemed to some the most potent preservative against such an event; others again were dazzled with the fancied splendour of such a choice. And so there had grown up in Trinity College a sort of vague anticipation, that Prince Albert was to be 'the man.' As might have been imagined, the Duke of Northumberland's death called this anticipation into a tangible shape, and although, as a body, the College had done nothing, yet throughout Saturday and Sunday His Royal Highness's name was buzzed about. In the mean while, as was fitting, a meeting of the Heads of Houses was summoned by the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Philpott, the Master of St. Catherine's Hall, which assembled on Monday morning, the 15th, at 10 o'clock, to consider the emergency, and, as was not fitting, this meeting proceeded to exceed their legitimate functions, by putting forward a candidate as 'their own,' as the candidate supported by 'fifteen out of the seventeen Heads of Houses,' by all, in short, except the Master of St. John's, and the President of Queen's. This candidate was no other than His Royal Highness, the predisposition in whose favour among the resident Fellows of Trinity College was, it is believed, announced at that meeting. There was no one there present to advocate the cause of the noble Earl; for, with a most unfortunate reserve, the amiable Master of St. John's shrunk from attending it, and bringing forward the just claims of his candidate, and bodily infirmity precluded the presence of the President of Queen's. Accordingly an address to the Prince Consort was unanimously voted, and signed by thirteen Heads of Houses, all those present, (subsequently by two more), and placed for the signature of other members of the Senate at the Vice-Chancellor's lodge.

In order that our Oxford readers may fully comprehend the bearings of the case, it is necessary that they should bear in mind, that the Heads of Houses at Cambridge do not, like the Hebdomadal Board at Oxford, form a recognized portion of the legislature in all matters—a distinct House of Parliament, so to speak, and possessed of the sole power of initiation,--but are, in all questions of general University law-making, merely seventeen members of the Senate, and nothing more; their chief distinctive power consisting in the right to select the two alternative candidates for certain University offices; the Vice-Chancellorship, for instance, and the Public Oratorship, &c., *but not the Chancellorship*, from which two candidates the general Senate makes its choice. Every member of the Senate possesses an equal right of initiating any measure he thinks proper. His 'Grace' has first to pass the ordeal of an *unanimous* sanction by the Caput,—an annual Board composed of the Vice-Chancellor, a Doctor in each of the three faculties, a regent and a non-regent Master of Arts, the five last elected by the Vice-Chancellor, Heads of Houses, Doctors, Proctors, and Scrutators, from three lists prepared by the Vice-Chancellor and the two Proctors respectively. If the Grace is fortunate enough to pass this dangerous quicksand, it is then put to the vote of the Senate, a body not possessed of the right of deliberation, or of amendment, but one whose only utterance is *placet* or *non-placet*. The Senate votes simultaneously in two Houses; the regents' House comprising the Masters under, the non-regents the Masters above, five years' standing—Doctors voting as they choose in either House. The Grace, in order to become law, must have a majority in both the Houses. Our readers will perceive, that although a sufficiently complicated system of checks has been provided, yet, that the—at first sight—most natural and direct one of the corporation of the Heads of Houses has, *ex consulto*, been kept out of sight; that an almost zealous care has been taken that the Collegiate system should be kept within its own limits, and should not be permitted to trench on the general rights of the whole University, 'The Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars,' as runs its legal description. The Heads have, indeed, an indirect influence in the nomination of the two candidates for the Vice-Chancellorship, one of whom must succeed to that office, and by right of it to a seat in the Caput, and in their votes for the remainder of that Board. But we are wandering. We have said sufficient to show, that the Heads of Houses at Cambridge occupy a very different position from the Hebdomadal Board at Oxford. Of a piece with these precautions is the fact, that the Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge need not be the Head of a House,—as a matter of fact, he has always been such since the time of Queen Elizabeth,—but during a period of great excitement in the last century, it was seriously agitated to put a very popular Fellow of Trinity College in nomination as one of the two candidates. His own unwillingness stifled the scheme; but had it taken effect, there was little doubt that he would have been elected. In the matter of the election of Chancellor, the distinction of regents and non-regents, and the interference of the Caput, is done away with, and there is not even the check of a preparatory nomination; but each member of the Senate presents his vote for whomsoever he esteems the worthiest; and at the conclusion of the election, in place of the votes being, as at Oxford, burnt, they are published. The Chancellorship, though, for more than three centuries, it has been a life office, is statutably only for the terms of two years, and then for so long as the tacit consent of the University shall permit. The Vice-Chancellorship is both *de jure* and *de facto* an annual office. The same freedom of voting is permitted in the case of the election of the members for the University; and also within the necessary limit, in the case of offices where alternative candidates are proposed by the Heads.

It was no wonder that so precious a right as this free choice of Chancellor was highly prized by every independent member of the Senate; no wonder that he should be jealously apprehensive of any invasion of it, more especially on the part of a body possessed of so much collective influence as the Heads of Houses, and who had already got a colourable pretext for such usurpation in their prerogative of semi-election to certain offices. Viewed in this light, the selection of a candidate in a claustral assembly of Heads, without anything like a conference with a general meeting of members of the Senate, which it was quite in their power to have assembled, was a most unconstitutional step: and the overpowering weight of the name of their favourite increased the perils. Still, however, dazzled by the princely name, and misled by college jealousy of St. John's, nearly all the resident members of the Senate, excepting those of that College, emulously rushed to St. Catherine's, and signed the requisition.

Some few there were, however, that paused and reflected who this new and brilliant candidate was; what were, in truth, his qualifications for so exalted an office, personal and political? The private character of His Royal Highness was, doubtless, unimpeachable, and for that he deserved the highest credit. But all merit, all eligibility is not concentrated in the one fact of a man being an exemplary husband, and an affectionate father of a family;—the Chancellorship of Cambridge could not be given as if it were the good-conduct prize of an agricultural association. His Royal Highness was very young; this, however, was a fault which would soon mend itself. But his previous training was in no way such as to point him out as the fitting candidate for such an office. His birth and his education were in a foreign land, and under a form of worship alien from the English Church. The latter consideration doubtless pressed more gravely on his 'High Church' than his 'Low Church,' opponents,—for both great parties in our Communion saw followers of theirs ranked under the opposing banner. Still, however, there could be but one general feeling, that the chief officer of a University, in which religion was such an object of vital importance, and which was destined so especially to the training of the Clergy of the English Church, ought to be one nurtured beneath her sheltering wing. His education was completed in one of the Universities of his native land, that of Bonn: and no one, but a very reckless innovator, will say, that exclusive familiarity with the system of a German University was a good apprenticeship to the governance of one of England. His Royal Highness's university career had been creditable to himself; but this, while of course it enhanced their personal respect for him, tended very little to diminish the apprehension of those who doubted his fitness. They naturally dreaded that the result of his youthful success might be an undue partiality for that system which had afforded him scope for distinction. His Royal Highness's course of life since his marriage with Her Majesty had not been such as to mark him out as peculiarly fitted for the dignity to which his over-zealous partisans were desirous of raising him. He had, indeed, come rather prominently forward as a judge of the Fine Arts; and rumour bruited it, that he was of a scientific turn of mind; but love of the Fine Arts, and a taste for science, were, in themselves, a miserably inadequate παίδευσις for the presidency of a seminary of sound learning and religious education. His Royal Highness had seemed to have been entirely involved in his own pursuits —of an innocent and laudable character, indeed,—but possessed of no especial congruity with the Chancellorship of Cambridge. The cultivation of music; the care of an experimental farm; the Fine Arts' Commission; the discipline of his regiment; and the general question of military costume, were, to the public eye, the sources from which His Royal Highness had to acquire that knowledge of the system, and the discipline of our Universities, which was to compensate for the natural disadvantage of his foreign nurture. His only practical experience of our Universities consisted in a short visit to each of them; in which, amid the hurry and the excitement of sight-seeing, he was, in each case, dignified with the degree of Doctor. But there was no proof to show that he really comprehended what was symbolized by this act; that he adequately realized that any thing more was comprised in the act than the conferring of a graceful compliment similar to, and swallowed up in, the numerous other ones, with which, as was beseeming, he has since his marriage been honoured in England. They had no proof that he became conscious of new relations, and grave responsibility, when invested with the scarlet gown, and admitted by the Vice-Chancellor to his degree in that awful form of words, which Cambridge still retains,—'*auctoritate mihi commissâ . . . . in nomine* PATRIS *et* FILII *et* SPIRITUS SANCTI.'[1] We assert, that they had no proof, because we cannot trace any increased interest in, or zeal for, our Universities in His Royal Highness after this, as compared with his previous conduct. The words, indeed, of his first answer (which we shall have occasion hereafter to give) wherein he says, that he 'would have felt great 'pleasure and pride in acceding to the desire expressed in this 'address,' (of being put in nomination for the Chancellorship,) 'and so *personally connecting myself* with your ancient and 'renowned seat of learning,' would point to a contrary conclusion. It was clear that His Royal Highness did not feel that being a Doctor of Cambridge was a personal connexion with that University. It is not unjust for us to assume that the Prince could fancy that he was conferring an honour on Cambridge by accepting its Chancellorship. But this is a very humiliating position for one of our ancient Universities to place itself in. In electing its Chancellor, it should esteem itself bestowing, and not receiving a high honour. Even the dread of the contrary being supposed, is a very strong moral argument against the eligibility of His Royal Highness.

With respect, again, to the Prince's political fitness for the Chancellorship. A Chancellor of Cambridge is, in quiet times, an officer who has not of necessity much to do. But the times are not always quiet, and he will be a bold man who shall venture to make sure of peace in these days. But the time may come, when such a place may be a very responsible and a very difficult one; when the State and the University may be in opposition; when the Chancellor may have to stand at the foot of the Throne, and boldly plead the cause of their ancient privileges, and arm himself to fight their battles against undue aggression from the more puissant civil power. Who can say that the signs of these present times are such that we may not have to live and see the unhappy contingency? Is it then a wise or a manly policy, for one of our Universities to tie its own hands, by choosing as its chief officer, one who is so intimately connected with, as to be the same person with that august Personage, in whose name the adverse party would be acting? The advocates of His Royal Highness answer this argument by appealing to his 'powerful protection'—they trust that he would have sufficient private influence to ward off the catastrophe. Do these individuals, then, really imagine, that in this turbulent age the single influence of the Prince Consort would be sufficient to resist the violent onslaught of a democratic ministry, backed up by a popular cry, and most probably, a friendly House of Commons? And are they assured that the Prince would see the same danger which they do in a revolution which, it would be represented to him, was for the purpose of bringing the English system into a greater similitude with that of his native land? Might not he be persuaded to look on this with no very unfavourable eye? Or, to regard the question in another light; is this a fitting argument to use? is it not a scarcely veiled method of stating, that one of the objects of his followers was to secure to the University the benefit of that private influence which His Royal Highness might not unnaturally be supposed able to exercise in very high quarters. We cannot but regard this argument as neither very respectful to His Royal Highness, nor very worthy of those who have used it. Whatever powerful protection, moreover, His Royal Highness might be possessed of, would be compensated for in his case by the loss of that extremely important privilege, the exercise of which forms one of the modern Chancellor of a University's chief functions, we mean a seat in the House of Lords, the means of openly and publicly defending its privileges and its constitution in that assembly, of making known its wants and its desires. In the most peaceful times, however, His Royal Highness's relation to the Crown is such, as almost to amount to a legal disqualification for the Chancellorship of a University, that relationship being husband to its Visitor, to that authority in which resides the right of judging the University in extreme cases. This impediment was very strongly and publicly urged by two of the highest legal authorities in the land, at one of the meetings held in behalf of the Earl of Powis in London.

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[1] Not only does the University of Cambridge still retain this venerable form of words in admitting to all her degrees, but the candidates for them (except in the case of honorary degrees) are admitted kneeling, the Vice-Chancellor holding their hands between his. It is important to note, that Cambridge has no honorary Doctors in the sense of Oxford; all her complete degrees give a vote in the Senate *in esse*, or *in posse*. On the other hand, her honorary degrees are confined within certain limits of rank. The nobility of talent is excluded. Graduates of Oxford and Dublin can only be admitted *ad eundem*.

There was, indeed, one precedent, or rather two, (no more, just two,) for a still closer union of the Chancellorship with the exercise of the supreme authority in England, with which (as they do not seem to be aware of so interesting a fact, and one which so materially strengthens their position) we beg leave to present His Royal Highness's supporters. They will find them by referring to a not uncommon book, the Oxford Calendar, where in the list of Chancellors we observe the two following entries:—

'1650. Oliver Cromwell.
'1658. Richard Cromwell.'

In 1660 we find a former Chancellor restored.

What, meanwhile, was the conduct of Lord Powis's supporters at Cambridge on this important Monday? What did they do to follow up their decisive act of the Saturday previous? We are sorry to say, very little more than nothing, at least towards forwarding his cause; for, as will be seen, in some respects they were not idle. The Master of St. John's, as we have said, unfortunately abstained from attending the meeting at the Vice-Chancellor's; the Fellows of his College, under the influence of a sort of unaccountable morbid delicacy, would not begin the canvass till his Lordship's intentions were ascertained, and the whole party seemed paralysed by the daring stroke of the Heads of Houses, and the lustre of the opposing candidate. As might have been supposed, the scattered friends of the Earl in the other colleges, though very anxious, could do nothing while such apathy prevailed at his head-quarters. The Prince's supporters, meanwhile, went on flattering themselves with the expectation that the Earl of Powis would, as a matter of course, retire from the field upon the first announcement of the requisition to his Royal Highness, and so leave to him the courtly victory of an unopposed election. They did not perceive how such a course would be tampering with the liberties of the University, and betraying the freedom of the Senate; how, in one word, it would be for ever abrogating (for who so wild as to dream that so glorious a precedent would ever be forgotten?) the ancient liberty of choice, and substituting for it full grown, sprung forth to sudden life, Minerva-like, in adamantine panoply, the *Congé d'Elire*. Still, with such little activity in the independent camp, there was some excuse for the prevalence of this opinion at that time. One Fellow, however, there was of St. John's College, who had the courage to come forward and save the honour of the University—he who had been sent on a mission to Lord Powis. He found his Lordship on Sunday at Walcot, a seat of his in Shropshire, and laid the requisition before him. His Lordship at once assented, and wrote the following address:—

'TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

'GENTLEMEN,—Having received from the Master and Resident Members of the College, of which I have the honour to be a Member, a requisition to allow myself to be proposed as a Candidate for the office of Chancellor of the University, accompanied by the information that other highly respected and influential Members of the University had expressed a similar wish, I take the liberty of announcing to you that it is my intention, in compliance with those expressions of favour, to offer myself as a candidate for the chancellorship, vacant by the lamented death of the Duke of Northumberland.

'Although I cannot hope to fill that high office with such advantage to the University as accrued from the presidency of our late valued and respected Chancellor, I may venture to assure you that no one will feel more anxious than myself to support the interests of the University, or to promote the welfare of the Church, for the maintenance of which the University of Cambridge forms so prominent a source.

'I request the favour of your vote and support on the day fixed by the University to supply the present vacancy.

'I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
'Your faithful Servant,
'Walcot, Feb. 15, 1847.' 'POWIS.'

This gentleman lost no time in returning to London, and inserted the address in the evening papers of Monday, hired a room at the British Hotel, in Cockspur Street, reinserted it in the morning papers of Tuesday, with an announcement that his Lordship's committee met at that place every day; and returned to Cambridge that night. Here he found two other Fellows of the College who ventured to brave that apathy, and return with him to London on Tuesday, and so form that Committee.

Tuesday dawned upon Cambridge just like Monday, the Prince's supporters slowly adding signatures to the address, those of Lord Powis (except the gallant deputation) doing nothing. But matters were otherwise in London. It happened that the announcement of the Cockspur-Street Committee was read by two non-resident members of the Senate, belonging, it must be noticed, to Trinity College, and who had previously been acting on a theory of their own respecting the Chancellorship, which they desisted from pressing, on seeing that the question was between the Prince and Lord Powis. They, in consequence, went to the British Hotel, having, previous to reading it, sent their adhesions to Lord Powis that morning to Cambridge. Here they found two of the deputation in very low spirits, as might have been expected, not knowing what to do, and fearful of the event. The third had proceeded to another part of London in search of one of those two persons whom he thought would be likely to give his support to the Earl rather than to the Prince. After some conversation, it was settled that they should try to bring together as many friends as they could, and consult again that afternoon. One of these two individuals went to a club, where he found a very general spirit of dissatisfaction, especially among the younger lawyers, at the nomination of the Prince, and a strong desire, therefore, to support any one who should oppose him. This spirit was boiling and swelling, and only wanted some channel to burst forth. Several young members of the legal profession were among those who were the earliest to give their support to Lord Powis, and to do what they could towards promoting his election. This is sufficient to show how false the charge was so commonly brought against the independent party, of being a mere 'Puseyite' movement. We, of course, think the charge of so-called 'Puseyism' no disgrace, but we are now talking about facts, and it is a fact that some of Lord Powis's earliest and strongest supporters were avowed 'anti-Puseyites.' It was natural for lawyers to rate highly the importance of the great principles of University rights at stake in the contest. Of these principles we shall soon have occasion to speak at length.

The afternoon came, and the gathering was small,—too small to be able in conscience to assume the character of a public meeting, or to organize any steps towards furthering his Lordship's success, beyond the one of calling a public meeting for the next day of members of the Senate friendly to his cause 'to secure' his election. It is very important to remember, that this step was deliberately taken in the face of the requisition to his Royal Highness, with the full conviction that it was the duty of those who ventured on the work, if need were, to oppose the Prince at the polling-box in the Senate House. In the course of the day, Lord Powis's Address had been lithographed, and a number of copies brought to Cambridge by one of the deputation, who came back that evening, returning to London next day. These the Master of St. John's most unhappily refused to allow being sent out on Wednesday; and it was only by dint of very great importunity that he was persuaded so far to relax as to permit them to be sent to members of his own College.

Wednesday (it was Ash-Wednesday) dawned at Cambridge just as Tuesday, except that of course the spirits of the requisitionists waxed higher, and the friends of Lord Powis were more dispirited, excepting for the little comfort of what had been done in town. The non-resident supporters of the Earl in London were not, however, inactive, and four o'clock beheld a sufficient assembly of his friends in Cockspur Street, full of determination for the fight. The chair was taken by the worthy inheritor of the name of Nelson, himself a member of Trinity College, and resolutions were unanimously passed, the first, it will be noticed, being proposed by the individual filling the distinguished and responsible post of Vice Chancellor of England.

> 'Proposed by the Vice Chancellor of England, St. John's College, seconded by A. J. B. Hope, Esq., M.P., Trinity College;
>
> '1.—That it is very desirable that the Chancellor of the University of Cambridge should have been educated at the University, in order that he may be acquainted with its interests and privileges, and that he should be a member of the Legislature, in order that he may watch over and maintain them in Parliament.
>
> 'Proposed by W. F. Pollock, Esq., Trinity College, seconded by G. S. Venables, Esq., Jesus College;
>
> '2.—That in the opinion of this meeting the Earl of Powis, from the independence of his position, and his steady support of the interests of the Church and the University, is eminently qualified to fill this high and important office.
>
> 'Proposed by R. P. Amphlett, Esq., St. Peter's College, seconded by F. H. Dickinson, Esq., M. P., Trinity College;
>
> '3.—That this meeting will use every effort to promote the election of the Earl of Powis.'

And a Committee was formed to further the cause of the noble Earl, which was noticeable for the great preponderance of members of Trinity which it contained, comprising ultimately (not to speak of late Fellows,) seven actual Fellows of the house, one of whom kindly undertook the office of Secretary. We must, however, state, that these seven ultimately refrained from voting on either side. Here were no petty jealousies, no College animosities evoked, no sordid views put forth. The first resolution lays down clearly and abstractedly what in the opinion of the meeting the qualifications for the Chancellorship were; the second proclaims in addition the special good deeds of the Earl of Powis which rendered him above other men worthy of the office; the third pledges the meeting to support one in himself so well-deserving of all gratitude, and endowed with all those qualifications which on the first onset the meeting had pronounced necessary for the office of Chancellor. It so happened, that his Lordship's probable opponent fulfilled neither of the requirements of the first resolution; but this fact in no way vitiated its intrinsic truth and justice, in no way rendered it an improper resolution to commence the business with; it rather proved the more conspicuously that Lord Powis's friends were proceeding on clear and fixed principles, and that there was somewhat a lack of such in the opposite ranks.

Now then the sword was drawn, and the scabbard was cast away; and thenceforward no one could misrepresent the contest as being merely one of Colleges; Trinity against St. John's, St. John's against Trinity, a modern Batrachomyomachia; it was manifestly to all a strife of high, important, principles. Two causes there were for which the supporters of the Earl of Powis contended; of two great principles he was the symbol: one, obviously of moment not to Cambridge merely, nor to Cambridge and to Oxford, but to all who wished well to the English polity; the other, apparently, and at first sight, a matter of internal arrangement solely, but really of hardly less importance than the former one, when we consider how intimately the general weal of the University is tied up in its maintenance.

The first of these was the independence of the University—Cambridge, the out-lying lecture-room of Croyland Abbey, the diocesan seminary of the Bishops of Ely, had grown like its sister of Oxford, by a parallel process to a parallel height of greatness. Endowed of old with singular privileges, emancipated by the then acknowledged head of all the Western Church from the control of the individual Bishops of Lincoln and Ely, these two great theological and literary schools had assumed a metropolitan character, an importance, which fully justified this great exemption Time ratified the liberty, and whatever might have been thought of the original concession, its practical working was salutary, and, as might have been supposed, the privilege has survived the authority which first bestowed it. Thus, on one side, was the independence of the Universities secured from that petty exercise of individual authority which a narrow-minded diocesan might in fancied self-defence be disposed to employ against such powerful bodies existing in his diocese,[1] and the legacy of their protection bequeathed to the entire church of the English nation.

But such an independence would have been a very incomplete one, had there been no safeguards on the other side, no defence raised against that even more potent influence, undue oppression by the civil power. Unlike the former danger, this could not be banned and prohibited for ever, it could only be met by constant prudence and untiring caution; by a zealous discharge of duties; by peaceable firmness, and clear-sighted energy; by allowing no loophole for the entrance of the dreaded invader; by affording no pretext through their own misconduct for apparently friendly interference, or the plausible exercise of retributive justice.

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[1] We trust that it will not be supposed that we are speaking disrespectfully of the Divine ordinance of Episcopacy; for what we have said about such a system as that of our Universities is no more oppugnant to the bare primordial idea of Episcopacy, than, *exempli gratiâ,* the patriarchal economy of the fifth century was.

Rumours there were about this time of an assault impending from this quarter, which, however they might be unfounded, were yet indicative of a prevalent bent of thought abroad, a clear forewarning of a far from impossible danger. At the present time, therefore, more than at any other, was it the duty of the Universities to beware of committing any such act of subserviency as might be construed into a submission of their privileges to the civil power. And this, as we have seen, was the opportunity chosen to bring forward a candidate for the Chancellorship of Cambridge, whose election would be tantamount to uniting that office with the crown; for proposing as the chief officer of a University the husband of its visitor!

The other principle wrapped up in the Earl of Powis was that of the liberty of the Senate. Had he withdrawn, or had his friends withdrawn him at the announcement of a royal opponent, he or they, we repeat it, would virtually have surrendered that ancient privilege of the members of the Cambridge Senate to elect whomsoever they chose, without constraint, or any nomination whatever, to be their Chancellor, and virtually have introduced into the University system for ever and ever the principle of the *Congé d' Elire.* If at the announcement of his Royal Highness's name all other opponents had given way, was it not to be expected, would it not be the natural sequence, that when some half century or so hence, the time should come to choose another Chancellor, some other illustrious Prince would step forward to claim succession to the paternal honour, and to scare away all less exalted candidates? Besides, the fact so prominently brought forward of the support of fifteen Heads of Houses, was also, as we have shown, in its way an invasion of these ancient liberties; an exhibition of the collegiate element of our Universities, (a most salutary and most happy characteristic in its own place,) where it had no business, where it impertinently interfered with other just as venerable rights.

With two such principles to contend for, and with the more personal concern of honouring one so truly worthy, it is not marvellous that the spirits of Lord Powis's supporters ran high, but with their joy a fear was mixed, so independently of their candidate had they acted. They could not help inquiring among themselves, 'Will Lord Powis after all feel 'as we feel? Will he then indeed grasp the greatness of 'the emergency, and show himself equal to it? Or will he, 'with the courtesy of an English nobleman, and not realizing 'higher motives, yield at once to so illustrious a competitor?'

This question, which pressed heavily on many hearts, was being answered elsewhere. The Master of St. John's, on hearing of the requisition to the Prince, had written on the Monday to Lord Powis, informing him of it, and asking him how he intended to act. His Lordship replied as promptly as his absence from Powis Castle (to which and to Alnwick Castle the letter had been written in duplicate) permitted, placing himself in the hands of 'his College and his friends,' and absolving, if need were, those who had offered him their support, from their promise. This letter and the answer were placed in the hands of his friends at Cambridge, on the night of Wednesday, and in London on the morning of Thursday, the 18th. The day after the meeting in London, and consequently in the afternoon of the same day, meetings were held in both places, where, without any concert, it was decided unanimously, (Mr. Justice Patteson moving, and the Vice-Chancellor of England seconding the resolution, in London,) that nothing had occurred to alter Lord Powis's position, and that he and his friends must go on.

The results of these two meetings were mutually communicated by electric telegraph. This instantaneous converse to which both parties had recourse, was one of the novel and picturesque features of this strange election, and opened strange visions of future states of human society. And at length a Committee was organized at Cambridge, to promote his Lordship's election; the Master of St. John's being appointed chairman.

Shortly after an envoy reached London from Cambridge,—the same gentleman, by the way, who had been previously despatched to Lord Powis. His Lordship was expected in London that evening, and accordingly a deputation from the London Committee was appointed, along with this gentleman, to wait upon him on his arrival. In time he arrived, and first the Cambridge and then the London resolution was placed in his hands. His reply was emphatic, '*cadit quæstio.*' He had no option, his friends had prejudged for him—he must go on. Such a contest was indeed a disagreeable one, but some things were duties, and this was one. Such were the heads, and nearly the words of his Lordship's answer, with which the deputation returned at midnight, to their wakeful colleagues. With such high principles at stake, and such a candidate to represent them, so ready, so resolute, so right-thinking in this matter, so deserving from his former good deeds, who would not put forth his best energies, for a fierce unyielding battle? So felt the friends of the Earl of Powis, and the canvass was prosecuted with increased energy.

This was not the only visit which Lord Powis received that night. Very soon after the deputation had left, a resident fellow of a College at Cambridge appeared with a letter from the Vice-Chancellor, stating what the Heads of Houses had done, with the view of ascertaining what Lord Powis's intentions were in respect to standing, under these circumstances. His Lordship in his reply, which was written the same night, informed him of the proceedings of his friends, and stated that he could not therefore withdraw from the contest without their sanction. He also enclosed copies of the resolution passed at both the meetings.

But we must now transfer ourselves to what was going on in other quarters. After the requisition had lingered on from Monday till Friday, a deputation, consisting of the Vice-Chancellor, accompanied by the Masters of Jesus and Christ's Colleges, proceeded to London to lay it before His Royal Highness. As it happened, this address was not presented till the next day, when the Vice-Chancellor alone was admitted to an audience. This, however, was not immediately known at Cambridge, and at a meeting of the Prince's supporters, held in the Combination Room of Trinity College, on Friday morning, the resolutions were prefaced with the following letter, announcing that 'a requisition had been presented to His Royal Highness.'

> 'Committee Room, Cambridge, Feb. 19, 1847.
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> 'An Address, numerously signed by the Members of the Senate having been presented to His Royal Highness Prince Albert, requesting His Royal Highness to permit his name to be proposed for Election into the office of Chancellor, vacant by the lamented decease of his Grace the Duke of Northumberland; the Committee appointed this day, at a public meeting of Members of the Senate, for promoting the Election of His Royal Highness, beg leave respectfully and most earnestly to solicit your concurrence for the above object, and to request that you will have the kindness to communicate, at your earliest convenience, the assurance of your support. The Election commences on the morning of Thursday next, the 25th instant, at ten o'clock.
>
> 'Communications may be addressed to the Committee, at Barraclough's Rooms, Senate-House Passage.
>
> 'I have the honour to be, your obedient and faithful Servant,
> 'W. WHEWELL, Chairman.'

At this meeting, his supporters organized his election in due form, though it should never be forgotten, that a quasi canvass had been in progress in his favour ever since Monday, in the shape of the collection of signatures to the requisition, which did not, however, after all amount to quite 200, including rather more than two-thirds of the resident members of the Senate, among whom we were sorry to see all the residents of Trinity College. At this meeting also a Committee was appointed to conduct the Prince's election, comprising ninety-one gentlemen, nearly all His Royal Highness's resident supporters, an imposing array of Heads of Houses, Professors and Tutors, under the Chairmanship of that eminent individual, the energetic and able Master of Trinity College, requested to act. There were some who were astonished to see themselves in print before their consent had been obtained; still none, we believe, held back. Friday and Saturday morning passed in active electioneering on both sides. At two o'clock of the latter day, the Vice-Chancellor was admitted to an audience with His Royal Highness, who was graciously pleased to return the following answer:—

> 'The expression of the wish upon the part of so numerous and influential a portion of the Senate of the University of Cambridge, including so many eminent names, that I should allow myself to be proposed for election into the vacant Office of Chancellor of that University, cannot be otherwise than highly gratifying to my feelings:
>
> 'Did it not appear, from the proceedings entered into by others in the University, that there does not exist that degree of unanimity which alone would leave me at liberty to consent to be put in nomination, I should have felt both the greatest pleasure and pride in acceding to the desire expressed in this Address, and so personally connect myself with your ancient and renowned Seat of Learning.'

The first impression, undoubtedly, of Lord Powis's Committee, on being put into possession of this answer, was, that if there was to be a contest, it would at least not be with His Royal Highness; that very possibly some Trinity nobleman, the Marquess of Lansdowne most probably, or the Marquess of Northampton, would be put forward, but that otherwise, the election of the Earl of Powis would be unopposed; they conceived that this answer precluded His Royal Highness from being any longer a candidate. By and by, however, it was stated by one of the body, that he had just met a warm supporter of the Prince, and that he told him that they meant to proceed with him in spite of his refusal.

This announcement, at first, was received with incredulity. Shortly, however, other facts were produced which at last threw a shade of probability over the matter, and the supporters of Lord Powis retired to rest that night, with a considerable idea that the Royal opposition was, after all, not yet out of the question. Sunday brought the tidings of a meeting of the Prince's supporters, held at 8 o'clock, lasting till 11 o'clock, the preceding evening, at Cambridge, at which place the news of the answer was known to the Prince's party at three, and generally at six, by which time the dignified ambassador had returned. Rumour says that he was seen about the University between 7 and 8 o'clock, without gown or bands. These we must remark, for the edification of our non-University readers, are omissions of dress, not common on the part of a Vice-Chancellor, when appearing in public at that hour.

At this meeting, four of the Prince's principal supporters (Heads of Houses) deprecated the continuance of the contest. The more extreme party however prevailed, and very bellicose resolutions were carried enthusiastically, and the papers of the following morning contained an announcement from the Prince's Committee, signed by the Master of Trinity, which amounted to a proclamation of uncomprising war against the party of the noble Earl.

> 'Litora litoribus contraria, fluctibus undæ,
> Arma armis.'

We give this document—

'His Royal Highness Prince Albert has declared, in his reply to an Address from a large body of the members of the Senate, requesting him to allow himself to be proposed for the Office of Chancellor now vacant, that he would with pleasure and pride accede to this request, if it were not for the proceedings of other members of the Senate.

'The Committee which was appointed for promoting the election of His Royal Highness, being persuaded that a large majority of the University agree with them in thinking His Royal Highness the most proper person to be the Chancellor of the University, are resolved to record their opinion by their votes at the election.

'They are fortified in this resolution by finding that many persons of the highest rank and authority, not resident in the University, have the same intention. They earnestly request that you will give your attendance here at the election, and unite your vote with theirs.

'The election will commence at 10 o'clock, A.M., on Thursday next, February 25.

'Cambridge, Feb. 20, 1847. 'W. WHEWELL, Chairman.'

Our readers will observe, that this letter declares that His Royal Highness '*would* with pleasure and pride *accede* to this 'request, if it were not for the proceedings of other members 'of the Senate:' whereas his words were 'Did it not appear 'from the proceedings entered into by others in the University, 'that there does not exist that degree of unanimity which alone 'would leave me at liberty to consent to be put in nomination, '*I should have felt* both the greatest pleasure and pride *in* '*acceding* to the desire expressed in this address.' This discrepancy, which, as we shall proceed to show, is not confined to this document, excited considerable comment.

This proceeding at Cambridge was followed up by a meeting of His Royal Highness's supporters, held in London, on Monday afternoon, at the Union Hotel, in Cockspur Street, which resulted in the following resolutions:—

'Moved by the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of London, seconded by Viscount Sydney—

'1.—That this Meeting has heard, with feelings of deep gratitude, the terms in which His Royal Highness Prince Albert has been pleased to express the pride and pleasure he would have in filling the Office of Chancellor of our University.

'Moved by Lord Ernest Bruce, seconded by the Right Honourable Sir J. Hobhouse, Bart.—

'2.—That this Meeting concurs most heartily in the desire which has been so strongly expressed by the Resident Members of the Senate for the Election of His Royal Highness Prince Albert.

'Moved by Lord Monteagle, seconded by Lord Norreys, M.P.—

'3.—That this Meeting pledges itself to use every effort to secure a result so honourable to the University, and that the following Noblemen and Gentlemen be requested to act as a Committee, with power to add to their number:—

'The Marquis of Northampton, P.R.S., Chairman.'
&c. &c. &c.

The same use of the present tense which we have observed in the Master of Trinity's letter, is also conspicuous in the first of these resolutions.

Among the members of the Committee, amid other distinguished names, (among them those of four cabinet ministers,) we observe, with regret, those of several Right Reverend Prelates, and with the deepest regret, that of the Bishop of St. David's,—not one member of the Episcopate was found to come forward and give his name and vote in favour of the man who had proved the true and the warm friend of the Episcopacy, amid a generation of faithless and cold-hearted statesmen, who had won for the order a victory such as they had not gained for centuries. It is, however, certain that the method of composing this Committee was somewhat peculiar. If our readers will look at the third resolution, they will perceive that it is not that 'the following noblemen and gentlemen *act*,' but '*be requested to act*, as a Committee;' that is, the managers of this deeply grateful meeting put down and published a certain number of the most prominent names attached to the requisition, without previously ascertaining whether those individuals were inclined to take part in the more extreme measure then pending. As we have already noticed, this plan had previously been followed at Cambridge. We are not talking at random, and we can name *at least* one Right Reverend Prelate, and one Very Reverend Dean, with whose names this liberty was taken, and who neither voted nor (certainly the latter) paired for His Royal Highness.

Copies of these resolutions were quickly lithographed, and distributed over the tables of the clubs.

There was at this time, and all along, something very peculiar and picturesque in the attitude of the whole contest;—one party holding its head quarters in the very University, at first at the Lodge of that high officer, who, during this vacancy, was of course *de jure,* its head, and who, we are sorry to say, used this headship, as we have seen, for party purposes, and partly under the auspices of the Master of its most distinguished College, proceeding to the battle-field with an imposing array of University and College officers; the other, having its head-quarters in London, where the Committee met and parted, and met again, ungowned, without any the least outward mark of the contest being for the Chancellorship of a University, but yet fighting for its liberties—fighting for those high privileges which only make our English Universities what they are. And yet, all along, time and space are annihilated by that wonderful invention of these late days, the electric telegraph; messages flew backwards and forwards, and conversations were held by one speaker in London, and the other at Cambridge; and Lord Powis's London friends felt strongly their union with the body politic of Cambridge. Maybe, too, the residents felt the same —maybe they felt that that unsightly shed beside the Hills Road, that most unworthy station, had wrought a change; had, by a new unlooked for revolution, brought matters back to their primordial condition; had called to life again the old constitution of the University, 'Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars;' had given life and energy to the Senate, no longer the clique of resident Fellows of College, but the august assembly of all the thousands whose degrees were complete, and whose names were inscribed in the great book of Alma Mater. Maybe, when next the Chancellorship shall be vacant, electors will be gathered together at the iron voice of the telegraph from Calcutta, and far Cathay. Maybe the fate of the contest, if contest there be, will be eagerly discussed, and anxiously expected, in the metropolitical palace of Calcutta, the learned Academies of Benares and Pekin, and the busy marts of commerce which shall crowd the valley of the deep Missouri. Of so much weight was the present contest.

The electric telegraph did good service to Lord Powis's cause on Monday evening; for it conveyed the following important document to London:—

'Clare Hall, Feb. 22, 1847.

'The Master of Clare Hall has sent to the Committee appointed for promoting the election of Prince Albert the following letter, of which the Committee for promoting the election of the Earl Powis, may make what use they think proper:—

'"The Master of Clare Hall, considering from the answer of Prince Albert to the address of many Members of the Senate, to allow himself to be proposed for election into the vacant office of Chancellor, that he has declined to do so, and that the proposing His Royal Highness as a Candidate is putting the Members of the Senate into a most delicate and painful situation, by exciting a contest, requests that his name may be withdrawn from the names upon the Committee." '

We need hardly say, that this letter appeared in all the papers of the following morning.

The position of the Prince's party at this time was a very singular one. It is at all times, of course, a delicate matter to go on with a candidate against his express declaration; but tenfold more so, when the individual is one of such exalted rank, as to preclude all that ordinary and familiar access—all that free, and, at times, even dictatorial communication, which in all common contests his supporters must make to either candidate. As might have been supposed, the more immediate circle of Lord Powis's supporters spoke strongly on the subject, but strong speaking was not confined to them; and certainly there was a very general feeling in society, even among some of those who felt it their duty to support the Prince, that his followers ought never to have presumed to have put him in so unprecedented and embarrassing a position.

The method in which this expression of opinion was met was very remarkable. There was no shrinking from the charge, and very little, comparatively, attempt at self-defence. On the contrary, His Royal Highness's supporters at Cambridge assumed an attitude of what, in less learned persons, might almost be termed swagger.

> ' ————tum spargere voces
> Per vulgum ambiguas.'

Dark rumours there were of private intimations, and real wishes well known and promptly followed up. 'Do you think 'we would act as we are doing, if we did not know?' was the staple of their talk. The number of Cabinet Ministers on the London Committee gave colour to this supposition, which certainly met with a wide acceptance. Of course His Royal Highness's final answer of acceptance, which we shall give lower down, proves how strangely erroneous this impression was; but its general prevalence, even in the quarters which should have been best informed, is certainly a singular fact.

Tuesday and Wednesday were busy days on both sides. At length the long-expected Thursday, the 25th, arrived. At 9 o'clock in the morning, the large bell of great St. Mary's, as is the custom, began tolling for an hour, and at 10 o'clock the election began. The aspect of the area before the Senate House was startling, and not much what we would expect, either at an election of the first officer of an University, or at a contest where 'the favourite' was the consort of the Sovereign.

A little to the right up the street, a doorway opened to a small court, whose portals were placarded with huge posting bills, on which, in gigantic capitals, the words 'PRINCE ALBERT' and 'COMMITTEE' were visible. There was a rush and a jostling of flies to the Senate House door, and on the flies the magic name 'PRINCE ALBERT' shone conspicuous, and the flymen had placards in their hats, and men lounged about who were not flymen, also with placarded hats, and 'PRINCE 'ALBERT' was the legend on all. Men's thoughts irresistibly reverted to hard fought boroughs, and contested beadleships, and all they wanted to make up the picture were favours and the drums. Lord Powis's Committee Room was some way up Trinity Street, and could not, therefore, enter into this picture.

Inside the Senate House the contrast was rather remarkable. Such of our readers as are not acquainted with that building, should be informed that it is a very large oblong hall, of Italian architecture, but of great dignity of aspect, built somewhat more than a century. Round the four sides runs a narrow gallery, of which all but the end portion belongs to the Undergraduates and Bachelors. At the far end, in a sort of small apse, is the throne which the Chancellor, and in his absence the Vice-Chancellor occupies, and a little below it another seat, also for the Chancellor, and for the Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor, on more ordinary occasions, with a table before it. This edifice serves the uses both of the Theatre and of the Convocation House at Oxford, and is, moreover, employed for very many of the University examinations. Though as a *coup d'œil* a ceremonial in the Senate House is not so striking as one in the Sheldonian Theatre, as upon that day when, amid the plaudits of an assembled University, the honorary degree of Doctor was conferred upon the Earl of Powis; yet, considered architecturally, it is a handsomer building, and it has one obvious superiority. The position of the Heads of Houses and of the Doctors at Oxford, though conspicuous, is really some what undignified. They are palpably stuck up to be looked at, and they are indecorously pressed upon by the gallery behind them. At Cambridge the Doctors are not conspicuous, but their place is where it should be, at the end of the apartment, and with an ample area.

To return from this digression. In order to accommodate the wants of such an election, the upper portion of the Senate House was barricaded off, and before the Vice-Chancellor was placed a box with two slits to contain the voting cards, according as each elector polled for the 'celsissimus princeps,' or the 'nobilissimus vir.' The Vice-Chancellor was supported by the two Proctors, the Registrar, the Scrutineer (the Junior DD.,) and the two assessors of either party. Lower down the

Senate House were two tables, one on each side, where the voting cards were distributed to the supporters of the several candidates, worded shortly

'AB. e. Collegio, M. eligit N. in Cancellarium hujus Academiæ.'

On one side these were being distributed by dignified Heads of Houses, on the other, by simple Masters of Arts; placards were put up just within the entrance of the Senate House, one bearing the Princely name in conspicuous capitals, the other that of the Earl of Powis in large text characters. Copies of a very curious document, a letter which the Master of Trinity had had lithographed, and had sent to various individuals, were being distributed, accompanied with the Master of St. John's comment upon it. This was very soon followed by an answer from the Master of Trinity. Lord Powis's Committee, as was proper, included this answer in their next edition. We give it as it then stood:—

The following is a Copy of a Letter which has been extensively circulated among the Members of the Senate.

[COPY.]

'*Trinity Lodge, Feb.* 23, 1847.

'MY DEAR SIR,—I hope you will give us the benefit of your vote in favour of PRINCE ALBERT as our Chancellor. In him we shall have powerful protection, sympathy in our studies, and freedom from political party. In Lord Powis we should only have a Chancellor of St. John's; for the conduct of his friends in whose hands he has entirely placed himself, has estranged the acting part of the rest of the University from him altogether.

'I am, dear Sir, Yours very truly,

'W. WHEWELL.

'This formal attempt to represent the present contest for the Chancellorship as a struggle between Colleges, is unjust and unprecedented. That it is not so regarded by the great majority of the Senate, may be inferred from the list of LORD POWIS'S Committee in London, which contains about forty Trinity names;[1] and the result of the Poll will clearly show how strong a sympathy with LORD POWIS is entertained within every College.

'R. TATHAM,

'*St. John's Lodge, Feb.* 25, 1847. 'Master of St. John's College.

'*Trinity Lodge, Feb.* 24 [*sic*], 1847.

'The Master of St. John's having printed and circulated a private letter of mine addressed to a Member of this College, I am compelled to state, in explanation of the expressions there used, that Lord POWIS failing to communicate to the Acting Officers of the University his intention when he had declared himself a Candidate for the office of Chancellor, his not enabling them to communicate with him in less than six days after that time, and his giving in reply to their communication no answer but the Resolution of a Committee, justifies the expressions there used.

'W. WHEWELL.'

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[1] Out of 64, there were not ten members of St. John's on this Committee.

We confess we cannot see how a letter which had been lithographed, and extensively distributed without any mark of secresy, can be called a private one. As for the pleas contained in the Master of Trinity's reply, we must observe, that we think them entirely inconclusive. His failure of communication was certainly a misfortune, as we have already observed; but for this Lord Powis himself was not in fault, and most assuredly the 'Acting Officers of the University' are in the matter of the election of Chancellor merely so many voters, and the executors of the mechanical office of taking the poll. The chronology too of this reply is somewhat confused. Lord Powis, as we have seen, received the invitation to become a candidate on Sunday the 14th, and as he could not and did not declare himself such before that day, his acceptance of this invitation was published on Monday the 15th. The letter from the Vice-Chancellor to him requesting to know his intentions respecting the opposing candidate, was placed in his hands just after midnight of Thursday the 18th, and his answer written immediately, and put into the hands of the Vice-Chancellor then in London, and made known in Cambridge on the morning of Friday the 19th, and consequently, in place of Lord Powis 'not enabling them [the acting officers of the University] to communicate with him in less than six days after that time,' [*i. e.* of his declaration of candidateship,] his *answer* to the communication of the first acting officer was in his hands five days after his Lordship first received the intimation that there was a desire that he should come forward as a candidate, Lord Powis being at the time in a distant part of England, and having business in another quarter, also remote, before he could come to London. Had, however, 'the principal acting officers' taken the trouble to enquire his direction at St. John's College, they might have materially shortened this period, for the Master of St. John's found means to communicate far more speedily. As for the third charge, we are at a total loss to understand what the implied affront is. Lord Powis, as we have seen above, put himself unreservedly into the hands of his supporters. Consequently, when the Vice-Chancellor asked him what his intentions were, he very properly and naturally answered to this effect,—'I put myself into the hands of my supporters, and this is the course which they have prescribed for me—that is what I must follow.' What cause of offence the Master of Trinity could find in such a reply, passes our comprehension? Lord Powis told the whole truth; did the Master wish him to suppress half, and assume to himself the entire credit of the line of policy which he adopted? It was not moreover the resolution of a Committee, but of two general meetings in Cambridge and in London, which Lord Powis forwarded.

At the commencement of the day, Lord Powis headed the poll, and by a little before one o'clock his majority amounted to 85. As might have been supposed, the spirits of his friends ran high. But a change soon became perceptible. Another train poured out its troop, and this troop was one composed mainly of the Prince's voters, comprising four Cabinet Ministers, two ex-Cabinet Ministers, (one the High Steward of, and the other one of the Members for, the University,) and several present and past officers of the Court. These and other votes brought down the majority to 30, before three o'clock; and by five o'clock, when the poll adjourned till eight o'clock in the evening, Lord Powis was only in a majority of 8. This majority was changed by the evening's hour into a minority of 17, and thenceforward the Prince headed the Poll. The numbers at the close of the first day were 618 to 601.

We should by the way remark, that the dinner in the Hall of Trinity was conducted with very good taste, in a spirit of perfect impartiality, so much so, that His Royal Highness's health was not drank. Both parties received 'Prosperity to Trinity College' with the utmost enthusiasm, and curiously the non-resident member of the College of the highest rank present on the Thursday, was the Chairman of Lord Powis's Committee.

The polling on Friday lasted for the same number of hours as the day before, and the result of the day's contest was to leave the Prince in a majority of 86; the numbers being 875 to 789. As on the preceding day, the Senate-house was thronged, members of the Senate below, Undergraduates above, and a number of ladies looking on at the unwonted bustle, while the arrival of each successive train poured in its flock of voters, its living bodies of hopes and fears, though in far less numbers than on Thursday. On Thursday the Undergraduates were rather for Lord Powis, on Friday half and half, on Saturday decidedly for the Prince. The townspeople all along espoused the course of the Prince, openly giving their reason; which was a practical and sensible one, that they expected his installation would be the more brilliant one, and graced with the presence of Her Majesty. The squibs which flew about were of very different degrees of merit. And for fear there should not be excitement enough in the severe struggle, this day was rendered memorable by a subsidiary conflict, which, if we can say no more in its praise, was certainly maintained with no lack of vigour. It is the privilege of the members of the Senate to wear their hats and caps in the Senate House (not however at an election within the bar). The Undergraduates, however, on this, as on previous occasions, kindly undertook the censorship of University manners, and hooted all those who availed themselves of the right. Throughout Thursday and a part of Friday, the Senate assented for peace' sake; about three o'clock, however, on the latter day, a sudden glow of dignity overspread the assembly, and they had the audacity to assert their undoubted privilege, which the weather rendered by no means a nominal one. This greatly moved the indignation of the higher regions, and the coolness with which their ungentle bursts of remonstrance were met did not allay their feelings. But the hour of vengeance was not far off. At the evening polling, the vast Senate-house, dimly lit by a few candles, was enough of itself to awaken feelings of desperate daring in the quiet breasts of the most hard-reading man. Yells after yells of savage fury burst forth, while the unfortunate members of the Senate were met with showers of missiles; peas, and even wood, and halfpence. It was necessary to stop the polling for some time, and send the Proctors to quell this disgraceful disturbance, which they did but ineffectively: next day, however, peace was restored, and the great public mind saw hatted Masters of Arts with tolerable equanimity.

On Saturday, the polling, which commenced at nine o'clock, went on languidly, only rendered memorable by a few cases of persons, who had come long distances to support the independent candidate, the Prince meanwhile continuing to increase his majority, till at the close of the poll at twelve o'clock, it amounted to 117, the numbers being 954 to 837, that is to say, His Royal Highness, the Prince Consort of the Queen of England, beat the Earl of Powis in a contested election by a majority of 19 to nearly 17 out of the largest number of members of the Senate ever polled, having, after great exertions of his followers, succeeded in receiving about thirty votes less than Lord Lyndhurst had done in the contest for High Steward, when the gross number who voted was smaller by 300; the pairs, moreover, in favour of the last-mentioned noble Lord amounting to 200, a far greater number than were made in the present contest. The tedious process of counting the votes was then gone through; this, in point of fact, being the statutable election, and all that had happened on the three days being merely the tendering the votes (the double polling box, and the other modern electioneering refinements, not being contemplated in the Statute); and the necessary Grace for letters patent to the Chancellor-elect passed. A few good people there were, who still confidently asserted, that he would not accept the office, grounding their belief upon his answer, in which he said, 'Did it not appear that there does not exist that degree of unanimity which alone would leave me at liberty to consent to be put in nomination, I should have felt,' &c. The general voice, however, spoke otherwise, and on Tuesday all doubt was set at rest, by the reply which the Prince gave to the notification of the Senate, contained in a Latin letter by the Public Orator, which was presented to him on that day (March 2):

'Mr. Vice-Chancellor, and Gentlemen of the Senate,—

'I thank you for the kind terms in which you have apprised me of the result of the recent election for the Chancellorship of the University of Cambridge.

'I need scarcely observe, after so recent and public a declaration of my sentiments and feelings with regard to my nomination as a candidate for that office, that the proceedings which have subsequently taken place have been entirely without my sanction and privity.

'The intention to propose me as a candidate was not known to me until a period when the time for the election was at hand, and when the arrangements for ascertaining the sense of the University were already completed.

'I could only have suspended their progress by a peremptory declaration, that under no circumstances would I consent, if elected, to accept the office of Chancellor; and such a declaration I did not deem it respectful to the University to make.

'The election has now terminated; and a majority of the University, including a very great number of its members most eminent for their services to the Church, to the University, and to the cause of literature and science, has declared itself in favour of my appointment to the vacant office.

'It is incumbent, therefore, upon me to notify without delay the course which, under these circumstances, I shall pursue.

'I have resolved to accept the trust which the University is willing to confide in me.

'In forming this decision I have been influenced by a respectful deference to the wishes of a majority of its members, by a great unwillingness to involve the University in the probable necessity of another contest, but, above all, by an earnest hope that through a zealous and impartial discharge of the trust which I undertake, I shall succeed in establishing a claim on the confidence and good-will of the whole academical body.

'Buckingham Palace, March 2.' 'ALBERT.

With respect to this answer of His Royal Highness, we are sorry, for the sake of Cambridge, that he should have at all felt it his duty to have assumed the office from that most laudable feeling, 'great unwillingness to involve the University in the probable necessity of another contest.' We are very sorry to think that his experience of the tone of that grave University should have been such as to have made it appear likely to him, that were he out of the question, all parties would not have united in conferring the honour on one whom all must have felt so worthy of it as the Earl of Powis, who, as it was, had received nearly half the suffrages tendered. We are sorry that His Royal Highness should, in his slight acquaintance with our Universities, have conceived so decided an opinion as to the existence of party feeling and collegiate jealousies. For our own part, we confess, we are more hopeful, and we do not think it at all improbable, (though, of course, there are probabilities the other way also,) that Lord Powis would have succeeded without a contest. At all events, we should never have used that strong word 'necessity,' which His Royal Highness employs. Considering the great loyalty of the leaders of his party, we cannot but imagine that one word in Lord Powis's just praise from his Royal opponent, would have gone very far towards diminishing the risk of an opposition on the part of those who might have been very well-disposed to the noble Earl, but yet afraid, even then, to support him, for fear of doing what might be distasteful to the Prince. In so doing, His Royal Highness would have shown his care for the independence of Cambridge.

'The election has now terminated,' and the supporters of the Earl of Powis felt, that though they had not succeeded in winning the Chancellorship for him whom they esteemed most worthy, yet that considering the enormous weight of influence and interest, direct and indirect, arrayed against them, both in the University and in the great world, considering the (in itself) praiseworthy feeling of misdirected loyalty, by which so many of the Prince's voters were actuated, they had in truth achieved a moral victory of no ordinary stamp. To have brought up 837 members of the Senate to pronounce (each man openly giving his name) such a verdict under such trying circumstances, was a most cheering spectacle. We do not pretend to say that there were not some secondary motives of action at work in the minds of some who supported his Lordship, but there never was an election where every voter voted from pure patriotism, and we fearlessly assert, that these were as but light dust compared with the feelings which must of necessity have occurred to the supporters of the august opponent. Lord Powis did not quite become Chancellor, but he has earned himself a name, which will ever live in the annals of Cambridge. As once he had shown himself the champion of our Episcopacy, so now he showed himself the champion of our great and famous Universities; he then became, and he will continue, the Chancellor of the hearts of hundreds of Cambridge's most devoted sons.

There is one point of view in which the conduct of Prince Albert's supporters among the resident members of Trinity College may be viewed. It is well known, that at the election for High Steward in 1840, resident Trinity College took up warmly the cause of Lord Lyttelton, and strongly repudiated any notion of worldly station weighing against other considerations in such a contest. May we not then justly presume, that the present open espousal of His Royal

Highness's cause by the resident members of the same College, was meant as a sort of atonement for past defective knowledge of the world, a loud and open confession to earth, and sky, and ocean, and the whole race of men, how grievously they had erred on that occasion?

We trust that the independent forces will not too hastily consider themselves disbanded, that they will not, as soon as they return, hang up their well-indented swords, and don the robe of peace, and fancy that all that is now left, is to raise loud the note of acclamation in honour of the victor. Such conduct comes recommended by very plausible arguments, and it appeals to the most praiseworthy feelings of the highest virtues. We hear of 'the olive branch,' and 'the right hand of fellowship,' and 'the oblivion of past contests;' and it seems to us uncharitable not at once to unbuckle our coats of mail. Let them by all means accept the proffered right hand, let them not render these distressing conflicts more distressing by introducing into them the harrowing elements of private discords, but still let them do so as armed men, as warriors in the time of peace; for the battle is not lost for them, nor have the other party won. The latter have carried a redoubt, but still they may have the fortress to defend, and it will be sad if they abandon it. The mission of the independent party is now perhaps only commencing; the other party are perhaps engaging in a service they wot not of; perhaps many of them will in time be the most honoured leaders of the independent ranks. We are sure, if our fears should unfortunately have any basis, that such will be the case. We trust, that we shall not be supposed to be counselling aggressive measures, or striving to meddle with the internal polity of Cambridge. Nothing can be further from our thoughts. All that we advise is carefulness. But we must speak out from our apprehension of a not impossible danger, (to pass over another, and that not impossible one, from the contrary quarter, viz. the attempt to introduce something like the Hebdomadal Board at Cambridge,) to which we have already alluded,—that of the Chancellor, out of intended goodwill to Cambridge, striving to introduce reforms based upon the idea of a University which he has acquired in his native land, and totally alien to those of England. We ask it, would it not, in such a case, be more than probable, would it not be a matter of mathematical certainty, that His Royal Highness would find himself at once surrounded by a band of supporters, men it may be of European reputation, though not on this account at all safe guides, whose breathless onwardness would allow him no time to pause, whose representations would be all fair and all persuasive, whose energy perhaps would lead him on he knew not whither. We are not dreaming; the alarm has already been given in those sure indices of public feeling, the newspapers; already, by the 'liberal press,' are Saturnian days predicted for the Royal Chancellorship. To withstand their chief officer, is, to all reverential-minded men, a most disagreeable thing, and still more so when the position of that chief officer is in other respects so exalted as that of His Royal Highness. But duty above all things; and, perhaps we earnestly hope it, His Royal Highness may ultimately prove on the side of the Universities of England, maybe (*O utinam!*) his natural force of character may triumph over the disadvantages of his early training and of foreign associations. If he is not, he cannot stand neutral, he will be made use of by their enemies against our Universities. But however things may be, the path is plain before the well-wishers to our English system. The watchcry must be the independence of the Universities, the maintenance of their ancient privileges, and the preservation with increased freedom of their ancient character. If these are given up, we must expect immediately to see, in the place of our 'Universitatis Scholares,' the stipendiary professors of an English University.—There is no middle course, no limited independence, no covenanted reference to government boards, no tolerated freedom of action. Either, we speak deliberately, we must be content to see a system of State education, extending its ramifications all over England, with the 'University of London' or of 'Great Britain' at its head, impartially granting diplomas of degrees, in the name, it may be, of some illustrious Grand Chancellor, and countersigned by some eminently intellectual minister of Public Instruction, to the alumni of Oxford and Glasgow and Cambridge, Maynooth and Manchester College, York, the 'godless Colleges' of Ireland, and St. Mark's, Stanley Grove, Oscott and Homerton, and watching with painful restlessness our every village school; or else we must forswear our personal ease, and contend for the ancient free Universities of England, the product of old days of religious fervour and far-sighted watchfulness, the true nurseries of the Clergy and the nobility of England, the true guardians of all that adorns the national character of Englishmen, those Universities, so beautiful in theory, whose days of trial have now come, who now must decide whether they will (for they *can* do it) fulfil that theory, or seal their fate by abandoning it.

ART. III.—1. *Anthems and Services for Church Choirs, Nos.* 1 *to* 12. Burns: London.

2. *The Te Deum for Four Voices, with Organ Accompaniment.* By Dr. Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy. Ewer: London.
3. *The Ancient Choral Music of the Church (publications of the Motett Society).* Chappell: London.
4. *Anthems and Canticle Music, by Dr. Boyce (new edition).* Novello: London.
5. *Prospectus of 'The Bangor Cathedral Collection, being a Selection from the Sacred Works of Astorga, Bach, Caldara, Curschman, Gossec, &c., adapted to English Words, for the use of Churches and Families.'*
6. *The Choral Service of Winchester Cathedral, consisting of the Prayers, Litany, Chants, Canticle Music, and Anthems. By* J. B. Binfield. D'Almaine & Co.
7. *The Words of the Anthems sung in York Cathedral, with Preface on Church Music, by William Mason, late Precentor (new edition).* Edited by C. H.
8. *A Mass in E Major. By* William Jackson, *of Masham, Yorkshire.* Novello.
9. *Anthems for Cathedral Choirs. By* J. L. Hopkins, Mus. Bac.
10. *The Hymns and Canticles, and Kyrie Eleison and Nicene Creed for Cathedral Choirs. By* S. S. Wesley, Mus. Doc. Chappell.

THE Book of Common Prayer, as the term implies, is the Office Book of a Congregational Worship. 'Answer,' 'read,' 'sing,' are the rubrical admonitions addressed to 'minister and people,' and the obligation is peremptory and universal, no exception being made in favour of Bishops or Canons, or indeed any class whether of the clergy or laity. The co-operative act of worship is not less stringent upon the laity in a Cathedral than in a parish Church, not less binding on the Bishop than the Lay Singer. But every act of worship is not of the co-operative class, and some we find to be representative only, such as those prayers where the minister prays as the mouth-piece of the people. So also in certain high acts of adoration and praise where the Choir represent the people in a duty necessary for the Church's welfare, imitative of ancient practice, intended as a special honour to the Almighty, but in which the general body of worshippers may be incompetent to join. In the consideration of the subject of music for the Church, it is beyond all things incumbent to keep these distinctions in view. Their importance is paramount, and should be settled prior to any matters of taste touching this or that Chant, or the merits of this or that school of Choir music. The character of the different singings in our Church services wholly depends upon the persons who are to sing.

It is a well-known fact, that in our services parts are read which should be sung, and parts sung but not by those who should sing them. And in this error lies the whole secret of the constraint and coldness too often observable in English Church worship. German, French, Italian priests sing—the English priest does not; but does he love music less? has he less refinement of ear, less capability of voice? By no means. The Continental Priest sings that which he is ordered to sing—the English Priest remains silent, and turns it over to a layman. Has the latter less reverence for his duty, less warmth and sincerity in his piety than the former? Assuredly not. What then is the reason for this variety of conduct? Simply this, that the foreigner sings that which from time immemorial the fathers of the Church directed the Priest to sing, and which the wisdom of ancient days settled as the most admirable form in which the Priest's voice could be heard; whereas our countryman is asked to *exhibit* himself in a tune, a tune composed beyond the compass of his voice, and thrown into a form which reason and art refuse to sanction as either proper for his duty or worthy of the Sanctuary.

The three great outward acts of congregational worship are those of the Morning and Evening Prayer and the Litany. The high act of the Church's praise and adoration is that of the Eucharistical Office. From the tenor of the rubrics, from well-known tradition, from the pages of history, and from the analogy which our forms bear to those of Holy Writ, it is incontrovertible that the singing of the Psalms, and that of the Prose Hymns and Canticles, the inflexions of the Responses, Versicles, and Suffrages, are severally congregational acts, and participated in by Minister and people. There only remain for the *representative* act of the Choir, the Anthem, and the Hymns and Creed in the office of the Eucharist, which are the only allowed opportunities for the manifestation of a high order of artistical Church music.

The reason for this distinction between the character of Ritual and Choir Music is obvious. Prayer, Instruction, and Thanksgiving, are severally acts in which the Laity should fully participate, whereas the Church's adoration is a higher, more important, and direct act of communion with the Church above in acknowledgment of the might and mercy of Almighty God. In the introductory address to the Morning and Evening Offices, these four particulars are plainly defined. We meet for Thanksgiving—'to render thanks for the great benefits that we have received at His hands:' Adoration—'to set forth His most worthy praise:' Instruction—'to hear His most Holy word:' and Petition—'to 'ask for those things which are requisite and necessary as well for 'the body as the soul.' Thanksgiving and Praise are rightly distinguished, the former being a grateful acknowledgment of God's mercies, the latter the adoration of His great and glorious perfections. The Thanksgivings of the Church, whether read or sung, are the readings and singings of Priest and congregation, none remain silent, nor do choir singers *perform* them, but only *lead* in the duty and response. Should the Choir perform them in an unintelligible song, the Book of Common Prayer ceases to be, what it in fact is, a book in which these Services are directed to be sung, when sung, by minister and congregation. And it is universally admitted that minister and people did sing the Responses, Hymns, Canticles, and Psalms so long as was retained the only music which the Church had authorized for such purpose. The Church appropriated the ancient Ritual Tones for the congregation in the Doxologies and Creeds, in the Psalms and Hymns of her Morning and Evening Services, and reserved the artistical resources of Counterpoint for the celebration of the Eucharist, and the praises in the Anthem. In these things she authorised a higher song, and since the invention of harmony, a noble and grand artistical Choir service; but she no more permits the caprice of amateurs to introduce into her higher forms of musical worship a medley of secular phraseology, derived from a sensuous school of art, than she permits the Choir to take from the mouths of her children and her Priests her thrilling responses and her daily Psalms. There is an artistical school of Church music for the Choir to sing; but, as this is not that of a Psalm Chant, nor a responsorial inflexion, so it is not a Collectanea from the impure repertories of French, Roman, and Neapolitan chapel orchestras. There is a legitimate school of harmony and music which the Choir executes, when it becomes the representative of the Laity, in the high act of adoration—an act which the Church has thought best consummated by an employment of every resource in musical art which can, with propriety, and in a true spirit of ecclesiastical feeling, be dedicated to the service of the sanctuary. The priests of old were truly designated artist-priests, and took the same interest in the progress of musical art as they did in that of painting and architecture. But they did not permit these advances in music to encroach upon the people's rights, or to lessen the prayers and thanksgivings of the great congregation. We find early examples of descant—the first form of harmony—upon the Antiphon, and the different portions of the Communion Office, but nothing authoritative, demonstrating any attempt to convert the daily office into a vicarious song of choirmen, in which the other worshippers were to stand apart, and take no share. History cannot adduce any early specimen of new Psalm

Chants, or even harmonized Chants; and although, on one occasion, early in the 13th century, a certain French Bishop authorized a harmony on the Vesper Responses, he was justly looked upon as an innovator: and, in later days, when the habit was generally adopted in France[1] of making an *ad libitum* harmony upon the Ritual music, it led to its deterioration, and secured that Church the scorn of Rome, and the derision of all artists. It is admitted that the Te Deum was formerly made a 'Prycked Song' on all occasions of high festivals, &c., but rarely so when sung in its ordinary place in the Matin Office.

There are who contend that the Choir may usurp the voice of the minister and congregation. Such as entertain these opinions, if they rely on authority or ancient usage, are bound to produce some specimens of harmonized music of the 13th to the 16th century—not upon Antiphons, or Eucharistical Canto fermo, but—upon the Responsoria, Invitatorium, Te Deum, Benedicite, Benedictus, Magnificat, Nunc Dimittis, and Litanies. And even should such evidence be advanced, of what avail is it, when we know that in those Churches where it was attempted and failed, priests *now* sing; whereas in those churches where the plain Chant has been harmonized or abandoned for new tunes, and four-part double Chants, both the ministers and the laity are utterly silenced? For ourselves we do not think modern innovations, in place of the plain Song, are better vehicles for the thanksgivings of our Bishops, Priests, and people, than the ancient tones in their integrity; and we cannot conceive any one maintaining that modern harmony is an assistance, and not an hindrance, in prayers and praises which are ordered to be the act of all present. We can excuse the inactivity of our dignitaries, as well as that of the laity, whilst the mysteries of double Chants, and choirman's Canticle 'Service' music, is being sung, but on what ground this conduct is pardoned by those who think such music the natural expression of all lovers of Church Service and Church duty, is more than we can comprehend.

The office of the Eucharist was always one of the most exalted worship; and it is natural that, in this solemn service, the Church willed that her grateful homage should be paid to the Almighty with such a pomp of devotion, such an overflowing of ceremonial and sweetness of melody, as was best calculated to impress the minds and spiritualise the hearts of her children. The words of the office are full of thoughts which lie 'too deep for tears,' and from their wondrous variety afford the sublimest vehicle for musical expression. Prayers so solemn and awful, praises so pure and joyous, became 'the chief of sweet things' to the Church composer; and 'the springs of understanding,' 'the fountains of wisdom,' 'the streams of knowledge,' seem to have been diverted from ordinary channels to swell into one oceanic depth the great current of the Church's utterance, throughout this her highest duty of reverence and love. The office came to be almost entirely rendered through the medium of Choir music, as, in addition to the singing of the 'Kyrie Eleison,' 'Gloria,' 'Credo,' 'Sanctus,' 'Benedictus,' 'Agnus Dei,' there were the occasions of the Introit, Offertorium, Gradual, the Hymn at the Elevation, (usually, 'O Salutaris Hostia,') and the 'Domine Salvum fac Regem,' forming, together, a series of no less than twelve opportunities for the presentation of musical art in connexion with the great mystery of our faith. These hymns and harmonies, sung as they were on certain occasions by a now unknown and unheard number of voices,—for in the Choir of St. Paul's were the Bishop, thirty Canons, twelve Minor Canons, and thirty lay Vicars, besides the Choristers,—must have afforded a striking and beautiful example of the gloriousness of the Christian worship, and a principal aid in impressing upon the minds of the faithful the lessons and mysteries of religion. The Precentor presided; he gave the pitch to the Canon at the altar; he commenced himself the Chants and Sequences, and the Gloria in Excelsis; he assigned to every one what he was to sing, as well to the Minor Canons as other ministers; and so long as the Choir of priest-singers, the veritable 'Clerks,' continued to uphold the Church's songs of praise in these beautiful and artistical compositions, their gracious ministering must have had a soothing effect on the pious mind, and one peculiarly authoritative on the careless or the thoughtless.

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[1] One of the most learned writers on the Church Chants, when describing the French mode of using the ancient Songs of the Church, observes, that harmony on a plain Chant is not taught in France; and the chapel-masters understand so little of this valuable remnant of the Greek music, that the most experienced of them will mistake even the tone of the Chant. They no doubt received it from St. Gregory, but by degrees made great alterations in it, and it was ultimately abandoned for absurd Chants, composed at a period when musical art was most depraved throughout France, and which demonstrate not only ignorance, but the worst possible taste. The extemporary harmony on the Canto fermo, frequently sung in the cathedrals by Choirmen shouting without rule or design, he considers a painful mockery of Church music, and a corruption of thought and feeling neither to be admired nor encouraged.

It is in this point, viz. the celebration of the Liturgy—strictly so-called—that our musical improvement ought to begin. Very unsatisfactory in this particular is the state of things in many Churches, where at least well-meant attempts at a musical celebration have commenced. We have heard the Psalms and Canticles chanted—and the Litany intoned—the Kyries properly sung; and when the Liturgy commenced even such sublimities as have been spared to us, the Sanctus and Gloria in Excelsis were *read* by the celebrant. This is beginning at the wrong end. There are fewer prejudices to encounter among those who are constant communicants: and we cannot but think that this, *the* class which has the greatest right to all the solemnities and beauties of the Church, indeed *the* class to whom alone the Church perhaps is justified in displaying her most majestic aspect, has great reason to complain of the cold, and often repulsive, and always constrained way, in which the Eucharist is celebrated in England.

That was an unhappy day when the clergy resigned the duties of the Choir, since, from this circumstance, the Eucharistical Office lost its outward glory, its sweet attempered songs, its high artistical celebration—symbols of the perfumed incense of joy and thankfulness. And was it because angelical art, purified and made holy in the spirit of our religion, like our first mother—

> 'Would be woo'd, and not unsought be won'

that there were found none endowed with that patient heroism and enduring belief requisite to obtain possession of her gifts? Artistical accomplishment and scientific acquirement in holy art demands not less a determined industry and discipline than that which graces the worldly professional. But if 'poor is 'the wisdom which provides the harp, and song, and all sweets of 'melody for feasts and hours of joy, and has none for days 'of sorrow, to cure the achings of the heart,' how much poorer still is the wisdom which would fit them all for the joys of earth, and leave none for the joys of heaven? If the Steward of the Temple turns aside his face, and with averted eyes sends forth the handmaid of the Church, like Hagar, into the perils of the wilderness of this world, with what of courage or confidence shall she enter again its gates with the escort of servants and menials?

She refused such companionship, and the lay singing-men found their labours terminate in the singing of the Kyrie Eleisons and Sanctus. But the humiliation of the Ceremonial of the Eucharist was by some strange principle of compensation endeavoured to be obviated by the introduction of an inferior kind of harmonized music, applied to the Prose Hymns and Canticles, in the Morning and Evening Prayer. These the lay singers appropriated to themselves; and in process of time, by new Chants, new Metres, and new modes of harmony, exhibited the chanting of the Psalms before the congregation, doubtless in such a manner as might make them appear to be sung; but it was a singing which Churchmen could only witness, not participate in.

There remained, however, the Anthem, for the opportunity of an artistical harmony; and this we consider offers the only legitimate and rubrical opportunity in the Morning and Evening Office for the exhibition of the Church's adorations and praises through the resources of high musical art. As the Anthem is a direct act of praise, it should be adorned with all of beauty, reverence, and devotion, which a wise learning, and chastened imagination, can suggest; for the employment of trained voices, whilst representatives of the thoughts and feelings of a worshipping laity, and praising Him whose name is great, wonderful, and holy, and whose praise 'ought to be glorious according to His excellent greatness.' It is usually a composition in four or more parts, contained in the range of three octaves, or twenty-two notes, from G gamut, to G in alt, entirely sustained by voices, and requiring no necessary accompaniment from the organ or any other instrument.[1] There is a school of Anthem writing, which has the accompaniment of an orchestra, but this is not the genuine Anthem of the English Church. So, also, one with an organ *obligato* accompaniment; but this is inconsistent with that style which the Church has considered, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, characteristic of her worship.

The principles of the mechanism of the Anthem address themselves rather to the reason than the imaginative faculties. It is the creation of intellectual action, the offspring of a reflective and profound feeling. The composer eschews striking and novel conformations, any great profusion of point or gorgeousness of harmony. A broad dignified theme must be its causation, and an unbroken unity of design its progression; the subsequent matter must only suit the original theme, for one phrase must beget the next; B must be created and evolved out of A, and C out of B: after the manner that 'the serpent 'moves, which makes a fulcrum of its own body, and seems 'for ever twisting and untwisting its own strength.' Every idea must grow out of, and be naturally deducible from, the theme; since the theme is the original cause of all which is to follow. To throw into a vast and magnificent whole an apparently simple thought, which originally seems to convey no emotion, and excite no surprise, by a scientific handling of the limited gamut of three octaves, and the combination of its details, agreeably to the laws sanctioned by the Church—this power has not been given to man without its stern accompaniment, the solitary life, the unwearied and energetic application, a more than ordinary intellectual endowment, and the perseverance which marks the career of genius and poetical temperament. It is not a reproduction, but a new creation, not the imitation of a school, but its continuation. To write such Anthems 'comes by Nature,' but not without its companion, 'reading;' and although the absence of inspiration will prevent its attainment, its presence is of small value without the assistance of a practised learning to guide its career. It is a

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We need hardly say, that the English Anthem is the same kind of composition as the Latin Motett.

mere nothing without discipline, nothing without its fetters; fetters, however, which genius hitherto has found a band of roses. We do not love the true Church Anthem, as some suppose, merely because its conditions of construction belong to olden times—for we are willing to admit 'the froward retention of custom may be as turbulent a thing as an innovation'—but no reason can justify the desertion of propriety and excellence, simply because such have endured for centuries, and will yet continue to assert their claims for centuries to come.[1]

The spirit of the Church Anthem is characteristic of a calm joyfulness, a most sweet dignity; and these elevated charms may be traceable from the hidden secrets of its symmetries or rhythm,—which are not the analogies of modern acceptation,—from the close and, as it were, logical opposition of its imitation points, the wondrous variety of its cadences, and the exquisitely apparent regularity, yet, to modern ears, wayward flow, of its harmony. If it be merely a collocation of scientific proportions, it is unquestionably a most dull and dry affair, and deservedly to be decried by the learned and lovers of ancient lore, as well as by the uninformed or half-informed. For although its direct appeal is to the intellectual faculty, yet it must secure an ideal result which shall refer itself to the imagination; and should it possess this result, it will act upon the feelings, divested and free from any technical or critical knowledge, by sustaining or elevating them, and reproducing in the breasts of the worshippers those emotions which led to the creation of the composition. To make others feel, we must first feel ourselves; and if there be no holiness or reverence in the mind of the musician, there will be neither of these emotions in the hearts of his auditors. Any composition, therefore, which has a tendency to elevate the mechanism above the emotion, will fail in portraying the characteristics of the genuine Church Anthem. The moment the pleasure resulting from musical composition appeals to physical sense, it ceases to give the right expression of the highest ideal form of composition, which is that of appealing to the passionless mind, free from any sensuous associations. This appeal to the mind is made through the agency either of the sublime or the beautiful—the principle of the first being a concealment of the analogies or symmetries that govern the character and conduct of the composition, that of the second being its most transparent and perfect intelligibility throughout. Thus the motetts of Palestrina, Vittoria, and Byrde class with the former, and the little anthems of Tye, Farrant, and Creyghton with the latter. The Kyrie Eleison of Beethoven's wonderful Mass is one of the highest examples of the beautiful in music, whilst the Credo, in parts, may be considered that of the sublime. But the emotions of the sublime and beautiful differ according to the means or media by which they are conveyed to the mind. The sublime created by voices alone is one thing—that by voices and a large orchestra, another. So also with the beautiful. A chaste solo sung in a small chapel to the accompaniment of a great player on the violoncello (as was the case in the Chapel Royal, *temp.* Charles II.) may be an example of the beautiful in music; but whether this order of musical beauty is that required for the solemnization of worship in a Cathedral or parish Church, is another question. A lady exquisitely attired and jewelled for the reception of her friends at an evening party, can scarcely be considered appropriately costumed for her duties at Daily Prayer.

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[1] It is a well known fact, that the changes in structure which Church music has undergone, and of which some are so enamoured, have been brought about by the popular influence of operatic and secular music. One mechanism has supplied the place of two. There is, therefore, a fair presumption that the music of the olden school, which was purely the offspring of ecclesiastical feeling, is the best.

The principles of the sublime and beautiful in music, whether for that of the Church or the world without, are the same, and will remain unchangeable. The exquisite parables of Palestrina and the Oriental imaginings of Beethoven flow from one and the same source; and he who derides the motett of the Roman, will usually be found in the same breath to sneer at the Mass of the German. The world of art was in its youth when the former perfected his school, nor had it begun to fade when the latter produced its counterpart. Each in their generation drew into the sanctuary the result of centuries. Palestrina took the Church gamuts as he found them; but he saw clearly that, by the inventions of the chromatic semitones, the peculiar bearings and dependencies of one gamut might be transposed, and become an integral part of another; and hence his writings point in a more distinct manner than those of any of his predecessors to the true principles of Church composition, that of the assembling of all the wondrous variety of combination and cadence, occasioned by every succession of scales of which the Church permits the use, in any one central point.[1] Purcel was the first in England who took up this secret of mixing the harmonies of the scales, but in many instances his forms are open to most serious objections. Sebastian Bach, with less of the calmness, austerity, and simplicity of expansion marking the Roman founder of his school, raised a massive fabric of sound, which, however difficult or complicated, was traceable to the same means, and stole on the minds of the hearers with a freshness, vigour, and strength of unity, which, however varied the detail or rich the expression, was yet a genuine form of Church art. His material was more extended than that of Palestrina, as he employs the use of the orchestra and the great organ of his country in combination with his voices. He admits the free employment of all the Church scales in transposition, and resigns no one feature of their peculiarities; and however he might approve the work of Galeazzo Sabbatini, the theory of his contemporary, Francesco Durante, the Neapolitan, that arch-traitor against the free liberties of Church music, came too late, and, indeed, was too unsound, for the broad and expansive views of the half-monkish Lutheran. Of Beethoven no more need be said than that he considered his acquisitions of the varied scales and their lofty harmonies as a kind of direct revelation to himself. He would not condescend to be drawn into an argument. 'Two things,' said he, 'I eschew: all discussion about religion and thorough bass.'

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[1] This great composer, of course, only used the tones authorized by the Church. Indeed, the chromatic tones of ancient Greece seem to be a matter of doubt and much question. Choron describes the Church gamuts as 'the degenerated tones of the Greeks;' but these scales could be in nowise degenerated, simply because diatonic, or because the Greeks employed others in their Pagan worship which the Christians refuse to recognise or admit into their purer and more holy ceremonial.

These three schools of music are each sublime and beautiful, and free from all worldliness, but are of different orders, and must not be mixed.[1] We have brought them together to show that the style of the prince of ancient ecclesiastical harmony is no unsymmetrical, uncouth, and barbarous result, but an ever-living creation, because containing the ideal product of fine art, and which, as our Choirs exist, and our means of celebration permit, offers the *ideal of excellence in harmonized composition for the sanctuary.* If there are points at which the world laughs in the works of Palestrina, there are certainly many more in Beethoven offering the same opportunity for so thoughtless a result. No doubt much prejudice has been created against the early school by examples found in incompetent writers of false accent, imperfect outline, incongruous association, incorrect harmony, unsymmetrical relations, and an ignorance of the best modes of clothing the ideas, and developing their progress. But such errors are still seen every day; the blessings of music-paper are not rare, and our own age certainly has small right to be very strict about the musical errors of its predecessors. To set down, however, the results of vanity and weakness in old writers as features inherent and essential in that school of composition, is, of all things, the most absurd. But, with all the errors of these older compositions, it should be recollected, that they contain the real principles of Anthem writing; and surely a solid genuine Church composition, if even incorrect in symmetry or arrangement, is to be preferred to a poor imitation of a sentimental glee. And let us bear in mind that it is often no difficult task to put these errors into better form, or to excise the incongruous expression. Zelter was accustomed to 'clear away the scum of a Sebastian Bach, that he 'might leave him nothing but the pure liquid;' and that which was necessary for so great a composer, may be hardly thought less necessary for those to whom the German was as a giant.

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[1] In one particular they agree, that of invariably failing in a concert-room. Out of the Church they have no life.

It is curious that the genuine school of Church harmony music should have been so often identified with unscientific associations. How frequently is the remark made—'It is all 'very well, and really wonderful for the time it was written; 'but what a pity it is that the old composers had not a better 'chance, for were they living now what glorious music they 'would write?' There was not so much ignorance in the days of Palestrina as is imagined; and the truth is, that whilst we have been acquiring new modes of relations in music, we have also been busily engaged in shutting out and decrying the old. We have chosen to set up two false idols in the form of a major and minor scale, and to create from them a system of harmony which, if it does not exclude, yet throws into the background, a whole series of combinations which neither taste nor time can annihilate. A major scale means no more than that the third of that scale is the greater third and not the lesser. A minor scale means that the third employed is the lesser third; as to the sixth and seventh, no agreement, it would seem, has been made, for some theorists decide on the greater sixth and seventh in ascent, and the minor seventh and sixth in descent, whilst others determine on the lesser sixth and greater seventh, both in ascending and descending. The two forms are



But the question may be naturally asked—'How is it that if 'there may be two thirds and two sixths in the gamut, why 'may there not be two seconds and two fourths?' And if we look to the ancient music of the Church, we shall find such admissions were granted, for the Phrygian scale (or scale of the lesser second) gives the required second, and the Lydian scale (or that of the greater fourth) the required fourth. Dr. Boyce, in his Cathedral music, describes the compositions in each particular key (or tone) as 'with the greater third' or 'the lesser 'third,' as the case may be. If we were to get rid of the Pagan terms for the keys not generally used, and follow Dr. Boyce's example, we should describe Palestrina's music in the same way. In place of writing 'Motett in the Mixo-Lydian Mode,' we should write 'Motett in G with the lesser seventh.' Instead of 'Jubilate in the Phrygian,' we should write 'Jubilate in E 'with the lesser second;' or 'Magnificat in F with the greater 'fourth,' in place of 'Magnificat in the Lydian.'

Music being a symmetrical combination of the analogies of sound either heard successively or together, the sole question in regard to the older harmony music may be considered to be, the truth and propriety of its analogies, and their symmetrical connexion. Modern association of ideas may lead to the conclusion that there is no connexion between A and B, or C and D, and yet such may subsist both in nature and art. Palestrina probably had no conception that such a passage as this,



if investigated mathematically, was the result of one prime or root,[1] that of G gamut, standing on the first line of the bass cleff; but yet he well knew such analogies did exist, for how often has he written



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[1] The student may parse it thus:—G, prime; B natural, greater third; D, fifth; F natural, lesser seventh; A flat, lesser ninth; C natural, diatonic eleventh; E flat, lesser thirteenth. Add the G gamut on the bottom bass line, and figure the intervals of each chord according to this formula. Every note is a vibration, deducible from G, the primitive or generator.

The Church knows nothing of major or minor scales, but her proportions from the key tone to its octave are as follows:



Here are no chromatic notes; all are the natural parts of her gamuts: viz.

One Prime	
Two Seconds Two Thirds Two Fourths	one the greater, the other the lesser.
One Fifth	
Two Sixths Two Sevenths	one the greater, the other the lesser.
and	
One Eighth.	

And this is the gamut of Palestrina.[1] The modern gamut is essentially different, as it includes the chromatic notes not found in the Church scales, and these are:



forming an addition of two modified or passing primes, one increased second, one lessened fourth, one lessened and one increased fifth, one increased sixth, one lessened and one increased eighth.

The combination of the Church scales with the chromatic notes formed the gamut of Beethoven, which we extract from his 'Studien.'



The natural scales, or those which consist of mere consonant proportions, are of two kinds, but each without either seconds or sevenths.

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[1] It may be tested by transposing any composition of the old writers into the key of C. The notes C, D, and G, are sharpened, when penultimates, but transpose the passages and they will resolve into the genuine gamut.



The auxiliary notes (the second and seventh) being discordant when considered in relation to the prime or generator, it cannot matter whether they be less or great, or, in other words, Phrygian, or Mixo-Lydian. They become matters of taste and association. But in relation to the Dominant or fifth of the key, the aspect is altogether changed. D flat becomes a changed fifth to G (in the key of C) with modern writers, but it is not so with the olden. Hence it is that the latter had a great range in the matter of what is termed 'false relation,' or, in other words, a want of coherency in the bearings and progress of their harmonies.

As modern theorists have arbitrarily thrown music into only two forms of scale, called major and minor,[1] so they have confined the range of harmony within a weak and meagre boundary. There are, they affirm, three chords for the major scale and three for the minor; and these are tonic, subdominant, and dominant; thus—



The major key is therefore compelled to move in chords of the same kind; the minor, however, has a variation, having one major and two minor triads. The modern scale for Church harmony contrasted with the ancient, will show how far any musician of the present day can with justice charge the ancient composers with a want of materials for the exercise of their genius. The first consists of three harmonies with the greater third, three with the lesser, and one with the fifth diminished.



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[1] The proper word for major scale is, that with the greater third, and for minor, the plagal or relative scale with the lesser third. Minor scales are plagals to major.

The ancient harmony scale is thus:



Here are two harmonies on the prime, five on the seconds, four on the thirds, four on the fourths, two on the fifth, four on the sixths, and seven on the sevenths.

From C to its octave will be found no less than twenty-eight varieties upon the mere simple unassisted triad: what these varieties lead to when combined with the discords of the seventh, ninth, eleventh, and thirteenth, may be in some degree conjectured.[1] They may be described as the Harmonies of the Church scales, brought by transposition to one centre, and without a knowledge of which it is impossible to parse or construe a single page of Palestrina, Purcel, Bach, or Beethoven. Purcel sooner than any other composer brought them together, but Bach perfected the system Palestrina commenced. Dr. Crotch writes of Purcel that 'his machinery was so *vast*,' his followers ceased 'to imitate that which they 'could neither control nor direct.' Dr. Crotch wrote his Lectures thirty years ago, and since that time much has been written to show how these things were done, and how they are still to be done.

But a knowledge of harmony will not suffice alone for the creation of a grand school of Church writing. As a great orator comprehended all oratory in the words 'action, action, 'action,' so we say breadth, breadth, breadth. The most difficult feature to pourtray next to that of richness of harmony, is a true symmetry which, by its expansion, shall not be transparent at the first hearing. Herein is Palestrina's glory, as well as Purcel's and Bach's. In this respect our English cathedral writers generally are sadly deficient. Take as an example the puritanical anthem of William Mundy, that set to the King's Primer Hymn, 'O Lord, the Maker of all thing,'[1] is it not as true and close as any of Child's written half a century afterwards.

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[1] We wrote down 136 varieties, without taking pen from paper, to a musical friend, who was rather incredulous on this interesting subject. And yet the greatest theorist of France declares there are only thirteen chords, and the most distinguished of Germany, only sixteen! In fact, nearly 3000 compound harmonies can be deduced from the Church gamuts.



There was yet a weaker school, and this was that of the imitators of the broad and salient characteristics of the Church cadences. These writers are like the pulpit orators, who fire off a volley of texts of Scripture one after the other without either order or reason, simply because a word in one quotation suggests the recollection of the next. To those who know the cadences of the modes, such writing is of all things the most melancholy: those who do not may like to see the formulæ, and we quote them as containing by far the best portions of our cathedral 'services,' from Gibbons' to the present century.

I.



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[1] This Anthem has been attributed to Henry VIII., but its style fixes its creation some thirty or forty years after the death of that monarch.

II.



III.



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

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

VI.



VII.



VIII.



Of the publications that head this notice, we think that entitled 'Anthems and Services for Church Choirs' bears the palm for intrinsic merit; and when we say that there are, in the numbers already published, more than fifty Anthems, and a long and most magnificent Communion Office, of Kyrie, Creed, Sanctus, and Gloria, the composition of Palestrina, and that the price of the whole together does not exceed sixteen shillings, we presume it will be considered unparalleled in its economical details. It has been undertaken in a right feeling and with a proper direction, for, when completed, it will furnish an abundant supply of Choir music for all the general, as well as special, occasions throughout the ecclesiastical year. There has hitherto been no attempt made, in any practical or acceptable form, to present the Church with appropriate compositions for the different seasons and festivals; we have had works of composers, specimens of schools, motetts of Neapolitans, masses of Germans, arrangements of Handel—anything and everything belonging to this or that individual has been brought into the sanctuary as Church music, but the feelings and needs of the ecclesiastics and the laity, the requirements of the services and the Priests, seemed to have been overlooked. Throughout these numbers, there is nothing that any member of the Clergy might feel the slightest objection to share in celebrating; there is the broad phrasing and magnificent detail of Palestrina, the sweet pathos of Tallis, the pure outline and calm dignity of Gibbons, the ceaseless flow of Orlando di Lasso, the grave beauty of Farrant, with a most judicious selection from Vittoria—of whom many very fine specimens are given—Casciolini, Allegri, Anerio, Nanino, &c. The noble expansion and wondrous closes of the great Roman composer may take some little time to master; and we think nothing will tend more to the speedy amendment of our Choir singing than a sedulous practice of the Palestrina compositions. The jewel of the first number, 'O praise the Lord,' by Palestrina, is, without exception, a masterpiece of thought and execution; 'Hear my Prayer,' by Tallis, is one of the best specimen we have seen of this venerable master, and is a combination of high beauty and deep pathos. But perhaps the great feature is the noble music of Palestrina to the whole of the Communion Office. What Canon is there in St. Paul's or Westminster Abbey who will, like the late zealous Dean of Wells, (Dr. Goodenough,) gather his choir together after service, and gain the mastery over his most excellent creation, too long an exotic from our churches and cathedrals?

The Te Deum of Dr. Mendelssohn we like less than any composition we have yet seen from his pen. He takes pride to himself that he can write in all known schools of standard composition, and has presented the English Church with a Te Deum, written in the modern scale with the short phrases, verse passages, and dwarfish points, that mark the English Church music of the last and present century. The only features that please us are the right division of the hymn, the return to the original motivo (or subject) at the verse, 'Thou art the King of Glory,' and the close of the composition beginning at the words, 'Vouchsafe, O Lord,' where the composer seems suddenly to have sailed out from his narrow creek and launched himself fairly into the bosom of the broad sea. If it be any credit to say of it that it is the best specimen we have seen of a bad school, Dr. Mendelssohn is entitled to this meed of commendation; fortunately it is not his natural style, and his excuse is, we believe, that it was made to order. Dr. Mendelssohn has done and will yet do great things for Church Music.

The last number of the collection, published by the Motett Society, includes six anthems of Croce, one by Vittoria, one by Hooper, and a Gloria in Excelsis and Sanctus by Dr. Blow. The Italians show a great superiority over the two Englishmen in that practised habit of composition which insures a ready flow and perfect intelligibility in the progress of their work. But former numbers of this work include more creditable examples of English talent and more varied ones of foreign.

In the Anthems of Dr. Boyce there is here and there something to approve; but taken as a whole, his music is unequal, and often inappropriate to the services of our Church. We believe the popular favourites are the Anthems, 'Wherewithal shall a young man,' 'By the waters of Babylon,' and, 'O where shall Wisdom be found?' The first is without excuse a dry, cold, and inelegant composition; the second is liked for the little serious glee inserted as an intermezzo; and the third although clever, marked by much contrast, and boasting as pretty a trio as was ever written for the catch or the glee clubs, is at an incalculable distance separated from the genuine school of Anthem writing. The whole of this author's Service music (as it is miscalled) is beneath criticism; and as it ought never to have been applied to such portions of our Offices, we trust it will soon fall into disuse.

A circular rather widely disseminated has announced the speedy publication of 'The Bangor Cathedral Collection of Church Music,' a work, it would seem, undertaken by the Dean of Bangor, who solicits subscriptions, which are received 'at the Deanery.' It is to consist, not of any manuscripts, or excerpta found in the Collegiate Library or ancient Antiphonarium, peculiar to Bangor Cathedral, but 'A selection from the works of Astorga, Bach, Caldara, Curschman, Graun, Gossec, Handel, Haydn, M. Haydn, Mozart, Naumann, Pergolesi, Righini, and Winter.' The words newly adapted in English, 'for the use of Churches and families.' The public are informed that 'the work 'has been approved of by all the organists of cathedral and 'collegiate Churches who have examined it;' and that 'copies 'have already been taken by several of the capitular bodies, and by 'professors and amateurs in London and the country.' But what follows is still more extraordinary. 'The following names are 'selected from the list of subscribers, to whom reference may be 'made :—

'The Dean and Chapter of Westminster.
'The Organist of Westminster.
'The Dean and Chapter of Winchester.
'The Organist of Winchester.
'The Dean and Chapter of Chester.
'The Organist of Chester.
'The Deans and Chapters of Bangor, Chichester, Ripon, and Salisbury.
'The Organist of the Chapel Royal, Brighton, &c. &c. &c.'

It is the disgrace of the age that our dignified clergy feel no hesitation in admitting their general ignorance of the real character and tendency of Church music. Our musicians share the sin, but alone bear the punishment. What has Mons. Gossec written—what has Herr Curschman conceived—that the organist and chapter of Bangor cathedral should fold them in their robes and honours and bear them triumphantly into the high places of our Holy Church? Again, Handel and Bach wrote nothing for Bangor, nor for any English Cathedral; their compositions require voices and orchestral accompaniments, and a far greater number of voices than the dean and chapter of Bangor are willing to provide for. Haydn's Masses were written for the small chapel of a private nobleman, and are totally unfit for any Church, being wanting in every essential of real Church music. Mozart lived to lament the misdirection of his high genius in the matter of Church music—was born a Church musician, and so christened, one would imagine, from his name, 'John, Chrysostom, St. Wolfgang, Gottlieb [Theophilus], Mozart,' but died, alas! on the morning of his first essay. Naumann was the composer of twenty-one operas, first master of the little electoral chapel, Dresden, and then of the Chapel Royal, Berlin. Pergolesi was composer to a little comic theatre in Naples, and wrote seven rather successful operas. Righini wrote fifteen operas for the theatre in Berlin. Winter was at Munich, and wrote not less than twenty-seven operas and melo-dramas for the theatre.

The Masses of these opera composers were written for the orchestras of the obscure personages to whose court they were attached, and were usually the *opera seria* of the morning, sung by the same vocalists who were to sing the *opera buffa* at night. The lady singers, whose vocal exertions were necessary to secure their continuance of favour and support, were too often not of the most immaculate character. The composers were altogether in their power; and the result, as might be expected, was a succession of Liturgical music disgraceful to the continental Church, and justly unpopular in the English. By what crime has the poor Church of Bangor suffered, that she should be visited with this humiliation? Let her have fair play; and as we now know the severity of her punishment, in justice let us know her offence.

The Winchester Cathedral publication consists of the harmonized intonations to the Morning and Evening Offices, the Litany, certain portions of the Communion Office, a voluminous collection of single and double Chants, by 'eminent composers;' canticle Chants and canticle harmonized music (alias 'services'), by Jackson, Kent, King, and Matthews; and a collection of Anthems, containing specimens from the works of Cecil, Chard, Gibbons, Hooper, Mason, Mozart, and Spohr. Among the subscribers are, the Lord Bishop of Oxford, the Venerable Archdeacons of Montgomery and Hobart Town, Rev. Lord A. Hervey, Rev. Sir H. R. Dukinfield, Bart., and thirty-four other highly respectable clergymen, including the Precentor of Winchester Cathedral.

With the harmonized music we have at present chiefly to do. The so-called 'services,' by Jackson, Kent, King, and Matthews, are confessed 'not to be the best, or as belonging to the highest 'class of Church music, but the editor is fully persuaded that 'any attempt to use the more elaborate compositions of our 'great masters *too soon* must end in disappointment.' 'But in 'commencing the practice of choral music, compositions, which 'a more severe criticism might exclude, are admissible, if not 'absolutely necessary.' In this view 'nothing will be found in 'the work but what will meet with the approval of competent 'judges.' And such is the miserable special pleading in defence of those who turn the order of our congregational service from its right direction, into one of impossibilities. The Church directs the people to sing the hymns, but nowhere requires the practice of choral (*i.e.* harmonized) music for this purpose. Legitimate hymn music the Church *has* provided, and adapted for persons 'whose mental and musical cultivation is not equal to give due effect to compositions of a high character.' And glorious and most magnificent is this music, and universal is it, for all Christendom can sing it.

Mr. Jackson's service in F is more like 'The Red Cross 'Knight,' or 'Life's a Bumper,' than anything we have ever seen. The following passage from the *Cantate Domino* is a fair specimen:—


With his own right hand, and with his ho - ly arm, hath he
got - ten him - self the vic - to - ry.

and this from the Te Deum:—


To thee Che - ru - bin and Se - ra - phin con-
tin - ual - ly do cry.

Mr. Kent is in the same vein:—


Con - tin - ual - ly con - tin - ual - ly do
cry - - - Ho - ly

which he retains to the close of his Te Deum:—


O let me ne - ver be con - founded, let me
ne - ver be con - founded, be con - found - ed.

So Mr. Mathews in his Te Deum:—


To thee Che - ru - bin and Se - ra - phin con-
tin- ual - ly do cry.

and his Jubilate:—


O go your way in - to his gates, in - to his gates with thanks-
giv-ing, with thanks-giv - ing, And in - to his courts, his
courts with praise, Be thank-ful un - to him.

Such is the issue of the attempt to make a new congregational tune in place of the authorized ritual one; an attempt which has created a school of harmonized music in the English Church infinitely more contemptible and profane than the worst of the most illiterate of conventicle precentors. Nothing of Dr. Rippon, Mr. Walker, Mr. Jarman, Mr. Moreton, Mr. Leach, Mr. Stanley, Mr. Clark, or in the Union and Congregational Tune Books, can equal in bad taste and shameless irreverence the services of such writers as the above. When shall we hear our own music once again to the Te Deum? Such strains as these:—[1]



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[1] From an MS. Antiphonarium (Sarum), 1470, just published, in Four Parts (Burns).


ly, - - Ho - - - ly, - - - - -
Lord God of Sa - - - ba - oth.

The Psalter contains eighty Chants, nearly all of them noticed in the recent article on 'Ritual Music,' which appeared in the last July Number of this Review, and some novelties which will create surprise. Let the reader refer to the Chants in B flat, by Mr. Heathcote, and that in F, by Mr. Long, as curiosities in their way.

Certain Chants, called 'the Gregorian Tones,' are also inserted in the Psalter, of which the editor declares 'the melodies 'have been taken from the originals, and for some of the harmo'nies reference has been made to some edition of them by Mr. 'Novello.' The whole affair is a mistake, unless Mr. Hullah's Psalter be 'the original:' the Chants are nowise like the ancient psalm Chants of our Church, and they and their harmonies are as bad and as clumsy as they can be, whoever may be the arranger.

The little Antiphonal contains the well known and admirable Collect by Gibbons, 'Almighty and everlasting God;' Mr. Mason's Collect, 'Lord of all Power'; an *Ave Verum* by Mozart; the Benedictus from Spohr's Oratorio of 'the Last Judgment;' two smooth anthems by Dr. Chard and the Rev. Mr. Hooper; and an Introit by the Rev. Mr. Cecil, which, being barred in triple time instead of common, is one series of confusion and false accent. Such is Mr. Binfield's Collectarium of Psalter, Canticle, and Anthem Music for the English Church.

The York Anthem Book is a new and enlarged edition of the celebrated production by the Rev. W. M. Mason, Precentor and Canon Residentiary of that cathedral, and first published in 1782, with rather an ambitious preface of about forty pages, entitled, 'An Historical and Critical Essay on Cathedral music,' from the pen of the Precentor. The Canticle music for the daily offices used in York Minster is as of a poor and debased a character as can be imagined. The catalogue shows that the hymns and creeds of our Liturgy are set forth to such counterpoints, as have long been banished from more southern Choirs. Amongst the writers of these things are: 'John Marsh, an amateur of Chichester; 'Wilton, an amateur of York; C. W. Hempel, of Truro; Mr. 'Latrobe, Valentine Nelson, Edward Finch, and Thomas 'Bridgwater.' Samuel Porter supplies two 'services,' William Jackson three, Dupuis four, Sir John Stevenson two, Clarke Whitfield seven, John Smith one, Attwood two, Kent two, King five, Travers two, Nares three, Hayes one, and Boyce three. There are two Tudor 'Services' by Tallis and Farrant; one by Gibbons and four by the Stuart writers Wise, Rogers, and Child; whilst Blow, Purcell, Hall, Aldrich, Goldwin, Tudway, and Croft, supply one each. Of these sixty-six offices, very few are proper for an English cathedral; and when we mention those by Gibbon, Wise, Rogers, Child, Blow, Purcel, and Croft, we select the full complement. The Tudor Services happen not to be music, and the modern ones are only fit for meeting-houses and the anniversaries of conventicles.

The York Choir Books, from the catalogue in this book, contain no less than 309 anthems. The proportion of good to bad is extraordinary. Tallis one, Clarke Whitfield eighteen, Farrant one, Kent sixteen, Palestrina (doctored by Aldrich) one, the Camidges nine, Ebdon eleven, Rogers one, Corfe ten, Creighton one, Nares twenty, Lock one, Stevenson seven, Webbe eight, Jackson four, Bond five, Beckwith four; Correlli, Graun, Fiocco, Millico, Pergolesi, Steffani, and Marcello, afford one each; Haydn's Oratorios and Masses eight; Mozart's Masses and Operas nine. The arrangers of these things are Mr. Gardiner, Jonathan Gray, Esq., Mr. Pratt, and Dr. Camidge. The latter has adapted the favourite song from the opera 'Il flauto Magico,' ('*Qui sdegno,*')[1] and so successfully that it has become a great favourite with the choir and congregation. Nor do the dignitaries disapprove, for the editor of the new edition, the Rev. Charles Hawkins, B.C.L., Canon Residentiary of the Cathedral and Vicar of Stillingfleet, Escrick, assures his readers that 'the adapted Anthems' have been selected 'from the best German and Italian composers:' that 'the example was set by

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[1] This song is set to the words, 'For look how high the heaven is in comparison of the earth,' &c. Ps. ciii.

Dr. Aldrich and others;' and that in modern times Mr. Bond, the organist of St. Mary Arches, Exeter, and Mr. Pratt, organist of King's College, Cambridge, led the way 'by the happy selection of *the most favourite* pieces of Handel and Mozart;' and that the example of these recondite musicians has been 'more 'or less successfully followed by Dr. Camidge, the Rev. W. 'Taylor, and other amateurs in their adaptations of Haydn's 'Creation, Mozart's Masses,' &c. &c.

The Oratorios of Handel supply about one sixth part of the Cathedral music in York Minster. Everybody seems to have had a hand in dressing up this composer in his pontifical habiliments. Upwards of forty pieces are selected, among them are:—

Air, 'Glory to God,' Joshua—Air, 'O liberty,' Judas Maccabeus—Air, 'Let the bright Seraphim,' Samson—Air, 'Sing unto God,' Judas Maccabeus—Air, 'From this unhappy day,' Saul—Air, 'An infant raised,' Saul—Air, 'With pious hearts,' Judas Maccabeus—Air, 'Shall I in Mamre's fertile plains,' Joshua—Air, 'As great Jehovah,' Saul—Air, 'Return, O God,' Samson—Air, 'Pour forth no more,' Jephthah—Air, 'Tears such as,' Deborah—Air, 'In sweetest harmony,' Saul—Air, 'When storms the proud,' Athaliah—Air, 'What tho' I trace,' Solomon—Duet, 'I'll proclaim,' Esther—Duet, 'Pious orgies,' Judas Maccabeus—Duet, 'Cease thine anguish,' Athaliah—Duet, 'Hail Judea, happy land,' Judas Maccabeus—Duet, 'Here labours past,' Jephthah—Duet, 'Sion now her head,' Judas Maccabeus—Duet, 'Joys in gentle strains,' Athaliah—Chorus, 'The Dead March,' Saul—Quartet, 'The youth inspired,' Saul—Quartet, 'Mourn, ye afflicted,' Judas Maccabeus—Quartet, 'O lovely youth,' Saul—Quartet, 'Mourn, Israel,' Saul—Chorus, 'Lead on, lead on,' Judas Maccabeus—Chorus, 'All applauding,' Esther—Chorus, 'We come in bright array,' Judas Maccabeus—Chorus, 'O Judah, boast,' Athaliah—Chorus, 'Let the celestial concerts,' Samson—Chorus, 'Fallen is the foe,' Judas Maccabeus, &c. &c. &c. &c.

No one will assert that Handel's oratorio music is not better than the 'Pastoral Symphony' of Corelli, the 'Gloria in Excelsis' of Pergolesi, 'Fallen is thy throne' of Millico, 'Graceful consort,' 'Now vanish,' 'With verdure clad,' 'By thee with bliss,' 'Most beautiful appear,' 'The marvellous works,' 'Awake the harp,' 'Now heaven,' 'Achieved is the work,' 'In splendour bright,' 'The Lord is great,' and all the other concoctions heard in York Minster, from the semi-operatic Masses of Haydn and Mozart; but the York musicians are chargeable with the great want of judgment in overlooking the really good Choir music of Handel, and preferring the very worst and most inappropriate to church service. 'Let the bright seraphim,' 'Sing unto God,' 'When storms the proud,' 'Hail, Judea,' 'Lead on,' 'Fallen is the foe,' 'Awake the trumpet,' 'Chemosh no more,' 'And grant a leader,' 'The Lord commands,' and 'The Dead March in Saul,' are descriptive music, written in a secular strain, and in most churches in

London we are happy to say would be thought great indecencies, and a total destruction to all good feeling and reverent decorum.

Mr. Mason's essay is an extraordinary condensation of ignorance on every subject connected with Ritual and Choir music; and it is to be regretted that any dignitary of the present day could have thought it right to re-issue it without note or comment. The author confesses to its being 'short and superficial,' but he hopes it will 'go some way towards abating an ill-grounded deference to antiquity merely because it is antiquity.' Antiquity and Mr. Mason were a long way asunder, and disagreed in every point of truth, wisdom, and beauty. Antiquity demonstrates the practice of heralding in song the symbols of our faith. Mr. Mason declares that 'creeds being of necessity 'narrative, and a solemn declaration of our faith, ought not to be 'accompanied with any music whatever—music being only use'ful to express sentiments of supplication, penitence, or thanks'giving.' Antiquity looked upon worship as not for man, but for the Lord God, and upon the privilege of joining in the Creed as a cause of thanksgiving to all members of the Christian fold. Mr. Mason was for utilitarianism and mere edification. He boldly asserts that previous to the Reformation 'the psalmo'dical and supplicatory parts, the Epistle and Gospel, were all 'sung, not in simple intonation or chant, but to music, in figura'tive descant of varied figure and elaborate canon.' Antiquity shows that neither the Psalms, Preces, Litany, Te Deum, Hymns, Epistle, or Gospel, were sung in harmony music, or in any other way than to the solemn Ritual music of the Christian Church, which priests and people could and can sing. It was reserved for far later days to invent a school of music to our responsorial worship which should stop all voices but those of singing men and little boys. Of the Psalter, he wished that 'a Cathedral Psalter was composed by judicious persons, in 'which every Psalm should have a peculiar Chant affixed to it, 'but for this purpose no new chant need be invented; and as the 'metrical Psalms have long had their peculiar harmonies, so those 'in prose should have their peculiar Chants.'[1]

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[1] It would be unjust to deprive York Cathedral of a singular peculiarity in her Psalter music. The following melody is known as the 'York Chant':—



Of the Responses, he thinks little; 'their long prescriptive use 'is their best defence, and, although monotonous, yet in large 'churches they serve to make the voice more audible, and prevent 'fine reading, which is as misplaced in service as *curious* (or 'figured) music.' The Canticle music, he says, is peculiar to the English Church, and being 'all composed after Byrde's old 'model, is defective in intelligibility.' To cure this, at York, he took in hand Mr. Camidge the organist, and suggested a scheme for the composition of 'Camidge's service in F,' which he thinks unequalled 'for unaffected simplicity of style, agreeable variety 'in modulation, and, in point of articulation, as intelligible as 'solemn speaking.' He gives his receipt thus:—'I read the 'shortest hymn over to him, and when he had got a sentence

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And this as one of those from the celebrated pen of the organist:—



We presume, were Mr. Mason living, even he would have been perfectly satisfied with these 'spirited and melodial subjects,' and with the happy audacity and innocent freedom that mark their construction. York, at all events, has now thoroughly abated every scintilla of reverence for the ways of antiquity; and if Mr. Mason's admirers are not content, we trust Dr. Rippon's are fully so.

'perfectly in his head, he wrote down a variety of minims, 'crotchets, and quavers, equivalent to the times of my pronunciation, either in common or triple time, as convenient. Proceeding, he produced the whole Hymn in musical time, according to my recitation. I told him this was the ground plan for 'the new service, that he was not to lengthen or shorten a single 'note or vary a rest, and that his harmony must proceed under 'the same limitations. He pleaded for a few repetitions to facilitate modulation, but I refused.' 'His youth and docility at 'length produced a Nunc Dimittis, which answered my idea perfectly.' But his Te Deum 'for solo, duo, trio, and chorus, regulated as before by me, was yet better still.'

He reprehends, in general, full choral Anthem music. First, because it is *noisy*.[1] 'Each performer, in order to do justice to 'his part, should make it audible, and this struggling with the 'others for audibility results in mere noise.' It is 'defective in 'intelligibility;' fuguing music obscures the sense of the words. From this habit of fuguing, it has been necessary to publish the words of the anthems. 'A good Protestant ought to be convinced 'that what was sung was not sung in an unknown tongue;' and as things are, 'he requires the assistance of the eye' to assure himself of this fact. It neglects 'syllabic distinction.' Old anthems set in any language can be readily adapted 'to any new 'words, and are as well calculated to answer the purposes of 'praise as of penitence, of sorrow, as of joy.' We think quite the reverse; but, at all events, this seems the case at York with respect to modern music. The song from the Zauberflote, Dead March from Saul, and Pastoral Symphony from Corelli's concertos, appear there as masterpieces of pliability in form and expression. It fails 'in expressing the different passions.' He thinks Tallis wrong to set the anthem 'I call and cry' chorally, and that a proper pathos is best gained from two voices, and more peculiarly so, from one. And, last of all, it evidences 'learning and ingenuity,' both of which militate much against solemnity and expression, intelligibility and pathos.

His opinions on our anthem writers are equally singular. The pretty puritanical counterpoint, 'O, Lord, the Maker of all thing,' he says, is devoid of rhythm and metre, which it is possible to make its great charm, and that as the poetry (the Primer Hymn for Compline) is very 'royal poetry,' he shrewdly suspects the king made that as well as the music. Master Giles, with his anthem of 38 parts, was the Aquinas, and Dr. Bull, with his of 40, the

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[1] Mr. Mason translates the term 'vibrata musica,' noisy music. We take it to be vibration-music, *i. e.* music constructed upon the harmonics or vibrations of sound. Hence the term 'operosa musica,' or artistical music; and where it assumed form and shape, 'figurata musica.'

Smiglecius of that epoch. Dr. Aldrich was right in setting the Tudor thanksgiving music to words of penitence and supplication, because at that time Church music had 'no sufficient spirited 'movement in it for such sentiments of gratitude and praise.' 'Purcel's music should be cleared of its scientific modulation, 'which might be without prejudice to its general harmony.' He denies Hawkins' assertion 'that Humphreys and Wise intro-'duced dancing movements into the Church,' and cannot find any coranto or gavot movements, or any instances of such depravity in their Anthems. He admits that the long divisions and flourishes in Croft's Anthems were 'a fashionable folly,' written to display Mr. Elford's fine voice, but as air or melody, 'when 'unadulterated by foreign mixtures,' *i. e.*, choral parts, 'never 'obscures verbal expression, these very repetitions, if taking from 'solemnity, are yet useful as affording so many channels to con-'vey the words to the hearer!'

Church music in general he defines as primarily of use *to please the popular ear,* and to convey the words in an intelligible strain; its secondary use is to convey sentiment and affect the passions.

It is really lamentable that so much misconception on the nature and history of our Church music should have met with the celebrity this mischievous Essay has enjoyed. With well-informed persons, anything which the composer of the anthem 'Lord of all power and might' chose to print would be a matter of small moment; but it is not so when we find it has led to such a repertory of anthems as is now seen in York Minster, and that a Canon of the present day has been found so little advised on these subjects, as to retain it in the quire of that Cathedral for daily perusal and edification during Church service.[1]

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[1] The prevalence of the operatic and dissenting schools of Church music in York Minster has become so much a matter of notoriety, that it has been thought necessary to defend the practice in the local newspapers. We extract one letter, to give our readers some notion of the position taken up by the admirers of the sectarian feeling:—

'SACRED AND OPERATIC MUSIC.

'TO THE EDITOR OF THE YORKSHIREMAN.

'SIR,—Having heard the playing of operatic music in York Minster severely commented on, I think it but right to say that Mozart's bass song, "Qui 'sdegno," from "Zauberflote," is sung, and is arranged for the Roman Catholic Church as a motett, by Novello. I am not aware of any other selection from Mozart's operas in the York Anthem Book, except the above-mentioned air; but this I do know, that Novello has arranged numerous duets, trios, &c. both from Spohr and Mozart's operas, and that they are constantly used in the English Catholic Chapels. By inserting the above, you would much oblige

'A SINCERE ADMIRER OF YORK MINSTER.'

No one, that we ever heard of, has yet charged Mr. Vincent Novello with knowing much about Church music; and why the York usage should be modelled after the secular and theatrical music of an English Roman Catholic Chapel of the modern fashion, is more than we can comprehend.

The three publications, Nos. 8, 9, and 10, are the works of amateur composers. Mr. Jackson is, we believe, a respectable tradesman; Mr. Hopkins, the clever Organist and Master of the Boys in Rochester Cathedral; and Dr. S. S. Wesley, the organist of Leeds parish-church, and the busy opponent of all upholders of that true school of Church Music, which learning and piety has long since declared the only legitimate music for the sanctuary.[1] Until some class-book shall be published for the use of intended composers for the Church, and until some mode of teaching Church melody and Church harmony be recognised and promulgated by authority, all modern Church composers who teach themselves can only be considered in the light of amateurs. And it is this self-teaching which has placed English Choir music so far below that of the Continent. In Italy and Germany, the mechanism of music, the division of schools, the forms of composition, the characteristics and eclectic peculiarities of composers, are dissected and laid bare in didactic and scientific works, which accredited masters throw into a due series of lessons. Every professor has gone through a course of instruction, and can write 'according to knowledge,' even if wanting the essentials for forming an individuality of style. But who of English Church composers has gone through this necessary state of pupilage? from Mr. Novello, the great authority for the York operatic displays, down to Dr. Wesley, the enemy of Tallis and Gregorian Chants? A comparison of Dr. Mendelssohn's Te Deum and these amateur performances of Messrs. Jackson, Hopkins, and Wesley, will reveal the force of our remarks. Dr. Mendelssohn's writing is, like that of an accomplished Greek scholar, thoroughly up in every nicety of the language, in all the felicitous turns of expression, in the precise force and signification of every word, sitting down to contend for the Greek epigram. The three amateurs may be compared to three self-taught Grecians, who can translate decently, and guess at beauties, but mistake this semi-perception of them for the power of inventing them. What chance have men so educated against the patient pupil of learned masters, and the result of years of mind and genius trained progressively upon paper to the highest results of art? None whatever. So long as the counterpoints and cadences framed on the Church scales continued as the land-marks of Church part-writing, the phraseology of English amateur writing was tolerably correct; although, in form and feature, in breadth and variety, there was a terrible lack of genius and talent. Exquisite polish, felicitous expression, and the most perfect way of embodying the idea, can only be the result of the pen guided by the master; and as the English musicians had no such master to fly to, these beauties are wanting in their works. What would Henry Purcel have been, if sent to Rome, Naples, or Venice, and properly taught to write Church music! What would the late Samuel Wesley, who so often lamented his misfortune in this respect! What wonderful madrigals would Ward and Wilbye have written, had they received the teaching of a Luca Marenzio!

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[1] See the *English Churchman, No.* 214, *Feb.* 4, 1847, in which is a curious correspondence transcribed from the *Manchester Courier*. And see also Note at the end of this article.

This tide of amateur composition, of bad psalters, and worse Hymn music, can only be stemmed by the act of the Clergy. Let them but study the class-books for Church music, ancient and modern, and at once they become better amateurs than their organists or singing men. Dr. Wesley must cease writing nonsense: he must (to use his own words) 'take professional advice' from his priest; and in place of demanding of his clerical disciples 'to approach him as they do their physician, when labouring under some fatal disease,' he must lose his 'inflated vain self-sufficiency,' abandon his 'very questionable kind of taste in Church music,' his 'trashy, ranting, conventicle chanting tunes.' Dr. Wesley has never yet had a master: he says so himself; and he will never write any great or enduring music without one, nor be able to teach others how to do so.

Whilst we think the mass by Mr. Jackson, the grocer of Masham, the most correctly written of the three compositions, we must give credit to Mr. Hopkins for his adherence to the Hanoverian forms of Boyce, and to Dr. Wesley for the strength of his memory, his evident love of Purcel, Bach, and Beethoven, Mendelssohn, and Spohr, and the happy contrasts by which he gets himself out of the pitfalls he is continually stumbling into. He shows his notion of melody of 'a Church-like Gregorian character,' by opening the Jubilate thus. The time is marked 112 to the crotchet:—


Serve - - the Lord with glad-ness. Serve - - the
Lord with glad - - - ness, with glad - - ness.

He thinks 'a few sheets of paper—*less than twelve, perhaps*—might contain all the really unexceptionable specimens of the early Church school;' and after soundly rating Tallis, Aldrich, and Rogers, their advocates and admirers, he rises to a climax, and declares, 'if our musical worship cannot be conducted in the best possible manner, I for one would cry, "Silence it effectually, and for ever!"' We hope Dr. Hook, with that praiseworthy attention to the beauty of the English offices which characterizes St. Peter's, Leeds, will silence Dr. Wesley's Jubilate most effectually; and if he wishes his services to be celebrated according to the proprieties of the Church and the comfort of priests and people, he will put an effectual curb on his turbulent vivacious organ-player.

Nor is the Te Deum any better than the Jubilate. Parts are fully as bright as the brightest of Mr. Jackson of Exeter. For example:—


To Thee all an-gels cry a-loud, The Heav'ns and all the
pow'rs there-in. To Thee Che-ru - - bin and Se-ra - phin.

Bad as Tallis may be, we much prefer the Tudor organist to the present one at Leeds, who cannot yet spell his harmonies; for he writes one chord for another. At the words 'the Father everlasting,' we find this combination:—



We presume this unfortunate passage should be spelt:—



But we decline to waste any more room for remarks upon such writing. Dr. Wesley declares no man can hold the appointment of Cathedral-organist without losing his self-respect. However much such a school of Canticle music may increase the writer's self-respect, one thing is clear, it must lead to the loss of respect on the part of all who have at heart the interests of the Church, and the well-being of Church Service.

Dr. Wesley is the compiler of a Psalter for the use of the Leeds choir. In this work he overlooked the 'Venite Exultemus,' and presents it to his purchasers on a card, which, like a bank-note, is carefully housed in a pocket inside the volume. We are gravely assured it 'is the best work of the kind which has ever appeared;' and the author recommends himself thus:—

> 'My object was to present the public with a Psalter clearly pointed, and containing all the really good Chants extant. I wished to collect the good Chants and exclude all the indifferent, or bad, from daily use. To furnish only such specimens as were of a Church-like Gregorian character; this I think I have succeeded in doing, if some slight exception be granted on the score of the very popular Chants by Jones, Lord Mornington, and a very few others. The Chants thus collected, are not, of course, the Gregorian Chants, but those which are in general use at our Cathedrals and Royal Chapels at the present time. It seems neither desirable, nor in the least degree probable, that these may ever be superseded by a re-introduction of the few specimens usually designated Gregorian, but which, in all probability, are of heathen origin. The great Church Musicians of modern times never dreamt of such a thing. No man ever displayed a finer appreciation of the peculiar form of melody by which the best of the Gregorian Chants are characterized than the late Samuel Wesley, and that *he* was no advocate for the exclusive use of Gregorian Chants is certain, from the fact of his being a composer of Chants of the form now universally adopted in the Established Church. Several of *his* Chants are as magnificent as so minute a specimen of art can well be, and it may be submitted that any one of his compositions contained in the present work affords an ample return for the price of the volume.'

Although the whole of this extract is not in the preface (part of it having appeared in a Leeds paper), no doubt can exist but that it emanates from one and the same pen. Dr. Wesley's great Church composers are Lord Mornington, Hon. J. Spencer, S. Matthews, Flintoft, Higgins, Langdon, Soaper, Jones, Woodward, Sir J. Stevenson, and Christopher Teesdale; to use his own words, 'inferior organists and choirmen too numerous and really too contemptible to particularize.' 'The Kings, the Scrogginses, Joneses, Porters, and Smiths! What have they been known to do well?' We will tell Dr. Wesley;—their counterpoints were far better than his, and so we hope their singing; for of all Psalters his is decidedly the worst. The division of the words is, as a whole, the most faulty we have seen, and shows he has never been taught the true principles of chanting the English Psalter. We quote one or two verses :—

O deliver not the soul of thy turtle dove unto the | multitude of the | enemies||
And forget not the congre | gation of the | poor for | ever.||
I said unto the fools, Deal | not so | madly,||
And to the un | godly, Set not | up your | horn.||
For look how high the heaven is in com | parison of the | earth||
So great is his mercy | also towards | them that | fear him.||
Even so is the Lord | merciful unto | them that | fear him.||
He re | membereth that we | are but | dust.||

Such chanting would assuredly secure the youngest boy a sound whipping anywhere but at Leeds.

Dr. Wesley can give no opinion on the ancient Chants, for he is utterly ignorant of every part and parcel of them. Of the Chants written by his father, the first, which is this—



was given up to 'Surrey Chapel,' and published by Mr. Jacob, to the Te Deum. Many and many a time has 'Old Sam Wesley' made fun of his friend, and greater fun of himself and his own Chant,—the one for having set it so absurdly, the other for having written it. Another of these 'rival Gregorians,' by Samuel Wesley, is this :—



which Dr. Wesley has set to the 85th Psalm, and allied to as puerile and clumsy harmony as can well be conceived.

The Chapel Royal Chants are, perhaps, the worst in Christendom. For example, we take one by Mr. Hawes, Dr. Wesley's self-taught master in the mysteries of modern chanting:—



And as Mr. Hawes thought the Psalms could be chanted on F in alt, so his pupil becomes his imitator; the best chant of Dr. Wesley's own composition in his Psalter, being a not less laughable one than this:—



Dr. Wesley thinks the Gregorian Chants of Pagan origin; if so, the Pagans had a great advantage over the Leeds organist. Their Chants are solemn and devotional, which his are not.

ART. IV.—1. DELEUZE. *Histoire Critique du Magnétisme Animal.* 2 vols. Paris, 1819.

2. ———. *Instruction Practique sur le Magnétisme Animal.* Paris, 1825.

3. ———. *Mémoire sur la Faculté de Prévision.* Paris, 1836.

4. AUBIN GAUTHIER. *Traité Practique du Magnétisme et du Somnambulism.* Paris, 1845.

5. *Isis Revelata; an Inquiry into the Origin, Progress, and Present State of Animal Magnetism. By* J. C. COLQUHOUN, Esq. Advocate, F.R.S.E. 2 vols. Edinburgh: Maclachan and Stewart; London: Baldwin and Craddock, 1836.

6. *Human Magnetism; its Claim to dispassionate Inquiry, being an attempt to show the utility of its application to the relief of human suffering. By* W. NEWNHAM, Esq. M.R.S.L. London: Churchill, 1845.

7. *Vital Magnetism, a Remedy. By* the REV. THOMAS PYNE, A.M. Incumbent of Hook, Surrey. London: Highley, 1845.

8. *Mesmeric Experiences. By* SPENCER T. HALL. London: Baillière, 1845.

9. *Lectures on Somnambulism; translated from the German of Dr. Arnold Wienholt, with Preface, etc. By* J. C. COLQUHOUN, Esq. Advocate. Author of *Isis Revelata,* &c. Edinburgh: Adam and Black; London: Longman, 1845.

10. *Mesmerism in India, and its practical application in Surgery and Medicine. By* JAMES ESDAILE, M.D. Civil Assistant Surgeon, H.C.S. Bengal. London: Longman, 1846.

11. *Abstract of 'Researches on Magnetism, and on certain allied Subjects,' including a supposed new imponderable. By* BARON VON REICHENBACH. Translated and abridged from the German by WILLIAM GREGORY, M.D. F.R.S.E. M.R.I.A. Professor of Chemistry.

12. *Mesmerism True—Mesmerism False; a Critical Examination of the facts, claims, and pretensions of Animal Magnetism.* Edited by JOHN FORBES, M.D. F.R.S. F.G.S. Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians. London: Churchill, 1845.

MANY very curious phenomena, both physical and moral, present themselves on the study of the history and claims of Animal Magnetism; but we really believe that few of them are more remarkable, than the vagueness of existing notions with regard to it: the entire ignorance of men, even in the educated classes, both of its facts and pretensions, and the consequent wide difference of opinion upon points which really seem to admit of a solution one way or other, almost as easily as does the question whether or not the magnet attracts iron or gold. 'What is animal magnetism?' 'What is the difference between it and mesmerism?' 'Do you believe there is anything in it?' These questions represent the ordinary state of the English mind upon the subject. And if asked in any ordinary society, the answers will elicit curiously opposite opinions from those, who, having formed decided opinions, are presumed, with more or less truth, to have examined it. Dr. Forbes will tell us, no doubt, *vivâ voce*, as he does in print, over and over again, that it is all 'folly and 'roguery.' The Rev. Hugh M'Neile, and many divines, whose claims upon our attention exceed his, will assure us it is a form of Satanic agency. Mr. Newnham, that it is neither supernatural nor yet fictitious, but a remarkable power given to man by his Creator, and intended and qualified for great and beneficent purposes, although capable of abuse. It is probable that many modifications of these opinions are general among those who have paid any attention to the subject.

Under these circumstances it is plainly the first duty of any one who makes any remarks upon animal magnetism to ascertain and state the facts connected with it, as far as they can be made out. We believe they will be found much as follows:—

In the month of February, 1778, a German physician named Mesmer made his appearance in Paris, and announced himself the discoverer of a new method of cure in numerous diseases. His pretensions made some stir, but (as was certain to be the case whether they were true or false) they gained little credit with the medical profession. Yet before long, one French physician, D'Eslon, became his convert. This conversion, however, led not to inquiry but persecution, D'Eslon was deprived of his medical privileges by the faculty of Paris: and the new doctrine continued to spread. Many persons who attained celebrity in the eventful years which followed, became disciples of Mesmer. Mr. Colquhoun mentions the name of M. Segur, who had been ambassador at St. Petersburgh, d'Espremenil, Lafayette, and others. The government offered him a very liberal compensation for the disclosure of his secret, which he declined, alleging that dangerous abuses would result if it were made known. Soon after this, however, the opposition to him became so strong at Paris that he withdrew for awhile to Spa. While there he agreed to return and communicate this perilous secret to a class of pupils, each of whom was to pay him 100 louis d'or, and not to divulge his secret until the number of his pupils had secured him a sum of 10,000 louis. The subscription soon far exceeded the stipulated sum. Mesmer is stated to have cleared more than 100,000 crowns. His pupils spread themselves into all parts of France, establishing what were called Harmonic Societies, and great cures were everywhere declared to result from the practice of his discovery. Meanwhile the discoverer complained of the publicity given to his process—an unreasonable complaint certainly, from one who had made his fortune by selling his secret—and before long retired into his native country, Switzerland, where he survived until March 5, 1815, when he had reached his eighty-first year. He continued to practise his discovery for the benefit of the poor around him, and left behind him only 10,000 francs; whether because his gains had been over-estimated, or his fortune dissipated, does not seem certain. But animal magnetism kept its hold in Paris. The works in which its principles and triumphs were detailed multiplied beyond example there and in the provinces; and at last, in March, 1784, a royal mandate appeared requiring the medical faculty to examine what they had already repeatedly and scornfully condemned. Two commissions were appointed; one of the Academy of Science,—Franklin, Bailly, La Roy, De Beri, and Lavoisier; the other of physicians (among whom we find the afterwards too well known name of Guillotin). These commissioners examined the practice of D'Eslon (for Mesmer refused to meet them), and reported that 'all is the work of the imagination, and that there is no such thing as magnetism. Imagination, imitation, and touch (*attouchement*), such are the real causes of the effects attributed to animal magnetism,' at the same time they presented another and more private report,[1] in which they declared to government that the processes of magnetism were highly dangerous to public safety and morals.

And thus the fate of animal magnetism was sealed. It had been tried, detected, denounced. Nothing more remained to the scientific and medical world than to triumph over the fallen enemy and moralise upon its history. The Encyclopædia Britannica (Ed. 3. A.D. 1797), which lies before us, speaks of it as 'a fanciful system, to call it by no worse name,' which was lately believed, and quotes the conclusion of the French Academicians 'that it is not entirely useless even to philosophy, as it is one fact more to be consigned to the history of the errors and illusions of the human mind, and a signal instance of the power of imagination.'

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[1] Deleuze, Hist. Crit. vol. ii. p. 50.—Also Bertrand, Du Magnétisme Animal en France: Note iii. and iv. pp. 482-516. Paris, 1826.

But, alas for philosophy! the disciples of Mesmer, like the British soldiers at Waterloo, could not tell when they were beaten, and there was no time when his plan was more warmly practised than that at which the Academy were drawing moral lessons in its funeral oration. One of the physicians upon the commission, M. Jussieu, refused to sign the report, and presented one of his own favourable to the new system. The practice spread, books were multiplied in which great cures and many strange phenomena were detailed. From France it spread to Germany, to the northern nations, in some degree even to England. Lavater introduced it to several friends in Germany, in particular to the well-known astronomer the physician Olbers, and his colleague Wienholt in Bremen. At this period the storm of the French Revolution, and the wars which followed it, swept over Europe, and the attention of men in general was turned from all peaceful subjects; but amid the clash of arms animal magnetism continued to make conquests, which, if less rapid, were far more durable than those of Napoleon. Soon after the peace, it is stated that one-third of the medical men in Paris were converts; in Germany and the north the belief in it was, 'if not universal, at least common.' Since that period it has continued to spread until, as Mr. Newnham tells us, it has produced in France and Germany alone 1400 publications. It cannot be shown that there is any country in which it has ever been received and fairly tried, and in which it has, after a time, lost ground and passed into neglect. Into England it may be said only lately to have been introduced, yet here it is practised by physicians of the highest eminence, by men of law, by divines; it has produced already a very considerable number of volumes, and is attracting a far greater amount of attention at this moment than it ever did before. But, worse than all, the French Academy of Medicine itself, which so long ago passed capital sentence upon this new folly, has been forced to reconsider its verdict. In 1826 a new commission of inquiry was issued, which, after pursuing its inquiries for six years, presented a report highly favourable to animal magnetism.[1]

We think that if animal magnetism be really altogether a dream, a folly, an imagination—as so many medical men in England are pleased to call it, the firm and increasing hold which it has acquired and retained upon the most civilized portion of the human race, in the 18th and 19th centuries, is one of the most remarkable facts upon record.

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[1] It may be found in Colquhoun, vol. ii. Appendix 1, where it occupies 100 closely printed 8vo. pages.

Neither does it avail anything to reply that the schoolmaster is still much wanted, that the mass of our population is still superstitious, that those who reject even the truth of revelation have subjects upon which they are victims of credulity; for it is not among the uneducated that magnetism has won its way either abroad or in England. Those who thus answer, should tell us whether they wish the schoolmaster to select for his discipline such as Cuvier? whether in their compassionate regret over our ignorance of the laws of evidence they include La Place? Even in England, although attention has only lately been called to the subject, yet we believe the number of medical men who, in spite of professional prejudices, have satisfied themselves of the truth of magnetism, to be very much greater than is usually supposed. It is not every professional man who is willing to incur ridicule and suspicion among his brethren—to run the risk of losing his professional practice, and, perhaps, his bread,—by declaring his belief in an agent of which they deny the existence; while the mass of patients regard it with suspicion and dread. It is not wonderful then if few, even of those who have satisfied themselves of the truth of magnetism, have, as yet, ventured to avow either the practice or their own belief. But as to the progress of mind by which they have been convinced let us take Mr. Newnham as an example. He has come so openly and honourably before the world, that it is no invasion of the sacredness of private life to say, that he is passed that period of life at which men readily adopt new opinions, that he has by far the first practice in his neighbourhood, and, therefore, has nothing to gain, but everything to lose, by innovation in medical art. We may add, that he is well-known to be an earnest and irreproachable member of the English Church. Being known as an author, he was applied to, about three years ago, to write (we believe for the 'British and Foreign Medical Review') a paper against mesmerism. He complied, and, therefore, 'investigated, for himself, a subject which, up to that time, had obtained his unqualified contempt.' He adds,

> 'I surrounded myself with the literature of animal magnetism—at least as far as London and Paris would enable me to do so; and the result has been the complete impossibility of writing against it, and the desire of asking you also to inquire into the premises.'

He proceeds to say, that it is a question of evidence, and that he only claims to 'report,' on the credibility of the testimony.

> 'But I may have been unfaithful, a monomaniac,[1] or a fanatic; and here I must fall back upon your judgment, appealing only to the facts, that my

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[1] Those who are acquainted with the works of medical men against animal magnetism, need not be informed that these are among the mildest terms employed by most of them, to designate men who believe the statements of the magnetizers.

inquiry was begun for the purpose of confuting the doctrines of magnetism; that I have advanced to the mature age of fifty-four; and that I can look back upon the past as devoted to truthfulness and honesty of purpose—as unmarked by credulity—as opposed to fanaticism and mystery in every possible shape—as undefaced by those crochets which mark the monomaniacal tendency, and as undistinguished by enthusiasm, except it be the enthusiasm of advancing professional knowledge, and of relieving the sufferings of the miserable.

'Claiming, therefore, your belief in the sincerity and honesty of your reporter, he must just explain to you that among the many thousand witnesses, he has altogether thrown aside, as worthless, all those

'1. Who are witnesses only of one particular fact, or series of facts.

'2. Who may be supposed to be interested in proving the truth of their assertions.

'3. Who have not verified their assertions by every possible and prudent means.

'4. Who are said to have received advantages from magnetism, and, therefore, whose judgments may have been warped by imaginary benefits conferred.

'5. Who may, from their position, or connexion, or previous association, have been prejudiced in favour of its phenomena.

'6. Who, from their class of life, early education, and mental development, or literary or professional habits, do not appear likely to be free from the taint of easy credence, and have not been accustomed to those processes of searching investigation, which for the most part belong to the philosopher only, and, perhaps, especially to the medical philosopher.

'7. Whose character for fidelity was not established—and, generally, all those over whom the breath of suspicion could exhale its withering blast, or the clouds of ignorance, or deficient information, could encircle with an atmosphere of doubtfulness.

'And having done so, your reporter has not withheld his belief from witnesses who are free from these taints,—from such men as Berthollet, Cuvier, Ampère Brogros, Prévost, Dumas, Georget, Puységur, Petetin, Virey, Moutravel, Deleuze, Bertrand, Bourgery, Bricheteau, Broussais, Créqui, Fonart, Gibert, Jacquemin, Kergaradec, Leroux, Patissier, Sabatier, Sanson, Itard, Lherminier, Marc, D'Eslon, Agassiz, Dupotet, Chardel, Foissac, Frapart, Wolfart, Kièser, Hufeland, Treviranus, Passevant, Boske, Wienholt, Teste, Marjolin, Cloquet, Sprengel, Reil, Frank, Authenrieth, Lavater, Hoffman, Zimmerman, Muratori, Rostan, Lordat, Orfila, Husson, Ribes Hecker, Reveillé, Parise, Colquhoun, Elliotson, and Chauncey Hare Townshend, with many others not enumerated.

'It is also to be observed, that some of the above-named witnesses are cited as affording unwilling testimony to the truth of facts upon which they had formed prejudiced opinions, opposed to the reality of those facts: and, moreover, that this list might have been greatly enlarged with both classes of witnesses: the above, however, is more than sufficiently numerous for the reasoning I am about to ground upon it.'—*Newnham*, p. 23.

Such is Mr. Newnham's argument, which reminds us of the answer given by one of the ablest medical opponents of mesmerism to an argument upon which much stress is laid on its behalf. No man, it is said, ever fully and fairly examined the evidence of animal magnetism without being satisfied of its truth. Granted, replied the editor of the Lancet; because no man whose judgment was worth anything would examine anything so absurd. So truly Baconian is the medical science of the nineteenth century!

And this rapid sketch of the history is the best answer to an objection which weighs much with sensible persons who have never had reason to examine the facts. They say, animal magnetism has once or twice attracted attention, been examined, refuted, and forgotten; it has its day, like other fancies, is popular, and dies away; and thus they argue its emptiness from the number of years it has been before the world. And if the fact were as they state it, the argument would have its force; but, in truth, its history ever since 1778 has been that of truth, slowly and gradually, but steadily, winning ground upon prejudice; and although its low voice was unheard amidst the clash of arms, there has been, probably, no year in which those who knew its truth were not more numerous than they were in the year preceding.

As a question of evidence, then, we cannot, any more than Mr. Newnham, reject the facts of animal magnetism. But what, it may be asked, are those facts? Our readers will have remarked that we have hitherto said nothing upon this part of the subject, confining ourselves to what may be called the external history of animal magnetism, and its progress in public opinion in different countries; but the question, What is animal magnetism? to which we now turn, is not only the most important part of the subject, but it is that upon which the greatest misconceptions exist; and the real objection of so many of the good and wise to its practice is the natural, indeed the legitimate result of those misconceptions.

Animal magnetism is commonly supposed to consist in throwing persons (chiefly of the female sex) into a strange and anomalous condition, analogous in many respects to intoxication, in which reason is suspended, while the patient talks and acts at the will of the magnetizer, and in which she exhibits powers and knowledge so strange that it is difficult to call them other than supernatural, while they seem to come from evil rather than good spirits. Now it would hardly be too much to say, that we might as justly define modern medicine as the art of depriving men of their limbs, or, again, of suspending by drugs the exercise of reason. No sane man would receive this as a true definition, and yet opium and amputations are of more common occurrence in ordinary medical practice than the phenomena to which allusion has just been made in magnetic treatment. Every author who has written in favour of magnetism has treated it as a means of curing or alleviating disease. Every one has laid it down as a great principle that the process should never in any case be employed for any other object;

as, for instance, from curiosity or experiment. All have added that it ought only to be employed under medical authority, (although it is, of course, impossible that it should usually be employed by medical men in person,) if the profession, instead of denying and deriding its power, would examine, and in suitable cases avail themselves of them. Moreover, it should be remembered, that the process was the discovery of a physician, and applied by him, professedly, to purely medical purposes only. Mesmer was practising as a physician at Vienna when his attention was turned, by an eminent astronomer and philosopher, the Jesuit Maximilian Hell, to the use of the magnet in disease. He tried the experiment, and found it efficacious in numerous instances; but, after a time, was led to doubt whether the efficacy was not, in many instances at least, rather in himself than in the magnet. He laid it aside, and found that he was able to do as much towards the cure and alleviation of disease without it. Hence he inferred that there resided in the healthy human body a force in some degree analagous to that of the magnet, and capable of being employed[1] for the cure of disease at the will of the possessor; and from this analogy he called his new method of cure animal magnetism. When driven from Vienna by opposition, he brought his method of cure to Paris. It must, we think, be confessed, that he laid the foundations for a general suspicion against his process, by involving it in needless mystery, and combining with it adventitious modes of working upon the imagination, which produced convulsions, called by him crises, and represented as part of his system. It is impossible to decide how far he supposed these things necessary to the effect. He might easily do so, groping as he was in the dark among experiments, all alike regarded by his medical brethren as absurd appeals to the imagination, while he knew that he was employing a real power, and yet was wholly ignorant both of its limits and of its *modus operandi*. Be this, however, as it may, it is certain that his successors have laid aside both the apparatus which gave to his practice an air of mystery, and the excitements and convulsions which caused reasonable alarm. After his retirement they soon adopted the mode at present pursued, which may be thus described, in the words of Mr. Pyne:—

> 'The best mode of magnetising appears to be, first to place the patient opposite to the magnetiser in an easy position, and such as each can retain; then to put the points of the fingers upon, and of the thumbs under, the shoulders, but at a short distance from them; from thence to draw the palms thus held gently down the arms to the hands, which should be taken in such a manner that the points of the thumbs of the magne-

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[1] We shall hereafter have occasion to show that the most recent experiments, those of Baron Von Reichenbach, seem strongly to support this conjecture of Mesmer.

tiser may touch the points of the magnetised person's thumbs, and the tips of the fingers the palms of the hands. The eyes should be directed to the eyes of the patient, who should look without staring at the magnetiser. Meanwhile, the magnetiser should will the convalescence of the patient, and feel as though an emanation passed from the one frame to the other. The knees and feet may be in proximity or contact, and the position should be kept till an equality of temperature is established between the parties. The first signs of the power will be shown in acts of gentle deglutition by the patient, then by tranquil sighs; the eyelids will *fall*, and perhaps the eyeballs will be, with a slight convulsion, raised. The magnetiser now withdraws his hand, and with the points of the fingers makes passes at a distance down the frame, following the great circle of the nerves, and pointing at times to the feet. No upward passes must be made, for this in some cases undoes what is done, and in others has been known to injure. The mind of the operator must be kept steady throughout, and fixed on the patient, and no emotion in the latter must rob him of his calm desire to do good. Should any hysterical symptoms come on, it will be well to demagnetise, which is done by counter passes, viz., by bringing the back of the hands together, and then suddenly separating them transversely: this should be repeated from the head to the trunk, and to any limb affected with rigidity. Should this not be sufficient, blowing in the eyes, introducing a current of air, or waving a handkerchief across the face will succeed. In no case should a magnetised person be violently disturbed, and in general it will be found well to leave nature spontaneously to resume her activity.'—*Pyne*, p. 64.

Mr. Pyne adds that passes applied locally are often found exceedingly useful, especially in removing pain.[1]

Such being the process, what are its usual effects? The most usual is sleep, from which it is best to allow the patient to awake spontaneously. Many, however, have been cured of painful and obstinate diseases without any suspension of consciousness. A sensation is very frequent as if warm water were running down the patient's limbs, and oozing out at the extremities. Some feel only drowsy, and never get beyond this; some have a numbness over the frame. Increased heat is almost universal. Whenever any of these effects appear, the patient is susceptible, although in various degrees, and each of them has been found in many instances to indicate an operation sufficiently powerful to mitigate or remove the most serious complaints.

With regard to the diseases which may thus be more or less affected, it will be confessed by all reasonable men, that we are, as yet, only feeling our way. And yet no circumstance more reasonably excites suspicion than the number and variety of maladies of which cures are reported upon good and indeed undeniable evidence. Sober men are naturally suspicious of anything which approaches to the nature of an universal specific, or elixir vitæ, and the like. Magnetism has no such pretensions; yet in the present state of our knowledge (or rather ignorance), there is hardly any form of disease to which we can be sure, prior to experience, that it will be useless. Even where cure is impossible without a miracle—as in cases of absolute loss or injury to the organs—it may alleviate suffering, and many cases quite beyond the reach of ordinary medical practice have already been cured. Dr. Esdaile, although he magnetized chiefly for a different purpose, reports eighteen different cures in the first eight months, among which were tic-douloureux, convulsions, palsy, rheumatism causing lameness, &c. Epilepsy has repeatedly been permanently cured—(a disease, we need not say, which has hitherto baffled the faculty)—some kinds of deafness are commonly relieved. Mr. Pyne says that it seems intended to remove that wide-spread plague of our race, scrofula. If we may express our own opinion, we should say that it seems rather qualified to cure certain individuals than certain diseases: and that there are few affections of those, whom we have reason to believe susceptible of its influence, in which it may not be worth while at least to try the experiment.

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[1] The above is only given as a rough and brief summary, conveying a sufficient idea of the method at present employed, not for the purpose of enabling any one without further knowledge to practise animal magnetism. The 'Instruction Practique' of Deleuze, which is translated, or the 'Traité Practique' of Aubin Gauthier, will best answer this purpose. At the same time any one may easily satisfy himself of the *reality* of the power by practising Mr. Pyne's directions; and if he keeps himself calm, and carefully abstains from any shock to the nerves of his patient by sudden waking, &c., he may generally do it with safety.

In coming to this conclusion, however, there are objections which ought to be fairly met. And first, that magnetism is a mere fancy, and does nothing at all. That such an argument should now be brought forward we cannot help considering a fact almost as wonderful as anything reported of magnetism itself; and if we are not mistaken, there are evident indications that we have heard nearly the last of it. Let any one who still doubts read Deleuze, Hist. Crit. chap. 11; 'Moyens de se convaincre.' He says in substance, 'Let any healthy man inform 'himself of the process; let him go into the country, in some 'remote part, where the name of magnetism has never been 'heard among the peasants. Let him select one or two patients 'whose maladies are not of so dangerous a sort as to threaten 'the interruption of the experiment. Say to them not one word 'of magnetism and its effects; take their hands and feel their 'pulse; ask whether frictions such as these do not ease their 'pain. With these securities against imagination, try your new 'patients once a day for a week; if you find no effect, take 'others, and let no man say that he has given magnetism a trial 'till he has tried ten such cases. I can promise that he will 'not try them without seeing unquestionable effects.'[1]

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[1] Deleuze, Hist. Crit. i. 57.

But, in truth, the objection of the nullity of magnetism, seems to be already somewhat modified. We may expect henceforth to see it adopt the form in which it is put forward by Dr. Forbes. He admits what he calls the simple facts of magnetism, and that it produces 'sleep, coma, altered sensibility, spasm, or tempory paralysis of muscles,' &c. But he attributes these merely to the effect of imagination, and of the cures reported by so many medical men; he is content to say, that—

> 'Every system of quackery that has infested practical medicine has been supported by abundant proof of this kind, and every individual empiric will boast his successes. We have no superior evidence in favour of the mesmeric cures.'—*Forbes*, p. 59.

We suspect Dr. Forbes of belonging to that class of physicians, which thinks a patient has no right to recover, when, by the rules of regular medicine, he ought to have died or languished. These gentlemen seem to think unauthorised restorations to health a sort of injury to the faculty. Yet after all, one whose life is made miserable by 'tic douloureux,' may be pardoned if he prefers being cured by mesmeric treatment, to continuing for years under a system which can only deaden pain by opiates, and relieve the repletion of the purse by long bills. 'My master Zeno taught me wrong,' said the stoic who was tormented with the gout, 'when he told me pain was no evil.' Englishmen in general do not profess to be stoics, and we fear their preference of regular professional medicine, when compared with quackery, will give way under the stern logic of pain. Surely, to come to one who knows that his life was a burden to him, and that he is now in the enjoyment of health, and to assure him that it is nothing but imagination, shows little more practical wisdom than to hope to cure pain by stoical disquisitions. What is imagination but a name? if it be true that there is a faculty in man, possessed of sanative powers so beneficent, but requiring some means of calling it into action, then, in truth, the best physician is he who is able to call forth the healing powers of imagination; and if, while the ordinary practitioner cannot enlist that faculty on his side, the magnetiser succeeds in curing by it, imagination and Mesmer may well carry the day against the doctor and his drugs.

We have enlarged upon this point, because in medical books it is usual to assume that magnetism is overthrown, if the theories by which it is commonly explained can be set aside. The first French commission conceived they had done their work in reporting that 'imagination,' &c., are the true causes of the effects attributed to animal magnetism; and yet what follows if this be granted?

It can hardly be necessary to remind Dr. Forbes, that

Deleuze, (the greatest author among the magnetizers,) and every sensible writer either in England or abroad—*e. g.* Mr. Newnham, Mr. Colquhoun, &c., repeatedly declare that they can offer no theory of magnetism as more than possible. Some words are necessary in order to express the effects, and these words (as the term animal magnetism itself) will imply theories. Mesmer's theory may be confuted; equally so may be the theory—for it is nothing more—of the academicians, about imagination. But the time is not come, when the truth of any theory can be demonstrated. Our present need is facts; facts accurately and dispassionately observed, will pave the way for future theory; and thus far we cannot but agree with Dr. Forbes, that as yet magnetism is an art rather than a science.

And while Dr. Forbes was theorising, a distinguished foreigner, the Baron Von Reichenbach, was trying a series of most curious experiments, which really as far as they go do seem to confirm Mesmer's theory. He has proved that the mineral magnet does produce great and unequivocal effects upon persons in certain states of disease; that there is a species of flame continually playing about it, invisible to healthy human eyes, but distinctly seen in darkness by persons in certain states of disease, and which produces the well known effects of light upon the Daguerreotype, and is capable of being concentrated by a lens. He afterwards found the same qualities, but unconnected with the power of attracting iron, in crystals and other substances, and above all in the human hand. He thinks, and we fully agree with him, that the emanation, whatever it be, which thus proceeds from the hand, can be proved to be polarised, *i. e.*, that it differs in the two hands by a law analogous to that of the poles of the mineral magnet, or of the galvanic wire. We have no space to detail the carefully contrived experiments by which he precluded the action of imagination, or fraud, in a study which required him in a great measure to trust to the senses of others, rather than his own. There seems every reason to believe that the phenomena of animal magnetism are connected with the power traced by the Baron; and if, upon further experiment, this should turn out to be the case, we may perhaps hereafter find an agent at work in animal magnetism, mysterious indeed, but which we may be able to trace as far as we can that of electricity itself.

Meanwhile, experiment seems already to have disproved the theory of imagination. Magnetic effects have, beyond all doubt, been produced upon persons who were not conscious of the operation:[1] upon little children and even infants: and upon these when lying in the unsuspecting sleep of childhood. It needs more than Dr. Forbes's theory, more, even, more than his negative experiment upon one individual (who was said to be affected when unconsciously magnetized, and who seemed unaffected when the experiment was tried with certain precautions), to convince us that these cases were only imagination.

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[1] This can only be done after the patient has been already magnetized on former occasions, and the susceptibility thus rendered acute.

The objection of Satanic agency, it is of course more difficult to answer, as requiring the proof of a negative. Yet there is none which should be met with greater respect and consideration, for unquestionably the temper of mind which leads a man to live as ever in an unseen spiritual world, surrounded with spirits, both good and evil, and acted upon in turn by each; this—although it may in some instances mislead us—is yet the Christian temper. The sentinel who is ever on the watch may mistake a shadow for an enemy: yet vigilance is not less his special duty. In the present instance we would beg those who entertain the apprehension, to consider the circumstances under which the discovery of animal magnetism was made—to ask themselves whether our Heavenly Father has indeed left His redeemed and regenerated children in such sort the sport of evil influences, that when applying for lawful and humane purposes, that which is an acknowledged lawful and natural agent (*i.e.* the loadstone), they should unconsciously stumble as it were upon a process by which they called in Satanic influence, without any charms, or incantations, or ceremony whatever—whether He would leave earnest Christians, to go on, year after year, applying this remedy for the cure and alleviation of human suffering, denying themselves that they might do it more effectually, commending it in prayer to Him for a blessing, giving thanks to Him for its results, if it were indeed a tampering with the powers of evil? And if so, where is the limit? How know we that our common medicines do not derive their power from the evil one? At least there is a greater *primâ facie* plausibility in this supposition, because most of them are deadly poisons, while in this case the only means employed are those bodies and souls which are now redeemed and restored from the fall. When the Jesuit's bark was first introduced into Europe,[1] and wrought cures as if by magic, 'physicians and ecclesiastics combined to forbid its use, declaring that it derived all its powers from a compact made by the Indians with the Devil.' Surely the *onus probandi* in each case rests upon those who assert the unlawfulness of the remedy.

And, accordingly, they have their reason for believing the Peruvian bark to be from above, and the magnetic process from below. This is nothing in the process itself—than that, nothing can be more innocent, less suspicious; it is in the strangeness of the effects sometimes produced, which are in themselves so anomalous, and are produced by means so apparently inadequate, that they cannot but suspect supernatural agency; and if so, then (as no Divine miracle is professed, and as evil men and unbelievers can do as much as good Christians), it can hardly be other than Satanic.

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[1] Colquhoun, i. 228.

The effects to which we allude are the entire loss of sensation in certain magnetic patients, so that they undergo without consciousness the most appalling surgical operations: and the phenomena of somnambulism, in which some patients, while in the magnetic sleep, hold conversations with their magnetizers and with other persons, and exhibit powers which they do not at other times possess. These are, a strange connexion with the magnetizer, (and sometimes with other persons brought into magnetic relation with them,) which enables some patients to understand his wishes, and take his commands, without any words or external signs,—to taste what is put into his mouth as if it were in their own,—to be conscious of music to which he is listening, although their own ears are stopped: again, an exercise of the senses in some unintelligible manner, apart from the use of the ordinary organs of sense, so that some patients seem to see with closed eyes, and the sense of hearing seems in some to have its seat in the pit of the stomach, rather than the ears: in some cases a remarkable faculty called prevision, by which the patients foretell the course of their own maladies, and the remedies which will and will not suit them; lastly, what is called clairvoyance or lucidity, in which they become conscious of things wholly beyond the reach of their ordinary knowledge, describe places, persons, &c., which they have never seen, and the like; and of all these things the patient is wholly forgetful when he awakes from the magnetic trance, so as not to know that he has spoken or been spoken to.

Narratives such as these, which are familiar to those who have studied works on animal magnetism, and which from time to time are brought before us all in the public papers, contain much that is starting to a Christian mind. It is probable that the Holy Fathers would have referred powers like these to Satanic possession, and have met them by exorcism. It is certain that our ancestors, for several centuries back, would have called them witchcraft, and encountered them with fire and faggot. But these are the things which present themselves to the minds of most religious men at the first mention of animal magnetism, and which form their real reason for believing its Satanic origin.

Now, first, are these narratives true or false? Let us hear an opponent, Dr. Forbes. He admits that some patients have been thrown into a state in which they are wholly insensible even to the most frightful operations. He admits also that somnambulism comes on in the sleep which is induced by magnetism, as well as in natural sleep. But he wholly denies all the special powers of prevision, introvision, transference of the senses from the common organs, clairvoyance, &c.; of these he accounts for some: as *e.g.* prevision, by saying that many cases of disease—epileptic fits, for instance—are capable of being voluntarily produced, so that the patient brings them on and accomplishes his own prediction; and thus it is a case not of prevision, but (to use his own expression) of pre-ordination. The rest he meets by the simple solution, 'folly and roguery,' only admitting that the idea of clairvoyance may have been suggested by the power—which he thinks probably has existed in some somnambulists—of seeing with much less light than is required by persons in a normal condition.

This solution, of course, precludes the idea of supernatural powers and Satanic agency, but unfortunately the facts will not bend themselves to it. Any one who reads the works of Deleuze, for example, must feel, that if he were not a fabricator of the most unexampled impudence, cases of prevision came before him which could not in any way have been fulfilled by the volition of the patient. See also the cases detailed by Mr. Newnham, in his ninth chapter. Neither again is it possible to deny, —without refusing to receive upon any human evidence facts which contradict our ordinary experience—that instances really occur of the other powers above enumerated. We cannot understand how they can be consistently denied by any one who rejects Hume's argument against miracles: that argument being, that there are facts so wonderful, that they cannot be supported by any amount of testimony, because it is more likely that any number of witnesses should be false than that such an event should happen.[1]

We cannot, then, deny the fact; but it is important to observe, first, that these phenomena are quite distinct from animal magnetism, although closely connected with it. This fact has been repeatedly pointed out by Deleuze and others, (see Deleuze Défense du Magnetisme, p. 58,) and as frequently overlooked by their opponents. And first, animal magnetism was practised with the greatest success for some years, before any of these phenomena were observed. The fact of magnetic somnambulism was first observed by M. de Puységur, a noble French officer, who was one of the disciples of Mesmer, but not until after the latter had retired. This gentleman—whose honour and character have never been impeached—happening to speak to one of his patients whom he had put to sleep, the patient replied without awaking, and the same fact was shortly after observed by the Society of Harmony of Strasbourg, and published in their reports, with the other remarkable phenomena which have been mentioned. Animal magnetism, therefore, may exist without somnambulism, clairvoyance, &c., and was so practised by its discoverer.

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[1] We have not space to enter into an examination of the facts upon which this conclusion is built We will only observe in passing, that Dr. Forbes's attempt to shake it by merely negative facts, *i.e.*, by showing that the powers supposed to exist in this or that somnambulist failed upon trial, really proves nothing, and is not to be weighed for a moment against any one well-authenticated positive fact.

Moreover, although Mesmer was beyond a doubt the discoverer of animal magnetism, (for he first discovered that it was a power either general or universal in healthy men, and gave rules for its exercise,) it is no less certain that it had been practised long before his time, by individuals who supposed and led others to suppose that they were invested with some attribute peculiar to themselves. Several such instances have been collected by M. Colquhoun and other writers upon magnetism. The most remarkable was that of the well-known Mr. Valentine Greatrakes. In his case a prepossession upon the mind that he had the power of curing the king's evil by his touch, supplied the motive and the confidence which induced him to exert the power afterwards employed by Mesmer, but he naturally believed it peculiar to himself. His cures were examined and acknowledged by the most able and accurate of his contemporaries, but it does not seem to have occurred to them that what he did others might do as well. The facts, however, of his cures were attested by Cudworth, who was one of his patients; by Dr. Henry More, who called his power a 'Sanative con- 'tagion;' by the then Bishop of Derry, who adopted the same view after having seen him lay his hands upon 'I think a 'thousand persons,' and who attests the reality of his cures, in words which might seem to be a description of successful magnetism in the present day, while he argues very soundly against the notion that they were miraculous;[1] by the great

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[1] 'I have seen,' says the Bishop, 'pains fly strangely before his hands, till he hath chased them out of the body—dimness cleared and deafness cured by his touch; twenty persons at different times in fits of the falling sickness, were in two or three minutes brought to themselves, so as to tell where their pain was, and then he hath pursued it till he hath driven it out at some extreme part; running sores of the King's evil dried up, and kernels brought to a suppuration by his hand; grievous sores of many months' date, in a few days healed; obstructions and stoppings removed; cancerous knots in the breast dissolved, &c. Yet the manner of his operation speaks it to be natural. The cure seldom succeeds without reiterated touching, his patients often relapse; he fails frequently; he can do nothing where there is any decay in nature, and many distempers are not at all obedient to his touch.' Whence the Bishop infers the cures were not miraculous.—*Colquhoun*, i. p. 205, see also *Biographia Britannica*, article 'Stubbe.'

Christian philosopher of the day, Robert Boyle, and by many other members of the Royal Society, before whom he was examined, as he also was before the Court, in the presence of King Charles II. It is even said that on one occasion, when some patients were waiting to be touched by Greatrakes, Robert Boyle took the glove of the stroker (as he was called) and touched them with it himself, thinking the contagion might pass from that. The experiment succeeded, but it did not occur to him that the sanative power might be in his own hand rather than in the glove of Greatrakes.

Now the process by which Greatrakes performed his cures was observed and recorded; and it was identical with those of the animal magnetizer of the present day. If therefore the one works by Satanic agency, so also did the other. Yet of Greatrakes, nothing is more certain than that he was an earnest and devout member of the English Church; of Boyle, More, and Cudworth, we need not speak. We have not referred to the other examples of magnetic power before Mesmer, which the reader will find in the books of animal magnetism, because it is not certain what process was employed in those cases, and also because in some of them there were pretensions, as it would seem, to magical or supernatural power, which, though not inconsistent with the supposition that magnetism was really the agent, must at least destroy the credit of the person by whom it was employed.

Again, to this hour no magnetizer professes to be able to induce any of these phenomena, or to anticipate in what patients, or even classes of patients, they will occur. Whenever they are seen, they occur spontaneously and unaccountably in the course of magnetic treatment.

Moreover, they are universally admitted to be very rare: so that a man may magnetize powerfully and successfully for months or even for years, and never meet one such case. Deleuze says:—

> 'Out of more than three hundred persons whom I have magnetized or in whose treatment I have cooperated, I have scarce met a dozen somnambulists who have presented any curious phenomenon. The majority of invalids who submit to magnetic treatment, find themselves relieved or cured by degrees, without having experienced any thing which would demonstrate any agency. About one in twenty becomes a somnambulist; and scarcely one-fifth part of these exhibit that degree of clairvoyance of which so many descriptions are found in the works of MM. de Puységur and Turdy, and in the reports of the Strasbourg Society.'—*Hist. Crit.* vol. i. p. 146.

It is a rule with magnetizers not to seek such phenomena, it being believed that they are salutary when they offer themselves naturally, but that the attempt to bring them on, is (generally or perhaps always) injurious to the patient, as well as futile.

From these considerations it clearly appears, that somnambulism, clairvoyance, prevision, &c. are not animal magnetism—as it is, we believe, generally thought—but simply certain strange and unaccountable phenomena which cannot be produced, but which, in some rare instances, occur spontaneously in the course of magnetic treatment.

The only question, then, is, whether these phenomena are so clearly Satanic, as to prove the evil origin of that method of practice of which they are, sometimes, the incidental results.

And here we are met by the remarkable fact that, wonderful as they are, there is none of these phenomena which does not occur in peculiar states of sickness apart from any magnetic treatment. In the British Critic for October, 1838, is an article of much ability, (although in great measure open to the objection of confusing magnetism and clairvoyance,) in which several of these cases are collected. Magnetic patients are said to have known the approach of particular individuals at the distance of several miles. Nothing more wonderful is reported of them; yet S. Augustine declares that a case of the same power possessed by a sick man, came under his own observation; and a similar instance, of very recent occurrence, is well authenticated. Prevision, and the prescription by somnambulists of remedies for their own maladies, are wonderful phenomena; but these S. Augustine had met with in another case. One very remarkable example, in our own day, of the possession of powers almost incredible during sickness by a person of unimpeachable character, and who in health resembled other persons, is described in a letter published by Mr. Newnham and Dr. Esdaile; the latter states it to have been written by a clergyman to Sir George McKenzie of Edinburgh. This was a case of perfect spontaneous clairvoyance, wholly unconnected with any magnetic treatment. The transference of the sense of sight to the whole of the body was perfect. 'I saw her last night,' says the writer, 'by merely laying her hand on it, without tracing the lines or 'letters, declare the contents of a note just brought into the room, '(when I could not decipher it myself without a candle,) and with 'a rapidity with which I could not have read it by daylight.' He adds, 'there are many exhibitions of extravagant powers 'which she possesses, which we talk of to no one; for, finding it 'difficult to acquire credit for lesser things, we do not venture on 'the greater.' (Newnham, 258.) Several other instances of clairvoyance in ordinary somnambulism are given by Wienholt, (Lectures on Somnambulism,) and several remarkable instances of prevision unconnected with magnetism, by Deleuze, in the appendix to the '*Mémoire sur la faculté de Prévision.*' See, among others, the case of Mademoiselle A. Lefebvre (page 147). It is true, that such examples are much less common than the corresponding cases in magnetic patients; but this is not wonderful, for there are, every year, we may say, thousands subjected to that treatment, and among them all every such case attracts immediate attention, while those suffering under catalepsy, &c. are exceedingly few.

If the limits of this article admitted it, we might much enliven it by transcribing some of these remarkable narratives. We content ourselves with announcing the conclusion to which they lead: viz. that, wonderful and startling as are some of the more rare phenomena of magnetic somnambulism, they cannot be accounted supernatural; because the same phenomena are found to occur spontaneously in certain morbid states of the nervous system; and if not supernatural, there is, of course, not even any *primâ facie* ground for supposing them to be of Satanic origin.[1] Meanwhile it must not be concealed that these phenomena becoming generally known in an age of curiosity and license like the present, have been much overestimated, and miserably abused. Mesmeric somnambulists have displayed knowledge, the source of which it was difficult to imagine, and straightway they have been supposed to be infallible, and reference has been made to them as oracles. No sober-minded Christian can doubt, we think, that all this is very wrong, as well as very foolish. They have been consulted on questions of religion, and morals, and politics; and, as might have been expected, they have often talked nonsense and blasphemy. This circumstance has led, more than any other, to the shrinking of good men from that, in which, if they regarded it only in its true light, as an instrument for the mitigation and cure of human sufferings, they would cordially rejoice. It may easily be shown, that most of the prejudice against magnetism, both in England and abroad, is caused by these abuses, not by the thing itself. For instance, the Roman Church is said to have condemned it. Dr. Esdaile publishes a document containing an inquiry of the Bishop of Lausanne, with the rescript from Rome. The inquiry relates wholly to somnambulism, not in any degree to simple magnetism. He asks, indeed, whether it is lawful to practise magnetism? but he describes it thus:—

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[1] If it should occur to any of our readers that the diseased states of body in connexion with which these phenomena spontaneously present themselves, *i. e.* epilepsy, catalepsy, &c., have often been supposed to proceed from Satanic possession, and that the analogy of the magnetic phenomena to them does not prove the latter to be other than supernatural—we would suggest, in reply, that these very forms of disease are those most frequently cured by magnetic treatment; insomuch that if they are assumed to be the effects of possession, (which is, certainly, a gratuitous assumption, and perhaps not charitable to those who are afflicted with them,) we must allow magnetism to be the most effectual known antagonist of possession, and therefore, upon the principle laid down by our Lord, (St. Matthew xii. 26,) not Satanic. Neither is it inconsistent with this theory,—which, of course, we do not admit—that the manifestations of such supposed possession show themselves during the magnetic process; for, if it were a case of possession, it is conceivable that the process which terminated might, in the first instance, develop, and so detect what before was latent. So much for an *argumentum ad hominem.*

> 'When a lock of hair is brought into the proximity only of the magnetized person, he declares what it is (without casting his eyes upon it), whose hair it is, where the person is actually sojourning to whom the hair belongs, what he is doing, and affords the above-mentioned information respecting his disease, not otherwise than if, after the manner of medical men, he were inspecting the interior of his body.'—P. 37.

The answer is, 'the use of magnetism, *as set forth in the case,* is not permissible.'

But, in truth, nothing is more certain, than that the power called clairvoyance, whatever it be, has been much overrated; it partakes of all the uncertainty, as well as of the mystery, of that obscure class of diseases in which it is found spontaneously developed. Dr. Forbes triumphs because he has found it fail in several cases. He has a right, if he pleases, to triumph over those who have erected somnambulists into oracles, but over no others. He has not taken the first step towards proving that no such extraordinary power exists; and we knew before, that it is as uncertain as mysterious; and that its action is confined within narrow limits. The late experiment of Sir Philip Crampton shows, that a somnambulist could not be found who could read three words written upon a hundred pound note, and locked up in a box, although the note itself was to be his reward. But it proves nothing more. Above all, it disproves nothing,—for instance, not one of the facts related in the letter quoted above, at p. 383.

The time may, perhaps, never come when these anomalous facts can be reduced to system and theory. But if it is ever to come, it must be by a careful and rational investigation and recording of facts, not by the senseless incredulity of too many physicians, or by the not much wiser enthusiasm of some magnetizers. Meanwhile, some curious facts have already been established. The somnambulist, when urged to speak upon subjects wholly out of his reach, (the universe, the Creator, the unseen world, and the like,) talks either in the language of his ordinary state or in that of the magnetizer. We have, therefore, Roman Catholic revelations, Protestant revelations, Infidel revelations, of the unseen world, from somnambulists. We have certainly had enough of them all. Again, the opinions and feelings of the magnetizer seem to be those which influence him, more even than his own. Again, some somnambulists have great power of describing places which they have never seen. But of course they are asked to describe places familiar to the magnetizer or some other person with whom they are *en rapport,* as it is called; there is no reason to suppose they could describe a place wholly unknown to all the party. This and several other phenomena suggest a theory, which Mr. Newnham is disposed to adopt: namely, that as the somnambulist is often conscious of impressions upon the senses of the magnetizer, (as *e.g.* his taste,) so he becomes in some unknown manner cognizant of the impressions upon his memory, and imagination, and the like. Thus, when a servant girl, magnetized at Alton, described to Mr. Newnham the interior of his study at Farnham, which she had never seen, it may have been, that the picture of those familiar objects was in some unknown manner transferred to her from his memory; even the experiment of Sir Philip Crampton would agree with this theory, for here the secret was known only to the mind of a man hostile to the effort of the somnambulist, and, we believe, absent at the trials. It would account also for many other reported failures, as it is hardly to be conceived that such communications could be made by minds hostile to the experiment and the agent, and bent only on detecting imposture. This is, however, nothing more than a theory of much ingenuity, which facts may perhaps hereafter confirm or overthrow.[1]

But after all it is to be remembered that these curious metaphysical inquiries are quite independent of animal magnetism—they will stand without it, and it without them. How far it is lawful for a Christian to make an oracle of persons whose diseased state of nerves has brought them into a new and strange condition, is one question. Whether he may or may not adopt for the cure of disease a system of treatment which sometimes induces that state of nerves and sometimes cures it, is quite another. The one is the question, how we are to conduct ourselves with regard to somnambulists, however they come into that condition—the other, whether or not we may avail ourselves of animal magnetism; and the more these questions are kept separate the better.[1]

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[1] In a similar manner, Mr. Newnham accounts for what is called phreno-magnetism. There seems no doubt that many somnambulists have been acted upon, in a very remarkable manner, by the hand of the magnetizer, when laid upon different parts of the head, the dispositions answering to the organs supposed by the phrenologists to be situated in those parts being successively called forth—as singing, when music is touched, and the like. This has been taken as a demonstration of the truth of phrenology. Mr. Newnham is no phrenologist, he believes that phrenology is likely to lead to materialism and infidelity, yet he admits the facts, but accounts for them by suggesting, that the will of the magnetizer acts upon the somnambulist, and causes the impression which he intends to produce, and not his hand applied to the organ. This theory, of course, is denied by the phrenologists, but it seems to us that Mr. Newnham has much to say for it.

On one phenomenon it may be well to say a few words—the entire insensibility of some magnetized persons. This is a fact established by evidence so unquestionable, that it is admitted even by Dr. Forbes. He acknowledges that imagination, according to his theory of magnetism, has thrown some individuals into such a state that the amputation of a limb has been effected without any consciousness on the part of the sufferer. He adds, that he fears[2] these cases must always continue unusual and extraordinary. We should have been inclined to agree with him a few months ago, but the experience of Dr. Esdaile inclines us to hope. Dr. Esdaile is a civil surgeon in Bengal; and his book gives us the record of his own experience, during the first eight months which elapsed after the power of magnetism was brought under his notice. His practice it seems lay chiefly among the natives: and having the care of an hospital at Hoogly, near Calcutta, he taught the native attendants to magnetize those who came for operations. We do not remember that he anywhere states in how many instances he failed to produce insensibility, an omission, if it be not our own mistake, which is to be regretted—but we should imagine that success must have been the rule rather than the exception, for he gives a tabular report of no less than seventy-three painless operations performed by himself alone, in those eight months of last year! The list is too horrible to extract; it contains, however, sixteen considerable amputations, besides many other very severe operations. Dr. Esdaile declares his opinion that it would have been impossible for some of these patients to have survived the operation, had the nervous exhaustion of pain and terror been added to the actual loss of blood, &c. We think these facts alone should make humane men hesitate before they denounce an instrument of so much mercy to suffering humanity.

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[1] We have hardly patience to encounter the argument of the danger to public morals. It is true, that some very few magnetic patients are reduced to a state of insensibility: and this is all that can be said; for as to somnambulists, all accounts agree in representing them as more secure against any immoral designs during the magnetic state, than at any other time. It is true, a very few patients fall into a state of unconsciousness. How does this add to the danger of morals in a country where opium, &c. are sold without restriction? specially, as these may be administered without the knowledge of the recipient, while none can be magnetised but by their own consent, and, therefore, all can choose a magnetizer in whom they have confidence, and witnesses of the operation. It would be quite as true to say that the medical profession is dangerous to the public morals.

[2] We are glad he says, 'I fear,' because some medical opponents of magnetism have asserted that the pain of an operation is an important part of it. Dr. Forbes seems to abandon this ground.

With regard to these painless operations, we have heard it suggested, that it is not right to avoid the pain which it pleases God to bring upon us. This objection, however, is not in truth an objection to magnetic treatment, but to any treatment at all. All medical treatment is an attempt to ward off or alleviate part of the heavy burden of misery which sin has brought upon man. It is plain, both from Scripture and the course of Providence, that this attempt is not displeasing to Him who has suffered us to be afflicted, either when it succeeds or when it fails. The physician is His appointment as much as the disease. And shall we stop here, or will it not be mere prejudice if we admit that He has given us the use of opium for the alleviation of pain; and yet deny that magnetism, which in many cases acts so much more powerfully, and without the same inconvenience for the same purpose, is his gift also? He who made the physician made the magnetizer, and we may thankfully employ one and the other as He shall give us the opportunity.

There is another objection upon which we wish to say a few words—the supposed tendency of magnetic practice to rival the miracles of our Lord and His Apostles. And first, may we venture to suggest to religious persons who indulge such a fear, whether there be not in it something of weakness of faith? If, indeed, it were the working of Satan, then it were evil, and to be rejected, whether he came to us in the garb of an angel of light, or in any other; but if this thing be part of the system of nature, *i. e.* of God's order in this His world, can it be hostile to His Revelation, 'with whom is no variableness 'neither shadow of turning?' But in truth, as was remarked of the cures of Greatrakes, 180 years ago, there is no resemblance between effects, however wonderful, which follow upon man's operations, but which he cannot cause when he will or in whom he will, and His works, who has but to say, I WILL, and all is done —not to mention so many other circumstances, as the gradual nature of most magnetic cures, the limits to all magnetic action, and the like, as noticed also by the Bishop of Derry, in the case of Greatrakes. One suggestion may, perhaps, be allowed us. In some of the miracles of our blessed Lord, He was pleased to employ means very similar to those employed in magnetic cures. He laid His hand upon the sick. He spat and made clay with the spittle. Virtue went out of Him, and healed her who in faith touched the hem of His garment. May we not say that if it be indeed true that God has implanted in the body and will of man any sanative power for the good of his brethren, call it by what name you will, He who condescended to become our brother, who was made in all points like unto us, who took all things belonging to the perfection of man's nature, would, by virtue of that ever blessed mystery which we celebrate at the present season,[1] take to Himself that faculty in all its perfection, as well as others? And as it was His will that His Divine power should continually act through, and as it were pervade and penetrate all parts of, His manhood, as He made them the instruments of His works of mercy, teaching with Divine wisdom and love and holiness, yet with man's voice; exhibiting all the fulness of the Godhead bodily; so should we naturally expect to find Him performing His Divine works of mercy through, and by means of the sanative power of the perfect human body and will, if it be true that such a sanative power exists. We should not, therefore, be startled if we find a degree of resemblance between the mode of His acting and that of His creatures, and after all, their works are as far below His as their teaching below His teaching—the creature below the Creator. But we are trespassing on ground too high for our present subject, or we might proceed to show, how everything which raises our estimate of the power which God has implanted in man's nature, tends only to bring home more vividly to the Christian mind His glory and His working, both of old and at this day, who has once and for ever united that nature with His Godhead, never to be divided.

After these thoughts, we cannot return again to such subjects as have occupied this article. We will only, in conclusion, beg our readers to consider whether, if what we have stated be true, it does not become the Church among us to recognise and confess that truth. Nothing is more to be deprecated than that any great instrument should be left in evil hands. Such cannot but use it for evil purposes. Has it ever happened that medicine has been left in the hands of unbelievers without signal injury to the faith? Has no harm been done, when science has been left in the possession of those who longed to employ it against God and His Church? Has any good come of the abandonment of history during the last century to the infidel party? And if we see all this clearly, as we now do, shall we not also see that to leave a great instrument of mitigating human sufferings, a powerful medical agent, in the hands of irreligious men, will be an act of great responsibility. Much more when, as in this instance, there is much in it which is not only useful but exciting; many curious facts of psychology, many unexpected results, and ensnaring speculations. Neither is this an imaginary evil. Animal magnetism, indeed, has no necessary or even natural connexion with unbelief. No one could read the works of Deleuze, for instance, and doubt that he was sincere in his profession of Christianity. But it is equally true that some of its ablest advocates in this country are evidently unbelievers, and desirous of using it as an instrument against Christianity. Under these circumstances, is it wisest to leave it in their hands, or to employ it ourselves?[1]

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[1] This Article was in type for our last Number.

Next to medical men, who in general either will not or dare not use it, the country clergy have most frequent opportunities of relieving or mitigating pain, and often of curing disease, by this powerful instrument; and if any of them should, for this purpose, inform himself of the process, and should so employ it, might he not answer to those who are disposed to censure him, in the words of the motto by which Bishop Berkeley prefaced his medical treatise—'as we have opportunity, let us do good unto all men?'

P. S.—Since this article was in type public attention has been much directed to the suspension of the sensitive powers by inhaling the fumes of ether, and the performance of operations in that state. Whether this will ultimately be found a safe method of operation it is not, of course, for us to decide, although, from the very small number of cases in which any injurious effects have yet been reported, we are somewhat sanguine in our hopes. Our readers, however, will not fail to observe how remarkably it bears out our argument as to the real nature of Magnetism. It is a peculiar method of medical treatment. Here we have one of its most startling effects produced by an operation confessedly medical; and as far as we know no one has yet so much as surmised anything about supernatural agency. Yet, in truth, how ether produces this effect is just as little known to us, as is the *modus operandi* of magnetism.

We have heard against this experiment the strange objection that we ought not to avoid by art the pains which the providence of God lays upon us. We call this a strange objection, because it is really inexplicable that men should think surgical operations lawful, which are so very evident and violent an interference with nature, which nature is but God's ordinary system in the world, and yet doubt whether it be lawful to lessen, or remove artificially, the pain of the operations. Those who think that when the Almighty has afflicted a patient with a tumour, it is a rebellion against God to have it extracted, do certainly take an intelligible ground, although we may not agree with them; but it is mysterious that any one should suppose that the pain and inconvenience of the tumour may lawfully be avoided by an operation, but that the pain of the operation may not lawfully be avoided, if it can without injury, by ether. The truth is, these objectors, of whom we would speak with all respect, shrink from this practice merely because it is new, while medical practice in general is a thing of long standing. Of course we are no apologists for the rash and reckless manner in which it has already been used, much less for its abuse to purposes of mere excitement, which we suppose differs little from intoxication.

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[1] We earnestly trust, that religious men, and Churchmen, will come forward to take upon themselves the management and direction of the proposed mesmeric infirmary. It is to be established. It will assuredly lead to many cases of cure; it will, therefore, be lamentable if the patients are left to attach themselves, by gratitude for benefits received there, to irreligious men or false guides; because others would not undertake the direction. That such an institution is urgently needed, cannot be doubted by any one who knows the sanatory power of magnetism, inasmuch as the practice is not allowed in our existing hospitals, and the cases are, consequently, very numerous in which the poor are wholly excluded from its benefits.

Some of our readers may be interested in the following extract from Dr. Esdaile.

'A return of medical cases cured by Mesmerism during the last eight months:—

Nervous headache	3	cured by one trance.
Tic-douloureux	1	ditto.
Nervousness and lameness, from rheumatism of two and a half years' standing	1	by chronic treatment.
Spasmodic colic	1	by one trance.
Acute inflammation of the eye .	1	by repeated trances in 24 hours.
Chronic ditto	1	by chronic treatment.
Acute local inflammation . . .	1	by repeated trances in 36 hours.
Convulsions	1	by one trance.
Lameness from rheumatism . .	2	by chronic treatment.
Lumbago	1	by general and local Mesmerizing for a week.
Sciatica	1	ditto.
Pain in crural nerve	1	ditto.
Palsy of one arm	1	ditto, for a month.
Ditto of half the body	1	ditto, for six weeks.
Feeling of insects crawling over the body	1	by one trance.
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By chronic treatment is meant daily Mesmerising without the intention of entrancing the patient, which is not necessary.'—*Esdaile,* p. 23.

ART. V.—1. *Schwedens Kirchenverfassung und Unterrichtswesen.* Von FRIEDRICH WILHELM VON SCHUBERT. Greifswald. 1821. 2 vols.

2. *Review of the latest Events and present State of the Church of Christ.* By C. F. AF WINGARD, Archbishop of Upsal. Translated from the Swedish. London. 1845.

3. *A Collection of Papers connected with the Theological Movement of* 1833. By the Hon. and Rev. A. P. PERCEVAL. London. 1843. Second Edition.

4. *The History of the Swedes.* By E. G. GEIJER. Translated from the Swedish. London: Whittaker and Co.

THE extent of the researches of the present day into the character and condition of different nations has almost proverbially left little food remaining for curiosity. As Lord Byron said of ancient Greece, we are tempted to say, that of nearly all countries we already know more than enough. Yet this feeling of satiety with which one takes up any modern book of travels is surely not so much caused by any deficiency in the material of investigation, as by the disappointment one constantly finds in the point of view taken by travellers. So it is, one book of travels is very much like another, although each man, on seeing a country for himself, is sure to discern many things he never found noticed in any book; and matters of interest are frequently suggesting themselves, which we at home expect will be cleared up by the information supplied by successive travellers, however often hitherto we have been disappointed. Since the recent ecclesiastical movement, for example, we suppose there are few persons who have thought at all on the questions at issue, without wishing for much more precise and extensive information as to the present state of opinion and discipline in the Oriental Churches, than we can readily obtain from any of the very numerous works that have appeared on Eastern travel, at least till within the last few years. Those who travelled most, seldom travelled for such an object. Manners, scenery, politics, commerce—perhaps the external religion of the country, little as that could be understood without an intimate acquaintance with the language and modes of thought of the inhabitants—all this might attract their attention—but we might look almost in vain for really useful and accurate details on the inner religious condition of Eastern Christendom. Recently, the works of Messrs. Wolff, Grant, Masson, and Harris, have done much to supply this deficiency, and, of course, the position taken up of late by the Anglican Church in the East, however we may deprecate it, will at least add most largely and desirably to the knowledge of all parties on the state and prospects of the Christian bodies which surround it.

Situated as we now are, any knowledge we can accumulate as to the actual character and position of all Christians outside of us, more especially of those who have any pretensions, however faint, to Apostolic order and discipline, will tend most materially to the clearing up of our own true position, will thereby assist many perplexed consciences, and lessen the difficulties of future generations.

Amongst such communities, we may fairly assign an important place to the Swedish Church, were it only because there seems ground for thinking that at a very early period it excited the interest of Anglican divines, and because more recently it again became the subject of some curiosity at the beginning of the present movement; although, from the excitement of the times, and the difficulty of obtaining information, the subject has been a good deal more neglected than it deserved to be. It seemed at first sight a considerable fact, if it were a fact at all, that a community existed in Europe, bearing an obvious superficial similarity to the Anglican Church, with Bishops, claiming, after a sort, Apostolical succession, and yet separate from Greece and Rome. This gave the Swedish Church at once a superiority in our eyes to other Lutheran communities, whilst, in common with them, its Reformation had retained a great many externals, which the English had laid aside. The Swedish Church had something attractive in its outward aspect, and we not unreasonably expected to find many more points of inward resemblance to our own than in reality it possesses.

Nor is this the only reason why Sweden and its Church ought to be interesting to the English. All travellers observe the great likeness the Swedish people bear to ourselves, connected, as we are, by a sort of national cousinship. In their intellectual character, practical and straightforward to a fault, and, whatever general demoralization they may be charged with, in the veracity which so honourably distinguishes them among the Northern nations, we discern that Teutonic element, unmixed, to the predominance of which in ourselves many of the features common to the English and Swedish religious history may be ascribed. Whichever view we take of their Church,—whether we place it, as for our part we believe it should be placed, on precisely the same level as other Lutheran bodies, or whether, following the conclusion of Mr. Perceval, in his pamphlet on the movement of 1833, we are disposed to consider it as possessed of the Apostolical succession, and worthy the name of a Church, it must excite in us some interest and curiosity on this further account, that Sweden was originally converted by means of English missionaries. Although it is true that England cannot claim the high honour of having given birth to the apostle of Sweden, S. Anschar, still, of those holy men, S. Sigfrid, S. Eskill, S. Henry, S. Bothvid, and others, who followed in his track, and won the crown of the confessor or the martyr, carrying the labours of that great saint to completion, most were our countrymen. To consider this, and then to observe the later fortunes of that Church, which began in a manner with us, (for the Saxons were no sooner converted themselves than they began to convert others,) still further on, to perceive the general similarity that exists between the Swedish and English reformations, cannot be devoid of a deep, however mournful, interest—greater, we will boldly say, than could be supplied by any such parallel or contrast in any other two members of the European family. It may be noticed, moreover, that the Swedish reformation deserves more attention than it has yet received, because in it the Lutheran idea was most perfectly realized, and has been least disturbed: we see in it precisely what every country in Europe would have been had Luther's views succeeded. It was untainted, except for a very brief period, by any admixture of Calvinist tendencies; and in the Swedish establishment, therefore, the speculator in ecclesiastical matters is presented, if we may use the expression, with a perfect anatomical specimen of an important system of religious belief and government.

The means, however, for an examination of it have been, and still are, so inaccessible to English readers, that we believe few have been able to gain sufficient knowledge on the subject even to form an opinion on the several very interesting questions it opens out. The works of travellers in Sweden are most signally deficient in this particular: the earlier writers especially, such as Acerbi, Clarke, and Coxe, having travelled for other purposes, and either passed over the subject of the Swedish Church with a narrow-minded contempt, or else even wilfully misrepresented it.

Within the last ten years, Mr. Laing, in his most valuable 'Observations in Sweden,' has certainly supplied us with some remarks on Church matters worthy of that attention which all remarks coming from an intelligent and keen-sighted traveller, of whatever opinions, demand. Still, as a Radical in politics, and a Scotch Presbyterian, he was likely to be a prejudiced witness on matters connected with an established Church, in which so many remnants of discipline and ceremonial have survived. Accordingly, we believe that he very considerably overstates the existence of a ritual spirit in Sweden, and will have completely misled the reader, if he infers from his evidence, that the least spark of what we commonly term Catholic feeling, is to be found amongst the Swedes. In saying this, we are not forgetful that Mr. Laing's work is one of those few books of travels that may, in general, be thoroughly depended on; and it is not his fault, if, from the circumstances of his education, many questions which interest us could not even occur to him, and if on others he has formed his opinions on very inadequate indications. His tour was, perhaps, one of the first that awakened any attention of late years in this country to Sweden —an attention that has been kept up, though in another way, by the translation of Miss Bremer's novels, which so agreeably supply that sort of deficiency in our general idea of a country, absolutely necessary for just conclusions on its religious condition, but which cannot otherwise be filled up, unless by personally visiting it.

We were in hopes that the little work of the Archbishop of Upsal, lately translated into English, coming as it did from a person bearing so high an office in the Swedish Church, would have satisfied our curiosity on these subjects more amply than it does. Only a small portion of it relates to Sweden, and that is chiefly valuable as a proof of what we shall presently consider at greater length, namely, the total, utter absence of anything like Catholic spirit in that country—an absence so complete, that it is almost amusing to recollect the expectations we built, on first adverting to the fact, that the Swedish Church not only used a ritual pomp, surpassing in many respects the so-called innovations which have excited such anxiety and alarm in England, but also had preserved the name of Bishops, and had some obscure pretension to Apostolical succession. However, for the reformation era of Sweden, we could not wish for a more satisfactory work than the admirable history of M. Geijer, recently translated by Mr. Turner, of which it would be difficult to speak too much, either as to its profoundly philosophical spirit, the Shaksperian animation of its portraitures, or the copious documentary knowledge with which the author has completed their minute features. More we could not say of this eminent historian. It is a work indispensable to all students of Swedish history, and holds the sort of place in it that M. Michelet's work holds in French historical literature, whatever opinion we may justly entertain as to the general tone and views of either.

Lastly, we conceive that we shall be doing a service to our readers in bringing before their notice the publication which stands first in the list at the head of this article. The author was commissioned in 1817 by the Prussian Government to collect information in Sweden on the ecclesiastical constitution of that country, where he spent two years, and published the result of his researches in 1821. The work is generally allowed by the Swedes themselves to be the fullest and most trustworthy account of their Church establishment that exists,—so very complete, indeed, that for some time nothing more will be needed. For what relates to the present state of the Swedish Church, there is no other work of the kind to be had; and as to its earlier history, the printed sources even in the Swedish language itself are, according to M. Schubert, very scanty. Any one who would undertake the translation of the whole, or a part of this important work, hitherto, we believe, little, if at all, noticed in our country, would furnish a most useful addition to our materials for thought on public education, and the relations of Church and State in modern Europe, as well as on the other important questions to which we have adverted.

Before we proceed to select for the reader's attention a few out of the many interesting details with which M. Schubert supplies us, it may be desirable to state one principal inference, which we believe to be deducible from the history of the Swedish Reformation, and still more from a general view of the liturgical alterations which the Swedish Church has adopted since that era. Especially if we contrast them with the corresponding phenomena in our own Ecclesiastical history, at the different epochs of Elizabeth, James I. Charles I. Charles II. and with the remarkable movement that has taken place in our own times, the conclusion will be still more apparent; that where the principle of apostolic authority is absent, external rites and ceremonies, however beautiful and numerous, go for nothing, and tend to decay: on the other hand, wherever it is retained, even in a modified form, or with hardly visible dimensions, external rites will have a tendency, even though at first discarded, to reappear one after another, and to grow around this root of vitality. The denial or retention of this great principle it is, that constitutes the wide difference between the Swedish and English Reformations, and accounts for all that *contrast* which is observable in the later history of the two Churches, however a superficial observer may be struck with their seeming resemblance. The traveller enters a Swedish church, and observes a ritual solemnity very like, and in some respects much greater than, what is used in an English cathedral. He sees clergy habited in chasubles embroidered with crosses. On state occasions he sees bishops with mitres, pastoral staffs, and other insignia of their order, which many a good Protestant in our country would call flat Popery. He looks into their Prayer-Book, and again finds great similarity to our own. The very preface and table of contents remind him of it. The various Church offices, as they stand at present, will please the reader, if a 'low Churchman,' more than ours do. He will say of them, 'Here is a due and moderate attention 'paid to externals, and yet an Evangelical spirit such as, with 'submission, we desiderate in many parts of the Anglican 'ritual. We might take a lesson from the Swedes.' And, if he be a high Churchman, he will be almost puzzled to explain the fact, that, although he might wish the Swedish Liturgy to speak more out on many an important doctrine, and though here and there he perceives in it clear notes of heresy, and though no one can know anything of Sweden, without being aware how complete and thorough-going is the hold possessed by the deepest principles of Protestantism on the public mind, still, in the general aspect of its Church, in the position held by it in reference to the State, in its interior constitution, in its formularies, there does exist so considerable an outward resemblance to the Anglican Church, that the commonest remark we hear from ordinary Englishmen, who have been in Sweden, is, 'Oh, they are very much like ourselves.'

A close examination of the Swedish formularies, and of the successive changes that have brought them into their present state, will greatly undeceive an English ritualist, as to the value he might at first be tempted to assign to the rites and ceremonies which they yet retain. He will see that there has been amongst them all along, a constant tendency to pare away externals, and that this tendency has by no means yet come to a stand-still. At each successive revision of their Liturgy, (and the revisions have been very frequent,) some rite or other of venerable antiquity, and affecting associations, has been done away with. We see in its history 'the shrivelling stalk, and silent falling leaf,' the fading of 'truth after truth, of choicest scent and hue.'

An Englishman is more apt to notice this, as half the ecclesiastical agitations of his own country have arisen from quite another cause, viz. the wish, in high places of the Church, not to curtail or remove externals, but continually to add them. At every revision of the Anglican Liturgy, it is undeniable that an advance in the direction of externals has been made; or what is the same thing, some externals, ready to fall off, and vehemently assailed by Puritan clamour, have been more firmly fixed by the deliberate sanction and approval of the Church. The English Reformed Church began the world, so to speak, with a much more scanty apparel of rites and ceremonies, than did the Swedish; but she retained, in however indistinct a shape, the principle of Church authority, which the Swedish reformers entirely laid aside. Now when a doctrine is held on Church authority, it is not likely to die out, as a doctrine would be which is held merely on the *ipse dixit* of a Luther or a Melanchthon; and therefore, as it lives in the mind of a Church, it will soon clothe itself with rites and symbols anew, if these, from circumstances, have disappeared; just as, at present, we wish to keep up or restore the stone altar, the surplice, or the offertory. On the other hand, very many of the externals retained by Luther, were retained by no means as symbolic of any doctrine at all, but merely as a matter of taste; and so, as taste in one age dictated their preservation, taste in another age dictated their removal. An altar in a Lutheran church *means* nothing, because they have no sacrifice but the metaphorical sacrifice of prayer. Again, they may, if they please, clothe their *preacher* in a chasuble, but neither does this mean anything, as they do not allow a priesthood to exist, but have created instead 'the holy preacher's office' (*predigtamt*), and the preacher wears his vestments, not as sacrificing in the person of Christ, and clothed with apparel symbolizing his office, but he wears them merely as dignified and beautiful habiliments, interesting from their associations, but not of the slightest material consequence, whether retained or laid aside.

It is true that Gustavus Vasa, like Henry VIII., always professed that he had no wish to destroy the continuity of the Reformed Church with the Roman Catholic, or to remove indiscriminately all the rites and ceremonies which had been handed down by the latter. His reformation was chiefly owing to political causes, and took its general character from them, although, doubtless, he was the very ideal of a Protestant king, and fully imbued with that love of the practical, economical, and social virtues, as opposed to the austere, the saintly, and the supernatural, which we believe constitutes one most essential distinction between the Protestant and the Catholic system and turn of mind. His was the blunt, straightforward intellect, impatient of minute argument, or such as cannot be presented in a very popular way, delighting in the peace, comfort, good order, and smooth working of the commonwealth, but vehemently opposed to whatever even apparently lessened it, and therefore, though hating the corruption of a priesthood, yet dreading their virtues more than their vices. Added to all this, he had a political conscience as unscrupulous as ever Protestant ascribed to the subtlest Jesuit—a base, grasping love of money, enhanced by as much need of it as any monarch could have on first ascending the throne. The wars by which the Danish yoke was shaken off, had necessitated the contraction of immense debt, which the government had no means of liquidating, except by the plunder of the Church, which, in proportion to the rest of the State, was perhaps one of the richest in Europe. It was, moreover, the easier prey, partly in consequence of the corruptions into which, like most other Churches, it had fallen, but still more, because it had uniformly been on the side of the

Danish tyranny and against the Swedish independence.[1] It had thus, in a very great measure, lost the sympathy of the people, and they were ready to look with indifference, or with malicious glee, at the commencement of Gustavus's daring and iniquitous proceedings. Little could be done by the Bishops to resist him, as all the sees but two were vacant at his accession, and of the occupants of those, one was incapacitated for business by his advanced age. But by way of putting the reader in possession of the general spirit in which Gustavus managed the early stages of the Reformation, we shall make two interesting quotations from M. Geijer.

> 'At the fair of St. Eric's day, 1526, Gustavus himself, sitting on horseback on one of the barrows of Upsala, discoursed to the people who stood round on the uselessness of the Latin service and the monastic life. Then, referring to the chapter, he demanded of them, "by what right the church held temporal power, and whether any ground for its privileges was to be found in Holy Scripture?" He now sought to acquire an ally against the church, and showed the nobility what they might gain by the reduction of the conventual estates, proposing himself, before the council, a claim to the monastery of Gripsholm, as heir of its founder, Steno Sturé the elder. His allegation was, that the consent which his father gave to its foundation had been extorted. Shortly afterwards, grounding himself on the voluntary cession of the monks, he sequestered the convent, without waiting for the declaration of the council. An explanatory letter was issued to all the provinces, intended, in his own words, to obviate evil reports, for which end the transaction is represented almost as an instance of royal generosity. At the same time he wrote to Bishop Brask, who had undertaken to make an inventory of the appurtenances of Nydala Abbey, "that he, the king, would himself take order regarding the monasteries," which was indeed performed in such a fashion that one after the other was brought under his own management. The secular fiefs of the bishops were confiscated, and the fines at law due to them were collected by the king's bailiffs, all complaints on this head being set at nought. No further regard was paid to the spiritual jurisdiction; on the contrary, the king adjudicated even its ecclesiastical causes, gave to monks and nuns who wished to quit their convents, letters of protection, and declared excommunications invalid. He appointed and deposed priests by his own authority, and assumed the episcopal right of taking the effects of those who died intestate, doing this even in some cases where the parties had left a will, and sharing their revenues with them at his good pleasure.'[2]

The thoroughly secular and sacrilegious character of the Swedish Reformation, is still more apparent from the details of the important diet of Westeras, in 1527, and above all, from the speech with which the King's favourite chancellor, Laurence Anderson, opened its deliberations. We observe at once that political reasons stand insolently in the very head and front of the whole argument. Abuses in doctrine or discipline are only mentioned very incidentally, as a make-weight.

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[1] The contest was of itself an important element amongst the causes of the Swedish Reformation: the assertion of their political independence had educated the mind of the nation for religious liberty also.

[2] Geijer, p. 114.

'All was laid to the king's charge, both the dearth, which he had sought to mitigate to the best of his ability, and the assessment of churches and monasteries, which was to be excused by the necessity of the case; although it was otherwise reasonable in itself, that the superfluity which the commoners had accumulated, should also be used for their requirements, and for the lightening of their burdens when need was. Lastly, it was imputed to the king that he was introducing a new faith into the land, because he, and many with him, had now learned to consider how they were cozened and oppressed in money matters by the churchmen, who were under the shield of the pope in Rome. The rulers of this land had been long enough exposed to the danger of provoking the Romish confederacy, and had been obliged to endure the insolence of the bishops, who revolted and levied war before their eyes, according as the Archbishop Gustavus Trollé had declared to the Lord Steno Sturé, that he had received from his pope a sharp sword to bear upright before him, and that he would use other weapons than a wax candle in the conflict. The same administrator, Lord Steno Sturé, had not been able to maintain more than five hundred soldiers from the revenues of the kingdom, because the crown and the baronage had scarcely the third part of that which was possessed by priests and monks, convents and churches. The king acknowledged that he had permitted God's word and gospel to be preached; but he had caused these preachers to be summoned to defend their doctrines, and some of them were now present and ready to do so. This, however, the prelates of the church heeded not, but wished to preserve their old usages, be they right or unright. There were some who slandered him publicly and shamelessly, pretending that he would suffer no priest to remain in the country; but he was minded to die like a Christian man, and knew that teachers were indispensable. . . . . If any government were to exist, means must be found for its sustentation, and now more than formerly; if Sweden were to have a king. That method of carrying on war which was now used in other countries, made greater charges necessary. The fortresses and castles of the kingdom were dilapidated, and in part destroyed; the income of the crown was endangered, whilst every one wished to be king over his own labourers; and yet the baronage had become weaker, so that it was unable to fulfil its obligations for the defence of the realm. The customs had sunk to nothing; the mines of silver and copper had fallen to decay; the trade did not support the towns, and for the little which yet remained, the country and the towns were quarrelling; the yearly outlay of the crown now amounted to two and a half times more than the receipts.'[1]

The bishops, of whom four were present, the rest of the diet being composed of representatives from the nobility, the citizens, and the peasants, could offer no effectual opposition, and all the demands of Gustavus were at last conceded. The king was empowered to take into his own hands the castles and fortresses of the bishops, to fix their revenues, and regulate the monasteries. The nobles were permitted to resume that part of their hereditary property which had been conveyed to churches and convents since the inquisition of Charles Canuteson, in 1454; and the preachers were to have liberty to proclaim the 'pure 'word of God;' 'but not,' added the nobles, 'uncertain miracles, 'human inventions, and fables.' The citizens and peasants gave a lingering and unwilling assent to this last proposition;

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[1] Geijer, pp. 116, 117.

they said: 'Inquiry might be made, but the matter passed 'their understanding. It was hard to judge more deeply than 'understanding permitted.' As might be expected, the lower classes felt acutely the extreme cruelty and violence with which these innovations were carried out by Gustavus. The religious, who were thus cast out into a world of which they knew nothing, and their places filled up by fierce soldiers, in many cases received no compensation whatever for their losses, but took to beggary or licentiousness for a livelihood. The churches were all sacked of their plate and bells to pay off the public debts; and this was a sacrilege peculiarly painful to the Swedes, a nation who are even now remarkable for the simple and homely pride they take in the adornment of their churches, in which good work a sort of rivalry exists between one parish and another. Revolts took place in different parts of the country, as with us, chiefly, however, provoked by this rude interference with their old associations, the most formidable of them being 'the bell sedition,' in Dalecarlia. But the Reformation may be said to have been complete when the sittings at Westeras terminated. The archbishop was already in exile, and Brask, the only remaining efficient prelate on the Roman Catholic side, also quitted Sweden for ever. So far we see, in the prominent rank held by purely political grievances among the causes of the Swedish Reformation, much to remind us of the history of our own; except that in the latter there was at least the pretence, on the part of many leading reformers, of devoting the spoil of Church property to objects connected with the well-being of the Church—a pretence which seems scarcely to have been hinted at by any of those who figured in the Swedish movement.

We now desire to trace for the reader the further resemblance which exists between the two reformations, by a sketch of the principal Church offices used at present in Sweden, and of the various important changes which have taken place therein. They are contained in two volumes, one intended for the use of the Pastor, and called 'The Church Manual,' (*Kyrko-handbok,*) the other entitled the *Evangelii-bok*, or 'The 'Gospels and Epistles for all the Sundays, Feasts, and other 'Holidays: as also the Collects and Prayers pertaining thereto.' Their ecclesiastical law is contained in a volume called 'The 'Church Ordinance' (*Kyrko-lag*). This is on the basis of one which was issued in the same year with the decrees of Westeras, and augmented at the synod of Orebro, in 1529, and again in 1554. A more complete Church ordinance drawn up by Laurentius Petri, the first Protestant archbishop of Upsal, was recognised by the government in 1571, though superseded for a time during the Roman Catholic movement of John III. 'But 'on account of the Catholic principles which prevailed here and 'there even in it, corrections were proposed as early as 1595, 'and on many occasions afterwards, which were also actually 'determined on and presented before the public, but never 'declared to be law."[1] At length, a final revision of the Church ordinances was made in 1685 and 1686, examined by a mixed commission of bishops, professors, and laymen, and ratified by Charles XI. Since that date, no change of any importance has taken place, though great wishes for an alteration were expressed in the early part of the last century, and a project for an amended Church law was all but sanctioned.

In the Church Hand-book, as we shall see, more frequent changes have been admitted. The construction of a Swedish Liturgy was first decreed in 1529, at the synod of Orebro, and was entrusted to the celebrated reformer Olaus Petri (brother of the Archbishop Laurentius), who drew his chief materials from the Manual of Linköping, set forth by Bishop Brask. Olaus completed his Hand-book the same year, and by the year 1531 he had also drawn up the Swedish Communion Service (*Mess-ordnung*). Both came into use only by degrees. Gustavus Vasa ordered that the Latin mass should be retained, where its intermission gave scandal, until the people should be better instructed; and the Church ordinance of 1571 still permitted Latin psalms and prayers. In 1577, this Swedish mass was abrogated by John III., who restored the Latin liturgy in a somewhat modified form, with a view to the gradual re-establishment of Roman Catholicism. The monarch being actually reconciled to Rome in 1578, a steady and systematic plan was carried forward for this object, during about six years—not as in our country, in the reign of Mary, by an unhesitating renewal of the old order of things, but by putting public instruction in the hands of Jesuits, and by carefully patching together whatever remnants of Roman Catholic belief and ceremonial still existed in the church. However, his worldly and unsettled character, devoid of sincerity and of mental grasp, soon led him to swerve from a purpose which hardly any powers could then have accomplished. He deserted the Roman Catholic faith, but after dallying for a while with the thoughts of a junction with the Greek Church, he at last contented himself with forcing upon his unwilling clergy his own modified Liturgy, the fit expression of his indistinct ideas. The reception of this, the 'Red Book,' as it was called, lasted only with John's life, and in 1593 it was utterly abolished by the Council of Upsal, which restored the Communion Service and Hand-book of Olåus Petri, and declared 'the Faith of Luther, as

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[1] Schubert, vol. i. p. 20.

'grounded upon Holy Scripture, to be the only established 'religion of Sweden.' Some alterations in these gradually came into use, which were formally sanctioned under Gustavus Adolphus in 1614. At another Council of Upsal in 1693, still further changes were made, and the Communion Service and Handbook thrown together into a single volume, called 'The Church Manual.' This remained unaltered till 1811, when, after many years' debate, the Church offices now in use were finally ratified by royal authority. The present Manual contains a short preface by Archbishop Lindblom, on the History of the Swedish Liturgies, and is divided into fifteen sections, as follows:—

1. The order of common prayer for Sundays, viz. i. The early; ii. The morning; iii. The evening service. This chapter contains also the forms for various week-day services. 2. The Litanies and other prayers used on holidays and certain special occasions. 3. Baptism. i. Of children; ii. Foundlings; iii. Private baptism, in cases of necessity; iv. Baptism of proselytes. 4. The first communion of young people. 5. The general confession. 6. Visitation of the sick and of those troubled in mind. 7. Matrimony. 8. Churching of women. 9. Burial. 10. Public penance. 11. Preparation of criminals condemned to death. 12. Consecration of Churches. 13. Investiture of a bishop. 14. *Consecration to the preacher's office.* 15. Induction of a rector (*Pfarrherr*) into his parish.

The other liturgical volume, called 'The Evangelii-bok,' and commonly bound up with the metrical Psalms and Hymns, is a sort of Protestant 'Missal for the use of the Laity,' containing not only so much of the Church offices as is necessary to be in the hands of the laity, but also short prayers to be used during their celebration, and a variety of other devotions adapted to the different circumstances of life. Some of the more interesting heads in its table of contents are as follows:—1. The Collects, Epistles, and Gospels used throughout the year. 2. Luther's Shorter Catechism, and St. Athanasius' Creed. 3. The History of the Passion of Christ, taken from the four Gospels. 4. Easter-day—the History of Christ's Resurrection. 5. The History of Christ's Ascension. 6. The History of the Destruction of Jerusalem. 7. A little book of Prayers, containing (amongst others) morning and evening Prayers for Sundays and weekdays—Prayers, before, in, and after Church: *e.g.* a prayer to be used when one intends to go to Church—another before the sermon, varying according to its object. A Prayer for children about to be baptized. A Prayer for protection through the instrumentality of the Holy Angels. A Prayer to be used when the clock strikes. The Litany. A set of Prayers for the Holy Communion, and the general confession which precedes it. Prayers adapted to different occasions: *e.g.* for a blessing in one's calling—for one about to enter holy matrimony—for a soldier—for a labourer—for a woman with child—for an orphan—for a servant. Prayers to be used in prosperity—for comfort in adversity, &c.—in time of plague, war, or famine—on a birthday or a burial. Prayers to be used by travellers by land or water, for the morning or the evening—also by their friends at home for them, &c. 8. The Swedish Sunday service (*die Schwedische Messe*). 9—12. The Forms for Marriage, Baptism, and Churching. 13. The seven Penitential Psalms, and the prayer of Manasses.

The *Evangelii-bok* took its present shape in 1614, when the Collects, seventy-six in number, were inserted in it from the Church Liturgies, into which they had been introduced by degrees, since 1531. There is a good deal of obscurity in the origin of the rest of the book; much of it, however, is borrowed from the Roman Missal, and much has been translated from German sources. It is in universal use throughout the country, its prayers are repeated in a low voice during the celebration of the Church service, and it is a favourite and indispensable manual for private and domestic devotion. The Swedish Church year divides itself, much as ours does, into the following seasons:—1. Christ's coming into the World. 2. The Person and Office of Christ. (New-year's Day to Sexagesima.) 3. Christ's Sufferings and Death. (The Fast-days.)[1] 4. The Resurrection of Christ, and the Institution of his Church. (Easter to Whitsuntide.) 5. The Doctrine of Christ. (Trinity Sunday to the 19th Sunday after Trinity.) 6. The Divine Power and Government of Christ. (20th to 27th Sunday after Trinity.)

Their Calendar, however, when examined in detail, supplies us with a remarkable illustration of our general remark. Its holidays are, at present, *Christmas Day*, *S. Stephen's Day*, (in memory not only of the Apostle, but also of a martyr of that name, an Englishman by birth, who converted the inhabitants of Helsingland in 1054, and whose remains lie in the churchyard of Norrala in that district,) *Sunday and Monday in Easter week*, *Sunday and Monday in Whitsuntide.* Up to 1772, *four* days were kept holy at each of these great festivals; they were then limited to *three* days, and have now dwindled to *two.* *New Year's Day*, *Epiphany,* otherwise called the Feast of the Three Holy Kings, or the Feast of the Baptism of Christ. *The Annunciation of the*

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[1] We believe Lent is hardly observed in the Swedish Church. The organs, however, are silent by old usage, from the Sunday next before Lent to Easter Day. In Holy Week the ringing of bells also was prohibited, but this prohibition was removed in the Church Ordinance of 1571.

Blessed Virgin Mary, Good Friday, Ascension Day, S. John Baptist's Day. This festival is still observed in Sweden with great rejoicing, as in other northern nations. The altars and candelabra in the Churches are adorned with flowers; the houses are decorated with green branches, and, in the country, bonfires are lighted on Midsummer Eve. However, two State festivals have been united with this; one the entry of Gustavus Vasa into Stockholm; the other, which was very wisely dropped in 1765, a commemoration, like our November 5th, of a defeated conspiracy. *The Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary* (*Lichtmesse von Kyntilå,* or Candlemas Day). The Roman Catholic custom of consecrating the Church candles on this day, and of burning many lights in the Churches, has only gradually disappeared since the Reformation. The festivals of *Michaelmas* and *All-Saints* have a place in the Swedish Calendar; but, since 1772, if they fall on week-days, their observance is deferred till the next Sunday. (In 1569 John III. had decreed that the *Feast of the Transfiguration* should always be held on the 7th Sunday after Trinity.) The progress of decay is very remarkable as to Saints' days. At the outset of the Reformation, it had been a principle of Gustavus Vasa's, as of our own reformers at first, to strike out all festivals not 'grounded on Holy Scripture;' such as the Feast of the Holy Guardian Angels, Oct. 2d.; the Conception, Nativity, and Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, &c. In 1529, the Diet of Orebro abolished all the festivals of martyrs, but retained those in memory of Apostles (amongst others that of February 22, *Cathedra S. Petri in Antiochiâ,* which was laid aside in 1571). At first only works of necessity might be done after divine service on these festivals; after 1686 *any* work was allowed. In 1724 it was decreed that only one sermon should be preached on them, and that the service should be over by ten o'clock; lastly, in 1772, Gustavus III. struck them altogether out of the Calendar, and abolished, moreover, in spite of much opposition, the third and fourth days of Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide, the Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Maunday Thursday, (*Skår-thorsdag,* called also in old English *Shere* Thursday,) and the Rogation Days.

The Swedish Church observes four so-called 'prayer-days' throughout the year, which answer in some degree to fast-days. They are generally held in the months of March, April, June, and October, and every year a mandate is issued by the king, at the instance of the Archbishop, for their observance. This mandate is accompanied with a pious address, adapted to the circumstances of the times, and also with fixed texts on which the clergy are to preach. Attendance at Church is strictly enforced by law on these solemn days, as well as abstinence from all secular business; they originated on occasion of a pestilence in 1544, under Gustavus I., who appointed four continuous days to be kept holy. Gustavus Adolphus changed the number to three, and distributed them over the year, fixing them for *Fridays*. Charles XI. increased them to their present number of four, but appointed them to be observed on *Saturdays*. In 1804 two of them were kept on *Sundays*, and since 1807 all the four.[1]

We proceed to give a sketch of the ordinary services of the Swedish Church. On Sundays three services are held, ('in Städten soll dreymal *gepredigt* worden,' a word used throughout by M. Schubert,) the first early in the morning (called in Swedish *Ottesång*), the second somewhat later, which they still denominate 'High Mass' (*Högmässo-Gudstienst*), and the third in the afternoon, which they call as we do 'even-song' (*Aftonsång*). This, however, applies merely to the towns; in the country, the 'High Mass' is the only Sunday service generally in use, except at Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide.

The early service consists of—1. A morning hymn. 2. A verse on the subject of the sermon. 3. A morning prayer from the pulpit, followed by the Lord's Prayer (all kneeling). 4. The sermon, on a section of the Catechism. 5. Then comes a short thanksgiving prayer on Festivals, the Collect, a prayer for the Royal Family and one for the sick, the Lord's Prayer, the Blessing, given from the pulpit, the people kneeling. 6. An appropriate text on quitting the pulpit. 7. A voluntary on the organ. 8. A short hymn.

The 'High Mass' begins about half an hour after this, in the following order. 1. A short hymn. 2. The minister goes before the altar, and with his face turned towards the people, repeats the following words:—

> 'Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, heaven and earth are full of Thy glory. We honour and praise Thee, we worship Thee, we thank Thee for Thy great glory, O Lord God, heavenly King, God the Father Almighty; O Lord, the only-begotten Son of the Most High, Jesus Christ; Holy Spirit, Spirit of peace, truth and grace!' 'All Thy works praise Thee, O God everlasting; everlasting as Thou art, is Thy might, unchangeable Thy love. Look down with compassion, everlasting God, upon a people assembled in Thy sanctuary, to worship Thee, to thank Thee for Thy mercies, and to entreat Thy grace for their souls and bodies. Enlighten our understandings to know Thee, and teach our hearts to bring unto Thee a holy offering of true obedience.' 'Bowed down under the burden of our sins, we fall down before Thee in the dust, and flee unto the mercy and forgiveness, O God, of our Redeemer. Mild and good art Thou; great is Thy mercy and compassion. Graciously hear our prayers, which we here jointly offer up before Thy throne.'

3. He then kneels down, and repeats slowly and solemnly, the General Confession, and the Prayer for Forgiveness, which

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[1] Schubert, vol. i. pp. 426 *seq.*

stands in the place of our Absolution. The people also kneel, and repeat this in a low voice, as they do all the other prayers, after the minister, as follows:—

> 'I, a poor sinful man, who was born in sins, and throughout my whole life have sinned against Thee in manifold ways, confess from my heart before Thee, holy and just God, that I have not loved Thee above all things, nor my neighbour as myself. Against Thee and Thy holy commandments have I sinned in thought, word, and deed, and I know that I thereby merit everlasting damnation, if Thou wert to judge me, as Thy justice demands, and my sins have deserved. But now hast Thou promised, dear Heavenly Father, with tenderness and grace to receive all penitent sinners, who turn unto Thee, and with a lively faith flee to Thy fatherly mercy, and to the merits of Jesus Christ, the Saviour. To them wilt Thou overlook whatsoever they have committed against Thee, and wilt never impute their sins unto them. Therefore I, a poor sinner, trust, and flee unto Thee, confident that Thou, according to Thy promise, will account me worthy of pity and grace, and wilt forgive me all my sins, to the praise and glory of Thy holy name.
>
> 'Almighty, everlasting God, of His great, unsearchable mercy, and for the merits of Jesus Christ, the Saviour, forgive us all our sins, and grant us grace to amend our ways, and to receive everlasting life with Him. Amen.'

4. The *Kyrie Eleison.*

5. The *Gloria in excelsis,* chanted by the minister, turning towards the altar.

6. A hymn.

7. The *Dominus vobiscum.*

8. The Collects for the day, read or chanted by the minister, turning towards the altar, after which he reads the epistle, and the Apostles' Creed, and then retires from the altar.

9. Another short hymn or psalm.

10. The Gospel for the day, read from the pulpit.

11. The sermon, preceded by a short prayer spoken, the Lord's Prayer in silence, and a sort of introduction to the discourse. Between this introduction and the sermon, alms are collected for the poor, or for special purposes.

12. Then follow several short prayers, for a blessing on the sermon delivered, and for pardon. A prayer for the Royal Family, and for the Magistrates and others in authority, with other collects, varying according to the day. On the four 'Prayer Days' a Litany is used instead of these, very similar to our own.

13. Notices, secular or ecclesiastical.

14. A Psalm, during which the minister leaves the pulpit, and returns to the altar. Then follows the Holy Communion, but if this is not administered, the minister reads or chants—

15. The *Dominus vobiscum,* and the Hallelujah.

16. The Benediction. This was formerly given with the sign of the cross—a usage that only very gradually disappeared since the Reformation. It was retained in the Liturgy

of Gustavus Adolphus in 1614, which however did not enforce its restoration in Churches where it had been dropped. In the last revision it was entirely laid aside. The Benediction is received by the people either sitting or kneeling.

The sermon usually takes up half or three quarters of an hour, and, together with the prayer, from an hour and a half to two hours. It begins at 9 o'clock in summer, and 10 in winter.[1]

The afternoon service presents no features worthy of notice, as indeed the sermon constitutes by far the greater part of it. There are morning and evening prayers lasting only a few minutes, on week days, in the cathedrals—but, if we may believe Mr. Laing (Observations, p. 66), with even less success than attends our daily service. 'The Cathedral service is kept up 'here (at Westeras) strictly, this being the see of a bishop, but 'apparently not more to the edification of the people than in 'cathedral towns in England. On hearing the bells ring, I went 'in on a week-day evening. The clerk was singing a psalm, the 'clergyman read the service, and I was congregation.'

We may here briefly describe the vestments used by the Swedish clergy, and the internal arrangement of their Churches. The vestments are, 1. Bands. 2. A cassock. 3. A long gown, made of light black stuff. 4. A white surplice of fine linen, with wide sleeves *(mess skiorta)*. 5. Over this is worn a chasuble *(mess-hacke)* of black velvet, without sleeves, having, on the front, embroidered in silver, a sun, with the name Jehovah in Hebrew letters—and behind, a simple cross, or a cross with the figure of our Lord, also in silver. When the Holy Communion is celebrated, they wear over their surplice, instead of this, a chasuble of red velvet, similarly embroidered in gold. 6. A Swedish bishop wears upon his breast, as a mark of his office, a gold cross, suspended by a gold chain: the archbishop's cross has a glory on it, by way of distinction from that of the bishops. At divine service, the bishops wear over their surplice the cope, of bright yellow silk, interwoven with gold thread. This vestment has a large cape falling behind. They also wear a mitre, to which is attached a fold of flesh-coloured silk, also interwoven with gold, falling over the cape. The archbishop's mitre is embroidered with his cross. Lastly, on solemn occasions they carry the pastoral staff.

The internal arrangement of the Swedish Churches resembles that of the Lutheran Churches in Germany: all those in the towns, and many in the country, have organs—the quire, where the clergy, sacristans, and their Church-officers are placed, is in some places separated from the nave of the Church by a low but elegantly carved screen. On the altar, which is always handsomely covered, lies a copy of the Bible or the Liturgy, and *Evangelii-bok.* Lights on the altar are only used at Christmas, not at the celebration of the Holy Communion. Before it stands a faldstool and desk for the reading of the confession. Over it are generally niches, in which are placed wooden images of Faith and Hope, with the cross and the anchor.

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[1] Schubert, vol. i. pp. 413—424.

Few images or paintings remain of a date earlier than the Reformation, as the council of Upsal in 1593 decreed their removal—here and there, however, we find an image of the Virgin and Child, or of St. Olave. The modern paintings are generally scenes from Scripture History—emblems, such as the lamb with the banner, resting on the Bible—or portraits of the deceased pastors of the Church. Sometimes the king's speeches at the Diets are framed, and hung up in the Churches. The pulpit is decorated with emblematic ornaments in gold, usually the figure of the tables of the Law, the volume of the gospels, or the sacramental cup. From the pulpit-cushion is suspended the figure of a dove in silver, surrounded by a glory. Behind it you generally see a representation of a sun, with the Name in Hebrew letters, such as is embroidered on the chasubles. An hour-glass, and the great folio Bible of Charles XII. complete the furniture of the pulpit. The flooring of the Church is strewed with rushes, but the use of leaves and festoons for its decoration has been forbidden since the year 1773. The architecture of the Swedish Churches supplies little to interest the traveller. 'In Sweden,' as Mr. Laing observes, 'there is no air of antiquity in anything.'[1]

Few people (Protestant people at least) excel the Swedes in their respect for Churches—and, what we should scarcely have expected, not only are their Churches consecrated by a special service, but also their altars, organs, chapels, church-yards, and private burial-places. This is performed either by the bishop in person, or by a rural dean *(contracts propst)* commissioned by him, or by the pastor of the parish. Still the Churches may be used before they are consecrated. Up to the middle of the century of the Reformation, in many Churches the anniversary of their consecration was kept as a festival, and called *Church-mass;* but this usage, like so many other fragments of ceremonial we shall have to mention, has gradually disappeared. The form of consecration may perhaps interest some of our readers, and we therefore venture to give it.[2]

Before divine service begins, the consecrator and his *assistentes,* clergy of the neighbourhood, assemble in the sacristy, where they offer up silent prayer; after which they advance in procession to the altar, habited in their full robes, the congregation singing a hymn. The *assistentes* arrange themselves round the altar; the consecrator advances in front of it, and says—'Holy, 'holy, holy, Lord God Almighty! heaven and earth are full of 'Thy glory. Fill also with Thine honour and glory this Thy 'temple, and all hearts that believe in Christ, because of Thy 'Holy Name.' He then delivers an harangue, according to the circumstances, which concludes with these words, 'The Lord 'did graciously hear the prayer of Solomon for the temple of 'Jerusalem: so will we, with united prayer, entreat for a blessing upon this holy place.' He and the *assistentes* then kneel down, and pray for a blessing on the Church, and on the holy offices to be performed therein, concluding with the Lord's Prayer. Then follows a hymn of thanksgiving; after which the *assistentes* by turns read the following verses: Exod. xx. 24; Gen. xxviii. 17; Eccles. v. 1; Ps. v. 7; Ps. xliii. 3, 4; Is. ii. 3; Heb. x. 24, 25. The consecrator then admonishes the congregation to regard the house of God now consecrated as holy; to offer unto Him therein prayers, praise, and thanksgiving; diligently to hear His word, and reverently to frequent the Holy Sacraments. He then concludes the Consecration service by the Benediction, and the ordinary service begins.

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[1] By way of specimen of a Swedish Church, we refer our readers to an interesting account of the Cathedral of Strengnås, published in 'the Ecclesiologist,' No. 57, March 1847.

[2] Schubert, vol. i. p. 378.

We shall now give as full an analysis as our space permits of the order for Holy Communion, and the preliminaries of it used in Sweden, viz. the Notification, the Examination, and 'the 'Confession.' The rule which in England is obsolete, that all who intend to communicate shall signify their names beforehand to the curate, is adhered to most strictly by the Swedish Church.

The names must be given in eight days previously, to the clergyman in Church. He registers, and afterwards compares them with a similar list kept of those who appear at the examination of communicants *(Communion-förhör)*, at the so-called 'Confession,' and at the Communion itself.

After the names have been given in, on the next Sunday or feast-day follows 'the examination,' in which the clergyman prepares the future communicants for the Holy Sacrament, by questioning and exhorting them on the design of its institution, and the self-examination needful fitly to partake of it. A Swedish pastor has very considerable powers of excluding the impenitent and unworthy from communion. On the *Sunday* next ensuing (for in 1699 it was forbidden to celebrate the communion on week-days) the Holy Sacrament is administered, as with us, after the ordinary service. But, before this begins, a service is held, called 'the Confession,' (*Skrift,*) at which all who intend communicating are obliged to be present. This relic of ancient times merely consists in a sermon on our redemption by Christ, the general confession of the Liturgy (given above), and the following vague absolution, which is received by the people, kneeling. 'If this your confession of sins is sincere, if 'there be earnestness in your amendment, and if your faith be 'true; then do I, as a minister of Jesus Christ, give you 'assurance, that God, of His grace, for the sake of Christ, hath 'forgiven you all your sins.'

Private, though not compulsory, confession had been retained by the Swedish reformers, and used to be held in Church early on the morning of the Communion Sunday, absolution being then given with imposition of hands. It very gradually died out: indeed as far down as 1676 it was in frequent use, and at that date had become very popular, after a partial decline. However, in 1686, it was checked by a royal ordinance that penitents might not choose confessors out of their own parishes, and about the beginning of the last century it had entirely disappeared. A little earlier, they dropped the custom of offering at the altar, during the communion service, the gifts called 'Shrove' or 'Confession-money.' There is now no offering at the altar, but money for the uses of the sacrament is occasionally collected by the Church servants from the parishioners who are of age to communicate.

The administration of the Lord's Supper in the Swedish Church is described by M. Schubert as of an imposing and highly devotional character. There are generally two officiating priests, one habited in the chasuble of red or black velvet over the white surplice, the other in a gown and cassock. The former opens the service by advancing solemnly from the sacristy to the altar, bearing the chalice and the patine, both of silver or of silver gilt, and covered with a beautifully embroidered cloth. The wafer baskets (*oblaten schalten*) and the ewers, also of silver, are previously placed on the altar, or borne after him. At the commencement of the Communion Service, the doors are shut, as with us, but non-communicants may remain. A Psalm is then sung, and the chief officiating clergyman reads, turning towards the people, an exhortation, from which we extract the following sentences. 'The Supper of the Lord is here this day 'celebrated. His Body and Blood is here given and received 'under Bread and Wine, after a supernatural, unsearchable 'manner, suitable to the wisdom, truth, and omnipotence of 'God, who hath himself instituted this Holy Banquet. . . . . 'So hath our Lord ordained that we should receive this Sacrament in remembrance of Him, that is, that we should thereby 'remember His death and blood-shedding, and that we should 'consider and believe that the same did come to pass for the 'forgiveness of our sins. Wherefore when we with sincere, 'hearty repentance, and trust in our precious Redeemer, eat of 'this bread and drink of this cup, with firm faith in the words 'which we hear this day, that Christ died for us, and that His 'blood was shed for us, then are we sure of the forgiveness of our 'sins, we are redeemed by His blood from death, which is the 'wages of sin, and made heirs of everlasting life through Christ.'

The priest then says or sings the *Dominus vobiscum,* and the *Sursum corda,* the people responding to each.

Next, turning to the altar, he says or sings the words of Institution—'Our Lord Jesus Christ, the same night that He 'was betrayed,' &c. Then, 'Holy, holy, holy, Lord God 'Almighty! heaven and earth are full of Thy glory. Hosanna 'in the highest. Blessed be He that cometh in the name 'of the Lord. Hosanna in the highest. Let us all now pray 'as our Lord Jesus Christ hath taught us. Our Father,' &c.

There is no manual gesture whatsoever, and this is all that stands for the Consecration Prayer. The custom of ringing a small bell whilst the words of Institution were said, was retained in the formulary of 1531, but discarded at the Council of Upsala in 1593.

The priest then says the *Pax vobiscum.* The communicants now slowly approach the altar, the organ playing softly. They bow thrice, on approaching the altar, and arrange themselves in circles round it. There is no distinction of ranks, but the men and women receive separately, and sometimes also the married and single. During the distribution of the elements, the organ plays, and the *Agnus Dei* is chanted by the congregation in low tones of exquisite sweetness. The communicants receive kneeling, but all the rest of the congregation stand, and the outer circles around the altar bow, as the words of distribution are said to *each* communicant. Indeed, bowing at the name of Jesus is universal in the Swedish Churches, throughout the whole service. The words used at the distribution are the following—'Jesus Christ, whose body thou receivest, preserve thee unto 'everlasting life, Amen.' 'Jesus Christ, whose blood thou re-'ceivest, preserve thee unto everlasting life. Amen.'

The Post-Communion consists of a thanksgiving prayer, 'for 'that God has vouchsafed to comfort and refresh us by this 'precious banquet of grace, beseeching Him to grant that it 'may tend to the strengthening of our faith, and our growth in 'holiness, and in all Christian virtues.'

The service then terminates with the Alleluia and the Benediction. The communicants are very numerous; in the large parishes sometimes as many as 500. The number of communions through the year differs much in different places. In some there are only three in the year. In others the communion is administered every second, third, fourth, fifth, or sixth week. Persons usually receive twice or thrice in the year. On those occasions, the men are dressed in black or grey, the women in black or white, and all witnesses appear to be struck with the great reverence and devotion the Swedes generally show at the Holy Communion.[1]

From this sketch of the service it is apparent, as might have been expected in so deeply Lutheran a community, that all idea of the eucharistic *sacrifice* has been completely dropped—indeed the only vestige of it which remains is the name (*Oblat*) which they apply to the consecrated wafer. Their belief on the subject of the Real Presence is, that when received in faith, the elements received convey to the communicant, at the moment of reception, the very Body and Blood of Christ, but that no change of any kind whatever takes place in them, apart from reception. Whatever wine therefore remains is poured back into the vessels, or may be used, for ordinary purposes. We may here mention that since the beginning of the last century, *red* wine has been disused in the communion, excepting when other wine cannot be procured. It is of course easy to see the reason of this alteration.

The present baptismal service opens with the following words:—

> 'In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. We Christians are well assured, through God's word, that all men are born in sins. We know also that unless Jesus, the Son of God and our Saviour, had come into the world, we had been lost for ever. Wherefore this child, like ourselves and all men, cannot enter into the kingdom of God, before he be born anew of water and of the Holy Ghost; but needs thereunto the grace and help of God, which Jesus hath obtained and offered unto all men, young and old. So will we now do what Christian charity requires of us, and, by means of baptism, offer this child unto God our Saviour, praying with all our hearts that He may graciously receive him, and grant him the might of His Spirit unto faith, the forgiveness of his sins, and a true fear of God; that, as a lively member of His flock, he may partake in the blessedness which Jesus hath obtained for us, and which Christianity doth promise. May God grant His blessing thereunto, through Jesus Christ our Lord! Amen.'

Then are read Matt. xxviii. 18, 19; Mark xvi. 16; John iii. 5; and a prayer follows, 'that God may receive the infant for his 'own child by holy baptism, for a member of the kingdom of His 'Son, that he may enlighten him with his wisdom, sanctify his 'heart, and give him strength through His Holy Spirit, to flee 'from sin, and serve God in holiness and righteousness.'

Next, the priest, laying his hand upon the child, says the Lord's Prayer, and then these words—'The Lord God, of ever-'lasting mercy, whose providence hath suffered thee to be born, 'and whose grace hath called thee to partake of the light, through

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[1] Schubert, vol. ii. pp. 57—84.

'our Saviour Jesus Christ, guard thee from the dominion of sin, 'and establish thee in his truth and fear, now and evermore. 'Amen.'

The Apostles' Creed, and Matt. xxii. 37—39, are read, and the priest says, 'Child, wilt thou be baptized in this faith, and 'through baptism take upon thee these holy obligations?' The sponsors answer, 'Yes.'

The priest then takes the child, moistens his head *thrice* with pure water, and says, 'I baptize thee, N. in the name of the 'Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.' 'In 'the name of the Holy Trinity, this child is now through holy 'baptism received as a member of the Christian Church, and 'hath a right given him to all the privileges joined therewith. 'God grant him grace, that he, all the days of his life, may keep 'and fulfil his baptismal covenant.'

After this comes a prayer of thanksgiving for that the child has been new born into everlasting life, and of supplication for God's grace on his Christian education, growth in the knowledge of God, and final salvation.

The priest then gives the blessing on the child, and the service terminates with an admonition to the sponsors, in which they are reminded that since the child has, through *the faith of* regeneration, become a child of God, and a fellow-heir of Jesus Christ, they, next to its parents, and, above all, in case of their death, must diligently provide that he shall be virtuously and godly brought up, so as to keep truly what he has promised by them in baptism. It is demanded of them whether they will fulfil this office, and they answer, 'Yes.'

Stone fonts are used in Sweden, but not universally; they are small and unadorned, and differently placed in different Churches; generally, however, in the quire at the entrance of the sacristy. In Churches where there is no font, a silver basin is used instead, which is placed on a table, or on the altar rails. Children brought to be baptized are clad in a white dress, gaily decked with ribands, and sometimes with a gold border. By a decree of Charles XI. the children of the nobility must not have above nine sponsors, those of the clergy and citizens may have six. The number varies much in different places. The sponsors are subject to the approval of the pastor, and must be of the 'Evangelical-Lutheran religion,' of full age, and instructed in the faith.

In the towns baptism is generally administered in private houses; only in Church here and there for the poor. In all cases, baptism must take place within eight days after the birth, under a legal penalty. In cases of necessity, laymen, and even women, may baptize, and this is very common in large parishes, but it must be done in the presence of the sponsors, and afterwards ratified in Church by a form analogous to that in our own service. In this form we need only notice that the minister repeats the Lord's Prayer, laying his hands on the infant, after which the Creed and some thanksgiving prayers are recited.

Since 1693, the Swedish Church has had a special service for the baptism of Jews, Mahomedans, and heathens, according to which the proselyte, standing before the altar, renounces his former errors, professes his belief in 'the pure evangelical doctrine,' and promises to keep it all his life. It is, however, at the option of the proselyte whether he shall be baptized in public or in private. There is a special law, though not a special service, for the baptism of *gipsies*, who must either adopt civilized habits, or else, if they insist on having their children baptized, leave them, after baptism, to the care of the State, which provides for their maintenance and education. This is an instance, amongst innumerable others, of the minuteness of detail into which the Swedish Church loves to descend. The national character appears to delight in exactness and completeness of analysis, a propensity which is remarkably developed in the systematic and complicated machine of their ecclesiastical government. So far then, at first sight, one would give a rather favourable opinion of the Swedish baptismal service. Though there is wanting in it the benediction of the water, and the ancient form of renunciation, and though in other respects it is somewhat vague, yet it contains not only a verbal assertion of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, but also the trine affusion, which, though it ought to be used, is not expressly ordered in the English Church. However, the small value of such a preservation will be apparent, when we observe throughout the whole history of the Swedish ceremonial, a gradual and progressive decay, which has been extinguishing rite after rite, almost up to the present time. A principle has been at work, the existence of which would make all externals, however numerous and beautiful, of no value whatever in the eyes of a catholic-minded theologian, which would make them like withered leaves, ready to drop off at the slightest breath of popular opinion.

Various usages, as M. Schubert informs us, were connected with baptism in the Swedish service, long after the Reformation, which are now abolished. Such were the sign of the cross, the use of salt, oil and lights, the white robe, and exorcism. The sign of the cross was made on the forehead, on the breast (twice), on the crown of the head, and between the shoulders, in memory of the salvation obtained by the cross of Christ, and to remind each Christian that he must be ready to take up his cross and to follow after Him. The priest formerly made the sign of the cross, with oil, on the head and between the shoulders, saying, at the first consignation, 'God Almighty, the 'Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath regenerated thee 'by water and the Holy Ghost, and hath forgiven thee thy sin, 'confirm and strengthen thee with His grace, and anoint thee 'with the Holy Ghost unto everlasting life.' And at the second: 'God, who, of His great mercy, hath called thee to baptism, 'anoint thee with the oil of joy.' This unction was abolished in the year 1541. The signing of the forehead and breast was discontinued as recently as the year 1811. For a whole century after the Reformation, the first part of the baptismal service, consisting of reading some verses of the Scripture, and signing with the cross, was performed in the porch of the Church, and called in Swedish 'Primsigna' (*prima signatio*); but since the date 1614, the entire service has been performed in the body of the Church.

According to the ancient usage, the priest placed salt in the mouth of the infant to be baptized, saying, 'The Lord give unto 'thee the salt of wisdom.' This custom was abolished by a decree of the Council of Upsal, in 1593.

Again, the priest clad the child in a white vestment, saying these words: 'The Lord clothe thee with the white robe, which 'thou must carry unspotted before His judgment-seat.' This custom was retained some twenty years longer, and dropped in the revision of 1614.

Lastly, the priest placed a light in the hand of the child, saying, 'Take thy burning lamp in thine hand, and keep thy 'baptism blamelessly, that when the Lord cometh to the 'marriage, thou, with all His saints, mayest meet Him, and 'enter into joy everlasting.' This part of the service lasted till 1593.

The form of baptismal exorcism was at first kept entire, as the Archbishop Laurentius Petri zealously maintained it, and translated from the German the treatise of Justus Menius on that subject; but its expressions were gradually modified, and at length, on the revision of the Liturgy in 1811, it was altogether laid aside.[1]

The Marriage-service of the Swedish Church retains many relics of old Catholic ceremonial, amongst which we may mention the use of myrtle wreaths and silver crowns, as well as of the ring; and even the name 'Bridal Mass' (*Braut-messe*), by which is meant, a solemn benediction given to the bride from the altar, whilst a rich canopy is held over her head. This is only usual when the communion service accompanies the ceremony. Yet even in this part of the Swedish ritual, one cannot but be struck by many curious indications of the same perpetual tendency to get rid of symbolic and external observances. For instance, the old formulary of 1529 enjoined the married pair to bend their heads, whilst the priest gave a benediction, early in the service. This bending of the head was disused in 1593, and the benediction has now disappeared. Up to the date, also, of 1593, lights were always used on the altar during a marriage, which were then prohibited. Until the latter part of the seventeenth century, espousals were always performed in Church; but although this is still used, with the delivery of the ring and other gifts, as a separate ceremony, apart from the marriage-service, yet it is now performed in private houses, or at the residence of the pastor. Indeed, we believe that the marriage-service itself, at the present day, seldom takes place in Church, comparatively speaking, except among the lower classes. For a lively description of this ceremony, which gives also a good idea of the kindly and homely character of the Swedes, we may refer our readers to Miss Bremer's novel of the 'Rectory of Mora.'

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[1] Schubert, vol. ii. pp. 121—142.

Similar observations apply to the service for Churching women. A preliminary part of it was, long after the Reformation, performed in the Church porch, where the priest met the woman, and, after a prayer of thanksgiving, led her into the body of the Church. This was called the 'Introduction' (*Inledning*), and was in use up to 1693, when it was abolished by a Council of Upsal. The custom of the women bearing lights in their hands, and making oblations, disappeared earlier, in 1593. There is little in the present service for us to notice; it is performed at the entrance of the choir, and consists in a short thanksgiving-prayer, after which, the priest, taking the woman by the hand, as she rises from kneeling, says the following words:—'The Lord lead thee in His truth, and in His fear, now 'and for evermore. Amen.'

We find the retrenchment of rites in the Burial-service has been steady and progressive. Long after the Reformation, for instance, the custom of wakes was kept up; the priest and the near relatives watched by the dead for one or more nights. This usage was a good deal limited in 1644, and abolished in 1686.

In the Hand-book of 1557, certain prayers for the dead are omitted, which, up to that time, were used by the priest before the funeral procession left the house. A double form of consecration, first of the grave, and then of the corpse, before the funeral, lingered till 1593. A short sermon (*Utfärds-predikningar*) was introduced as a substitute for this; (the Swedish

Church is peculiarly partial to preaching, and it is brought in on all possible occasions;) but even the sermon was abolished in 1686.

It was formerly a custom, both in town and country, for the funeral procession to sing hymns from the house to the Church; but in 1686 this was forbidden for the country, and in 1688 for the towns.

The beautiful old usage of carrying the corpse in procession round the Church, or inside of it, was abolished as early as 1593, when they also gave up bearing the cross and banners in front of the procession.

At present, the corpse is not taken into Church at all, but left near the grave, whilst the mourners enter the Church to hear the funeral sermon. This is generally delivered from the pulpit, but sometimes from the altar, and always bears a special reference to the character and circumstances of the deceased; it was introduced early in the Reformation, as a substitute for the old mass for the dead (*Seel-messe*).

All unnecessary expenditure on funerals is forbidden by law, and even the number of persons constituting the funeral procession is limited to twenty-five, except for the *noblesse.*

The burial service presents little that is remarkable;—the priest sprinkles earth thrice on the coffin, saying, 'Out of earth 'wast thou taken; to earth shalt thou return; Jesus Christ our 'Saviour shall awaken thee at the last day.'

Then follows a rather spiritless prayer, which, however, formerly contained a supplication for the dead: this latter has been left out since 1593. The custom of singing certain hymns at the grave, and of reading 1 Thess. iv. 13, has also gone out of fashion. It is now at the option of the minister to read one or other of the special prayers in the *Evangelii-bok,* and some select texts given in the Liturgy. The Lord's Prayer and the Blessing conclude the service.

We may add, as another note of the gradual decay of Catholic feeling, that the priest now buries *unbaptized* children, though without the procession, or tolling of bells. For some considerable time after the Reformation, the priest was not present at such interments. Persons who have committed suicide, or been slain in a duel, or have died in the commission of great sins, are always buried on the north side of the church-yard. In cases of infanticide or illegitimacy, the children are also buried in the same quarter, by way of disgrace to the parents.[1]

The modern Confirmation-service possesses less interest than the others, as it is hardly to be called a relic of Catholic times at all, except in name, and is, in fact, a mere examination of young people preparatory to their first communion. Moreover, it is not necessarily performed by a bishop, but is conducted, once a year, by the ordinary clergyman of each parish. Yet we are induced to give a brief outline of it, as we believe the Bishop of London, some years back, desired the then Bishop of Gothenberg (now Archbishop of Upsal) to confirm the children of the English there; which he did, using the English form, after asking the King of Sweden's permission. We cannot think that his Lordship could have sufficiently adverted, either to the fact which we have just mentioned about the Swedish view of confirmation, or to the utterly invalid character of the Swedish orders. Even in this rite, we find another instance of the decay of externals in the Swedish Church. It had become rare by the middle of the seventeenth century, but was brought once more into use by the Bishop Laurelius and the Archbishop H. Benzelius. This restoration M. Schubert ascribes to the previous revival originated by Spener in Germany.

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[1] Schubert, vol. ii. pp. 148—163.

The present confirmation office is performed on Sunday morning, after the ordinary prayers. The catechumens stand in the quire, and the minister commences the service by addressing them on the sanctity of their baptismal covenant. He next examines them in the elements of Christian doctrine, and then says,—'Dear children, this is the doctrine which Jesus 'Christ and his Apostles have given us in Holy Scripture; this 'is the faith which the Christian Church doth confess; I ask 'you now, and you have to answer before God and this congre- 'gation, as your witnesses at the last day,—

'Do you acknowledge this doctrine as God's Truth, and as 'the right way to salvation?

'Take then upon yourselves your confession, and renew the 'promise which you have already given in baptism.

'Do you believe in God the Father Almighty? &c. &c.

'Will you also fulfil the duties whereunto this confession of 'faith binds each disciple of Christ, to love God with all your 'heart, all your soul, and all your mind, and your neighbour as 'yourself?

'Is your resolution stedfast, to be true and obedient all the 'days of your life to God and to your Redeemer?

'Do you promise, for that end, to call upon God for grace, 'with daily prayer, and to use conscientiously the means which 'He hath given to strengthen you in the faith, and in true 'Christianity?

'Will you confirm all these promises and assurances with the 'holy Supper of the Lord?'

Then follows another exhortation, after which, both minister and catechumens kneel down, the former saying the Lord's

Prayer. He then rises up and gives them the blessing, and the service concludes with an appropriate hymn. The catechumens always communicate the following Sunday.

With respect to the visitation and communion of the sick, we may notice, that in the place of a direction that the sick man shall be moved to make a special confession of his sins, the Swedish ritual orders that he shall say the general confession, and adds to the ordinary form of absolution, already given, the following words;—'The Lord strengthen thine heart with His 'grace, and let the memorial of the death of Jesus, which thou 'wilt now celebrate, seal thy faith, quicken thy love, and confirm 'thy hope unto everlasting life.' Then follows the communion, at which, M. Schubert observes, that the minister does not use his altar vestments, but is clad in his ordinary habit.[1]

Extreme unction was used in Sweden till the appearance of the Liturgy of 1548; and for some time after the Reformation they retained the old usage of putting a light into the hand of the dying person. In the Liturgy of 1529, directions were given, that the priest should urge the sick man, where circumstances permitted, and when it would not injure the survivors, to leave legacies for building churches, founding schools, or maintaining the poor. However, these directions were struck out of the Liturgy in 1693.

From this sketch of the principal parts of the Swedish ritual, the reader will easily perceive that very little value is to be attached to the ceremonies which they still preserve, and that, even were a much greater number still in use, it would in nowise imply the existence of a ritual or ecclesiastical spirit in the country, for the simple reason, that principles exist which must gradually curtail them. They have no idea of the sacramental nature of rites. Every external is, in the mind of the Swedish Church, merely a shape or mode of *preaching the word.* They would grant, for instance, most readily, that baptism confers regeneration, (though nothing is further from their thoughts than baptism, when they ordinarily speak of regeneration,) but they would grant it only in this way, that the outward rite has a strong tendency to quicken and enliven faith, the only instrument of grace; though, of itself, they would say, it can do nothing. Again, in the Lord's Supper, they would readily allow, that, if you can believe it, you do really receive the very Body and Blood of Christ, in, with, and under, the elements of bread and wine; but that in these natural elements, apart from the recipients, there is in no sort any real presence of the Body and Blood. Hence, as we have noticed, the elements may be put to ordinary uses, after the administration of the sacrament is over. Confirmation, as retained by them, is regarded in no respect as of a sacramental character, conferring the gift of the Holy Ghost; it is only a striking ceremony, which imparts grace, merely so far as it awakens the mind, and, as it were, *preaches to it.* It is the same with ordination. They would regard the imposition of hands simply as a very forcible mode of exciting the faith of the candidate, and of animating his prayers towards the attainment of the graces he needs. It *confers* nothing whatsoever, transmits no gift, any more than we can say a sermon transmits or confers anything. It is only a visible sermon—a sermon expressed by the gesture of the hand, instead of being spoken by the tongue. The idea of infused grace, of grace conferred by outward agency, is totally lost in the Swedish Church. Their admissions therefore, (and of these they will make plenty,) so long as this heretical principle lies at the root of their whole system, prove nothing at all, and whoever attributes the slightest weight to them, will be completely deceived. Were the Anglican Church far more denuded of externals than she is, were the Swedish Church again to be what she was in the days of Laurentius Petri, whilst in visible aspect the former might be called Calvinistic, the latter almost Catholic; still, the theory which lay behind the external ceremonies would reverse our judgments of both. The former would, in *principle*, be the most Catholic of the reformed Churches; the latter one of the most Protestant. And the ritual history of both fully bears out this judgment. We have shown, in the imperfect sketch which has just been given of the Swedish services, that a change or abolition of the rites used in them was no sooner demanded than it was granted, so that the rites still retained are indefinitely depreciated in value. On the other hand, we need only allude to the successive changes in the Anglican Church; as in Elizabeth's reign—to the alterations in the communion office, the restoration of chancels, and of the original rubric about vestments, the improvements in the calendar, the erasure of the prayer against the Bishop of Rome in the Litany, the canons of 1571; in James I.'s reign—to the maintenance of various usages, such as the cross and the ring, on *principle*, tending obviously to the restoration of others that had been laid aside; then to the ecclesiastical policy of Archbishop Laud in England and Scotland, later on to the decisive opposition made by the lower house of Convocation in 1689, to any identification of the Church of England with foreign Protestants; and lastly, to the great ritual movement that has characterized our own times. All this, into the details of which it is not our purpose at present to enter, is enough to show, at a glance, how complete and rooted is the opposition in principle between the two establishments of England and Sweden; and how idle a dream it would be, to think of any approximation to an alliance (except on a basis of utter indifferentism, such as the coalition recently effected in the Prussian Church), even in the dim vista of a remote futurity.

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[1] Vol. ii. p. 210.

Again, not only is the sacramental principle lost in Sweden, but also the whole idea of Church authority. Neither rite nor doctrine is accepted on the faith of a *teaching Church*—all continuity with the old Church is broken—all sympathy with any other communities, as the oriental, or the Anglican, on apostolic grounds, has vanished; nor are the present Swedish bishops connected with the old episcopate, as the transmittors of a faith received from it. The legal name of their religion is, 'the pure evangelical doctrine,' or 'the evangelical religion of Luther.' The symbolical books, to which, as containing this, the clergy must profess an adherence, are, the three Creeds, the Augsburgh Confession, Luther's Longer and Shorter Catechism, and the *Formula Concordiæ.* The three last were added in the latter half of the 17th century. Outward conformity to them is strictly enforced; nor could any one, for instance, an Anglican, or a member of any other Protestant body, *legally* communicate, except, on examination before a pastor, he signified his acquiescence in these five documents. The king would vacate his throne *ipso facto,* if he ceased to be a Lutheran; no civil offices can be held except by Lutherans; even the knights and companions of the Royal orders are sworn conscientiously to hold in honour *Luther's Evangelical doctrine;* those, for example, of the Sword of Sweden, swear 'to hazard goods and blood in its defence' (*zu ihrer Vertheidigung Gut und Blut zu wagen*). 'Although toleration 'nominally exists,' says Mr. Laing,[1] 'a man not baptized, con'firmed, and instructed by the clergyman of the Establishment, 'could not communicate in the Established Church, and could 'not marry, or hold office, or exercise any act of majority as a 'citizen,—would in short be an outlaw.' Yet the people are deeply attached to their Church; and the Nonconformists, such as the Swedenborgians, the Moravians, and the so-called *Läsarer,* or Readers, are very few in number and insignificant. The truth is, they have no pretence to dissent from the Establishment, because in reality it binds them to nothing, whilst it seems to bind them to a great deal. M. Schubert observes, 'Men are only bound by the symbolical books in so far as 'they recognise their agreement with Holy Scripture. It is

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[1] Observations, &c. p. 277.

'only in this manner that the Church ordinance and constitution generally, express a strong maintenance of the symbolical 'evangelical doctrine; in no other sense have the clergy or the 'States professed that they do not diverge from the symbolical 'books—in no other sense have the government on many 'occasions laid down the necessity of this adherence.'[1] According to a favourite distinction, the Bible is the *norma normans*, which, like the sun, no two people can be certain that they see alike, and about which every one is welcome to have his own opinion. The Creeds, or dogmatical books, are the *norma normata*, the shape in which human reason presents the original truth; the copy wherein it is adumbrated for the weak vision of the many, at best a likeness, and never such a likeness as that we may not hope for the production of one more perfect. 'Luther was raised up,' they would say, 'to interpret the 'original truth of Scripture, after a manner that may well 'serve as the basis of our conceptions on the subject; but we 'accept him merely as a man—we accept even the Creeds, merely 'as the composition of men like ourselves, beyond which we 'may appeal to Holy Scripture itself.' We believe that we are perfectly correct in saying, that this is the view taken by the whole body of the Swedish clergy—a view which will as little recommend their doctrines to English Churchmen, as the sacramental theory we have stated will recommend their rites. In a word, they will be found unable to entertain the notion of a doctrine delivered by tradition, and all they understand by 'the Church,' is the aggregate of believers all over the world, holding or not holding Luther's doctrine, *i.e.* the Church invisible. In conformity with this conception of the Church, they have struck out the word 'Catholic' from the Creed, and substituted for it 'Holy Christian.' There is a remarkable passage in the Archbishop of Upsal's little work, in which he ascribes (most truly) the recent ecclesiastical movement in the Anglican Church mainly to our retention of this one unaltered article of the Creed: 'The point at issue,' says the Archbishop, 'was taken from the fact that in the Apostles' 'Creed the English read, *the holy* CATHOLIC *Church*, not as we 'do, *one holy* CHRISTIAN *Church*. It is necessary to know, say 'the Puseyites, in what sense the Church is *Catholic*.'[2] He proceeds—'Puseyism has also regard to the Church, on 'account of her having preserved the truth as apostolical tradition. The Scripture and tradition must go hand in hand; 'the Scripture is explained by tradition, and tradition is confirmed by the Scripture. Tradition gives form to a doctrine,

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[1] Vol. i. p. 47.

[2] P. 143.

'and the Scripture gives it life. Tradition teaches—Scripture 'proves. It is obvious how the value of Scripture hereby 'becomes depreciated, and how doctrine is made to depend 'upon tradition. The word *tradition* is also ambiguous, and 'the notion is vague. How long was tradition preserved pure, 'and when was it corrupted? Among which of the fathers of 'the Church shall a concord be sought for, seeing that they 'differ from one another on various points? It is evident, 'therefore, that, with the adoption of tradition, the uncertainty 'will not be less than without it. The *second principle* of '*Puseyism* is *apostolical succession.* Thereby is not meant the 'limited one of episcopacy, but the whole priesthood and power 'of the keys. Christianity is to be considered as a trust '(*depositum*). The essence or substance thereof is the commu'nion with Christ, and the membership with his body, which is 'the Church. The Scripture is nothing else, but the record 'which determines the nature and object of this membership. 'Whereas, now a *depositum* must be administered, it follows 'hence, that an *authority* must be established for the due 'administration of the same. This authority cannot be the 'Church collectively, but those persons whose calling it is to 'administer the sacraments, and who are commissioned to hold 'the office of the keys.'[1]

'Should the Church give up the Word for tradition, and 'envelop herself in a harder formalism than her present rather 'inflexible one, she will more and more alienate the Dissenters 'from her, and prepare the way for her own dissolution, to the 'enlargement of Rome.'[2]

We will give another extract from his introduction.[3] 'According to the commandment of Christ, God must be '*worshipped in spirit and in truth.* By the great atoning sacri'fice, all others become abolished, as only figurative of the 'same. A priesthood, mediating between God and man, ought 'to cease, since the only Mediator has been manifested, and has 'fulfilled his mission upon earth. Nevertheless, we find the 'primitive Church relinquishing with reluctance those institu'tions which had lost their import, and the Roman Catholic 'Church reviving and preserving them; and in our days we 'find the Puseyites wishing them to be partly reinstated within 'the very bosom of Protestantism.'

Such is the view taken by the Archbishop of Upsal on the principles of tradition, of the apostolical succession, and of the Christian priesthood. They fully establish whatever we have endeavoured to show by an analysis of the Swedish services, that the Church of Sweden is what it professes to be, a simply Lutheran community, so thoroughly purged of all Catholic ideas, that nothing of what an Anglican means by 'Church spirit,' is left in it. We do not quarrel with them for being what they cannot help, but we think it of some importance that the truth should be distinctly known, since attention has been drawn to the subject, and a disposition shown here and there in our recent ecclesiastical literature, to attribute more to the *fact* of the Swedish Church, than it can claim with any colour of justice. The Swedes do not want the commendations of the Anglicans, nor have they the slightest sympathy with the ecclesiastical movement that has taken place amongst us, unless we may call curiosity by that name. They are an integral, national communion, *tota teres atque rotunda,* wholly and utterly independent of all the Christian world without, and they would not thank us for raising idle questions about their possible Catholicity. They know that everything in their Church is fixed and settled, that they are entirely destitute of any authority except the king's, which, by the fundamental laws of the kingdom, could entertain the question of intercommunion with other Churches, and that consequently these inquiries are '*otiose,*' matters of no practical moment, however interesting to theological antiquaries.

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[1] P. 146. [2] P. 149. [3] P. x.

We stated at the commencement of this Article, that there is reason to think that the Swedish Church early excited the attention of Anglican divines. It may not indeed, be generally known, that Archbishop Laud empowered a commissioner to treat with the Swedish theologians, on the basis of a restoration of unity between the Reformed Churches, and that this person (whose name is given as Duræus, in *Baazii Inv. Eccl. Sveogoth.* viii. c. 12—13) came to Stockholm, in 1636, with letters from Laud, from the Archbishops of St. Andrews and Armagh, and from Bishop Davenant, of Salisbury. He solicited that a discussion should be held by the theological faculty in the university of Upsal, which actually took place, but with no satisfactory result. They determined, amongst other articles on which intercommunion might be based, that there should be a toleration of ceremonies and *adiaphora,* according to Scripture; that the parties desiring unity should deal candidly and openly, lest any ancient errors should be concealed by ambiguous phrases, and that the ministry and government of the Church should be constituted according to the apostolic rule.

In 1638, the Swedish bishops and clergy assembled for the Diet, reconsidered this question, approved of the above articles, and added another, viz.—'that the symbol of the genuine 'Evangelical Churches, that is to say, the *Confession of Augs-*

'*burgh*, must be sincerely and honestly accepted; meaning 'thereby, not the semi-Calvinist confession, drawn up without 'authority, ten years after the Diet of Augsburgh, neither 'approved nor confirmed by blessed Luther, and the Protestants, but the first and unaltered document presented to 'Charles V.' The bishops, also, threw in many other obstacles, and Baazius concludes drily,—'Sic re infectâ discessit 'Sveciâ Duræus.'

It is impossible, without access to original sources, to form an opinion as to what views Laud and the other bishops may have entertained about the Swedish Church; but as Duræus had previously visited most of the other Protestant bodies on the continent for the same object, we conclude that a regard for the real or supposed succession maintained by the Swedes, had no special share in the motives leading to the mission. He produced the minutes of a private disputation held at Leipsic in 1631, and also public letters from the various Reformed communities of France, Switzerland, Poland, the Low Countries, and Transylvania. Bishop Davenant's letter was afterwards published at Cambridge:—'Cum adhortatione ad fraternam communionem inter Evangelicas ecclesias restaurandam.'

No further overtures appear to have been made, nor have the Swedish and Anglican Churches ever come in contact, except here and there in America, where bodies of Swedish colonists have occasionally become Anglicized by degrees, and have adopted the English form of religion along with the English language. Such an instance, which a contemporary calls 'a concession of considerable interest and importance to the Swedish Church,' was brought before our notice about two years ago. A congregation of Swedes had settled in Wisconsin, within the diocese of Dr. Kemper, the missionary bishop for Missouri and Indiana. He ordained for them a native of Sweden, and gave him permission to make occasional use of some parts of the Swedish Liturgy. M. Schubert informs us,[1] 'In earlier 'times there were several Swedish congregations in North 'America, on the Delaware, the direction of which, and the 'appointment of their pastors, belonged to the Archbishop of 'Upsal. The use of the Swedish language was gradually 'obliterated, by the intermixture of persons born in the country, 'of English descent; the clergy at length could seldom venture 'to preach in Swedish, and the congregations became entirely 'English. Thus the divine service, and Church offices, which 'had originally been performed according to the Swedish ecclesiastical law and ritual, were naturally administered more and

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[1] Vol. ii. p. 30

'more, and at last exclusively, after the use of the English 'Church. The American mission came to a termination in 1789 'by the recal of the last Swedish pastors, Girelius and Collin.'

But to return. We shall proceed, in conclusion, to lay before the reader a sketch of the Swedish ritual for the Consecration of Bishops, and the Ordination of Priests. We repeat that the question of their apostolical descent is, to an Anglican, one of mere curiosity, since they have manifestly adopted and avowed the principle of heresy in their symbolical books, and in their alteration of the Creed, thus breaking off all continuity of teaching with the ancient Church. That an Arian, a Donatist, or a Monophysite body retained the Apostolical succession, would not, in the slightest degree, bring them nearer to a right of communion with the Church Catholic; nor, we apprehend, is the case of the Swedes better than that of such bodies, since they, like all other Lutherans, are committed not to any particular heresy so much as to heresy itself. If their succession were absolutely certain and legitimate, instead of being what it is, more than dubious, it would be equally a waste of time in an English Churchman to speculate on the possibility of alliance between our two Churches. And the Swedes themselves regard their Apostolical succession, supposing it genuine, as a thing of no importance, although, as a *matter of fact*, they assert that they can lay claim to it.

It will indeed be apparent, from their ordination services, that the idea of Holy Orders has disappeared from the Swedish mind, as completely as the idea of Catholicity. With them 'preacher' is the genus comprehending bishop and priest, (for the term 'priest,' is retained as a legal appellation,) not, as with us, *sacerdos*. The 'preacher' is an ecclesiastical officer entirely unknown to the Catholic Church, and dating his origin from Luther. The Swedish form of ordination does not contain the least trace of the idea of the priesthood, nor has the bishop ordaining any intention of conferring such functions. Of course, the Lutheran theory of the sacraments would of itself nullify their orders, even were the form materially valid, as this is with them only, as we observed above, a shape or mode of 'preaching the word,' of awakening the faith of the recipient. However, independently of that, we think the reader will agree with us, that the ritual of itself sets the question at rest. It is to be remarked, moreover, that the order of the diaconate has been entirely laid aside in Sweden.[1]

The validity of the Swedish orders depends upon those of the Archbishop of Upsal, because all the Swedish bishops are consecrated by him;[1] and the two so-called 'assistentes,' who join with him in the consecration, are not necessarily bishops, but may be members of the chapter of the diocese to which a bishop is to be appointed. Their orders, therefore, are obviously uncanonical; as being delivered, for any proof we have to the contrary, by *one* bishop only; whether they are *valid*, is a question which rests on other considerations. The first of these concerns the episcopal character of Bothvidus Sunonis, the bishop of Strengnas, from whom were derived the orders of the two consecrators of the second Protestant Archbishop of Upsal. This prelate, Laurentius Petri Gothus, being, at the time of his appointment to that see, rector of the University of Upsal, but not a bishop, was consecrated in 1575. The ceremony was performed with full hierarchical pomp, by desire of the king, John III., who was then edging nearer and nearer to Rome, though he did not actually conform till three years later. Not only were the episcopal mantle, mitre, and crosier used on this occasion, but also the anointing with oil, in spite of the vehement opposition of the clergy. The two prelates consecrating, were Nicolas Canuti, Bishop of Wexio, and Paulus Justen, Bishop of Abo, both of whom had been ordained by Bothvidus Sunonis; the former priest in 1545, the latter bishop in 1554. '*A quo autem consecratus fuerat Bothvidus, prorsus silent*,' says Fant, de Succ. 'Episc. Sueciæ,' (quoted by Dr. Routh, vid. Mr. Perceval's Collection of papers, p. 65.)

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[1] The *name* of 'deacon' is given to a clergyman who bears the archbishop's crosier on state occasions.

This Bothvidus, however, was appointed bishop by Gustavus in 1536. Only five years before, Laurentius Petri Nericius had been appointed archbishop, and he was regularly consecrated by Peter Magni, the Roman Catholic bishop of Westeras, Gustavus himself delivering *the crosier.*[2]

Now, as Gustavus had previously employed the same Peter Magni to consecrate bishops for the sees of Skara, Strengnas, and Abo, it is argued that he showed a sufficient inclination for the keeping up of the Apostolical succession, to authorize the conclusion that Bothvidus was duly consecrated by Laurentius Petri Nericius, although there are apparently no documents to establish it beyond controversy. Yet it must be remembered, on the other hand, that if at first Gustavus showed an unwillingness over hastily to break up the old order of things, his own views, as well as those of his Archbishop, seem very soon afterwards to have been such as must greatly weaken this inference. M. Geijer (chap. ix.) says—'He (Gustavus) seemed 'even disposed to abolish the episcopal office in Sweden, and to

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[1] We believe superintendents never consecrated bishops, though they sometimes ordained ministers.

[2] Schubert, vol. i. p. 171.

'reconstitute the Swedish Church upon the Presbyterian model. 'George Norman, who had been recommended by Melanchthon 'to the king's best confidence, was appointed superintendent 'over the whole clerical order in his dominions. According to 'an Instruction issued in 1540, office-bearers called conservators 'and councillors of religion, supported by assistants who were 'styled elders, were to regulate the affairs of the Church in the 'provinces under his revision, and to hold visitations. Although 'this arrangement appears never to have been generally carried 'into effect, it is certain . . . . . that changes were made affecting 'the power as well as the titles of the bishops. From the year '1544, the king ceased to give the episcopal designation to any 'except the primate of Upsal; the others were styled ordi- 'naries, and the bishoprics were subdivided according to the 'royal pleasure among several of these overseers, "seeing that '"the bishops have had heretofore far too large dioceses and juris- '"dictions." Towards the end of this prince's reign the sees of 'Upsal and Linköping were thus parcelled out, each into three 'portions, those of Westeras and Strengnas into two. In all 'the countries where the Reformation was established, it is ob- 'servable that at first vacillation and uncertainty prevailed 'respecting the question of supreme authority in spiritual 'affairs. Gustavus scrupled not to arrogate this power to himself.'

As to the views of the first Protestant archbishop on holy orders, the reader may not be displeased to see them in the original, as given in a paper of his quoted by Baazius (lib. iii. c. 19). 'Inter nos et Papistas est controversia de legitimâ 'ordinatione, videlicet, quinam illi sint sacerdotes legitimi, qui 'consecrent sacramentum Eucharistiæ? Certum est quod 'Papistæ id honoris suis rasis et unctis solis, magno verborum 'supercilio adscribent, freti ingenti cumulo sententiarum hu- 'manarum. Nos contrà adserimus, id honoris pertinere non ad 'solos rasos et unctos; imò, quatenus tales sunt, omninò non 'ad eos; sed ad omnes fideles Christi, dicimusque hos omnes 'veros et legitimos Novi Testamenti esse sacerdotes, quibus ver- 'bum Dei et omnia sacerdotalia officia commendata sunt, idque 'divinitus. Quod sic probamus. Quoscunque Deus Pater et 'Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, hoc est tota Trinitas, per Baptismum 'adoptat inter Dei Filios, eosdem simul per unctionem incorrup- 'tibilem, nempe Spiritum Sanctum, facit sacerdotes legitimos et 'spiritualiter ordinatos, ut (sicut dicit B. Petrus), virtutes annun- 'cient illius, qui à tenebris vocavit ipsos in admirabile lumen 'suum. Nec potest magis legitima et rata ordinatio haberi . . . . 'Cùm autem eligendi potestas pertineat ad ecclesiam, semper 'legitimum et ratum est quicquid ipsa ministros eligendo fecerit, 'à quocunque tandem *Presbytero vel Episcopo*, ipsi Electi 'manûs impositionem postea acceperint, modo sit fidelis ac 'Christianus.'

Any conclusions as to the diligence men of these sentiments may have shown in maintaining the Apostolical succession, must be very precarious. But the real objection to the Swedish orders lies: 1. In the Form for consecrating bishops, in which the king's appointment and the will of the congregation are, in so many words, stated to be the source of the episcopal character,—the king being virtually, in Sweden, as in other countries of a purely Protestant character, the chief bishop; 2. In the Form for consecrating the so-called priests, from which, as we have observed, all trace or vestige of the *sacerdotium* has vanished.

There is no separate form for the consecration of the archbishop, as he is now always chosen out of the number of the existing bishops. The Swedish episcopate consists of the Archbishop of Upsal and eleven bishops. The archbishop is, by virtue of his office, speaker of the Diet of the clergy; he consecrates the rest, or, in case the See of Upsal is vacant, this function is performed by the Bishop of Linköping. To the See of Upsal, moreover, belongs the right of anointing the king at the coronation, and of baptizing the members of the royal family. Other privileges are also attached to it, which we pass over, as we wish to confine our reader's attention to the ritual of ordination.

The service for the consecration of bishops begins with a hymn, during which the procession moves to the altar. First come two 'priests,' habited in chasubles, bearing the cope, the mitre, the cross, and the pastoral staff, which insignia are placed upon the altar. Then comes the bishop elect, followed by the archbishop who is to consecrate, along with his *assistentes* (being either bishops or members of the chapter of the diocese). The consecrator, with his *assistentes* on each side of him, stand in front of the altar, the bishop elect opposite, without the altar-rails.

The consecrator then delivers a discourse, and afterwards a prayer for the bishop elect. Next, the clerk of the chapter reads the king's patent appointing him to the See, and then hands it to the archbishop.

The archbishop says, 'As thou art thus called to the office 'of a bishop in N. diocese, and art now come to the altar of the 'Lord to be consecrated to the same, hear with good heed, and 'lay up in thine heart, the precious doctrines which shall now 'be read to thee from God's word.'

The *assistentes* read in turn—Matt. xxviii. 18—20; Tit. i. 7—9; 1 Tim. vi. 11, 12; 1 Tim. v. 21, 22; Acts xx. 28; 1 Pet. v. 2—4; Luke xii. 37, 38.

After an admonition from the Archbishop, the bishop elect then rehearses the Apostles' Creed; upon which the Archbishop says: 'The Lord give thee grace to hold fast to this belief unto 'thy life's end, and therein to strengthen the brethren.' And then puts to him the following questions: 'Art thou willing to 'take upon thee the weighty office of a bishop in N. diocese, 'with all its duties? Dost thou promise to devote to this office 'all the powers of thy soul and body? Dost thou promise 'therein to take care that the doctrine of reconciliation shall be 'preached, according to God's word, unto wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption? Dost thou promise, by 'God's grace, to set an example to others in purity of heart and 'conversation? Dost thou promise unweariedly to watch that 'all unrighteousness shall be put away, and that that which is 'good, useful, and commendable, shall be promoted?'

After these questions have been put, the following oath is administered to the bishop elect:—

'I promise and swear by God and His Holy Gospels, that as 'I, in the name of the Holy Trinity, do undertake this office of 'a bishop, I will not only myself abide firmly by the pure word 'of God, and the true religion, but I will also take care that all 'others, teachers and hearers in the diocese, shall abide by the 'same, and lead a life void of offence: so that the doctrine and 'exhortation of the Apostle Paul in Titus and Timothy concerning the duties and office of a good bishop shall serve me 'for a rule. I will faithfully take care that the instruction of 'children in the Catechism and in the Articles of the Christian 'Faith shall be properly conducted; as also the administration 'of the Sacraments, and the legitimate use of the keys of the 'kingdom of Heaven; unto which end I will also diligently 'visit the parishes, and sufficiently inquire how all things are 'carried on therein, and whether the clergy use diligence, particularly as touching their doctrine, and manner of life.

'Likewise I will and shall be faithful to my rightfully and 'lawfully crowned king, the most mighty prince and lord N., 'so as to seek and further, in every way, the king's good and 'advantage. With life and blood I will defend the royal house, 'and the rights and liberties of the states of the kingdom, 'exactly as is settled in the constitution recognised by the king 'and states on June 6th, 1809. Even so will I discover at the 'fitting time, should I hear of such being contemplated, any 'alteration or abolition of that excellent fundamental law, which 'I will and shall obey and execute in all its points.'—(*Oath of 'Allegiance.*)

'I will also ordain, as need requires, fit priests, who shall be 'found, in life, knowledge, and gifts, capable of the office: and 'will never consecrate to *the holy preacher's office,* for the sake of 'any shameful lucre or gain, any persons who are unfit for it, 'or who have not undergone the appointed examination; neither 'will I keep back therefrom any who are qualified and worthy, 'having a lawful vocation.

'The same diligence and the same care will I show in my 'office, when any shall have to be appointed in the gymnasia 'or schools, to conduct education and instruction, that such 'persons shall be chosen thereunto who have the necessary 'gifts, and can contribute to the advancement of the youth, 'their edification in their studies, and in all Christian virtues; 'and therein will I attend especially to the advantage of the 'parishes and of the youth.

'Likewise I will always maintain the public peace, and be personally loyal and obedient, and, as far as in me lies, promote 'obedience to His Majesty, my gracious King, and to those 'who bear rule in his name. I will admonish the clergy '*(Priesterschaft)* always to think and speak aright of the secular 'government, which is ordained of God. I will not mix myself 'up with worldly occupations, which are not suitable to my 'office. In all things I will govern myself according to the 'Church Ordinance set forth by the King, and I will admonish 'and exhort the Clergy in my diocese to do the like. All this I 'will and shall gladly do, by God's grace,—so help me God in 'body and soul.'

Then the consecrator says, 'God strengthen thee, God help 'thee to fulfil all this! And I, *by virtue of that commission,* '*which, in God's name, His congregation hath given unto me,* '*hereby deliver unto thee the King's appointment, and therewith the* '*office of bishop in N. diocese;* and I put upon thy breast this 'emblem of Jesus Christ,' (the cross described above,) 'to be 'a perpetual remembrance that thou shall preach his precious 'word of reconciliation, and holily keep the same; and I also 'deliver unto thee this staff, as a sign of thy right, and a 'remembrance of thy duty, to guide and govern that flock 'which is committed unto thee. And this I do in the name of 'the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. May 'the Most High grant that it may be unto thine own eternal 'salvation, and of those who are committed unto thee. We 'will to this, and pray to God, from whom cometh every good 'and perfect gift, when we join the requests of our hearts, in 'the prayer which our dear Saviour hath taught us.'

Then the consecrator and his *assistentes* take the cope, and array the new bishop therein, after which they lay their hands on his head, the consecrator saying the Lord's Prayer. Then the mitre is placed on his head, and the consecrator says, 'Almighty God, bless thy labour in the Church, that His 'great name may thereby be glorified, and the everlasting salvation of many souls be furthered, through Jesus Christ. Amen.'

The service concludes with the consecrator's giving the benediction to the new bishop. 'The Lord bless thee, and keep thee,' &c.; and a hymn being sung, the procession returns in the same order to the sacristy.[1]

The Swedish clergy receive ordination from a bishop, but, in the vacancy of a See, *deans of a cathedral church have occasionally ordained, by special permission.*[2] The ceremony is always performed in the cathedral of the diocese, and the following notice is given of it, after the sermon, in the ordinary service:—

'After divine service ended, there will be held in this house of the Lord a regular consecration to *the holy office of a preacher*. The Christian congregation will therefore call upon the Almighty in united prayer, for grace and blessing upon those who are now to be consecrated. Merciful God, loving Father, we thank thee heartily for that thou through thy Son Jesus Christ hast instituted on the earth *the Preacher's office*, and until now, hast graciously maintained it amongst us. We pray thee to guide and govern, by Thy Holy Spirit, all faithful teachers in thy Church, that the truth of Thy Word may be proclaimed in its purity unto all. Grant unto them that shall now take part in this office, truth, strength, and grace, that through their ministry the Gospel of Jesus Christ may enlighten many souls to true conversion, and lead them to everlasting salvation, that so Thy Great Name may be rightly honoured, and our Saviour Jesus Christ ever more and more glorified in thy Church.'

At the conclusion of the ordinary prayers, a hymn is sung, during which the bishop, habited in his full episcopal vestments, the *assistentes*, (generally four,) and the candidates, habited in white surplices, advance in procession to the altar. The chasubles to be used in the course of the ceremony are arranged on the altar-rails.

The bishop then begins the service 'in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,' and delivers an harangue, having reference to the candidates, individually. Then, turning to the altar, he offers up a prayer for grace and blessing on the candidates.

Next follow the reading of certain texts, an admonition from the bishop, the rehearsal of the Creed, and the interrogation of the candidates, which last is precisely similar, *mutatis mutandis*, to that used in the consecration service for bishops.

The following oath is then administered to each of the candidates:—

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[1] Schubert, vol. i., pp. 175-185.

[2] *Id.* vol. i., p. 323.

'I, N., who am now called and received to *the holy office of* '*a preacher*, do promise and swear by God and His Gospel, 'that I will neither in private by myself cherish, nor preach 'and divulge before my hearers, any other doctrine than that 'which is grounded on the pure and clear Word of God, the 'prophetical and apostolical writings of the Old and New Tes'taments, and noted down in the three Capital Creeds, viz. 'the Apostolic, the Nicene, and the Athanasian, as also in the 'unaltered Augsburgh Confession of 1530, received at the 'Councils held at Upsal in 1593 and 1693, and lastly set forth 'in the *Liber Concordiæ*.'

'Also I will, with all diligence and fidelity, practise catechiz'ing, instruct my hearers in God's Word, administer the Holy 'Sacraments, after the institution and ordinance of Christ, and 'flee from all heretical doctrine as the poison of the soul.'

(Here comes the Oath of Allegiance, given above.)

'Also I will and shall render due honour and obedience unto 'my bishop and ecclesiastical superiors, and faithfully execute 'whatsoever shall be imposed upon me in my office.'

'I will never seek my advancement by cabals and illegal 'means. I will yearly and daily seek to improve myself in the 'knowledge of God's word, and of the articles of the faith, and 'in the other studies necessary for me. By God's grace I will 'rightly divide the Word of Truth, and honestly discharge my 'office: and also endeavour that my life shall be sober, becom'ing, and such as may befit a virtuous teacher; that I may 'therewith set a good example before others.

'Also I will, to that end, strive to maintain amongst my hear'ers, right and due Church discipline, conformably to the Church 'Ordinance, promulgated by the King's Majesty, and admonish 'them to the practice of godliness, public peace, an honourable 'life and conversation, and mutual love and unity. I will ad'monish them to pray to God for those in authority; I will 'remind them of the submissive loyalty to which they are bound, 'and I will exhort them to obedience and docility.

'I will never meddle with secular affairs, and such as do not 'pertain to my office, or are not well-accordant with the cha'racter of a spiritual person and a teacher. I will keep myself 'from avarice and disgraceful gains; and after I shall have been 'inducted into an appointed parish, I will demand no more from 'my penitents than of right comes to me, and they are indebted 'by the Royal ordinances, at present in force, or hereafter to be 'enacted.

'Especially, I never will or shall trouble and constrain the 'poor, beyond their circumstances and ability, nor hinder any 'one from the sacraments and privileges which the Church im'parts, on account of a trifling deficiency in the payment of fees.

'If I fail in one or other of these points, and my superiors 'reprove or admonish me for it, I will, by God's help, gladly 'amend myself.

'All this, and whatsoever is generally set forth in the Church 'Ordinance, I will and shall faithfully execute with all my 'strength, by the grace which God grants me, as it befits an 'upright and virtuous clerk, and as I shall have to answer for 'it before God and man, without double-dealing or deceit; so 'help me God in body and soul.'

The bishop then says:—

'Almighty God strengthen and help you to keep all this. 'And I, by virtue of those powers, which are, in God's name, 'entrusted to me, by His Church, for this business, *deliver unto 'you herewith the preacher's office*, in the name of the Father, and 'of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. May the Most High 'grant that it may tend to your own eternal salvation, and to 'that of the flock who shall be entrusted to you. We will to 'this end pray unto God, from whom every good and perfect 'gift cometh, when we join the requests of our hearts in the 'prayer which our dear Saviour hath taught us.'

The bishop and *assistentes* now array the candidates in the chasubles, and the Lord's Prayer is said over each, individually, with a general laying on of hands.

Then the bishop goes back in front of the altar, and says:—

'God Almighty bless your work in the congregation, that 'His Great name may be glorified, and the everlasting salvation of 'many souls be furthered thereby, through Jesus Christ. Lift 'up your hearts unto God, and receive the blessing. The Lord 'bless and keep you, &c.'

The service then terminates with a hymn.

After the ordination, the newly ordained clergy receive titles of orders (*Prast bref*) drawn up in Latin, in which the bishop attests their lawful appointment and consecration to *the holy office of a preacher*, and adds warnings and exhortations. There is no regular form used for these throughout the kingdom, but they vary in particular dioceses.

The above forms of ordination will necessarily, we imagine, destroy whatever interest any Anglicans may have felt in the Swedish Church, as a sister inheritant of apostolical succession, but she still remains an object worthy of profound attention as the most perfectly organized Protestant community in Europe. Into the various questions, however, which have been worked out in her history under that character, whether as to the relations of secular and ecclesiastical power, the internal system of the Church, her political position, and her tenure of public instruction, it is beyond the purpose of the present Article to enter.

ART. VI.—1. *Louis the Fourteenth and the Court of France in the Seventeenth Century. By* Miss PARDOE. London: Bentley.

2. *Cinq-Mars. By* Count ALFRED DE VIGNY. *Translated by* WILLIAM HAZLITT, Esq. London: Bogue.

EVERY nation has its leading idea, which is at the same time its stimulus to exertion and its besetting sin. That of the English character is a certain independence of all around it, which enables a man to be complete in himself, and to be indebted to no one for his happiness or security. Now, the chief means of obtaining this desired independence John Bull knows to be twofold: first, to have his pleasures circumscribed within such bounds as he can himself have some control over; and, secondly, to have a full purse wherewith to supply his wants at his own discretion. He thus rejoices in the comforts of his own house rather than in the gaiety of assembled crowds, and the energy of his mind is directed towards the establishment of his fortunes rather than the dissipation of the present moment. This is the spirit of a commercial people, and to this is England indebted for her wealth, her power, and her boldness of character. Yet this love of independence is also our besetting sin as a nation. Money becomes the Englishman's idol; and in the possession of this fountain of self-respect he forgets to conciliate his neighbours by the arts of courtesy, on which he would otherwise be dependent.

The Frenchman, however, is more ambitious in his views of pleasure, without being so careful of the security of his foundation. He wishes to be in the world that he may see and be seen; he has no notion of concealing such charms, either physical or intellectual, as nature has bestowed upon him, or of suffering means of enjoyment to lie dormant within him. He idolizes his nature, and all the faculties of humanity, and loves to bring them forward, without being sufficiently discriminating between his good and his bad propensities. 'Do something,' he says to himself; 'be something, never mind what; enjoy the world, and let the world enjoy you; never let the noble qualities of your nature be useless, or be confined in their influence within such a narrow sphere as a *home*.' The Englishman can think himself a great man if he has but his comforts and a good account at his banker's, though nobody sees him beyond his own immediate sphere; but the Frenchman must be in public; he spends his leisure hours, not in the quiet society of his own thoughts, or the simple companionship of his own fire-side; but in his cafés, his theatres, his assemblies of various kinds, and his promenades;

or should he be at war, he thinks not so much of attaining the professed object under dispute, as of proclaiming his glory to the world. The leading idea of the French is glory, and their besetting sin is vanity. Yet such a disposition is not altogether without its agreeable results. Vanity is selfish, indeed, but it is not that kind of selfishness which wraps itself up in the self-satisfaction of its own thoughts; for it has a great desire to please others, as its very food is the adulation of the world. The French, therefore, are agreeable in their manners, lively in their conversation, and particularly desirous of pleasing strangers: unless, indeed, other passions interfere, in which case we all know that they can be equally unpleasant.

One characteristic of national vanity is however of great interest in connexion with the work we are about to notice. National vanity always looks towards a centre; it chooses some object which it invests with its ideas of perfection, and which it holds out to the world as identified with itself: it does not feel satisfied that the world will appreciate general excellences; it requires a particular idol to be the representative of its own merits, and to be the object of worship alike to strangers and to themselves.

No country is so liable to be carried away, by its devotion to some idol, as France: her general history shows this. At one time the thought of liberty, at another time the Emperor, is the idol of their hearts, to which they have offered sacrifices that throw contempt on the fires of Moloch, or the hecatombs of more barbarous times. Such an idol was the family of Bourbon in its brighter days; and perhaps even still the peculiarities of true Frenchmen are such as were formed under the Bourbon dynasty. The extent, indeed, of their former adoration for their royal family, and the consequent tyranny under which they found themselves, produced a reaction to an opposite extreme; but France, whatever she may say, is not republican in spirit, she still has the same disposition which formerly led her to delight so much in the magnificences of a courtly race of kings. The seventeenth century was remarkable for the development of individual character; and, through its great men, for the establishing of those national principles and tastes which distinguish the countries of modern Europe; and in France there was Louis XIV. for more than half that century creating for himself the name of *great*, by being, what the country he ruled over most admired, a man of pomp, pleasure, and vanity; in short, by embodying the spirit of a thorough Frenchman o. his own day, and by so far establishing the character as to be a pattern by which it has also been maintained. No one is more aware of, or proud of, the influence which the Bourbon family have had over France than its present member, 'the citizen king:' most anxiously has he schemed to restore in his own family the former grandeur of the Bourbons. His whole position, indeed, is a deeply laid plot to work ultra republicanism into the unconscious instrument of re-establishing on the throne of France the power it had sacrificed so much to pull down. Most successful appears the policy of Louis Philippe up to the present time; how long this will last we do not pretend to be sufficiently endowed with prophetic powers to decide, but as far as observation of facts yet informs us, republicanism certainly has been deceived by the shadow instead of the reality. Louis Philippe, a descendant of the Bourbons, does, in the year 1847, reign with almost despotic power over the French; in every public building his subjects see him in marble, or on canvas, under the pretext of his being the Napoleon of peace: the Parisians spend happy and cheerful evenings among the chesnut trees of the Tuileries, contemplating the magnificent emblem of royalty before them; they rush in overwhelming crowds to see Versailles, the creation and very type of Bourbon magnificence; they imagine they are but admiring the lovely gardens and a palace that is the present depository of acres of canvas representing all the glory of France; but in reality this appropriation of Versailles is part of the scheme to win over France once more to the genius loci of the place, to the spirit of the Bourbons.

The history of the time of Louis XIV. is thus most interesting, if we wish to understand the France of the present day; and it is remarkable how many memoirs there are, written by the gay courtiers of the time, to gratify future curiosity. Miss Pardoe, in the preface to her work, first declares that it will be her aim, 'not so much to talk of wars or politics, as to display, more fully than has yet been done, the domestic life of the "Great Monarch;" and to pass in review the wits, the beauties, and the poets of his court;' she then proceeds:—

> 'Perhaps for a task like that now before us, no reign has afforded so many and such rich materials. The passion for personal narrative, of which Marguerite de Valois displayed so extraordinary an example in royal life, afterwards spread like an epidemic in the court of France; and under Louis XIV. princesses, warriors, statesmen, courtiers, and beauties, vied with each other in recording, not only passing events, but also the individual passions, interests, and prejudices by which they were influenced; and while amazed and breathless, Europe saw only the working of the great monarchical engine, by whose movements it was affected throughout its whole extent, the denizens of the most gorgeous court the world had ever known, in the intervals of their devotions, their dissipation, and their intrigues, still found time to emulate the professional writers of the age, and to record the hidden and intricate springs by which it was forced into action. Not a word, not a gesture, not a weakness of the

> monarch escaped either his friends or his enemies, or was suffered to remained unchronicled; the hopes or the attachments of the first, made them dwell with adulation and delight upon every brilliant quality which they discovered in their idol; while the jealousies and the vindictiveness of the last caused them to batten upon every failing, and to dilate upon every vice.'—*Pref.* p. vi.

Miss Pardoe's task, in forming her work from such diffuse materials, has been, no doubt, most arduous; but we hesitate not to say most successful. The interest of the reader is thoroughly maintained throughout, because, in the great drama she represents, new lights are ever being thrown on old characters, and new characters rise up in perpetual succession to vary the scene.

Her tendency, we should say, is towards the description of people than to that of things. As drawing out the characters of individual members of the court of Louis XIV., the book is very striking; but we had expected more minute accounts of the magnificence of courtly life than we discover; in fact, too much of the work seems devoted to the opening and the wind-up; thus not leaving space enough for the description of the court in its full tide of glory. Such details, however, are by no means omitted altogether, as we shall prove by a few extracts when we arrive at them in their due order; but even then she sometimes introduces them with an apology as if they were not of general interest. It is also but fair towards Louis XIV. to dwell on the circumstance of his early life, or even on the whole period of his father's reign, to show the disadvantages under which his moral character was trained up. And, as regards the long summary, the facts of the case certainly, in a great measure, justify our authoress.

There is one remarkable feature in the early part of this history especially, which is the prominence of churchmen and women in the direction of public affairs. We say churchmen without committing ourselves to the propriety of their position, for a more gross state of the Church, as regards the distribution of her higher offices, than prevailed then, could not possibly exist. For nearly half a century Anne of Austria, Cardinal Richelieu, and Cardinal Mazarin, entirely governed France. We will give, from Miss Pardoe, a slight sketch of the life of Anne of Austria, in which these cardinal statesmen will also be introduced. We begin with her marriage.

> 'It was at the commencement of 1615, just as he was about to attain his fourteenth year, that it was announced to the young king that his marriage was shortly to take place with the Infanta, Anne of Austria, daughter of Philip III. He received the intelligence coldly, and far from congratulating himself upon an event which must necessarily change the whole

> current of his existence, and diversify alike his pleasures and his duties, he contemplated it with the distrust and self-love of one who resolves not to be duped.
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> 'A species of royal barter was to take place between the two courts of France and Spain; for at the same time that Louis XIII. became the husband of Anne of Austria, the Infant Philip was to receive the hand of Henrietta of France, commonly called *Madame;* and the young king no sooner ascertained that his affianced bride was on her way to Bidassoa, where the exchange of the princesses was to be made, than he despatched Luynes to meet her; ostensibly to convey a letter, but in reality in order to hear, from the lips of a man in whom he had firm faith, whether the beauty of the Infanta were equal to the representations which had been made to him.
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> 'The report of the favourite exceeded the hopes of the king; but still unable to overcome his natural distrust, he left Bourdeaux, whither he had been accompanied by the court, and mounting his horse, he galloped, accompanied only by two or three persons, to a house which she must pass on her way, and entering by a back door, seated himself at a window on the ground floor, where he awaited the coming of the cavalcade. A nobleman of the court, who had been previously instructed, stopped the Infanta for the purpose of pronouncing a congratulatory harangue, during which time Louis was enabled to convince himself of the extreme loveliness of his young bride; a loveliness, which, according to all the historians of the times, was of the highest order. "They represent Anne of Austria," says Dumas, "as combining in her person sufficient to satisfy even the exactions of loyalty." Beautiful with a majestic beauty, which subsequently tended admirably to assist her projects, and a thousand times compelled the respect and love of the turbulent nobility by whom she was surrounded; as a woman captivating to the eyes of a lover; as a queen perfect to the eye of a subject; tall and well shaped; possessing the whitest and most delicate hand that ever made an imperious gesture; eyes of exquisite beauty, easily dilated, and to which their greenish tinge gave extraordinary transparency; a small and ruddy mouth, that looked like an opening rosebud; long and silky hair, of that lovely pale shade of auburn which gives to the faces that it surrounds at once the sparkling complexion of a fair beauty, and the animation of a dark one—such was the wife whom Louis XIII. received as his companion.'—Vol. i. p. 6.

This lovely being, however, turned out to be rather difficult to manage, though her exterior was so enchanting. Miss Pardoe, we think, is rather too gentle in her treatment of her; she excuses her levity on the ground of the melancholy repulsive manner of her husband, which was not at all suited to her gaiety of disposition. Certain it is, however, that the gaiety of youth turned, as years advanced, into a scheming, selfish, and overbearing old age. Old age is the true test of the simplicity of the heart in youth. We can excuse frivolousness in youth, which becomes good-nature in old age; but we cannot when nothing but selfishness is the consequence.

As regards Louis XIII., we should also remember that, to begin with, he certainly had good reason to feel a coldness towards his wife, and then that there is every presumption that she gave the first cause for it; since, though her character remains unsullied, she certainly trespassed much on her reputation; while Louis XIII. had never a calumny even brought against him. We are thus severe against Anne of Austria, because we attribute much of the evil of later days to her. It was certainly through her weakness, or even worse, that Mazarin gained such an odious tyranny over France, and she is also responsible for the gross neglect in the education of Louis XIV. If his mother had been worthy of her position, there is no knowing what Louis XIV. might have been. Maria de Medicis (mother of Louis XIII.) is accused of wilfully selecting a most dangerous companion for the young queen, in order that her precocious intellect might not so far rouse her husband as to deprive his mother of her control over him. Anne of Austria, however, certainly received Madame de Chevreuse as her companion most willingly, and by this time had so far shown her disposition as to justify the following description:—

> 'Vain of her person, coquettish by nature, although virtuous in principle, and easily deluded by all that bore an appearance of mystery or romance, Anne of Austria readily fell into the snare which had been prepared for her: and although she unquestionably never forgot what was due to her honour, either as a woman or the consort of a king, she accustomed herself too easily to affect a disregard for that virtue which in her inmost heart she held at its proper value, To this fatal facility may be traced much of the unhappiness and mortification of her married life.'—Vol. i. p. 17.

The great cardinal was, about this time, destined to exhibit himself in a character that was at least unusual to him, and which he probably then assumed for the first, and certainly for the last, time. Many great men have often committed one folly which has rankled in their bones to the end of their days. Perhaps great power of mind leads some men to be too confident of doing everything; a little experience in the world is necessary to show even the greatest that they must follow the course for which nature has fitted them; and that if they depart from it they lose this influence, or expose themselves to acute ridicule if they court adventures for which nature has not fitted them. First, however, we will introduce the cardinal from the commencement of his court career.

> 'Armand Jean Duplessis was the son of Francis Duplessis, Lord of Richelieu, a man of high birth, notwithstanding all the doubts which may have been put forth upon that point, for we have, in support of the fact, the testimony of Mademoiselle de Montpensier, than whom no better authority on questions of nobility and precedence ever existed in any age. He lost his father when he was five years old, who died leaving three sons and two daughters; Armand Jean being the youngest of the former. The first entered the army, where he lost his life; and the second, who was Bishop of Luçon, resigned his See in order to enter a Carthusian com-

munity; when the subject of our sketch, who had also been bred to the Church, succeeded to the bishopric.

'In 1607, he departed for Rome, in order to receive the consecration of his new dignity at the hands of Paul V., who inquired of him whether he had attained the age required by the canonical law, which is twenty-five years. The embryo prelate replied at once in the affirmative, but immediately after the ceremony he requested the Holy Father to receive his confession; in which, with the same composure, he admitted the falsehood of which he had just been guilty. The Pontiff absolved him of his sin; but in the course of the same evening, he pointed out the new bishop to the French ambassador, remarking that he would one day become a great impostor.'—Vol. i .p. 8.

Richelieu was a great man, but this commencement of his ecclesiastical life does not show him to be much of a churchman. He soon became immersed in politics and deep in intrigue. On the unhappy occasion we have referred to, his love of intrigue was not confined to politics, but he ventured on the field of gallantry, and his affections rested on no less a person than Anne of Austria.

'Anxious to devise some method of curing the cardinal for ever of his presumptuous passion, Anne of Austria confided to Madame de Chevreuse the scene to which we have just made allusion; and it was at length decided between them that the queen should affect to doubt the vows which he so profusely poured forth, and exact, as a proof of their sincerity, that Richelieu should dance a saraband in her presence, in the costume of a Spanish jester. The queen declared that she consented to the experiment, only because she felt convinced that Richelieu, at once a churchman and the minister of a great nation, would never submit to such a degradation; and that, consequently, she should secure a defence against the prosecution of his suit, in his denial to gratify her caprice; while Madame de Chevreuse, on the contrary, maintained that they should see His Eminence, castanets in hand, at any hour which his royal mistress might deem expedient; and the favourite did not reason idly, for she was no stranger to the extent of Richelieu's passion for the young queen.

'Ten o'clock on the morrow was accordingly appointed; for the cardinal at once verified the assurance of Madame de Chevreuse, only stipulating that no one should be present but Her Majesty during the travestie, save Boccace, a musician of his own band, of whose discretion he was assured. Anne of Austria, still half incredulous, was nevertheless the first to declare to her favourite that the concession of the cardinal was, should he indeed fulfil his pledge, at once too great or too trifling to effect her purpose, were no other spectator of the ecclesiastical masquerade to assist her in profiting by its absurdity; and accordingly Madame de Chevreuse, Vautheir, and Béringhen, two of the gentlemen of her household, were concealed behind a folding screen in her cabinet; the queen still persisting that the precaution was unnecessary, for that the cardinal would send to excuse himself, and Madame de Chevreuse resolutely asserting that he would appear in person; when, punctually to the moment, Boccace made his entry, armed with a violin, and announced that he should be speedily followed by His Eminence. All doubt was at an end.

'Ten minutes later, a muffled figure appeared upon the threshold, advanced with a profound salutation, unfolded the enormous mantle in which it was enveloped, and the cardinal, prime minister of France, stood before the wife of its monarch in a tight vest and trousers of green velvet, with silver bells at his garters, and castanets in his hands!

'It required an immense effort on the part of Anne of Austria to restrain the mirth, which, at this spectacle, caused her to lose all apprehension of the consequences that it might involve; she succeeded, however, in preserving sufficient gravity to receive her visitor with a gracious gesture, and to request him to complete his self-abnegation in courteous and fitting terms.

'She was obeyed; and for a time she watched with both curiosity and amusement the evolutions and contortions of the cardinal; but the extreme gravity with which he executed his task at length rendered the spectacle so supremely grotesque, that she could no longer preserve her self-possession, and gave way to a violent fit of laughter. Her merriment was instantly re-echoed from behind the screen; and Richelieu, at once perceiving that he had been betrayed, strode furiously from the room; upon which the merry trio emerged from their concealment, delighted with the adventure of the morning. Little did they guess that they had roused a slumbering serpent, whose sting was sure and fatal! Little did they understand, as they indulged in witticisms, of which the cardinal-duke was the subject, that he had, as he left the palace, vowed an undying hatred to Anne of Austria and her favourite, from the effects of which neither the one nor the other was destined to escape.'—Vol. i. p. 21.

George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, was however more successful over the affections of Anne of Austria. His coming to Paris was unfortunate for her reputation.

'Chosen as the representative of Great Britain to terminate the negociations of marriage, Buckingham arrived in Paris, in his turn, magnificently attended, and at once became the idol of the people, the admiration of the ladies, and the aversion of every handsome cavalier, alike of the court and the city. We are not about to trace the mad and reckless career of the hot-headed envoy; it is a page in the romance of the world's history, and must be familiar, in nearly all its details, to nine-tenths of our readers; we shall merely remark that, from the hour of his entrance into the presence, with his doublet of white satin embroidered with gold, and his mantle of silver-grey velvet, upon which the oriental pearls were so loosely sewn, that he scattered them at every step as he advanced, for the profit of the surrounding courtiers, the duke produced a powerful impression on the imagination of the young queen. His chivalric devotion and noble bearing were in accordance with her national associations, while his profusion was not without its effect, for the wars which the princes of the blood had successively waged against the state, had exhausted the treasure amassed by Henry IV. and reduced his successor to an income very inadequate to satisfy the necessities of royalty.'—Vol. i. p. 28.

Thus he commenced a most brilliant visit to the Parisian capital. Anne of Austria was quite overcome. Madame de Chevreuse was gained over to favour the cause of Buckingham, but still interviews could not be managed between the queen and the gay envoy without great scheming. On one occasion Buckingham personated the White Lady of the Louvre, and in that costume gained the royal apartments, but the approach of the king disturbed him after a few minutes, while Richelieu was not to be taken in by pretended ghosts.

We will not, however, detail all the indiscretions of Anne towards Buckingham,—their evening walk during a State ball, in the garden at Amiens, or their affectionate leave-taking,—suffice it to say, that Anne crowned her rashness by presenting to Buckingham a splendid shoulder-knot, which had been given to her by the king, with twelve diamond pendants; and thereby hangs a tale, which we must give at length.

'Madame de Lannoy, the zealous spy of the Cardinal, had detected the disappearance of the diamond aiguillette from the queen's casket; and, with the ready perception of malice, she suggested to Richelieu that it had, in all probability, been sent to Buckingham as a parting present. The Cardinal lost not an instant in writing to one of the ladies of Charles's court who was in his interest—for, like the spider, he attached his web on every side—offering to present her with fifty thousand livres if she could succeed in cutting away a couple of the tags of the shoulder-knot the first time that Buckingham appeared in it, and forwarding them forthwith by a safe messenger to himself.

'A fortnight afterwards, the two tags were in the possession of Richelieu. The duke had worn the aiguillette at a state ball, and the emissary of the cardinal had cut away a couple of its pendants unobserved. The vindictive minister gloated over his prize! Now, as he believed, his revenge was certain.

'The first care of Richelieu was to carry the diamonds to the king, and to acquaint him with the method by which they had been procured. Louis examined them closely. There could be no doubt that they had indeed formed a portion of the ornament which had been his last present to his wife; his pale brow flushed with indignant rage; and, before the cardinal left the royal closet, every precaution was taken to ensure the speedy exposure of the queen.

'On the following morning Louis himself announced to Anne of Austria that a ball, given by the civil magistrates of Paris, at the town-hall, would take place the day but one following; and he coupled this information with the request that, in order to compliment both himself and the magistrates, she would appear in the aiguillette which he had lately presented to her. She replied simply and calmly that he should be obeyed.

'The eight-and-forty hours which were still to intervene before his vengeance could be accomplished, appeared so many centuries to the cardinal-duke. Anne of Austria was now fairly in the toils, and still her composure remained unruffled. How was this apparent tranquillity to be explained? Richelieu had already experienced that, aided by Buckingham and Madame de Chevreuse, she had possessed the power to baffle even *his* ingenuity; but she now stood alone; and even had she resolved to venture upon so dangerous a step as that of replacing the jewels, he well knew that on the present occasion she possessed neither the time nor the means.

'The hour of the festival at length struck; and as it had been arranged that the king should first make his entrance into the ball-room accompanied by his minister, and that the queen should follow, attended by her own court, Richelieu was enabled to calculate upon commencing his triumph from the very moment of her appearance upon the threshold.

'Precisely an hour before midnight the queen was announced, and every eye at once turned eagerly towards her. She was magnificent alike in loveliness and in apparel. She wore a Spanish costume, consisting of a dress of green satin, embroidered with gold and silver, having hanging sleeves, which were looped back with large rubies, serving as buttons. Her ruff was open, and displayed her bosom, which was extremely beautiful; and upon her head she had a small cap of green velvet surmounted by a heron-feather: while from her shoulder depended gracefully the aiguillette, with its twelve diamond tags.

'As she entered, the king approached her; avowedly to offer his compliments upon her appearance, but actually to count the tags. His arithmetic amounted to a dozen. The cardinal stood a pace behind him, quivering with rage. The twelve tags were hanging from the shoulder of the queen, and nevertheless he grasped two of them in his hand at the same moment. Aye, in his hand; for he had resolved not to lose an instant in triumphing over the proud and insolent beauty who had laughed his passion to scorn, and made him a mark for the ridicule of her associates. The vow that he uttered in his heart, as he gazed upon her calm and defying brow that night, probably cost Buckingham his life; for Richelieu was not duped by the belief that the shoulder-knot of the duke, from whence his own two tags had been severed, was not identical with that now floating over the arm of Anne of Austria.

'The plot had, nevertheless, failed; and once more the cardinal was beaten upon his own ground.

'It is, however, time that we should disclose the secret of this apparently mysterious incident to our readers.

'On his return from the State ball, at which he had appeared with the aiguillette of Anne of Austria, Buckingham, who would confide to no one the care of this precious ornament, was about to restore it to its casket, when he perceived the subtraction which had taken place, and for a moment abandoned himself to a fit of anger, believing he had been made the victim of a common theft; an instant's reflection, however, convinced him that such was not likely to be the case, as he had upon his person jewels of greater value, which it would have been equally easy to purloin, and these all remained intact. A light broke upon him—he suspected the agency of his old enemy and rival, the cardinal-duke; and his immediate measure was to place an embargo upon the English ports, and to prohibit all masters of vessels from putting to sea, upon pain of death. During the operation of this edict, which created universal astonishment throughout the country, the jeweller of Buckingham was employed day and night in completing the number of the diamond tags; and it was still in full force when a light fishing smack, which had been exempted from the general disability, was scudding across the channel on its way to Calais, under the command of one of the duke's confidential servants, and having on board, for all its freight, the aiguillette of Anne of Austria.

'In the course of the ensuing day, the ports were again opened, and the thousand and one rumours which had been propagated by the people died gradually away, as no explanation of the incomprehensible and rigorous measure ever transpired; whose result was the receipt of her shoulder-knot by the queen, the very day before the ball of the magistrates.

'Thus the apparent tranquillity of Anne of Austria, which had been for the first few hours the apathetic calmness of despair, ultimately grew out of the certainty of security; and the ready wit and chivalric devotion of Buckingham, which had so frequently threatened her destruction, for once supplied her ægis.'—Vol. i. p. 41.

After this time, many years passed of comparative estrangement between the king and queen, till, in the year 1638, they were reconciled by the birth of a Dauphin, whose horoscope was thus drawn up:—

> 'Meanwhile, the astrologer Campanella, had arrived in France, and was invited to proceed with his task without delay. At first he endeavoured to excuse himself, aware of the danger to which such a responsibility must expose him; but as his excuses were not admitted, and he was commanded to speak the truth fearlessly, he ultimately, after the usual precautions, announced that his combinations had informed him that "the infant would be as luxurious as Henry IV., and of conspicuous haughtiness. That his reign would be long and laborious, although not without a certain happiness; but that his end would be miserable, and entail both religious and political confusion upon the kingdom."'—Vol. i. p. 100.

The joy at the birth of a dauphin, after more than twenty years of suspense, was naturally very great. The king took him from the arms of his nurse, and approaching the window, exhibited him to the crowd, exclaiming, as he did so, 'A son! gentlemen, a son!' In course of time an extraordinary nuncio of the pope arrived with swaddling-clothes, blessed by His Holiness, 'which he habitually sent to the dauphins of France, in recognition of those princes as the elder sons of the church. These garments, dazzling with gold and silver, were enclosed in a couple of chests of red velvet, which were opened in the presence of the king and queen.' Miss Pardoe takes this opportunity of reviewing the general state of the country.

> 'At the birth of Louis XIV.—although the court vied with each other in lavish and idle expenditure—their monarch was in receipt only of an income of a hundred millions of livres, according to the value of money in the present day; and France had not yet attained any prominent rank among the European nations. Internally she was rent by faction, and her external strength was almost negative. Even the capital, and the great high-ways through the country, were in a state of neglect difficult to comprehend; the first individuals in the State having so much interest in the improvement of both the one and the other. The roads were scarcely passable, under no government authority, and infested by robbers: while the streets, narrow, ill-paved, and choked with mud and refuse of the foulest description, were, immediately after night-fall, crowded with thieves, pick-pockets, assassins, and all the refuse of a great capital, whose depredations were carried on to an immense extent, and with an audacity which received little check from a police, that did not amount to fifty men, although it was entrusted with the whole safety of the city.
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> 'Socially, the position of France was little better. The heads of the first nobles of the land had fallen, or been bowed by disgrace and imprisonment. Duelling had recommenced with a resolution which more than ever defied the power of the monarch; while the intellectual progress of the public tribunals is sufficiently marked by the fact, that Léonora Galigai had been burned as a witch in 1617, and Urbain Grandier as a sorcerer in 1634.
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> 'Literature and morals were alike at a deplorably low ebb. England, Italy, and Spain, had each given birth to more than one gigantic talent, while France was as yet only the nursery of that genius, which was to form so bright a galaxy in the succeeding reign. The two celebrated female wits of the day were Mademoiselle de Scudéry, and Ninon de l'Enclos; while Madame de Sévigné, who was to found an epistolary school, destined to endure as long as the language in which she wrote, had just attained her twelfth year.—Vol. i. p. 101.

Louis XIII., though on better terms with his queen, still seems to have cared more for the society of his favourites. Sometimes these favourites were ladies, or even nuns, for the king of France could enter all religious houses by ancient right. No slander, however, was occasioned by these lady friends. One royal favourite is remarkable, as being the hero of the romance, the translation of which we have appended to the head of our Article. All the great characters of the age are brought into Alfred de Vigny's 'Cinq Mars' with great vigour. Miss Pardoe thus mentions the work:—

> 'The exiled favourite was, however, replaced by Richelieu in the person of M. de Cinq Mars, whom he introduced to the notice and favour of the king, and who became, ere long, the object of his devoted regard. It is not our purpose to follow up circumstantially the career of this unfortunate young nobleman, which was one of an interest too absorbing to remain in obscurity. Even in the sober pages of history, it assumes the semblance of romance; and the details which history does not condescend to supply, have since been given to the world with an industry of research, and accuracy of narration, beyond all praise, in the volumes of the Count Alfred de Vigny, which bears his name.'—Vol. i. p. 104.

On the death of Richelieu in 1643, and of Louis XIII. soon after, Anne of Austria and Mazarin fully came out. It would be impossible to describe their intrigues, when acting in concert, and their selfishness individually, within less compass than Miss Pardoe has devoted to it; but we will mention, that it is generally supposed they were privately married—that they provoked the wars of the Fronde—that they shamefully neglected the education of the king—and in many other ways abused their powers.

One extract on the education of the king:—

> 'The greatest misfortune attached to a regency is the effort made by those in authority, to prolong to its utmost extent the infancy and helplessness of the royal minor. The least guilty of these exalted guardians content themselves by maintaining their charge in a perfect state of ignorance concerning those duties whose knowledge is imperative to individuals hereafter to be entrusted with the government of a state and the welfare of a people; and in order to carry this point, they are not only careful to avoid every opportunity of mooting questions likely to lead to such a knowledge, but also to remove from about the persons of their royal pupils all such companions as are likely to inspire a taste for study and enquiry.
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> 'This was precisely the position of Louis XIV.; with the exception of his devotional exercises, sufficient military skill to review his troops, and a perfect familiarity with court etiquette, the young monarch when he took possession of the throne of France, was utterly ignorant; and could not have competed with the most shallow school-boy of his age. This effect the regent and her minister had been anxious to accomplish. Louis, as we have elsewhere said "enacted the king" to perfection; his personal grace entranced the populace; his polished self-possession was the proverb of

the court; and his innate pride prevented all assumption of equality on the part of his customary associates: while, in every question of State, he was a cypher, helpless and dependent upon the intellect and energy of others; and, although possessed of a strong will, which under other circumstances might have enabled him to throw off with a bound the shackles which had been wound about him, so conscious of his own deficiencies that he could not command sufficient courage to trust in his mental resources, such as they were.

'Of all the young nobles who had been placed about his person, none caused so much uneasiness to the regent as the Count de Guiche. Independently of his great physical beauty, his frank fearlessness led him to speak without reserve both of persons and occurrences; and the queen and her minister soon discovered that by this very inconvenient quality he was teaching the king to think, the most dangerous habit which he could acquire under the circumstances, as regarded their particular interests.'

We will conclude our rather uncourteous examination into the character of Anne of Austria, by the description of a scene that certainly proved she had admirable powers of acting. For the second time, during the wars of the Fronde, the queen was meditating an escape out of Paris, with the king in her charge, and all things were in readiness, when her intentions were suddenly frustrated.

'The queen was no sooner apprized by this tumult that her design had been discovered, than she caused the young king, whose travelling dress was already adjusted, immediately to take off his clothes, and retire to bed; which he had scarcely done ere one of the officers of the guards announced to her that the mob were threatening the palace, in their exasperation on learning that the king was again about to leave the city; and that they insisted upon seeing him, in order to convince themselves that he was not actually already gone. While the officer was yet speaking, a messenger arrived from the palace-sentinels to request new orders, the mob which had collected about the Palais-Royal having threatened to tear up the palisades; and before the regent had time to answer the appeal, the messenger of the Duke d'Orleans arrived in his turn, and was conducted to her presence; when he informed her Majesty that he was deputed by *Monsieur* to request that she would terminate the popular commotion which had been excited by a report that she was about to remove the king from the city; a measure which he begged to assure her was impossible, for that the citizens were resolved not to permit it.

'The queen replied, with great haughtiness, that it was the Duke d'Orleans himself who had occasioned the tumult, and that, consequently, it depended upon himself to allay it, should he see fit to do so; that she was well aware he had merely acted upon the advice of the coadjutor; while, as regarded the alarm excited by the supposed departure of the king, nothing could be more unfounded, both His Majesty and the Duke d'Anjou being then asleep in their beds, as she had herself been before the outcry compelled her to rise; and in order to convince him of the futility of the report, she desired him to follow her to the chamber of the king. As she ceased speaking, she moved forward; and de Souches saw, as she had declared, the young sovereign apparently in a profound sleep.

'He was about to retire, when suddenly the outcry of the populace became more violent; and shouts of "the king! the king! we must see the king!" penetrated even to the royal apartment. The regent reflected for an instant: and then turning towards the envoy of *Monsieur* she desired him to command in her name that all the doors of the palace should be flung open, and every one admitted to the chamber of the king who desired to enter it; directing, however, at the same time, that the citizens should be informed that His Majesty was sleeping, and requested to make as little noise as possible.

'De Souches hastily obeyed; and having transmitted the order of the regent to the guard, afterwards repeated her message to the people. All the doors were immediately opened, and the mob rushed into the Palais Royal. Nevertheless, contrary to all expectation, they had no sooner reached the royal apartments, than the indviduals who appeared to act as their leaders, remembering that the queen had assured them the king was sleeping, desired the untimely visitors to proceed in perfect quiet; and as the human tide moved onward, their very breathing was suppressed, and they trod as though they dreaded to awaken every echo with their footsteps. The same mighty mass that had howled, and yelled, and threatened, without the gates, like some wild beast about to be bereft of its young, now, as the chamber of the sovereign gradually filled, had become calm, respectful, and cautious: and approached the royal bed with a feeling of affectionate deference, which restrained every intruder from drawing back the curtains. It was the queen herself who performed this office. She had maintained her post near the pillow of her son; and pale, but calm, and dignified, as though she were merely going through some courtly ceremonial, she extended her hand, and gathering back the velvet folds which had intervened between the people and their sovereign, revealed him to their eager gaze in all the beauty of youth and apparent slumber.

'By a simultaneous impulse, the whole assemblage dropped upon their knees, and put up a prayer for the preservation of the noble child, who lay sleeping before them; after which they retired through an opposite door, to give place to those who were waiting to succeed them.

'This living stream continued to flow on until three o'clock in the morning: and still the queen never faltered. Like a marble statue she retained her position, firm and motionless; her majestic figure drawn haughtily to its full height, and her magnificent arm resting in broad relief upon the crimson draperies. And still the boy-king, emulating the example of his royal parent, remained immobile, with closed eyes, and steady breathing, as though his rest had remained unbroken by the incursion of his rebellious subjects. Is was a singular and marked passage in the life of both mother and son.'—Vol. i. pp. 384—387.

We would willingly also dismiss Mazarin from our thoughts, but there are aspects of his character brought out, which it is impossible to pass over. He is one of those vipers who excite envy by their success, when applause would be given to an equally unscrupulous man who had yet shown a little more of the lion. We feel even indisposed to allow him strength or power of mind, and try to impute his position to unfair influences; but yet, he was clever in his craftiness, beyond all dispute. An Italian adventurer, he came to France without anything whatever; he gradually rose to power and influence—he then sent for his nephews and nieces, whom he settled in alliance with the greatest nobility, and even royalty, of France—he reigned despotic, though hated, for many years—yet, all this time the chief powers of his mind were absorbed in one overwhelming vice, before which every principle of honour, and every feeling of his nature, gave way. Grasping covetousness was the passion of his existence; not even did he spend money on his nephews and nieces—he only sent for them when his influence was so great that they could make their fortunes without any cost on his part. So much did the meanness of their uncle dwell in their minds, that when a few days before his death he gave to one daughter a few hundred coins, she called her sisters, and forthwith threw them out of the window, to enjoy for once the pleasure of diffuse liberality. On one or two occasions he clearly saw it was his policy to give an entertainment, and, of course, it was then on a magnificent scale. On the marriage of one of his nieces he thus devised a plan of delighting the king:—

> 'When the king at length rose to precede the guests into the great saloon, a strain of consummate melody heralded his appearance. Mazarin, who had, in his gratification at the splendid alliance of his niece, resolved to make his avarice for once subservient to his magnificence, had imported from Rome the principal musicians of the Pope's choir, for this express occasion, and the French court listened for the first time, at the marriage of Olympia Mancini, to the exquisite voices of Italian vocalists, pouring forth, in waves of harmony which rose and fell upon the ears of their astonished auditors like the soft but mysterious undulations of a summer sea, the finest compositions of Leo and Scarlatti. The sacred music (for it was all such) had been adapted to words analogous to the circumstance; and the sublime canticles which had inspired each divine *maestro*, were now replaced by amorous ditties and sentimental epithalamiums; a species of metamorphosis common enough in Italy, however singularly misplaced upon this particular occasion, when the festival was given by one of the princes of the church.'—Vol. ii. p. 158.

Another of the cardinal's festivals:—

> 'Before the commencement of the ball, the cardinal conducted his royal and noble guests into a gallery filled with objects of art, precious gems and stuffs, Chinese wonders, and every description of costly toys, of which he had prepared a lottery, whose every ticket was a prize; and whence a cornet of gendarmes carried away a diamond ornament valued at four thousand crowns, and Mademoiselle another, estimated at the same number of livres.'—Vol. ii. pp. 190, 191.

But now look on the other side of the picture:—The Palatine of Posnania and the Bishop of Warmia had been chosen by the king, Wladislas VII., as his proxies to espouse the Princess Marie. The magnificence of the Poles was astounding—silver and gold, rubies, diamonds, and pearls were in profusion—the Bishop of Warmia was habited 'in rich watered silk of a violet 'colour, with a hat whence depended a cord of gold enriched 'with diamonds.' The Palatine was in 'gold brocade covered 'with precious stones; having his scimitar, his poniard, and his 'spurs encrusted with turquoises, rubies, and diamonds, and his 'horse's saddle and housings of cloth of gold: while the animal 'was also shod with gold so insecurely, that long ere he reached 'the palace its shoes had become detached.' Yet Mazarin at this time kept the regent so impoverished that there was no light to see all this splendour: they entered the Palais Royal in the dark—the young king went to meet them in a carriage that was a disgrace to France, and made but a poor figure beside the Polish equipages. At Fontainebleau the regent ordered a splendid supper for them, but it was not forthcoming at the time, and finally the Poles had to grope their way through the royal apartments, on taking their departure. The young king on one occasion had a hundred louis given him, but Mazarin took them from him. For months did the cardinal keep Henrietta Maria, the exiled Queen of England, almost in a state of famine.

> 'It was to the influence of the coadjutor that Henrietta-Maria was now indebted for this well-timed assistance. Five or six days before the count left Paris, he had been to visit her, and found her sitting by the bedside of her daughter. On his entrance, she said, with a melancholy smile, "You see, M. le Coadjutor, that I am keeping Henrietta company. The poor child has not been able to leave her bed to-day, because we have no fire." The cardinal had, in fact, omitted during the last six months to pay the queen's pension; the wood-merchant refused to furnish any further fuel, and there was not a morsel of wood in the palace.'—Vol. i. p. 278.

We now come to look at the end of all this. When he found that death was approaching, the enormous wealth which he had accumulated actually terrified him. He mentioned it in the course of his confession, and his confessor, startled like himself at the unheard-of amount of his wealth, at once declared that 'His Eminence would be damned if he did not forthwith make 'restitution of that portion of the money which had been ill-'acquired;' to which the cardinal rejoined, 'that he owed it all 'to the bounty of the king.' The honest ecclesiastic, however, was not satisfied, and withheld absolution till he could distinguish between what he had received honestly or not, on which Mazarin, in despair, said he must restore the whole.

> 'When Colbert had obeyed the summons; the cardinal confided to him the difficulty which had arisen; and the former at once advised, in order to remove his scruples, and to prevent his immense fortune from passing away from his family, that he should make a donation of all he possessed to the king, who would not fail in his royal generosity to annul the act at once. Mazarin approved the expedient; and on the 3d of March the necessary document was prepared; but three days having elapsed without the restoration of his property, he became the victim of a thousand fears, and as he sat in his chair he wrung his hands with agony. The wealth for which he had toiled and sinned; which he had wrenched alike from the voluptuous noble and the industrious artizan, had, as he believed, passed away from him for ever. The labour of his life was rendered of none avail; and the

curses which he had accumulated upon his own head had failed even to gild his tomb. "My poor family!" he exclaimed at intervals, "my poor family! they will be left without bread."

'This bitter suspense was not, however, fated to be of long duration. On the third day from the transmission of the deed of gift, Colbert entered his chamber radiant with success, and placed the recovered document in his hands, with the intelligence that the king had definitely refused to accept the offering; and that he authorized the minister to dispose of all his property as he should see fit. On receiving this assurance, the worthy Théatine declared himself satisfied, and at once bestowed the absolution which he had previously withheld; and he had no sooner done so than Mazarin drew from beneath his bolster a will which he had already prepared, and delivered it to Colbert.'—Vol. ii. pp. 280, 281.

And what may the reader suppose was the wealth which thus so troubled him in his last moments? It could never be exactly told, for he left special directions that no inventory should be made; but it was ascertained that he left behind him about the sum of 40,000,000 livres! which, in money of the present day equals 200,000,000 livres!

'In 1630, he had barely emerged from obscurity, and had, for all fortune, his diplomatic subtlety, and his indomitable ambition; while, in 1661, he died possessed of a sum equal to two hundred millions of the money of the present day. He died unmourned even by his own family, every member of which he had raised to rank and opulence; for his avarice had counteracted the effect of his exertions. Each felt that he was striving rather to exalt himself through them, than to benefit their individual fortunes; while they resented the parsimony, which, after decorating them with a rank requiring a corresponding expenditure, left them in a position that prevented their upholding it with dignity. The results of such a system might have been foreseen; the Princess de Conti and the Duchess de Mercœur, from the fact of their having married shortly after their arrival in France, escaped its effects: but M. de Mancini and his remaining nieces became, so soon as they had acquired the means, improvident and careless to a degree exceeding belief.

'In short, the avarice of Mazarin had passed into a proverb; and both friends and enemies were subjected to its withering effects. Every circumstance afforded him a pretext for augmenting his hoards; and his favourite axiom whenever he was thwarted, of "They sing, they shall pay for it," was never once contradicted by his practice throughout his whole period of power. He is, moreover, accused by more than one authority of having stooped to measures degrading to his high rank in order to increase his property; and is even suspected of having shared with the privateers the profits of their ocean forays, although this fact was never fully proved; but the Dutch did not hesitate to brand him with a moral degradation which they would never have assigned to the Cardinal de Richelieu.

'Mazarin felt no compunction in cheating at cards, which were at that period the ruling passion of the court; and, miser as he was, habitually risked the gain or loss of fifty thousand livres in a night; while, as a natural consequence, his temper ebbed and flowed with his fortune.

'Perhaps the most amusing anecdote connected with his avarice, multitudinous as they were, was an equivoque which occurred only a few days before he breathed his last, and within an hour after he had obtained the absolution which his confessor had for a time withheld. The Cardinal had just transmitted his will to Colbert when some one scratched at his door, which having been interdicted, Bernouin, his confidential valet-de-chambre, dismissed the visitor.

'"Who was there?" asked Mazarin, as his attendant returned to the bedside.

'"It was M. de Tubeuf, the president of the chamber of account;" replied Bernouin; "and I told him that your Eminence could not be seen."

'"Alas!" exclaimed the dying man; what have you done! he owed me money, perhaps he came to pay it; call him back; call him back instantly."

'M. de Tubeuf was overtaken in the ante-room and introduced. Nor had the cardinal deceived himself. He was indeed come to liquidate a heavy gambling debt; and Mazarin welcomed him with as bright a smile as though he had years of life before him in which to profit by his good fortune; took the hundred pistoles which he had brought in his hand, and asked for his jewel casket; which was placed upon the bed; when he deposited the coins in one of the compartments; and then began to examine with great interest the valuable gems which it contained.

'"You must give me leave, M. de Tubeuf;" he said with emphasis, as he lifted a fine brilliant and passed it rapidly across the light; "to offer to Madame de Tubeuf———."

'The president of accounts, believing that the cardinal, in acknowledgment of the heavy sums which he had from time to time gained at the card-table on his account since he had been too ill to act for himself, was about to present him with the precious gem which he then held in his trembling fingers, moved a pace or two nearer to the bed with a smile upon his lips.

'"To offer to Madame de Tubeuf——" repeated the dying miser, still gazing upon the jewel:—"to offer to Madame de Tubeuf—my very best compliments." And as he ceased speaking he closed the casket, and made a sign that it should be removed.

'Nothing remained for the discomfited courtier but to make his bow and depart: with the mortification of feeling that he had been for an instant so far the dupe of his own wishes, as to believe, that while he was yet alive, Jules de Mazarin could make up his mind to give away anything for which he had no prospect of receiving an equivalent.'—Vol. ii. pp. 285—288.

The position of the cardinal-statesmen in these times would naturally appear to be an interesting subject, in an ecclesiastical point of view; but we confess that the secular part of their character so entirely outweighs the ecclesiastic, as really to leave nothing for a churchman to think of but the fact, that they wore cardinal's robes, and had the title of cardinal attached to their names. Nor was this only the case with the cardinals. As a specimen of the scandalous manner in which Church revenues and dignities have been disposed of, we introduce the following for the admiration of all pluralists:—

'Madame de Rhodes was the widow of a simple esquire, a natural son of the famous Louis, Cardinal de Lorraine, whose bigoted intolerance made him the terror of the Calvinists of his day; and who was himself the son of Claude de Lorraine, the first Duke of Guise, and was born in 1525. As a specimen of the ecclesiastical pluralist, he was probably never surpassed in any church or in any century. He was archbishop of both Rheims and Narbonne; Bishop of Metz, Tour, Verdun, Thérouane, Luçon, and Valence; Abbé of Marmoutiers, Cluny, St. Denis, Fécamp, &c. He was admitted to a seat in the Conclave in 1547, and in 1561 distinguished himself at the conference of Poissy, where his arguments are stated by his party to have triumphed over those of Theodore de Beze. He was also conspicuous at the Council of Trent. In 1573, he founded the University of Pont-à-Mousson, and in the following year died.'—Vol. i. pp. 361, 362.

Another of this family, Duke Henry de Guise, was also Archbishop of Rheims during the time our history is concerned with; he was twice married, 'by virtue of some peculiar dispensation,' which ceased to make his marriage lawful when his fancy roved from the Abbess of Aveney to the Countess of Bossut. He was also a warrior, and accomplished the conquest of Naples. Cardinal de Retz, also, though we rather admire his honesty and boldness of character, as displayed in the wars of the Fronde, was not much of an ecclesiastic in his tastes, or a very fit holder of Church honours; nor, indeed, did he at first willingly possess them: on the contrary, he launched out into the wildest profligacy, for the purpose of unfitting himself for the clerical profession, but his family interest nevertheless forced him to submit, and, there being no discipline in the Church to exclude him, he became a popular preacher and coadjutor of Paris, &c.

We have already dwelt so long on the earlier part of our history, that we must omit several amusing personages whom we intended to notice, in order that we may spare a little space for one illustrious lady before we proceed to the later characters of the book, and the period more personally connected with Louis XIV.

The lady whom we refer to is MADEMOISELLE, daughter of Gaston, Duke of Orleans, brother to Louis XIII. She was therefore cousin to Louis XIV. Her memoirs of herself and her political adventures are so mixed up with the whole history of the times, that we cannot hope by any moderate selection of extracts to represent her amusing vivacity, and her audacious exploits as they deserve. In all her words and actions there is an elasticity and a boundless freedom from ordinary common-place existence, that is most wonderful to contemplate. She knew no law indeed but her own caprice, but that caprice was most stern law in itself. She was alike subject to the most deluding vanity, and the highest flights of heroism. She was a thorough Frenchwoman, and the granddaughter of Henry IV. Her vanity is so undisguised that it becomes simplicity; her desire for a matrimonial alliance so freely expressed, that she disarms all sneers at so common an infirmity; and her warlike achievements are so original, that on the whole she leaves rather an agreeable impression. One cause of her variety of mind and her energy of action was, we should say, the entire absence of what is called passion; she certainly had no tender feelings beyond a certain sentimentality which made her look with very much the same sensations on love, on heroism, and even on religion. The consequence of this was, that she was utterly wanting in what usually is considered a charm in her sex, that is, modesty. All her powers and all her thoughts were concentrated under her indomitable self-will and self-conceit. Circumstances singularly favoured the development of her extraordinary disposition, but nevertheless nobody but herself could have been found in the varied positions which she occupies throughout our history. We can only compare her career to the wild vagaries of an india-rubber ball. At one time she has the offer of being Queen of France, which she declines, though afterwards she would willingly have taken Louis XIV. as her husband. We then find her leading an army of the Fronde party to the city of Orleans; and, on being refused admittance, ordering the gates to have a hole made in them, through which she goes head-first to claim authority over her liege citizens.

She next appears wandering through the galleries of the Louvre, listening to Charles the Second's solicitations to become the wife of the exiled King of England. She then mounts the rostrum of the Hotel de Ville, and addresses the citizens of Paris. She again receives earnest entreaties to marry divers kings and princes, but the Emperor of Austria so occupies her mind that she despises humbler thrones. The crisis, however, of her audacity is during the battle of the Porte St. Antoine, when she ascends the Bastile and equally astounds both citizens and royalists, by pointing its roaring cannon against the very centre of the army of Louis XIV. All this, however, is readily forgotten when peace came, and all she hears of it is from the queen-mother, who tells her, in a joking way, that she certainly could have strangled her just then, but that she likes her none the less now. The end of poor Mademoiselle excites our pity. After so many offers of kings and princes, she at length, when forty-five, married a most worthless scoundrel, an officer of the king's guard, who enjoyed her enormous fortune, and laughed at his wife as the 'old woman.' His insolence at last is so intolerable that they were separated for the rest of her life, which she spent in retirement.

We will now give a few extracts in which her adventures are told. They are doubly interesting when written by herself, with all the personal details that she introduces. When the queen escaped from Paris during the night, with the kind intention of *starving* the Parisians into obedience, Mademoiselle joined the court.

'When we arrived at St. Germain, we went straight to the chapel to hear mass, and all the rest of the day was spent in questioning those who arrived as to what they were saying and doing in Paris. Every one spoke of it in his own way, and all were agreed that no anger had been exhibited at the departure of the king, that the drums were beating all over the city, and that the citizens had taken up arms, I was very uneasy about my equipage. I knew that the Countess de Fiesque was so timid that she would not leave Paris during the commotion, nor forward my equipage, which was most necessary to me; as for herself, I could have done very well without her.

'She sent me a coach, which passed through the rebels without remark, and the others could have come with equal ease; those who were in it were treated with great civility, although it was by people who are not in the habit of showing it; and I was informed of the circumstance. She sent me in this coach a mattrass, and a little linen. As I saw myself in so sorry a condition, I went to seek help at the Château-Neuf, where *Monsieur* and *Madame* were lodged. She lent me two of her women; but she had not her clothes any more than myself; and nothing could be more laughable than this disorder. I slept in a very handsome room, well painted, well gilded, and large, with very little fire, and no windows; which is not agreeable in the month of January. My mattrasses were laid upon the floor, and my sister, who had no bed, slept with me. I was obliged to sing to get her to sleep; and her slumber did not last long, so that she disturbed mine; she tossed about, felt me near her, woke up, and exclaimed that she saw the beast, so I was obliged to sing again to put her to sleep, and in that way I passed the night. Judge if I were agreeably situated for a person who had slept but little the previous night, and who had been ill all the winter with sore throat and a violent cold; nevertheless, this fatigue cured me. Fortunately for me, the beds of *Monsieur* and *Madame* arrived; and *Monsieur* had the kindness to give me his room. They had previously occupied one which the prince had lent him. As I was in the apartment of *Monsieur*, where no one knew that I was lodged, I was awoke by a noise. I drew back my curtain, and was much astonished to find my chamber quite filled by men in large buffskin cellars, who appeared surprised to see me, and who knew me as little as I knew them. I had no change of linen, and my day chemise was washed during the night; I had no women to arrange my hair and dress me, which is very inconvenient; and I ate with *Monsieur*, who keeps a very bad table. Still I did not lose my gaiety, and *Monsieur* was in admiration at my making no complaint, and it is true that I am a creature who can make the best of everything, and am greatly above trifles. I remained in this state ten days with *Madame*, at the end of which time my equipage arrived, and I was very glad to have all my comforts. I then went to lodge in the Château-Vieux, where the queen was residing, and I had resolved, if my equipage did not reach me, to send to Rouen to have some clothes and a bed made; and for that purpose to request some money from the treasurer of *Monsieur*, who might very well give it to me, as they were enjoying my property: and if, indeed, they had refused me a supply, I should have had no difficulty in finding some one who could have lent it.'—Vol. i. pp. 243—245.

We now give the visit of Charles II. of England.

'While this absurd contention was engrossing the court, Charles II. had arrived at Péronne, whence a courier was forwarded to apprise their Majesties of the fact. The queen immediately communicated the news of his advent to Mademoiselle, saying with a smile, "Your suitor is coming;" and it is evident, notwithstanding the disclaimers of the princess, that she was greatly excited by his reappearance; for blended with the *morgue* and egotism of her style, snatches of the most extraordinary, simple, and straightforward frankness may be detected. In the present instance she says, with almost girlish unguardedness:—

'"When the Abbé de la Rivière spoke to me on the subject, I told him I was dying with anxiety for the English king to say soft things to me, because I did not yet know what they meant, for no one had ever dared to address them to me; not on account of my quality, since many had been said to queens of my acquaintance, but because it was well known that I was not coquettishly inclined.

'"On the day of his arrival we all rose early to prepare for him; he was only to dine at Compiègne, and it was necessary to set off betimes to meet him. I had caused my hair to be curled, which I seldom did, and as I entered the carriage of the queen, she exclaimed: 'It is easy to distinguish those who expect their gallants. How she is dressed!' I was quite prepared to reply, that those who had themselves had lovers knew how to act, and were aware of the trouble which it was necessary to take in order to please them; I might even have added, that as mine was to be my husband, I had reason to be particular about my appearance; but I did not dare to say anything. We went forward a league to meet him. When he appeared every one alighted; he first saluted their Majesties, and then myself. I thought him very good looking; much more so than when he left France; and if his intellect had appeared to me to equal his person, perhaps he might have pleased me on that occasion. When he was in the carriage, the king questioned him about dogs, horses, the Prince of Orange, and the sport in that country; to all which he answered in French. The queen wished to have some particulars of his political position, but he did not reply to her inquiries; and when he was asked at different times to explain several very serious facts, which were of considerable importance to his personal interests, he excused himself from answering, by urging that he could not speak our language. I own that, from that moment, I resolved not to conclude the marriage; for I conceived a very poor opinion of him, being a king at his age, and having no knowledge of his affairs. As soon as we arrived, dinner was served up. He ate no ortolans, but flung himself upon a piece of beef, and a shoulder of mutton, as if there had been nothing else at table. After dinner the queen amused herself, and left him with me. He was a quarter of an hour without saying a single word, but I am willing to believe that his silence was the result of respect rather than any want of passion; though on this occasion I frankly confess that I could have wished it to have been somewhat less plainly exhibited. As his supineness began to weary me, I called Madame de Comminges to my side, that she might endeavour to make him talk, in which she fortunately succeeded. M. de la Rivière shortly afterwards approached me, saying; 'He looked at you during the whole of the dinner, and is looking at you still.' To which I replied, 'He has plenty of time to look at me before he will please me, if he does not speak.' 'Ah,' said he, 'you will not admit that he has said sweet things to you.' 'Pardon me,' I retorted; 'come near me when he is at my side, and you will see how he sets about it.' When the queen rose, I approached the king of England; and in order to make him talk, I inquired for some persons whom I had seen in his suite, but he answered my questions without the slightest gallantry. When the hour for his departure arrived, we got into our carriages, and bore him company to the middle of the forest, where every one alighted, as they had done on his arrival. He took leave of the king, and then approached me, accompanied by Lord Germain, saying, 'I believe that my Lord Germain, who speaks French better than I do, has explained to you my sentiments and my intention; I am your very obedient servant.' I answered, that I was equally his obedient servant. Germain paid me a great many compliments; and, after they were over, the king bowed and departed."

'We consider this description of the courtship of the "Merry Monarch" as sufficiently curious to afford its own apology to our readers for the length of its quotation.'—Vol. i. pp. 301—304.

Mademoiselle had been disappointed of Austria once, but another chance offered.

'Mademoiselle also followed the queen, and upon reaching the convent was informed by Her Majesty that news of the empress's death had arrived, and that on this occasion everything should be done to secure her own marriage with the imperial widower. Mademoiselle thanked her with great humility, and confesses that the tidings gave her considerable pleasure.'—Vol. i. p. 309.

Her account of Madame de Condé supplicating the queen, in the most heart-rending strain, for her husband and son, is characteristic. 'The princess entered: she had been bled the night 'before, which compelled her to wear a scarf; and this was put 'on in so ridiculous a manner, as well as all the rest of her dress, 'that the queen and myself had great difficulty in restraining our 'laughter.' This unhappy lady's death is mentioned shortly after in somewhat of the same spirit.

'At the same period, news arrived of the death of the Princess-Dowager, at Châtillon, after a long period of suffering. The report was general that she had died heart-broken, and pining once more to embrace her children: but Mademoiselle, with a flippancy for which she was proverbial on all serious subjects, asserts that "she died in the most beautiful and Christian sentiments imaginable: she had lived during her last years with great devotion, which even caused her to abandon the interests of her son, either because he was quite resigned, or that she cared less for him. The prince," she adds, "knew the real cause; and as for me I shall give no opinion." And this was all the regret expressed at court for the old and tried and affectionate friend of the regent, whom she had sent to her grave, solitary, childless, and heart-broken.'—Vol. i. p. 371.

We now give part of her Orleans adventure.

'Mademoiselle, as she confessed to the Countess de Fiesque, was emboldened in this attempt by a declaration of the Marquis de Vilène, who was esteemed one of the most accomplished astrologers of the time, that whatever she undertook between midday on Wednesday, the 17th of March, and the following Friday, was certain to succeed; and that confiding in the science of the marquis, whose prediction was then in her pocket, she felt confident that she should either force the gates of Orleans, or escalade the walls. Terrified as they were by this display of resolution, the two countesses could not suppress their merriment at the menacing attitude assumed by their female commander-in-chief; who, nothing daunted by this display of their incredulity, calmly pursued her way along the ramparts, until she arrived at the river-bank, where the boatmen, who at Orleans form a considerable body, approached her, and offered their services, which she immediately accepted, haranguing them in a style which excited them to such enthusiasm that she saw her point was gained; and accordingly proposed that they should row her as far as the Porte de la

Faux, which opened upon the river; they, however, proposed a gate upon the quay, which they said would be more easily forced, as well as much nearer; and that, should she desire it, they would instantly go to work. Mademoiselle bade them lose no time; showered money among them, and in order to superintend the progress of their attempt, and to animate them by her presence, ascended a hillock whence she could command the gate, to effect which she was compelled to climb upon her hands and knees, defying alike flints and brambles; nor could the expostulations of those about her induce her to abandon her position.

'Careless as she was of her personal safety, the princess was, nevertheless, a sufficiently able diplomatist to forbid all her own people from assisting in the violence she had authorized; in order, as she confesses, that should the enterprise have proved unsuccessful, she might deny that it was undertaken by her order. One light horseman only, who was a native of the city, disregarded her injunction, and during the operation was slightly wounded by a stone. The princess had left the troops, who formed her escort, at the distance of a mile from the walls, that she might not alarm the citizens by a military force, and they were ordered to await and conduct her to Gergéau, in the event of her being unable to make good her entrance into Orleans.

'Ere long, however, MADEMOISELLE was informed that the work was getting on well; and upon this assurance she at once approached the scene of action, attended by an equerry and an exempt; but as the quay was invested, and that between the princess and the gate the river washed the walls, a bridge was formed by a couple of boats; and as the opposite bank was exeedingly steep, a ladder was placed in the second boat, by which MADEMOISELLE with some difficulty mounted to the assault; for it unfortunately chanced, that in addition to its somewhat unstable tenure on its floating foundation, one of the steps was broken. By these means she reached the quay, and had no sooner arrived there, than she ordered her guards to return to the carriages, that she might prove to the authorities of Orleans the confidence with which she entered their city, unaccompanied by a single armed man.

'Her appearance among them tended, as a natural consequence, to animate the boatmen to increased exertion, while a party of the citizens assisted them from within; and the guard, which was under arms, stood by in perfect neutrality, neither aiding nor preventing the aggression which threatened the destruction of their post.

'At length two of the centre planks of the gate were forced, and it was soon discovered that it could not be opened more effectually, being traversed by two weighty bars of iron; upon which the princess desired one of her attendants to take her in his arms, and to push her through the aperture, whence her head had no sooner emerged, than the drums beat, and the captain of the guard drew her into the city. In an instant she was on her feet, and extending her hand to him exclaimed with perfect composure, "You shall have reason to rejoice that it was you who effected my entrance." Cries of, "Long live the king and princess, and down with Mazarin!" resounded on all sides; and, as on many great occasions, the sublime and the ridiculous overpass the one pace by which they are said to be separated, so it proved upon this also; for while the princess was radiant with the triumph of her successful exploit, two men approached her with a wooden chair, upon which they almost compelled her to seat herself, and thus bore her exultingly towards the town-hall, where the municipal authorities had congregated to discuss their measures at so difficult a crisis, not having yet been able to decide whether the gates should be opened to the king or to herself; and as bold actions always involve the sympathies of the million, she was escorted by the whole of the populace; who pressed about her in order to obtain a look, or to kiss the folds of her dress.'—Vol. i. pp. 451—454.

For the remainder of Mademoiselle's warlike and political career we must refer the reader to Miss Pardoe's volumes, and conclude our notice of her with a letter from Madame de Sévigné to her cousin M. de Coulanges, announcing her intended marriage.

> 'I am about to inform you of the circumstance, the most astonishing, the most surprising, the most miraculous, the most triumphant, the most bewildering, the most unheard-of, the most singular, the most extraordinary, the most incredible, the most unforeseen, the most immense, the most minute, the most rare, the most common, the most conspicuous, the most secret until to-day, the most brilliant, and the most enviable; in short, a circumstance of which there has been but one example throughout past centuries, and even that one is not precisely similar: * * * * I cannot make up my mind to tell it,—guess it,—I will give you three guesses: *do you throw your tongue to the dogs?* Well then! here it is. M. de Lauzun is to marry on Sunday next, at the Louvre,—guess who? I will give you four, I will give you ten, I will give you a hundred guesses. Madame de Coulanges says: It is by no means difficult to guess: it is to Madame de la Vallière: not at all, Madam. It is, then, to Mademoiselle de Retz: not at all, you are a mere country gentlewoman. The truth is, we are very dull, say you; it is Mademoiselle Colbert. Still less. It is then, assuredly, Mademoiselle de Créque: you are wrong again. It must end by my telling you: he marries, on Sunday next, at the Louvre, by permission of the king, Mademoiselle, Mademoiselle de,—Mademoiselle,—guess the name: he marries Mademoiselle,—on my word, by my word, my solemn word!—MADEMOISELLE; the great Mademoiselle; Mademoiselle, the daughter of the late MONSIEUR; Mademoiselle the granddaughter of Henry IV.; Mademoiselle d'Eu, Mademoiselle de Dombes, Mademoiselle de Montpensier, Mademoiselle d'Orleans; Mademoiselle, cousin-german to the king; Mademoiselle, destined to the throne; Mademoiselle, the only match in France which was worthy of MONSIEUR. There is fine subject of gossipry. If you exclaim, if you are beside yourself, if you say that we have fibbed, that it is not true, that we are quizzing you, that it is a poor jest, and a tame fancy enough; if, in short, you abuse us, we shall consider that you are right; we should have done as much to you. Adieu; the letters which go by this post will show you if we tell the truth or not.'—Vol. ii. pp. 423, 424.

It is now time that we should speak more directly of the great monarch himself, the hero of Miss Pardoe's work. It has already been said that the period of his reign was an important one in stamping the character of the nations of modern Europe; and when, besides this source of interest in Louis XIV. and his times, we have our attention directed personally to him for the space of no less than seventy-two years, during which he was King of France, he becomes at once a *great monarch* to one's imagination, from the very weight of responsibility that was over him, independent of his personal character, or the use he made of his position either for good or ill.

We say that Louis XIV. reigned for seventy-two years, but for the first eighteen of them, till he was twenty-three years of age, he was a mere show king, under the iron grasp of Mazarin. During this time he was as helpless as were all others whom Mazarin ruled. Nor is this to be wondered at; though, nominally, the regency ended when the king was fourteen, it is not so easy to shake off the influence of such a man as was the Minister of France, when all the hopes and fears of childhood have been associated with him. Louis XIV. had grown up under the minister's penetrating eye, and had been purposely trained to *act* the part of, rather than to be, a king. Whether his character was really formed by this dependent position, or whether he inherited it naturally, we should say that Louis XIV. was a man singularly deficient of a truly independent spirit, and peculiarly susceptible of receiving impressions; exasperated, indeed, by his long and iniquitous subjection in youth, he revelled for the rest of his life in the absolute enjoyment of self-will, and in the gratification of every desire; but this is far from being the token of an independent mind, which always looks first to the government of itself. For a time, indeed, Louis XIV. presented the appearance of a powerful-minded king, whose arms were successful abroad, and whose court was magnificent at home, while he erred but in his extreme love of pleasure; but as his years advanced, and the vigour of youth departed, the weakness of his mind could not be concealed; a dark crafty influence wound round him, from whose trammels he could not escape, who degraded him before his subjects by a private marriage with one whom he could never make his queen; and who but added to his moral infirmities by placing before his eyes an external profession of religion that but ill disguised her own ambitious projects, which prompted him to the crying sin of his reign, and soothed a conscience that ought rather to have been awakened. Madame de Maintenon, with all her sobriety of conduct, and all her apparently good influence over Louis XIV., is not a character which after ages can look on with satisfaction. Yet surely the influence of such a woman over his late years was a fit retribution for his shameless abandonment of all moral obligations, and especially of all respect for conjugal ties, which was so conspicuous in the prosperous stage of his life. It is a remarkable feature of the court of Louis XIV., that its whole history is so closely connected with the *reigning favourites* of the king, as to create the idea that the country in which such things went on was under the lenient rule of Mahomet rather than the sterner morality of the Catholic Church. Yet, with all this, we hear of cardinals and bishops attending the king at his devotions. The king, on his return from mass, went, as a regular mode of passing the day, to Madame de Montespan's apartments. So accustomed, indeed, did the queen become to share but a small part of her husband's affections, that she formed quite a friendship at last with La Vallière. The peculiar relation, indeed, in which these members of the court stood towards the king, was not acknowledged till the advancement of their children to the highest titles of the land made all disguise ridiculous. But, even at an earlier stage of their influence, it was so far a matter of notoriety, that the ambassadors of some African king, after making handsome presents to Louis XIV. and Maria Theresa, asked, with the most unconscious simplicity, for the 'king's second wife,' that they might show their liberality to her also.

But what were the qualities which made Louis XIV. the remarkable king he was? We have already said that he was early taught to enact the king rather than to be one: and, most obedient to his teaching, he acted the character of a *great monarch* with consummate skill; but it was only acting. Nature singularly endowed him with the externals of a king, and his natural turn of mind was equally suited for the establishment of a kingly magnificence, that, within bounds, is a proper accompaniment of royalty. His temper, though not truly independent, was yet imperious, so that he could demand respect from those around him; while his love of military glory prompted him so to make use of the illustrious generals and well-trained armies which former wars placed at his disposal, as to gain the character almost of a mighty conqueror; but it must be noticed that the same success did not attend the arms of France in the latter part of his reign, which is the real test of his own military greatness.

Of his political or military proceedings, however, we have not to speak further than is immediately connected with his personal character. The chief kingly qualities which concern us, and which, indeed, are the secret of all his greatness, such as it was, are the dignity of entire self-possession, the instinctive love of pleasing, and the high-bred courtesy which ever distinguished him. In early life these are more conspicuous—of course, after years spent in the most selfish indulgence of every caprice, he could not but exhibit the coldness of his heart on some occasions where circumstances would have made it a difficult *part to play*, for him to have acted with true courtesy; or where unpleasant sensations must have been brought home to him, had he even pretended to a proper degree of feeling. But even here we may see it was against his better nature; and when it was a short *scene* only through which he had to go in order to behave as the courtesy of his heart prompted, he did it with a grace that never failed of its object. But if the trouble was too great, or most of all, if he was reminded of death, his greatest horror, he was cold-hearted enough. Thus we have some melancholy farewells to the memory of departed friends, and some melancholy scenes of cold-hearted forgetfulness of some whose lives, whose characters, and whose all were lost in his service.

But Louis XIV. would never say or do an unkind thing from choice; when his affections changed their object—when from La Vallière he turned his attention to Montespan; from Montespan to Fontanges; and from Fontanges to Madame de Maintenon; when also, for the first three of these, he left his devoted Maria Theresa to her own bitter sorrow, he was ever profuse in his gifts and favours to make up for his altered feelings. He distributed duchies, chateaux, titles, abbeys, anything to put them in good humour, but the sacrifice of his fancy was what he would never submit to; he would try to cure, but not to prevent, a broken heart.

The substance, then, of the character of Louis XIV. is, that he was the form of a great king, but not the reality; that he personated a great monarch, but that himself and all he did were utterly hollow. But we would not thus lay all the blame on his shoulders—he was, we have said, very liable to receive impressions, and, therefore, in him we but see the type of his age. On the subject of morality he was not a man to go beyond what the world would endure—he never defied the world, but he went only so far as he could carry the world's esteem along with him. The position of 'second wife to the king,' we find, did not prevent members of the royal household from enjoying general popularity. Many aspirants indeed Louis saw around him for that distinction. Even before Mazarin's death a mother of a family then at court requested the minister to give the king a favourable impression of her daughter, undertaking on her part that the young lady would not *aspire to the throne:* the mutual advantages between the minister and the mother were to be, on one side the betrayal of all the king's secrets, imparted in thoughtless moments to his charming companion, and on the other side, the advancement of the mother's other children. We need hardly say that even the cardinal declined the accommodating offer.

This universal hollowness of principle was nowhere more conspicuous than in the religion of Louis XIV. and his court. Miss Pardoe does not enlighten us much on this subject; but still it comes out that the king was regular in his devotions, and habitually received the sacrament. The mixture of formal religion with open profligacy which we find in his reign, is a phenomenon not exactly to be accounted for on the principle of any religious school of the present day. We extracted, while on the subject of Mademoiselle, an expression which she makes use of with regard to the death of Madame de Condé; she describes her latter end to have been *beautifully christian;* yet the nakedness with which the word christian is introduced, shows a peculiar meaning to lie in the expression, and the manner in which it is here used may, we think, give us some key to the comprehension of the religious notions then prevalent in the court of France. These refined courtiers admired Christianity for its beauty of sentiment, just as they admired any other relic of antiquity which struck them as possessing beauty. France took a prominent part in the revival of pagan tastes. Louis XIV. surrounded himself with all the heathen gods and goddesses that mythology described; every room had its appropriate divinity. So absorbing, indeed, does this taste for choosing gods to suit particular purposes seem to have become, that Christianity shared the same fate. Those influences of Christianity which were pleasant they received and made use of, while the rest, which were not agreeable, they dispensed with—just as in their dining-rooms they represented Bacchus, without performing all the orgies to that god which his genuine worshippers did in former times. Christianity, in fact, was set up as one among many divinities, the distinction being, that its influence applied rather to the soothing of the mind, and the quieting of superstitious alarms, than to the physical arts and sciences. Christianity they saw was beautiful, and, moreover, they had some feeling of conscience in them, so they put themselves under the influence of religion as they would surround themselves with a pleasant odour, or build about them gorgeous palaces, and enchanting gardens. Christianity assumed a classic form, and found herself mounted up in white marble on a pedestal, vis-à-vis to Apollo, and with Venus at her right-hand; a companionship about as suitable as that of 'Homer, Cæsar, and Nebuchadnezzar, all standing naked in the open air.'

But must not the Church itself be in a great measure responsible for the profanation of her sacraments, which is the result of such a state of religion as existed in the court of Louis XIV.? We have already spoken of the appointments to ecclesiastical offices; and with cardinals and archbishops such as we have seen, is it any wonder that the court should satisfy their consciences with but a vague semblance of true religion? Nothing, of course, that is here said has any allusion to the universal corruption of religion in France—on the contrary, we have many symptoms, even in the volumes before us, of the most sincere teaching of the Church's doctrines; but we now speak only of the king and the court of France.

We have been thus diffuse in our exposition of the character of Louis XIV., in order that we may now present to the reader a series of extracts from Miss Pardoe, without the interruption of many remarks by way of explanation or comment. We have given our own conclusions, derived from the whole account of the times, but will not at all commit ourselves to such extracts as shall tend to establish particular assertions or particular principles therein contained.

First we give his portrait at the age of twenty-three.

> 'He was in society the model of an accomplished gentleman. Of middling height, but admirably proportioned; he increased his stature by the adoption of high-heeled shoes, which raised him some inches. His hair was magnificent, and he wore it in masses upon his shoulders, after the fashion of earlier times; his nose was large and well formed; his mouth agreeable in its expression; his eyes of a deep blue; and his mode of utterance slow and strongly accentuated, lending to all he said a gravity incompatible with his years, but which produced an effect admirably in accordance with the impression that he studied to produce.'—Vol. ii. p. 297.

We now look at his queen Maria Theresa.

> '"The Infanta," says Madame de Motteville, who acompanied Mademoiselle to witness the marriage, "is short but well made; we admired the extreme fairness of her complexion; her blue eyes appear to us to be fine, and charmed us by their softness and brilliancy. We celebrated the beauty of her mouth, and of her somewhat full and roseate lips. The outline of her face is long, but being rounded at the chin, pleased us; her cheeks rather large but handsome, had their share of our praise; her hair, of a very light auburn, accorded admirably with her fine complexion. To speak the truth, with more height, and handsomer teeth, she would deserve to be estimated as one of the most beautiful persons in Europe. Her bust appeared to be well formed and tolerably full, but her dress was horrible."'—Vol. ii. p. 257.

Such was the queen who, loving her husband with all the ardour of her nation, was destined to pass much of her time in weeping in secret over his estranged affections: nor was it long before her troubles commenced; the loveliness of Mademoiselle de la Vallière soon attracted the king, and produced her own fall. Of all the favourites of Louis XIV., La Vallière alone excites any interest. We give her portrait, and her first introduction to the king, at a royal fête, which, on its own account, could not be passed over.

> 'At this period she had just attained her seventeenth year; and even while eclipsed in beauty by many of those about her, the charm of her unaffected modesty, the retiring timidity of her manner, the extreme purity of her complexion, her large and languishing blue eyes, and the profusion of flaxen hair which shaded her brow and bosom, gave a singular loveliness to her appearance, of which she alone was unconscious. Her figure, which was not yet formed, and a slight lameness, occasioned by a fall during her childhood, were the only defects which even her enemies could discern in her appearance; save, perhaps, a slight trace of small-pox, which

had in some degree impaired the smoothness of her skin; and meanwhile her peculiarly unobtrusive habits exempted her on all sides from either jealousy or suspicion.

'Among the festivities at Fontainbleau, a ballet took place, in which both the king and *Madame* bore an active part. Louis XIV. figured on the occasion as Ceres; and the *grand Monarque,* who resented the most trifling want of respect from those around him, made his appearance in a Greek tunic, and a coronet of golden wheat-ears; declaimed his own praises in the rhymes of Benseradi; and, finally, figured in this unregal costume before the eyes of the whole court. At the termination of the ballet, the company dispersed themselves about the park, where they found in every direction tables sumptuously provided, of which the honours were done by nymphs and forest deities, crowned with ivy; but all these magnificent arrangements were almost unheeded by Mademoiselle de la Vallière, who was absorbed by the image of the king-goddess, whom she had so lately seen exhibiting the graces of his person amid applauding crowds; and she at length felt the gaiety by which she was surrounded so oppressive, that she suggested to Mesdemoiselles de Chalais, de Tonnay-Charenti, and de Montalais, that they should walk in the forest, and repose themselves for a time in one of its dim recesses.

'To this proposal they willingly consented; and after strolling for a while, listening to the nightingales, and watching the stars which from time to time peeped through the foliage as it swayed beneath the voluptuous breeze of evening, they finally seated themselves under a large tree upon the border of the wood, and began to discuss anew the pleasures of the day, and the chief actors in the gay scene which had formed their principal feature. For a time Louise bore no share in the conversation; but she was at length startled from her silence by an appeal to her judgment, when she unguardedly declared that she could give no opinion upon the subject discussed, and was only surprised that any man should be remarked beside the king.

"This reply drew down upon her, as a natural consequence, the sarcasm of the whole party, who accused her of being so difficult that nothing save a crowned head would satisfy her vanity; when the poor girl, anxious to exculpate herself from a charge which she felt must overwhelm her with ridicule should it become the gossip of the court, hastily exclaimed that they did her injustice, for that his crown could add nothing to his natural advantages, but was, on the contrary, the safeguard of those about him, as without it he would indeed be doubly dangerous.

'She had no sooner made this unwise rejoinder, than she became aware of the extent of her imprudence; and while her three companions remained silent in astonishment, she sprang from the ground to escape, and discovered that two men were partially concealed behind the tree against which she had been leaning. A faint shriek instantly directed the attention of the whole party to the fact; and terrified beyond control, they simultaneously fled in the direction of the château, where they arrived panting and breathless.'—Vol. ii. pp. 317—319.

After some days spent in painful apprehension of being the subject of gossip and ridicule, she was at length compelled to take her place in the household where the king would be present.

'As she had anticipated, the king was already there; and engaged in conversation with the different ladies of the suite; carefully addressing a few words to each as he passed down the room. He was yet at some distance from the door near which she sat; and thus she saw him slowly approach, and began to comprehend that she should probably be spoken to in her turn; an honour which had never yet occurred to her, and which caused her heart to beat with mingled joy and apprehension. At length, as she had anticipated, he paused before her, and inquired what she had thought of the ballet of the previous Saturday, if, indeed, she still remembered it?

'With some difficulty she compelled herself to answer; but her agitation was increased by remarking that the king started as he heard her voice; and looked at her with a marked attention, which drew upon them the observation of all by whom they were immediately surrounded. After remaining a few seconds with his eyes steadily fixed upon her, Louis, with a profound bow to the blushing and bewildered girl, prepared to leave the room; but before he did so, he again turned more than once towards the spot where she was sitting.

'Thenceforward Mademoiselle de la Vallière found herself the marked object of the attention of the king; and fortunately for her composure, she continued unaware that His Majesty had been one of the eaves-droppers of the wood of Fontainbleau, induced to this somewhat treacherous indiscretion by the suggestion of M. de Beringhen; who seeing the four fair girls retire from the brilliant scene around them to hold a conference in the forest, had laughingly remarked, that they were about to confide to each other the secrets of their hearts; and that the opportunity was a favourable one for ascertaining the identity of their favourite cavaliers. The king had entered willingly into the jest; but as it was too dark to permit either himself or his companion to discover who were the fugitives, they were compelled to trust to their after-penetration to discover this important point; and then it was that Louis XIV. jealous above all things of being loved for his own sake, had the gratification of discovering that one heart at least acknowledged the power of his attractions, not as a monarch, but as a man. The sequel of the incident we have already shown; and when he recognised the voice of Mademoiselle de la Vallière, it was scarcely wonderful that he should examine with attention the person of whose attachment he had obtained such unequivocal testimony.'—Vol. ii. pp. 321, 322.

A daily correspondence was shortly commenced between Louis and La Vallière; each party, however, feeling unable to compose sentiments worthy of the occasion, applied to a confidential friend of more literary powers, to undertake the writing department. La Vallière at last being much complimented in one of the king's epistles for the beauty of her style, could no longer disguise the fact that her letters were not her own. The king was equally frank; and on comparing notes they found that M. de Dongeau was the friend to whom both had applied, and who much enjoyed the privilege of their double confidence.

The following extract allows us a passing glance at La Vallière, when her influence was still great; but she was not alone —and also it affords a curious specimen of political and moral intrigue combined. Our own monarch certainly did not set an example of virtue to his neighbours across the Channel.

'To ensure the neutrality of Spain, the Marquis de Villars was despatched to Madrid, with instructions to impress upon the Spanish cabinet the advantage which must accrue to themselves from the depression of the Low Countries, their natural enemies; while a princess of six-and-twenty was chosen by Louis XIV. as his plenipotentiary at the English court.

'His ambassadress was *Madame*, the sister of Charles II.; who, having consented to undertake the mission, was escorted to the coast by the monarch and his whole court, under the pretext of a journey to his recent conquests; and the pomp which was exhibited on this occasion exceeded all that had yet been witnessed, even during the reign of the pomp-loving Louis XIV. Thirty thousand men marched in the van and rear of the royal party; some of them destined to reinforce the garrison of the conquered country: others to work upon the fortifications; and others again to level the roads. The queen was attended by all the most beautiful women of the court. *Madame* shared her coach; and immediately behind them followed a second carriage, containing Madame de la Vallière and Madame de Montespan, who were even occasionally invited to take their places in the royal equipage: while among the ladies selected to accompany Madame to the English court, the most beautiful was Louise Rénée de Panankoët, known as Mademoiselle de Keroualle, who had also her secret instructions, which she had accepted with as much alacrity as her royal mistress.'—Vol. ii. pp. 443, 444.

The negociation was successful, and Charles II. became enchanted with Mademoiselle de Querouałle, who was subsequently the Duchess of Portsmouth.

We now, without any comment, for it tells its own tale, lay before the reader the after life of La Vallière.

'It was late in the evening when she drove under the sombre portal, and requested an interview with the abbess, who was well known to her; and to whom she exclaimed as she entered the apartment; "Madam, I have no longer a home in a palace, may I hope to find one in a cloister?"

'The abbess, to whom she told the whole tale of her bitter sorrow, received her like a Christian, and at once acceded to her request: and after they had for a time mingled their tears together, La Vallière was conducted to the cell in which she was to pass the night. But for her there was no rest; she could not pray, although she cast herself upon her knees beside the narrow pallet, and strove to rejoice that she had at length escaped from the trials of a world which had wearied of her, and of which she herself was weary. There was no peace, no joy in her rebel heart; she thought of the first days of her happiness: of her children who on the morrow would ask for her in vain; and then as memory swept over her throbbing brain, she remembered her former flight to Chaillot, and that it was the king himself who had led her back again into the world. Her brow burnt as the question forced itself upon her—would he do so a second time? Would he once more hasten, as he then had done, to rescue her from the living death to which she had consigned herself as an atonement for her past errors? But hour after hour went by, and all was silent. Hope died within her, and yet she could not pray; daylight streamed dimly into the narrow casement of her cell; and soon the measured step of the abbess fell upon her ear, as she advanced up the long gallery, striking upon the door of each cell as she approached; and uttering in a solemn voice, "Let us bless the Lord;" to which appeal each of the sisters replied in turn; "I give Him thanks."

* * * *

'In vain did the king represent to her the extreme austerity of the order which she had selected; and bid her make choice of any of the richest abbeys of France, declaring that she should become the abbess of whichever she might prefer: La Vallière declined to avail herself of this last mark of consideration, alleging that she who had not been able to govern herself, was ill-calculated to undertake the control of others; and this painful interview once over, she hastened to take leave of her children, her worst and greatest trial, and to send them away from her; for she feared to expose herself to their presence and caresses, lest her heart should fail her at the last moment. This done, all that remained to be accomplished was comparatively easy; for she regulated her worldly affairs like one in a dream without a tear or regret.

'On the day which preceded that of her retreat, she went at an early hour to the apartment of the queen, where, throwing herself upon her knees, she implored her pardon for all the sorrow she had caused her; when Maria Theresa, moved to tears, raised her up and embraced her, desiring that she would, like herself, forget the past errors for which she was about so nobly to atone.

'The fatal day at length dawned; and by a singular coincidence Louis XIV. was to depart immediately after the grand mass to join the army in Flanders, at the same moment that the forsaken favourite was to set out for the living grave, to which she had herself consigned her youth. Throughout the whole of the service she remained in deep and earnest prayer, and never once raised her eyes; but at its conclusion, as she advanced to the tribune to take leave of the king, her countenance was as pale as death; and she staggered, and must have fallen, had she not been supported by her mother.

'This weakness was, however, not contagious. The eye of Louis was dry, and his voice firm, as he bade her farewell, and expressed a hope that she would be happy in her cloister; after which he stood composedly to see her enter her carriage with a tottering step, and drive away. Not a sign of emotion escaped him; and the equipage had no sooner disappeared, than he entered into conversation with those about his person, as calmly as though he had never loved the unhappy woman whose life was to be thenceforward one of trial and privation.

'On arriving at the grate where the superior of the Carmelites was awaiting her at the head of her community, the repentant sinner cast herself upon her knees, declaring that she had hitherto made so ill an use of her will, that she came to resign it up into the hands of the abbess for ever; and entreated that, even during the year of her noviciate, she might be permitted to wear the dress of the order.

'Nothing could be more exemplary than her resignation: nothing more unaffected than her piety. The hard and narrow pallet, the vigorous fasting, and the hours of unbroken silence exacted by the order, awoke no murmur upon her lips. She complained only of the flat and unwieldy sandals by which her feet were wounded, and her thoughts occupied, when she would fain have detached them wholly from earth. The visits of the court were irksome to her; she longed to be more thoroughly severed from her memories of the past; and in the extent of her humility, had requested permission of the abbess to profess as a lay sister, which was, however, refused; her strength not being considered equal to the life of labour which such a vow would have entailed.

'All the trials of the sister Louisa of Mercy, however,—for such was the name of her adoption—were not destined to end at the dark portal which she was never again to cross.

'The death of her brother, the Marquis de la Vallière, was a heavy blow for which she was wholly unprepared; and seven years subsequently, that of her son the Count de Vermandois, grand-admiral of France, was announced to her by Bossuet. For a moment she stood motionless, as if turned suddenly to stone, with her hands tightly clasped together, and her pale face bent down upon her bosom; but in the next instant she rallied, and raising her large blue eyes to heaven, she said, in a resigned and humbled accent: "It would ill become me to weep over the death of a son, whose birth I have not yet ceased to mourn."

'For six-and-thirty dreary years did the hitherto delicate and pampered duchess exist amid the privations, hardships, and austerity of a convent, increasing whenever she was permitted to do so, every humiliation and every fatigue; until at length the death for which she sighed finally released her from all further suffering, in her sixty-sixth year, in the arms of the daughter whom she had so fondly loved; bequeathing to her affection a memory which had been purified by piety and prayer.

'Something so gentle and so touching is attached to the name of La Vallière, despite her error; and this second phase of her life awakens so deep and sincere an interest, that we have permitted ourselves to dwell on it at considerable length, feeling that we shall be pardoned for our prolixity.'—Vol. iii. pp. 14, 15.

We now, by way of contrast, bring on the stage a sterner specimen of womankind, Queen Christina of Sweden, daughter of Gustavus Adolphus. M. de Guise thus describes her:—

'I will, while I am myself cruelly uncomfortable, endeavour to amuse you by forwarding the portrait of the queen, whom I accompany. She is not tall, but her figure is plump, her arm beautiful, her hand white and well formed, although more like that of a man than a woman; one shoulder higher than the other, a defect which she, however, conceals so cleverly by the singularity of her dress, that you might venture a bet as to its existence. Her face is large without being faulty; all the features the same, and strongly marked; her nose aquiline; her mouth rather wide, but not disagreeable; her teeth tolerable; her eyes very fine and full of fire; her skin notwithstanding a few marks of small-pox, tolerably clear and fair; the outline of her face passable enough, but surmounted by a very fantastical head-dress—a species of man's wig, very large and extremely raised above the forehead, very thick at the sides, and terminating in thin points. The summit of her head is a mass of hair; and at the back it has somewhat the look of a woman's *coiffure*. Sometimes she wears a hat. Her boddice is laced across the back, as our doublets were wont to be; and her chemise is drawn through all round above her petticoat, which she ties very loosely, and not over straight. She is always very much powdered, with a quantity of pomatum; and never wears gloves; she is shod like a man, and has the voice and manners of one. She affects extremely to enact the amazon. She possesses at least as much pride and hauteur as her father, the great Gustavus, but is very courteous and kind; and speaks eight languages, and, above all, French, as though she had been born in Paris. She knows more than all our Academy and the Sorbonne put together; understands painting, as well as everything else, admirably; and is better acquainted with all the intrigues of our court than I am. In short, she is altogether an extraordinary person. I shall attend her to Compeigne by Paris, so you will be able to judge for yourself. I believe that I have omitted nothing in her portrait save that she sometimes wears a sword with a belt of buffalo-hide, that her wig is black, and that she has nothing over her neck save a scarf of the same colour.'—Vol. ii. pp. 143—145.

One more female oddity—the Princess Palatine Charlotte Elizabeth of Bavaria, who married *Monsieur* the king's brother.

'She had, according to Madame de Sévigné, coarse features, a heavy figure, robust health, and an indifference which almost amounted to aversion for dress, etiquette, and all such occupations as involved restraint. The portrait which she has drawn of herself in her memoirs is even less flattering. "I was born," she says, "in Heidelburg in 1652, and was a seven-months' child; I must necessarily be ugly, for I have no features, small eyes, a short, thick nose, and long flat lips; and such a combination as this cannot produce a physiognomy. I have heavy hanging cheeks, and a large face, and nevertheless I am short and thick; to sum up all, I am an ugly little object. If I had not a good heart, I should not be bearable anywhere. To ascertain if my eyes have any expression, it would be necessary to examine them with a microscope, for in any other manner it would be difficult to form a judgment. There could not probably be found on earth hands more hideous than mine; the king has often remarked it to me, and made me laugh heartily; for not being able, with any conscience, to flatter myself that I possessed anything good-looking, I have made up my mind to be the first to laugh at my own ugliness. I have found this plan very successful, and frequently discover plenty to laugh at."'—Vol. iii. pp. 24, 25.

Fouquet, who managed the finances of the kingdom under Louis XIV. followed Mazarin's example of also looking well after his own. His château and fête to the king are well described.

'Rocking himself in this delusion, he was unguarded enough to invite Louis and all his court to a fête at his château at Vaux, upon which he had expended the enormous sum of fifteen millions. No step could have been more weak, or ill advised; for the king was little likely to forget, as he looked upon the splendour of Vaux, (by which that of Fontainbleau and St. Germain was utterly eclipsed,) that its owner had derived all his wealth from the public coffers; and that it had been accumulating at a period when he was himself in need of the funds which had been here so profusely lavished.

'Every one who bore a distinguished name in France was bidden to this princely festival, which was destined to be commemorated by La Fontaine and Benserade; and where a prologue by Pélisson was to be spoken, and a comedy by Molière to be played. The king arrived at the château, accompanied by an escort of musqueteers, and was received at the gates by his imprudent host; who had no sooner welcomed him, than he entered the park, followed by the whole court, and found himself surrounded by a scene of enchantment, for which, despite all that he had heard of the gorgeous palace of his minister, he was still far from being prepared. A cloud passed over his brow; and the smile was very bitter with which he turned towards Fouquet and remarked, "I shall never again, Sir, venture to invite you to visit me: you would find yourself inconvenienced."

'The epigram was too pointed to fail in its effect, and for a moment Fouquet turned pale; but he soon rallied, and persisted in doing the honours of his sumptuous home to the mortified sovereign, with an ostentatious detail which left no one of its marvels unremarked.

'The first surprise was the sudden play of the fountains, a luxury at that period almost unknown in France, where a solitary attempt of this description had been made by Henry IV. at St. Germain. The astonished admiration of the spectators may therefore be imagined, when it is stated, that the superintendent had purchased and pulled down three villages, in order that the water by which they were supplied might be conducted, from a distance of five leagues in every direction, into vast reservoirs of marble manufactured in Italy.

'As twilight deepened, the waters suddenly ceased their play, and a splendid banquet supervened; after which the *Fâcheux* of Molière was represented; and succeeded by a splendid pyrotechnic display; while the ball, which terminated the amusements, was protracted until day-light. Before its commencement Louis made a tour of the château, accompanied by its owner; and was compelled to acknowledge that nothing, in all probability, existed throughout Europe which could compete with it in magnificence.'—Vol. ii. pp. 333—336.

Fouquet was soon after arrested, and passed the rest of his days in confinement.

The following is a curious instance of courtesy between hostile forces. Louis was besieging Lille, and Count de Brouai, the governor of the town, sent to ask him which quarter of the camp he occupied, in order that he might not fire upon it. His answer was, 'all quarters.' Again.

'Every day M. de Brouai, finding that there was no ice in the camp, sent a given quantity to the king; who on one occasion desired the gentleman by whom it was brought to request the governor, if he could conveniently do so, to increase the supply.

'"Sire," answered the Spaniard, bowing gravely; "he is chary of it, because he hopes that the siege will be of long duration; and he is apprehensive that your majesty may ultimately suffer from the deprivation." And he made a second profound bow.'—Vol. ii. p. 407.

In 1680, the king married Mademoiselle de Blois, legitimized daughter of La Vallière, to the Prince de Conti, nephew of the great Condé. The bridegroom's toilet on the occasion is amusing, as described by Madame de Sévigné.

'I as yet know nothing of what passed at the wedding; I am ignorant whether it were by sunlight or by moonlight that it took place, but I will tell you the greatest and the most extraordinary piece of news which you can learn; and that is, that the Prince was shaved yesterday, actually shaved; this is not an illusion, not a thing said at random, it is a truth; all the court were witness to it; and Madame de Langeron, seizing her opportunity when he had his paws across like a lion, made him put on a vest with diamond button-holes; while a valet-de-chambre, also presuming upon his patience, curled his hair, powdered him, and at length compelled him to be the handsomest man at court, with a head that threw all the wigs into the shade. That was the prodigy of the marriage. The costume of the Prince de Conti was inestimable; it was an embroidery in large diamonds, which defined all the pattern of a black velvet plush raised upon a ground of straw colour. The duke, the duchess, and Mademoiselle de Bourbon had each three dresses trimmed with different jewels for the three days. But I was forgetting the principal point: the sword of the Prince was encrusted with diamonds:

"La famosa spada
All' cui valore ogni vittoria è certa."

The lining of the mantle of the Prince de Conti was of black satin, studded with brilliants like minever. The princess was romantically beautiful, superbly dressed, and happy.'—Vol. iii. pp. 76, 77.

One frightful concomitant of an unnaturally luxurious and profligate age was not wanting in the time of Louis XIV. Secret poisonings, or indeed the prevalence of assassination in any shape, is a sure index of the balance of society being destroyed: it ever implies an internal rottenness in a state, even politically speaking, that in the end must lead to a crisis. The extent to which the art of secret poisoning was carried on in France during this reign is most awful: a special judgment would seem to have been sent to terrify men, who were so bent on the enjoyments of life, into a conviction of its uncertainty. To attribute the vice to the persons who first supply the means is a false idea—a supply is ever created by the demand: we will, however, describe one of these wretches:—

> 'La Voisin, a popular fortune-teller, who was consulted by all the high nobility of Paris, was the first to venture upon this diabolical trade; she saw at a glance how much her reputation must profit by so sure an opportunity of realizing her own predictions; and, ere long, she not only foretold to expectant heirs the speedy removal of their wealthy kindred, but she even undertook to ensure to them the exact period when they should enter upon their inheritance; and as her pledge was almost universally redeemed, she found the number of her clients increase so rapidly, that she was compelled to take into her confidence another fortune-teller, named La Vigoreaux, and two priests, Lesage and d'Avaux.
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> 'This fiendish association was no sooner formed than Paris was inundated with murder. No precaution sufficed for safety. Death lurked in every object of daily use—a glove, a perfume, a glass of water, or a missal, each in its turn did the work of the conspirators. Friends shrank from receiving the gifts of friends; fathers looked with suspicion upon the hospitality of their sons, and sons in their turn forebore to grasp the hands of their fathers; the young beauty shuddered at the cosmetics upon her toilette, and the grave matron at the relics upon her rosary; the soldier could not handle his weapon without suspicion; and magistrates bent with dread over their parchments.'—Vol. iii. pp. 54, 55.

To enumerate the dreadful cases which Miss Pardoe mentions of the murderers and murdered, would far exceed our present limits. Among both of these, however, figure the high born nobles of the court of France, nor was even royalty itself exempt. Investigations were made to put a stop to the evil, and many absurd accusations made, which were responded to in an equally absurd manner: the Duchess of Bouillon was summoned before the judge, and asked by M. de la Reynie, the lieutenant of police who presided, if she had ever seen the devil, whose apparition La Voisin was accused of calling up. To this query she answered calmly; 'No, sir; I had not previously seen him, but I do so at this moment; he is very ugly, and disguised as a councillor of state.'

La Voisin's death is in accordance with her life:—

> 'After having undergone the question, both ordinary and extraordinary, by which every bone in her body was broken, and all trace of her

humanity almost destroyed, she continued to utter oaths and blasphemies, at which even the soldiers by whom she was guarded were appalled; and as the flames reached her, poured forth her last breath in a hideous oath.'—Vol. iii. p. 63.

One of the most sad victims of poison at this time was the Queen of Spain, the daughter of the unfortunate Princess Henrietta. She had reluctantly married Charles II. of Spain, and her forebodings of ill turned out but too true. She gained, indeed, an affectionate husband, but her gentle disposition did not preserve her from enemies of her own sex. One day she was thirsty, and the Countess of Soissons went to fetch her some milk, which she strongly recommended, asking time to have it iced. The queen received it with a smile from this daughter of Mazarin, and in a few short hours was no more. An awful story is told subsequently of Charles her husband; a month before his own death, he persisted in being carried to the tomb of his long lost wife. We give it at length.

'The way wound down an almost imperceptible slope arched overhead, and along this highroad to the faded glories of the past, the monarch, who was so soon to lay down his own among them, passed slowly and feebly forward, with trembling knees and labouring breath, sinking beneath a vague sense of terror which numbed the slight remains of his already failing strength; but at length the pilgrimage was ended; and he stood among the shadows of spent centuries—among shivered sceptres and broken shields.

'A score of enamelled lamps, suspended above the long line of monuments surmounted by their kneeling or reclining effigies, cast a pale and sepulchral gleam over the sculptured marble; and a close and fetid odour—that savour of death which not even gums of Arabia or the spices of the East can wholly counteract, and which breathes into the nostrils of the living the atmosphere of mortality—appeared to float about the pendent lights, and to cling in vapoury clouds around the lofty tombs.

'Charles II., panting, pale, and awe struck, ultimately paused before a sarcophagus indicated by his confessor; who said in a hoarse whisper: "Sire; you desired to look once more upon Philip IV.; he lies before you."

'The dying king bent for an instant over the withered body of his father ere he gasped out: "May your rest be indeed as deep as it appears. Perchance I may have irritated your spirit by bequeathing inconsiderately the kingdom which I inherited from your hand. Speak, Philip! are you satisfied with me?"

'"Charles!" exclaimed the stern monk at his side; "beware of sacrilege. Ask no questions of the dead. Silence is the privilege of the tomb, which must speak only to the eyes, and to the soul. Its best lesson is that example of the nothingness of human vanity which you now see before you. Profit by it, and pray."

'"I humble myself before God;" replied the king submissively; and then, after having embraced the remains of his father, he murmured: "Now lead me to my mother."

'"She sleeps beneath this arch," said the confessor.

'Again Charles bent down to gaze upon a dead parent; but this time he started back appalled, and covering his eyes with his hands, gasped out: "Merciful Heavens! she yet scowls upon me! Her face still bears the impress of the anger with which she first heard me aver that I was about to transfer the sceptre of Spain to her own family, unhappily become her enemies. Mother, forgive me! I had indeed obeyed your will; but the Prince of Bavaria is now, like yourself, the tenant of a tomb. Farewell, mother! may your troubled spirit be appeased." And the unfortunate prince pressed his pale lips to the fleshless cheek of the skeleton, ere he turned towards the next tomb before which his confessor paused.

'It was that of the ill-fated Maria Louisa of Orleans, who had been cut off in her youth, her beauty, and her tenderness, by the hand of a secret assassin; and who now lay wasted and ghastly in her shroud. "And this, then;" said Charles, as he lifted from the livid brow a portion of its velvet covering; "this, then, is all that is left of the loveliness by which I was once thralled! Of the wife who was once my idol!" As he continued to gaze earnestly on the mouldering remains, a convulsive shudder passed over his frame; and raising himself suddenly, he asked in a hoarse whisper, "Who talked of poison?" "No one, decidedly, Sire;" eagerly answered the cardinal with a blanched lip. "In the name of heaven let me entreat your Majesty to leave this place, and return to the palace."

'"No, no;" said Charles, whose agitation visibly increased; "I heard the word distinctly; a fearful reproach was murmured from the coffin of my wife. Leave me to tell her how I loved her—how I mourned for her —let me embalm her cold remains with my tears; and yield up my own spirit by her side."

'"Forget not that, although a monarch, you are still a Christian;" said his confessor, in a cold hard accent, which formed a strange contrast with the impassioned anguish of the unhappy king; "profane not the dwelling of the dead with the thoughts and the words of sin;" and he grasped the arm of his penitent to lead him away.

'"Close the tomb of my mother!" exclaimed Charles, as he shook off the clasp, and raised himself to his full height; "I will look on her no more. Maria Louisa! victim of hate—of poison. Ah! close my mother's tomb!" And as he repeated these words in a faint scream, exhausted by sickness, fatigue, and emotion, he fell senseless over an empty sarcophagus which yawned cold and void beside him.

"It is his own," said the monk, unmoved by the melancholy spectacle; while the cardinal, raising the insensible monarch in his arms, desired the attendants to bear him carefully from the vault; and a few moments subsequently the melancholy procession retrod the gloomy passage even more silently than it had been previously traversed; and conveyed Charles to the chamber which he was never again to leave with life. In another month he lay in the narrow tomb which had before received him for an instant in mimic death.'—Vol. iii. pp. 322—325.

It is time, however, that we should return to Louis XIV.

The *grand Monarque* desired to leave a monument behind him which should cause his magnificence to be known in all ages. So as the people after the flood built Babel: as the Pharaohs built the pyramids; or as a hundred other great places have been built to commemorate a powerful nation or a successful conqueror, so Louis XIV. built Versailles. Great buildings are the type in which the history of the world is written. There have been few eventful periods in history which have not left behind them some trace of their spirit or tendency of mind in solid letters of brick or stone. Religion, both true and false, has been foremost in this work. Solomon built the temple, and the ages of faith built the cathedrals of Europe. The Druids left Stonehenge, and the ancient Hindoos their Elephanta. Classic art built the temples of Greece; and human science, in its various stages of development, has built the aqueducts of Rome and the railways of the nineteenth century.

Individual pride has followed the same inclination; in fact, it is part of the very nature of the world. Birds and beasts do the same; nay nature herself rejoices in her everlasting hills and her rugged rocks. In obedience to this love of monumental architecture, the French of the seventeenth century, as represented by Louis XIV., built all the chief edifices of Paris. These are emblems of the spirit whence they arose: courtly magnificence, supported by the very vitals of the nation, are represented by the Tuileries, the Louvre, the Palais Royal, and most of all by Versailles. It would be curious to compare the respective *genii loci* of the two palaces of Windsor and Versailles. Windsor, mounted on a proud eminence, seems to overshadow the country which it rules with a kind but confident protection. Half-baronial, half-ecclesiastical in its style, it upholds divinely-sanctioned power, as both the guide and the ornament of the rich plains which lay at its feet. Versailles, on the contrary, seems to aim at isolation from the country of which it is the chief palace. From no points that we are aware of can Versailles be seen at any distance; at any rate, such is obviously not its object. Nature, in every form, is excluded to the utmost that is possible. The ground on which it stands is, as far as the eye can reach, deprived of its natural undulation, and modelled into a paradise of the human mind. No mighty Thames runs past its foundations, but luxurious fountains play round pagan gods; no gentle slopes or winding paths meet the eye, but all is straight, formal, and glaringly magnificent. Enormous terraces, and forests of luxuriant verdure, deprived of all natural form by the stern knife, with white marble statues and marble lakes, are the striking objects of the gardens of Versailles. Versailles, in short, is all for itself and for human vanity—and therefore is not the palace of a race of kings that would really love, and be loved by, its people. We do not, in saying this, attribute the pride of overbearing tyranny to Louis XIV. This was not at all his character. Selfish vanity prompted him to be cruel and oppressive, when he could not otherwise gratify his desires; but there was a degree of sincerity in his courteous manner, for he had a real consciousness of the equality of the human race. Whether he acted on this or not, we may judge from the following speech to his brother that he felt it. The Duke of Orleans had requested of the king some court privilege; the king refused on the ground of the necessity of maintaining the dignity of the throne, and then said, 'Before God you and I are two beings precisely similar to our fellow-men; but before men we appear as something extraordinary, superior, greater, and more perfect; and the day on which people cast off this respect, and this voluntary veneration, by which alone monarchy is upheld, they will see in us only their equals, suffering from the same evils, and subject to the same weaknesses, as themselves; and this once accomplished, all illusion will be over.'

We shall now, by the help of extracts, give some idea of the progress of the building, and also of the scenes which were afterwards enacted at Versailles. Louis XIV. was deeply mortified by the magnificence of his minister, Fouquet, at Vaux, and determined to build a palace unapproachable in splendour by any subject, and which he meant not only for the age, but for futurity. He thought of Versailles, which already was a palace built by Louis XIII., though not on a large scale, and tried the experiment of a seven days' fête there, to test the convenience of the situation for his future project. These fêtes are worthy of notice.

> 'We have alluded in this rapid sketch to the magnificent fêtes given in the gardens of Versailles in 1664; but they were so remarkable as to merit more special mention, alike from their magnificence, their singularity, and their intellectual attractions, which added a new grace to the profuse splendour that was their main characteristic. Versailles had even then become a delightful residence, although it as yet betrayed no vestige of its after-greatness.
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> 'Early in the spring, the king, followed by a court composed of six hundred individuals, the whole of whose personal expenses were defrayed, as well as those of their respective attendants, took up his abode at Versailles; and the marvellous rapidity with which his artificers erected the stages, amphitheatres, and porticoes, all elaborately ornamented, which were required in succession to give effect to the various entertainments, was not one of the least prodigies of the festival. The fêtes commenced by a *carrousel*, in which all those who were to compete, appeared in review order on the previous day, preceded by heralds-at-arms, pages, and equerries, who bore their shields and devices; on the former of which were written in letters of gold, verses written for the occasion by Périgni and Benserade.
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> 'The king represented Roger; and all the crown jewels sparkled upon his dress and on the housings of his charger. The queen, attended by three hundred ladies, seated under triumphal arches, were the spectators of the procession. The cavalcade was followed by a gilded car, eighteen feet in height, fifteen in width, and twenty-four in length, representing the chariot of the sun. The four ages of gold, silver, steel, and iron, the signs of the zodiac, the seasons, and the hours, followed immediately behind it; while the lists were carried by shepherds, and adjusted amid flourishes of trumpets, contrasted at intervals by the music of bagpipes and violins.
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> 'When the tilting terminated, and twilight threatened to cause a cessation of the festivities, four thousand immense torches suddenly illuminated the space destined to the banquet; and the tables were served by two hundred attendants, habited as dryads, wood deities, and fauns; in the midst of

> whom Pan and Diana approached the august circle, on the summit of a moving mountain, whence they descended only to superintend the arrangement of a repast which combined all the luxuries attainable by art or expense. Behind the tables, which formed a vast crescent, an orchestra was suddenly erected as if by magic, and peopled with musicians; the arcades surrounding the banqueting hall and theatre were lighted by five hundred girandoles of green and silver; and a gilt balustrade enclosed the whole of the immense area.
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> 'The fêtes lasted seven days; and the prizes prepared for the victors in the lists were most magnificent.'—Vol. ii. pp. 360—362.

Satisfied that the site of Versailles was eligible, he commenced the stupendous work in 1664, which was to immortalize his name as regards futurity; and as regarded the age in which he lived, was to swallow up the enormous sum of one hundred and sixty-five millions, a hundred and thirty-one thousand, four hundred and ninety-four livres.

Nor was money alone spent to produce Versailles. In 1685 the king was anxious to receive a Genoese envoy in his new palace; we give the history of this event.

> 'The palace of Versailles was at that period, although still unfinished, sufficiently magnificent to impress the minds of the Genoese representatives with a high idea of the splendour of the monarch to whom they were about to tender their submission; and already surpassed the fading glories of Fontainebleau and St. Germain. Every obstacle had been overcome, but at a fearful sacrifice of human life. For the space of three months cartloads of dead labourers had been borne away from amid the waste of hewn stone, destroyed by the impurity of the atmosphere, and exhausted with toil. Now, however, the regal pile bore no evidence of the blood by which its walls had been cemented; no vestige of the suffering through which it had grown into majesty and beauty. Amid stately trees, transplanted at enormous cost from the forests of Fontainebleau, Marly, and St. Germain, already rose on the soft turf of spacious lawns, and amid groups of flowering shrubs, the marble creations of Coysevoix, Girandon, Desjardins, and Puget. On the ceilings already began to breathe beneath the pencils of Le Brun and Mignard, a mythological world, in which Louis XIV. and the members of his family were represented in the garb, and with the attributes of the heathen deities; but as if even this luxury of splendour did not suffice for the occasion, additional objects of taste and show were lavished on every side; and the throne prepared for the monarch excited the astonishment even of his own court.
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> 'Louis XIV. had caused this throne to be erected at the termination of the great gallery, near the Hall of Peace; and beside him stood the Dauphin, the Duke de Chartres, the Duke de Bourbon-Condé, the Duke du Maine, and the Count de Toulouse. On either side of the gallery an amphitheatre had been raised, and covered with crimson velvet, for the accommodation of the ladies of the court; while the nobles, arranged in two lines at their feet, formed a double avenue through which the doge and his attendants passed to the foot of the throne. When the king entered and took his seat, the blaze of the jewels with which he was covered dazzled the eyes of the spectators; and as the doge approached, he placed his hat upon his head, and commanded him to resume the cap of embroidered crimson velvet which he had withdrawn; but the senators remained bare headed, while the princes of the blood stood covered like the monarch.

'The act of submission, which had been dictated by Seignelay, was then read by the doge, after he had been, as a mark of indulgence on the part of Louis, accommodated with a folding-stool opposite to his own seat. The voice in which it was delivered was firm and haughty, although occasionally as it proceeded, the velvet cap was raised for an instant, and then replaced. At its conclusion, however, the doge withdrew it altogether, and by a simultaneous impulse of courtesy all the princes followed his example.

'The king listened throughout with grave politeness; and at the termination of the ceremony treated both the doge and the senators with dignified politeness and magnificent liberality. All the rising wonders of Versailles were exhibited to them; a ball was given in their honour; they were received by the dauphin and the princesses; and on their departure, the king presented to his new ally a magnificent box adorned with his portrait, and a suite of tapestry from the Gobelines.

'As the Genoese envoys were about to leave the palace, the Marquis de Seignelay, anxious to flatter the self-love of the monarch, inquired of the stately Lescaro, who despite the difficulties of his mission, had never, even for a moment, forgotten his dignity, what, amid all the wonders of Versailles, had caused him the most surprise? " the fact of my finding myself there"—was the calm reply.'—Vol. iii. pp. 131—134.

We now look to the daily routine of the king in this palace of Versailles; but as we cannot extract the whole of the interesting chapter which contains this, we will see how the king got up in the morning and went to bed at night. The same etiquette is observed through the rest of the day.

'At eight o'clock in the morning, while one of the officers of the oven renewed the wood in the chamber of the king, the under valets softly opened the shutters, carried away the collation, the mortar and the taper which had been burning throughout the night, and removed the watch-bed. The first valet de chambre, who had meanwhile dressed himself in an ante-room, then entered, and remained silently beside the royal couch, until the hands of the time-piece pointed to the half-hour; when he awoke the monarch, and immediately passed into the waiting-room to announce that he no longer slept. An attendant thereupon opened the two battants of the door, when the dauphin and his sons, *Monsieur* and the Duke de Chartres, who awaited this signal, entered to inquire how the king had passed the night. They were followed, after the interval of a moment by the Duke du Maine, the Count de Toulouse, the first lord of the bed-chamber, and the grand-master of the robes; and these were succeeded by the first valet of the wardrobe, followed by several officers bearing the royal vestments. Fagon the first physician, and Telier the head surgeon, had also the privilege of the *entrée* by virtue of their office.

'Bontems then poured into the hands of the king a few drops of spirits of wine, holding beneath them a plate of enamelled silver, and the first-lord of the bed-chamber presented the holy water, with which the monarch made the sign of the cross upon his brow and breast. This done, the dauphin and the Duke du Maine approached the bed to inquire how his Majesty had slept, and the king, as he replied, asked in his turn of the latter after the health of Madame de Maintenon. Then still in his bed, he recited the short office of the Holy Ghost; which was no sooner terminated, than M. de St. Quentin displayed a collection of wigs, from which Louis XIV. selected that which he intended to wear. When he at length rose, the first lord of the bed-chamber put on his dressing gown, which was always composed of some rich material, Quentin presented the wig, which

Louis adjusted with his own hands; and Bontems drew on his stockings, and placed near him his slippers of embroidered velvet. The king had no sooner thrust his feet into these, than he again crossed himself with the holy water, emerged from behind the balustrade which enclosed the bed, and seated himself in another large arm-chair, which was placed beside the fire-place; when he demanded the *first entrée.*

'The principal lord of the bed-chamber immediately repeated in a loud voice, "*the first entrée,*" and an attendant stationed near the door then admitted those who were privileged to assist at the *petit-lever.*

'The king only shaved every second day; on which occasions, while an attendant prepared the water, and held the bason, Quentin removed the royal beard, and afterwards washed the parts upon which he had operated with a soft sponge saturated with spirits of wine and water. The king wiped his face himself, while Bontems held the looking-glass.

'At the moment in which the master of the robes approached to dress him, the king demanded his chamber, or *grande entrée;* upon which three of his principal attendants took up their position at the entrance of the apartment, attended by several valets de chambre and door-keepers of the cabinet; admission to the *grande levée* being a signal favour for which even princes occasionally sighed for a considerable time in vain; while the greatest precaution was observed to prevent the intrusion of any unprivileged person. Thus as each individual presented himself, his name was whispered to the first lord of the bed-chamber, who repeated it to the king. When the monarch made no reply, the visitor was admitted, and the duke walked back to his station near the fire-place, whence he marshalled the new comers to their several places, in order to prevent their pressing too closely about his majesty. Princes and governors, marshals and peers, were alike subjected to this tedious and somewhat humiliating ceremony, from which three individuals alone were exempted; and these three were, Racine, Boileau, and Mansarel; who, on their arrival at the guarded door, simply scratched against the panel, when the huissier threw back the battants and they stood in the presence of the monarch.

'Meanwhile the king was occupied in dressing himself. A valet of the wardrobe delivered to a gentleman of the chamber the socks and garters, which he, in his turn, presented to the monarch, who drew on the former himself; a second then handed the *haut-de-chausses,* to which his silk stockings were attached; and a third put on his shoes, and clasped their diamond buckles. Two pages, habited in crimson velvet, overlaid with gold and silver lace, then removed the slippers, while the king adjusted his garters, which were also buckled with diamonds.

'The royal breakfast succeeded. Two officers of the buttery entered, one carrying a loaf on an enamelled salver, and the other a folded napkin, between two plates of the like description; while, at the same time, the royal cup-bearer presented to the first lord a vase of gold-enamel, into which he poured a small quantity of wine and water, which was tasted by a second cup-bearer; the vase was then raised, and offered to the king upon a gold saucer; and he had no sooner drank, than the dauphin giving his hat and gloves to the first lord in waiting, took the napkin, and presented it to the monarch to wipe his lips.

'When he had finished his frugal repast, Louis XIV. threw off his dressing-gown; and while one of the higher attendants withdrew his night-shirt by the left sleeve, Bontems held the other. The latter then received from the hands of the monarch the reliquary which he wore about his neck, and transferred it to one of his subordinates, who carried it to the king's closet, where he remained to guard it. The royal shirt, which had meanwhile been warmed, was then given to the first lord; and the dauphin, once more disembarrassing himself of his hat and gloves, approached and presented it to the king. A marquis then assisted in the arrangement of the *haute-de-chausses*, and a duke adjusted the inner waistcoat.

" Two valets of the wardrobe next brought forward the royal sword, the vest and the blue ribbon, when some man of high rank buckled on the sword, assisted in putting on the vest, and flung over it a scarf with a ribbon, to which were attached the cross of the Holy Ghost in diamonds, and the cross of St. Louis tied with red. The king then drew on his under coat, with the assistance of the grand master of the robes; adjusted his cravat of rich lace, which was folded round his neck by a favourite courtier; and finally entered into the pockets of the loose outer coat, which was presented to him for that purpose, the contents of those which he had worn on the previous day. He then received two handkerchiefs of costly point from another attendant, by whom they were carried on an enamelled saucer of an oval shape, called *salve;* and his toilette once completed, Louis XIV. returned to the *ruelle* of his bed, where he knelt down upon two cushions, already prepared for him, and said his prayers; all the bishops and cardinals entering within the balustrade in his suite, and reciting their devotional exercises in a suppressed voice.

' At the conclusion of his prayer the king received such of the foreign ambassadors as required an audience.

* * * * *

' During his progress to the chapel every one addressed him who desired the privilege: it being merely necessary to intimate such a wish to the captain of the guard, and even this formality was dispensed with where the individuals were persons of high rank. On his return from the mass, the king entered the council chamber; and at one o'clock he dined.

* * * * *

' This done, the dauphin approached with the night-shirt, which had previously been warmed by a valet of the wardrobe; and the first valet-de-chambre having lifted the candlestick from the table, the king indicated the nobleman who was to have the honour of lighting him to bed; which was no sooner decided than the door-keeper exclaimed:

' " Now, gentlemen, pass out."

' The whole of the assistants then left the room save the candle-bearer and the physician; when the king decided upon the dress which he would wear on the following day, got into bed, and made a sign to the physician that he might approach, and ascertain the state of his health. The monarch was then finally left alone with Bontems, who closed his curtains, extinguished the tapers in the candlesticks, arranged the night lights, and took possession of the watch-bed!'—Vol. iii. pp. 173—186.

The extent to which we have already extracted, from the fund of amusing and instructive matter contained in the volumes before us, will prevent our dwelling on the character of Madame de Maintenon as we had intended. Her childish history is most romantic, and, after many adverse turns of fortune, she married the poet Scarron. In youth she was a Calvinist, in after years she was under the control of the Jesuits. Knowing thus much, the following passage throws much light on her character, if considered in all its direct and implied meaning. She was at this time gouvernante to Madame de Montespan's children, of whom the Count de Vexin was one. This prince, at the early age of about one year, was appointed, by the king his father, abbot of the rich Benedictine community of St. Germain des Pres. The Benedictines were naturally rather disgusted at their new ecclesiastical superior; but their indignation was answered by the king with the precedents of married princes and soldiers who had enjoyed the dignity.

> 'The community, silenced but not convinced, were fain to accept their new superior: and the pious heart of Madame Scarron leaped for joy as, a few days subsequently, she presented the princely abbot, in full monastic costume, to his admiring parents; caused the crozier, the mitre, and the cross, to be painted on the panels of his coach, and obtained the appointment of vicar-general for one of her own devout friends.
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> 'A short time subsequently, Madame de Montespan succeeded in removing from the mind of the king the prejudice which he had imbibed against the gouvernante; and this was no sooner accomplished, than he inquired of the lady if she could, without regret, lay aside the name of Scarron, so ill-suited to her grace and beauty: when upon her assurance that her feelings towards her late husband had never exceeded those of esteem and gratitude, he presented to her the sum of one hundred thousand crowns, with which to purchase the princely estate of Maintenon, with its dependent marquisate; and, this done, he publicly addressed her as Madame de Maintenon.
>
> '"I can scarcely describe Madame Scarron," says La Vallière, usually so gentle and so indulgent; and whose evidence is consequently the more valuable, as it may be supposed to be least prejudiced: the word prude would be applicable to her, but that is a mere shade. She is at once a bigot and a *bel esprit.* She is naturally very formal and straight-laced; but nevertheless she has been seen enacting the very humble servant of Madame de Montespan, her reader, and her submissive friend. She is of a piety which appears all of a-piece, alike stiff and inflexible; yet, notwithstanding, this piety has bent beneath the will of the king, and has found its joints. Madame Scarron is an admirable woman, for whom a specific term should be invented....... When she first appeared at court, her robe of serge, her plain linen, and her black lace, exhaled such an odour of pedantry, that her very appearance gave the king the vapours. Suppleness and patience are, however, admirable qualities, which operate wonderful conversions! She now has her horses, her hôtel, and a suite of servants; she is no longer the governess of the children of Madame de Montespan, but of those of the king, which her confessor declares to be quite a different thing. This is what she has been clever enough to accomplish."'—Vol. iii. pp. 11, 12.

A sarcastic remark of a brother of Madame de Maintenon is amusing, as showing the light in which he looked on his sister's piety. He had been annoying herself and the king by his extravagance and dissipation, and his sister undertook to persuade him to a better course of life: 'In reply, the count assured her 'that his reformation was impossible; but that, as regarded the 'affectation of amendment, he was quite ready to undertake it, 'if she would point out the method.'

A period of history, such as we have been considering, must naturally have results in some degree proportioned to its own importance. We have attributed to the reign of Louis XIV. the establishment of an unreal and unnatural constitution of society, both morally and politically; and what was the end of this? Without going into details of history, we may yet make the general assertion, that Louis XIV. began a system which ended in the French Revolution. The balance once disturbed, then capsized; inward rottenness had then so far eaten through the substance, that the shell itself broke in with a crash. Aristocratic luxury, and that neglect of duties belonging to station, which must follow from reckless extravagance at court, cannot go beyond a certain point, especially in a country like France, where there is no great difference of blood between the higher and lower classes.

Amid all this evil, however, let it not be supposed that there is no good. The French character has many virtues which it would be well if England copied, though never may she acquire them at the same price they have cost her neighbour.

ART. VII.—*The Ministry of the Body. By the* Rev. ROBERT WILSON EVANS, B.D., *Vicar of Haversham, Westmoreland, and late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Author of the 'Rectory of Valehead,' 'Bishopric of Souls,' &c. &c.* London: Rivingtons.

IT is no disparagement of this book to call it a book of one idea. It is, rather, the best praise we could give it. The author intended it to have only one idea; and he has succeeded. He saw a prevailing fault in the religion of the day, its abstract character, want of definiteness, contempt for the visible as connected with the spiritual; in a word,—if we may momentarily allow the false sense in which the word is used,—its "spiritualizing" tendencies. The popular christianity throws aside as secondary, the acts, forms, and externals, of religion, and professes to address itself straight to the spiritual principle itself in man; he is considered to become religious not by doing any thing religious, not by those ways in which a being comprised of body and soul, would ensure his possession of any ordinary gift or quality of mind; but by simply having and being ready to assert his possession of this abstract internal religious quality. With respect both to religious action, and the external observances of religion, one line of sentiment is conspicuous; that which separates the visible from the invisible, and will not regard them in union. Mr. Evans has fixed on this prevailing line of thought as his subject; and he has followed it through all its various ramifications. So that we have in this book one idea copiously enlarged on, and pursued in every direction. If we were to make a criticism, we should say that Mr. Evans occasionally wanted accuracy and definiteness in drawing his pictures of the different states of mind and lines of sentiment he comes across; and that he sometimes begins clearly and pointedly, and shades off into a kind of mistiness afterwards. When a thought has been pursued beyond a certain point, the reader sometimes doubts whether he has been understanding the author right; and he is obliged to give a guess, and be content with feeling that he knows the author's main idea, and his view and line of thought as a whole. But with all this occasional vagueness, a great deal of valuable and catholic thought comes out very clearly and strongly; and with a freshness, and often an originality of form, which shows that the writer's thoughts are thoroughly his own.

Mr. Evans then in this book brings out and expands the plain and obvious, but great truth, that man has body as well as soul, and that if he follows his own nature he must acknowledge a 'ministry of the body.' He insists on the plain fact, that there is a connexion between body and mind; that the mind expresses itself through the body; that if a man has certain feelings, he is forced by those very feelings themselves into a certain attitudes and motions of the body. The thorough naturalness of forms is thus shown; and the ceremonial of external worship is proved to follow from the very principles of our constitution as human beings. There is a kindred philosophy with respect to religious acts. Persons think that it is carnal and corporeal to think of definite acts; that it is a sign of a higher and more spiritual mind to think of general principles and motives only, and converse with the abstract. He shows that this is a mischievous mistake. It is the same with respect to direct theology. Persons imagine that it is unspiritual to dwell on Christ's Body, and some object to entertain definite images in the mind at all, in contemplating God. Mr. Evans reminds them that this is just what Christianity teaches us to do. He thus shows, on the whole, that what is by many considered to be specially spirituality, is, in fact, a cold and negative kind of religion, which falls by its pride, and aiming at results without media, ends in having no results at all; and turns out a blank and a vacancy.

We will quote from the introduction first. The sense is a truly deep one, though we must premise that the constant prefixing of descriptions of scenery to such discussions has not always the best effect. Mr. Evans's view of nature is undoubtedly a religious one; still the picture of the *antiqui gloria ruris*, of village haunts, running brooks, and moorland cottages and woodbine, stands occasionally, in his pages, in rather too close juxtaposition with the Articles of the Creed, and the theology of the fathers.

> 'To be in the body, what a mystery! To exercise its senses, what a blessing! To rule its appetites, what a charge! Such are the thoughts which naturally come into my mind, when I lift up my eyes from my book or my writing to the view which lies before me. To the left is the tower of the parish church, peering in the valley below out of a cluster of wood mixed with the white houses of a small, scattered hamlet. It has a background of hills, which present great variety of hanging wood, grey crag, and turfy slope. On pursuing them with your eye to the right, they run into the estuary of the Kent in three promontories, which jut one beyond another in most harmonious succession, and are responded to from the opposite side by the projection of the waving line of the Cartmell Fells. These gradually decline until they dart into the water with the sharpness of needles, and the most distant with so prolonged a line as to seem to nearly reach this hither shore, and lock up the estuary into a lake. The glittering outlet discloses the sheet of Morecamb Bay, with ships seen in

black spots against the horizon. In front is the line of craggy ledges which surmounts the tower-like cliffs and fragmentary slopes of Whitbarrow Scar. The rocks are white as snow with lichen. After rain they shine forth with the lustre of silver, contrasted with the several shades of green, which are displayed within the same glance of the eye, from the dark yew-tree which juts out here and there from the clefts, to the rim of bright turf which runs round their base, and seems to enchase them in emerald. Beneath this huge mass of precipice gleams the broad elbow of water which denotes the junction of the Kent with the Pool. To the right, the opposite ridge, seen across a well-cultivated valley, exhibits a varied scene of wood, pasture, and hamlet, and forms a rich foreground to the dark-blue mass of mountains which soars above it. These embosom the lakes; and often on a summer's morning there is seen floating amidst them the white, fleecy mist which ascends from the bosom of Windermere, the token of the day. Bowfell and the Langdale Pikes form the boldest, though not highest summits of the range.

'Few scenes present such picturesque variety. Its solitude may make its daily contemplator egotistical and talkative; but its beauty will awake him to self-reflection, and set his train of thought in motion from the furthest recesses of his heart. Various, indeed, are the notions which it suggests, the affections which it inspires. If the notion be one of God's glory in this world, it soon arrives at his glory in the world to come, and the outward form is compelled to tell the secret of the inward spirit: if the affection be the love of life, that may last for a long possession of such a blessing in the body, yet such enjoyable feeling is soon refined into a less gross perception, and becomes the harbinger to the contemplation of the immeasurable riches of God's bountiful goodness and mercy, who, in the eternal and unseen things of the life to come, has provided delights compared with which this can be but the experience of poverty. Those things will be unalterable forms of everlasting glory: these continually shift their hues from bright to dark, and for half our lives refuse altogether to minister to our senses. Beggarly, therefore, indeed, in comparison, is such enjoyment. Yet may it not be made, and should it not, therefore, continually be made, an element of the perfection to come, a lively earnest in flesh and blood of fulfilment in the spiritual body?

'Our future state will still be a bodily one, and, therefore, it surely seems not unreasonable to suppose that our purest bodily enjoyment may contain the seed of that future enjoyment, even as the present body contains the seed of the future body. The day, indeed, will come in which all this splendid host and beautiful array of nature's objects shall vanish away; but shall we weep, therefore, as did that fond Persian king over the magnificent spectacle of his mortal armies? On the contrary, as life suggested to him death, so the mute insensibility of these preaches of life to our hearts. There it is not dumb and unmeaning, whatever it may be to eye or ear: it there whispers, 'Body thou art, and body thou wilt be; and, therefore bodily things, however highly refined towards spiritual, will always be among the objects of thy contemplation.' Are you sufficiently aware of this? Are not you, and almost all men, unduly prejudiced in favour of an independent spiritual existence? You might not express yourselves to this purport in direct terms, though, by the way, your language strongly savours of it. Yet do you consciously and regularly carry the notion of the body into that world which you are contemplating in spirit? Do you not rather imagine that the first thing to be done in such a contemplation, is to divest yourself as much as possible of all bodily consciousness, and remove from you, as far as you can, all corporeal reference? And are you not thus fixing your attention merely on the intermediate, and not fixed state of your nature?'—Pp. 1—5.

We will continue the quotation, and remark, in doing so, our satisfaction and pleasure in observing that Christian humility and honesty which makes so popular an author as Mr. Evans, not ashamed to own defects in former publications.

'I for one must plead partly guilty to this charge. On looking back to past thoughts, and recurring to former expressions, I cannot but detect the inaccuracy which arises from such insufficient consideration. And conversation and books assure me that I am but one of a multitude, that it is difficult to find one by whom the body is duly kept in sight. And yet to it, after all our ambitious aspirations, we must come at last. However we may flutter, and flatter ourselves with flying, we are but like the bird going the length of the chain that is fastened to the top of the pole on which he is perched. Accordingly, the relative position assigned to it in the complex frame of our human nature must ever be an essential, if not conspicuous, principle in every system of professed Christian belief. All erroneous systems have concurred in undervaluing its rank. This the Gnostic learned to do from the speculations of Greek and Oriental philosophy. And is not our stage of society much the same? is not the popular mind similarly affected towards undue spiritualism? and are we not all apt to acquiesce in the language and notions of our times on all those points which have not drawn to them our particular attention? Not, indeed, that any have come, or seem likely to come, to that pass, that they should neglect its rights, after the fashion of those old heretics, who systematically and spitefully macerated it, as the corrupter of the soul, or, on the contrary, abused it to all uncleanness, as a vile thing to be vilely used.'—Pp. 5, 6.

'Is it possible for a mind, which habitually expresses itself in this partial manner, to maintain, to anything like their proper fulness and palpability, those four grand doctrines of our creed, the visibility of the Church, Christ's intercession in his human body in heaven, the resurrection of the body, and the future judgment? Can it experience, as it should, their living operation on the heart, their abiding presence among the thoughts which carry a man through his daily conversation? And must not their peculiar subordinates, the rites and discipline of the Church, fall into much neglect? Is it even possible that the body should be maintained with the rigorous watchfulness which its position demands? If it be considered as nothing more than the servile exponent of the soul in the world of matter, if it be not regarded as that part of ourselves, which, as far as we can form any distinct apprehension, defines our human nature, if it be not treated as the intimate associate of the soul, which all the power of our abstraction cannot separate in practice or practical thought, whatever it may do in language, and which, however disjoined for a time, shall be reunited to all eternity, can it receive from us that vigilant care which a vessel of sanctification demands? The language of Scripture distinctly declares that it should be in itself sanctified. But our prevalent mode of expression rather considers it but as the vessel which contains the sanctified soul. Can we then entertain that instinctive abhorrence of sinful dealing which is so necessary to circumspection of walk? Surely we are considering ourselves as mediately rather than immediately affected by sin; we are thinking our garments defiled, and not ourselves; and we are partially, however unwittingly, recurring to the old antagonistic system, and looking upon the sins of the sanctified as the inevitable outbreaks of the rebel and corrupt body against the constraint of the purified soul, rather than as the lamentable consequences of an unwatchful acquiescence of the spirit with the law of the flesh. And thus in the court of conscience our offences seem remote, and more venial, than if they were directly charged upon that combiner of the action of body and soul, which, with reference to the body, we call heart, with reference to the soul, mind. The views, therefore, of all social duties are lower and more indistinct than high and strict profession demands, both in civil and religious matters. For through the soul only how are we bound to communion with fellow-men? Hence there is imminent danger of falling into a state which, however we may disguise it under specious terms, is one of mere selfishness; and disastrously indeed must it work against all the ties of the society of the State, and all the bonds of the unity of the Church.'—Pp. 7—9.

One way in which Mr. Evans combats this 'spiritualizing' system, is by denying it to begin with the right to its name. He says very properly, your professed spiritualist is a real materialist. That is his more proper title. 'The only test 'allowed by the spiritualist of these days is the evidence of the 'senses. Whatever in speculation cannot ultimately be tested 'by their notice, and in practice immediately referred to them, 'is rejected. This seems at first sight a contradiction in terms. 'Yet when a man has refined all without him that can come 'under a general term into an inanity of abstraction, what reality 'remains for him but that which comes from the exercise of the 'senses?'—P. 352. This is most true. There is nothing more simply common sense than the apparent paradox, that those who do not raise and give importance to the bodily, do not thoroughly believe in the spiritual. It is through the bodily that our faith in the spiritual is tried. The bodily, the visible, is the boundary line which brings us into immediate juxtaposition with the spiritual, the invisible. It is in combination with the bodily that the spiritual takes hold of our mind, and comes, as it were, into actual contact with us. The combination is what tests. There is a school of minds who say, Let the spiritual stand by itself, the visible by itself: do not unite the two: it is lowering to the spiritual to do so. But the fact is, they do not realize the spiritual at all, in a genuine way, when they thus entirely separate it from the bodily. It is vacancy and nonentity rather than spirituality to them: it is so removed from their whole nature by this severance from the bodily, which is a real part of that nature, that that nature does not apprehend it, does not fairly entertain and take in the idea of it. It is like a mockery offered to one of the senses. Can you touch with your eye? can you see with your hand? can you hear with your tongue? The discordant object is infinitely removed from the sense to which it does not belong. In the same way the invisible is infinitely removed from us, if we persist in demanding an immediate avenue to it through pure mind and intelligence. It is not caught and apprehended by us simply as the invisible. It is through a medium that we realize it, so far as we can realize it. The outward religious rite brings it near us. We then feel ourselves on the confines of a world with which we are not conversant. A barrier is before us, and beyond that lies the *terra incognita,* which contains all our hopes and joys and fears. It is at this line of juxtaposition, where the visible acts as the sign of the invisible, and seems just to separate us, like a veil and curtain, from it, that awe is most raised, and faith, if we have faith, is most tender and quick. Here we are tried, and our hearts are proved whether they are believing or not; whether they really go beyond this outward veil of the flesh, or stop short at it. It is the combination, and not the separation of the two which thus tries us: and the person who says that he has so intense an idea of the spiritual in his mind, that he cannot thus bring it into combination with the external and bodily, believes in the word spiritual rather than in the thing, and rejects the very touchstone of his faith. There is nothing hard, or trying, in believing in a vague abstract spiritual, removed from all outward media, and all that which makes us realize it. Minds will entertain any religious ideas you please, if you only will not oblige them to realize them, if you will let them hold them as words; it is the realizing which is the point; and the line of realizing, in the case of the spiritual, is the line at which it combines and unites with the visible.

To take the common instance of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. Persons will say that they believe in baptism, and believe in regeneration; but will not believe that they go together. But it is evidently no great trial of a man's faith to hold these two truths in separation. Baptism, separated from its spiritual results, is no subject of faith; it is simply a material visible fact; a man sees it administered with his eyes, just as he sees other things done with his eyes. Again, regeneration, disconnected with all outward rite, by means of which it is conferred, is apt to be but a vague truth of the mental or metaphysical world; hardly appealing to our faith any more than our faculties of feeling or imagination do. You were enrolled at your baptism, our congregations are sometimes studiously told, among the members of the *visible* Church; but you were not admitted into the *invisible* Church by it: that latter is quite another thing. By thus separating the two, we say, the mind dexterously eludes the touchstone of its faith. It believes in two things, neither of which is by itself a trial to faith, but of which the combination is the trial, as two things separately, and not in combination. Instead of grasping both, it slips through an opening between the two, and touches neither. 'Divide and destroy,' is a maxim which does much fatal work in religion, as it does in politics. We here specially want the two together. The visible is our medium to the invisible; faith requires the sensible to bring it out and make it real; it is in the quick transit from the seen to the unseen, that it especially declares itself faith. In assisting at the sacramental rite, it regards the latter as the veil which just separates it from the spiritual world; and therefore feels that world near and close to it: and in that feeling enjoys its own peculiar essential character and life.

Thus much on the general principle, which Mr. Evans's book draws out and illustrates. He combats the general habit of separating faith from rite and symbol; the bodily from the spiritual. 'The serious mind,' he says, 'is much tempted now to 'take a too abstract view of faith. A love of the abstract is one 'of the distinctive features of the present public mind.'

And now to follow the general principle of the book through some of the applications. We will first take a doctrine, a very awful and fundamental one, in its treatment of which this particular characteristic of our popular religion is too apparent. The doctrine we mean is that of our Lord's perfect human nature, and bodily presence in heaven.

> 'Every one, who in earnestness of heart has put his means to account, that he may obtain to the full the access to the Divine presence in Jesus Christ, must confess, that amongst the most difficult things for our conception to grasp, amongst the most remote things which it is our business to bring near, and put on the commonplace daily list of the real and practical things of our faith, is the bodily existence of Christ in heaven, and the bodily office of his intercession there. We are required to go to the utmost height and depth of the reach of our bodily existence, and to stir up its consciousness to the most intense flame of life along the whole line of extent; to carry out its sympathies to the remotest objects; to call upon our imagination, and yet immediately to remove its image with a reverent fear of degrading so awful a scene. Of course, the doctrine of the spiritualist in no case more remarkably manifests its defectiveness: it has no application whatever to a practical difficulty which it has never contemplated. For assuredly, however this bodily existence of Christ may not be denied, it neither is, nor can be, according to his system, a fixed object of contemplation. How seldom, if ever, is the bare mention of it found in the works of not only popular but even modern theology? All seem to conspire to slur over, or rather not contemplate, the difficulty. It is indeed much more easy to abstract body from spirit, and so lightened to mount aloft to the height of our aspirations, than to maintain the due combination of body and spirit, and so laden to ascend together with Christ on high to regions where we assign the abode of as pure spirit as we can conceive, and there to place Christ in his human nature in the immediate presence of the everlasting Father of spirits.'—Pp. 386, 387.

There is but too much truth in this passage; and perhaps the defect pointed at extends, in the case of many minds, to something even more than a neglect of this particular doctrine. There is a general prejudice in a considerable class of minds, and one which a certain philosophy among us much encourages, against forming any internal imagery whatever in connexion with God and divine things. The extreme form of this sentiment is that which was adopted by Blanco White. 'Idolatry 'does not exist,' he said, 'in worshipping material figures, but 'in reducing the Deity to an object of the *imagination;*' *i. e.* in having any positive imagery in the mind connected with Him, in imagining Him in a place, heaven, upon a throne, with angels around Him, and other circumstances of majesty, which the Bible draws. Blanco White prayed, 'sitting before 'an open window in view of the heavens.' 'The mere act of 'directing my mind to Him, in the presence of his glorious 'works, filled me with an inexpressible, though a tranquil and 'rational delight. I said to myself, "What a glorious gift 'conscious existence is!"' This was his philosophical worship. All human ideas, whether of simple locality, or grandeur and majesty, were to be abstracted from the internal image of the Deity in the mind, and as naked and abstract an essence was to be contemplated as the human intellect could conceive. A highly unreasonable struggle against nature this, upon the most ordinary principles of common sense. For can there be anything more unphilosophical, even allowing the philosophical standard here, than for a person deliberately to throw aside one-half of his nature in worshipping God. If man has a body, and if, through the avenues of sense which that body contains, a certain imagery has naturally entered into his mind, by which he expresses to himself internally greatness, majesty sublimity; power, what can there be unphilosophical in using such imagery; unless, indeed, he is a Manichæan, and thinks the body and all connected with it, as such, evil? Such imagery is part of his mind: he cannot help himself: he may as well give up his mind at once, and try to contemplate God without his mind. He must annihilate himself on this principle, and become absolutely and positively nothing, a *non-ens,* in order to be a true and pure worshipper of the Supreme Being. So long as he and his mind are what they are, let him do what he will, and let him think in what mode he likes, and let him rarefy and purify to whatever extent he can his internal atmosphere, and let him reduce his conceptions to the extremest pureness, tenuity, and elementality possible,—however far he goes, he will find when he stops that he still has an image of material origin before him, and nothing more. Let him think of the Deity in the most abstract way possible, and confine himself to the most simple essences which philosophical analysis can arrive at, he has still imagery before him. Our ideas are images; and we cannot escape imagery, but by expelling ideas *in toto,* and doing without them. Our *idea* of spirit, for example, is an image, and an image of material origin; we picture it as a kind of breath or exhalation of some form and outline, according to what the subject before us may be. Our *idea* of essence, again, is something of the same sort. We do not imagine essence as a nothing, but as a something; and that something, however elemental we may try to make our idea of it, will be an image, and an image drawn from material existence. So let philosophical religion reject as scrupulously as it may all human imagery, and worship simply an ubiquitous, all-pervading essence, and spirit of the universe; that idea of an all-pervading essence and universal spirit is an image of as absolutely material a birth, as the most human and most local imagery which catholic devotion puts before us. And the intellect which professes to reject human imagery, in its conceptions of the Divine Power and Majesty, after all only exchanges one set of images for another; only substitutes the physical conception for the ethical, and uses the world of science for its purpose, instead of that of poetry.

But to return to the practical neglect of the doctrine of our Lord's bodily presence in heaven, which a prevailing line of thought among us encourages, Mr. Evans proceeds to comment on it, and follow it up to its consequences.

> 'It were even better to abide by the particulars of materiality with which the unpractised mind must at first engross such a conception, than not to entertain it at all: for it is not the Son of God, as such, that is the Mediator on our part between the Father and us; He stands on the Father's part only: but it is the Son of man, uniting the manhood with his godhead. In the moment that we lose sight of this union, we have lost sight of the proper objects of our hearts as seeking his intercession. May it not even be said that we are partaking somewhat of the error of the Docetæ, who denied a substantial body to Christ, except that we confine our negative to his heavenly state? So necessary is such an effort not only to this particular practical occasion, but even to the maintenance of the accuracy of our whole faith. If we once lose sight of the human nature of our Mediator, though that be at the very height of heaven, we have in that moment dissociated it from the divine; we have endured the separation, and are therefore prepared to be led further, as others have been led, who have degenerated from the high Calvinistic spiritualism into the low Socinian tenets. So perilous is the neglect with which this doctrine is treated. Though essentially practical, it nowhere appears among the practical tenets of the popular school, and seems only to escape being put into its favourite class of non-essentials by not coming into any consideration whatsoever.
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> 'But are we to realize this view? how shall we ascend into heaven with our Lord, and pursue that body which the clouds have received out of our sight, into action of which we can form no conception, into a region of which we form our notion only by abstracting as much as possible from time and place?
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> 'The way according to which we are to follow our Mediator through the various stages of his office is, of course, in exact adaptation to the limited nature of our body, which some are pleased to call its infirmity. We cannot therefore make Him real to us in heaven, until we have made Him real to us upon earth, by decking Him in the real habits of the critical circumstances of his terrestrial ministry, such as his baptism, his temptation, transfiguration, last supper, crucifixion, resurrection, and appearance especially to Thomas,

> and ascension into heaven. All these our liturgy, with its usual depth of meaning, and justness of its application to our condition, calls up vividly to our mind in that solemn appeal which is made to Him in the opening of the Litany, in the words, 'By the mystery of Thy holy Incarnation,' &c. In this dress He abode with us, in this He left our sight. In this therefore we must still view Him through the force of that association which it must be our grand endeavour to form in our minds; and this will be formed by a regular habit of carefully perusing the Gospels. There our Saviour is personally exhibited to us; thither therefore let us bring our hearts continually close to the hearing of his words and seeing of his works. Let us put ourselves among the crowd which surrounded Him, and endeavour to feel the impression of their immediate bearing. Let us thence transfer ourselves into our real position, and there also endeavour to understand and feel their mediate bearing, as it concerns us who have to look up to Him in faith seated upon the throne of his glory in heaven. Thus we shall bring our minds into an abiding sense of his humanity. Such reference from earth to heaven under the adoration of thankful prayer, becoming habitual, will enable us to rise into heavenly places and see Him there.'—Pp. 387—390.

Nor is our author unconscious of the charge which will be brought against such a line of thought as this:

> 'The doctrine thus unfolded into all its bodily particularity is, of course, most offensive to the pure rationalist. He will denounce it as downright materialism. O that our spiritualists would take warning from his course, and seriously observe to what a goal he has come from the starting-place which they seem so well inclined to take up. We find him, in Germany, gone on to the denial not only of Christ's divinity, but of his personal existence in Jesus; and not only of the personal existence of Christ, but of the personal existence of God Himself. If the starting-place be assumed in England, what is to hinder the running of the same course to the very same end? And will they not beware of that tendency to Socinianism which must be produced and fostered by not steadily pursuing Christ's human nature into heaven?'—P. 397.

The same spirit which puts aside our Lord's bodily presence in heaven, consistently puts aside also the day of judgment, and forgets it. The day of judgment is too definite a fact for minds of this school to look forward to: it suggests a too local, too corporeal scene to engage their attention; and it is thrown into the background as inconsistent with their main idea of Christianity, as a spiritual religion.

> 'What a prominent place, indeed, does Scripture assign to the resurrection to judgment! How directly, how urgently, is it asserted and pressed upon the attention in formal and distinct propositions, as well as left to continual inference from allusion and implication! It stands like some enormous and magnificent gateway, as of an old Egyptian temple, which so absorbs the attention as to swallow up from sight every intermediate object, and presents a glorious promise of the exceeding splendour of the sacred mansion which stands behind it. The view of our human nature in its intermediate state sinks into such insignificance before it, as to be left to inference from parables and expressions by the way, so that we need not trouble ourselves with curious inquiries about it, but regard it as the same thing to our immaterial part as the grave is to our material, in

which it lies for a short time to rise again for eternity. Even the continuous immortality of the soul is not, in the face of such a view, thought to require direct assertion, but is left to inference, or faint and apparently casual expression, subservient to the grand enunciation of the resurrection. How different is all this from the strain of our popular theology!

'Deeply, indeed, is the reality of the resurrection impressed on the heart which is free to receive in all its distinctness the language of the tremendous prophecies which announce it to us in a loudness and clearness of strain, anticipatory of the blast of the last trump which shall awake the dead. With what striking minuteness of detail are the transactions of the day described! The sudden manifestation of the Son of man in his glory, —the appearance of the quick and dead before his judgment-seat,—the examination there with question and answer recorded,—the sentence of blessing and cursing,—these are all so announced to us that this day should come home to our innermost hearts. Surely we cannot think seriously as Christians, and steadily contemplate our state as members of God's Church, without this scene rising up before us in all its awful magnificence. It is the irrevocable end uniting all the manifold consequences of that which we are doing or seeing done; and the more practical we become in making our body a pure and useful instrument of God's service to his glory, so much more lively is the presumption of the body which on that day shall stand in the presence of the Lord. It is the last general assembly of God's visible Church, containing both the wheat and the tares; and the more sensible we become of our membership in Christ by executing its social duties, so much the more continual and deep in our minds will be the thoughts of the answer which we shall be enabled to give to its Head on that day. It is to the saved the first day of a new stewardship; and the more lively the faithfulness of our present stewardship, so much the more joyful is the anticipation of its wages which will then be paid.

'Scripture rings to us from beginning to end with loud notes of call to preparation, and consoles or terrifies us according as our state agrees or disagrees with it. We are bidden to turn our faces continually towards this scene as the final release from trial, when the Lord Jesus Christ shall openly receive those that have been preserved blameless in spirit, soul, and body to his coming; as the rest from trouble, when the Lord shall be revealed with his mighty angels; as the day of retribution for good or evil, when all shall stand before the judgment-seat of Christ, and receive the things done in the body. Thither we must look, however rich we may be in gifts, however assured in hope, with an earnest and expectant eye; for all is incomplete before that day. But then the good work begun by God in his saints shall have its completion; then the forgiveness of sins, which is now felt in the earnest of humble, though assured hope, shall be pronounced directly from the mouth of the Judge. Then the sons of God, now having the knowledge of their high rank to themselves, and unacknowledged by the rest of mankind, who cannot see the heart, shall be openly manifested before the Church of men and angels, and the redeemed body shall with the signal of a glorious appearance proclaim the adoption into the family of God. Meanwhile, however earnest in looking forth, we must wait in patience, stablishing our hearts. Until that day we must defer all judgment; until that day all is held but in earnest, and is but conditional as to the fulfilment. Our reconciliation to God, in order to our presentation in holiness and blamelessness before Him on that day, depends upon the perseverance of our faith. Salvation is yet to come. We are to strive to make our calling and election sure. Not but that the earnest through the Holy Spirit is amply sufficient to assure the doubtfulness of the condition in all that are sincere, being the stamp of the seal which shall be recognised on that day. Forgiveness has been accorded, though not finally ratified; salvation has been conveyed, though not executed; glory has begun working, though not perfected.

'How little practical will all this appear under the naked tenet of the immortality of the soul! All melts into a mass of generality, and we can readily account for the utter insensibility, strange though it was, which was shown to the force of such terms and propositions as the above in the last century. Is there the remotest reference to Christ incarnate, crucified, buried, risen again, gone into heaven, thence to come again, in such a tenet? Is there not, on the contrary, involved in it a strong prejudice against such bodily realities? But the doctrine of the resurrection of the body in incorruption sets Christ's resurrection immediately before us, and that refers us backward and forward to his pre-existence and to his everlasting kingdom, to his incarnation and to his bodily reappearance, to his sufferings and to his glory; and we are taken by it out of a state of morality into one of spirituality, from heathenish speculation into Christian hope. It awakes us at once to the necessary preparation of ourselves in this present body, and stimulates us with a lively consciousness of our bodily condition.'—Pp. 405—410.

We pass over a page or two, and the passage proceeds:—

'And now does it not seem utterly unaccountable to right reason and sound understanding in scriptural knowledge, that a prospect so distinct, and in its very nature so permanent, should become so dim, so fleeting, so as to be on the verge of vanishing, to any eye that professes to gaze upon heavenly things? Are we not justified in supposing some important fundamental error, some organic defect in the system? Yet such is the case in our popular theology. In that the putting off of the present body, and not the putting on of the future, is considered as the admission into heaven. Of course, therefore, it involves no cogent reason to pursue the deeds of the body beyond the present state: it accepts the language of Scripture to lament over its frailty, to acknowledge its vileness and corruption. But the indistinctness of its views beyond is much in the way of the energy which should overcome evil with good, and favours a weak indolence which acquiesces with frailty as an irremediable and pardonable evil, and has recourse merely to a feeling of the soul where it should have the testimony of the acting body. It thus dilutes even the weaker half of our great practical stimulus. The joyful anticipation of the incorrupt and glorified body, which sends forth such a rousing call to watchful and diligent action, has no fixed place among its living and practical principles. Incapable from its narrow views of comprehending a whole, its ambitiousness of knowledge being obliged to be content with the notion of a general view under a partial glance, it has no contemplation of the whole man. Old man and new man mean to it but death and life in the soul. They do not, moreover, refer the man to the old and new body, or to the man of the earth earthy, and to the Lord from heaven heavenly. They do not carry him down to the grave to see the utter end of the old man there in the dissolution of the body of corruption, and thence raise him up to see the corporeal beginning and perfection of the new man in incorruption in the body fashioned after the glorious body of Christ, the firstborn from the dead; thus, in the most lively manner, giving substance to the spiritual burial and resurrection with Christ, bringing it home to the body, the affections of which, as to its mortification and sanctification, are so deeply concerned in the most spiritual part of it. From all this range of practical contemplation he is excluded, by excluding so much from his view one important portion of the whole man, that part, too, which is naturally so obtrusive on

> his attention as even, abstract how far soever he will, to supply him with all his notions of life and death, defilement and cleanness, and, bearing the outward stamp of all God's ordinances, to call him to a lively inward sense of their benefit. How can we wonder that in such a mind the judgment to come should have no definite time, the resurrection of the body no reality?'—Pp. 414—416.

Mr. Evans connects, as we might expect, with the defective belief in the presence of Christ's body in heaven, and of the resurrection of our own bodies, the defective belief in the visibility of Christ's body upon earth—the Church. He finds that the school of minds he is talking of, only believe in a spiritual Church. He asks them one or two questions on this point:—

> 'How can we, made up as human beings of body and spirit, be in communion with one another in one only of these component parts, and that one such, that, had we its information only without the instruction of the other, we could not have had the slightest knowledge of the existence of any other soul or spirit than our own in the world? And when, too, the society into which we have been called is one body with one spirit, what right have we to dispense with one of those conditions? Do we even so much as commune with pure spirit quite irrespectively of bodily action? When we approach the Father of spirits, do we always feel ourselves drawn nearer in proportion to our unconsciousness of bodily acts? . . . . When we can discern spirit without going through bodily signs, when we can converse on spiritual things in terms unborrowed from bodily things, it will be time to talk about spiritual unity without bodily unity. When there can be any possible meaning in the assumption of a spiritual invisible association between those whose bodies are not only visibly unassociated, but professedly dissociated, then it will be time to argue with the upholders of the sufficiency of merely spiritual unity.'—Pp. 253—255.

Thus the whole omission of the body in its creed, our author justly concludes to be a most serious sign about our popular religion. He finds in every department of doctrine the body forgotten, the soul only acknowledged: he finds Christ's bodily presence in heaven, the resurrection of the human body, and, connected with these two, the visibility of the Christian body—the Church, all set aside and unattended to. Here is then one great and striking feature about our popular religion; and he begs persons seriously to consider whether it does not tally in some degree with the known mark in St. John's Epistle.

> 'So contrary to the proper notions which we should entertain upon the bodily abode of our Lord in heaven, upon the bodily state of ourselves in the world to come, upon our bodily condition in this world, is the tenet of the Church being merely a spiritual society: so injuriously does it work in its course. And equally injurious is the end; for to say nothing of the anarchy which is its necessary result, it must also lead, if not in the same man, yet in a succession of men, to a heresy which is surely very little contemplated by its advocates; for if the great head of the Church still abide in that human body through which He came in the flesh, and be waiting to be rejoined by all his people in human bodies, must not the rejection of all but spiritual unity resolve all this substance into a phantom? Is it not so doing already practically? Is it therefore extravagant to predict a revival,

under some more specious or rather accommodating shape, of the Gnostic heresy of denying that Christ is come in the flesh, as well as of maintaining that the dead are not raised? And thus the very system which some are setting up as antagonistic to Popery, especially in their view of this latter as the Antichrist, terminates in exactly verifying in itself the very and only definition given to the term Antichrist by St. John.'—Pp. 260, 261.

There is another subject of a somewhat kindred character to those just mentioned, upon which Mr. Evans brings the principle of his book to bear. He does not think the existence of the Angelic order to be practically believed in and recognized by this popular theology. Scripture is so clear on the subject, that nobody of ordinary seriousness can profess unbelief upon it; but minds of this school do not imbibe Scripture teaching on this head; they are evidently out of harmony with it; the whole subject is a dead one to them. To such the following passage is addressed—

'If in the Church of God upon earth we find ourselves bound into one with persons whom we have never seen, of some only heard, and of the greater number not so much as heard at all, is it possible to keep our upward look to God and heavenly things, and not to inquire whether we have not partners in worship, filling the infinite space, which stretches above us with regions habitable by infinite numbers of ranks of superior beings? Accordingly God has satisfied this natural yearning of our heavenly affections, and deduction of our illuminated understanding, as far as reason, though not curiosity, can expect. His word informs us not only of the existence of such beings, but of a close relation of them to us; telling us of ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation. The establishment of both covenants is full of examples of their operation. The law was given and carried on by the disposition of angels. The gospel, when preached by our Lord and his apostles, was served by their diligent attendance; and, when it shall have its final accomplishment on the last day, shall again require their visible agency. Offices are likewise assigned to them which are peculiar to no particular time; such as guarding the good, smiting the bad, and carrying departed saints into Abraham's bosom.

'That the sense of the fellowship of these upper servants in the household of God is not to be overlooked, is plain from those representations of the majesty of the presence of God, which describe him as surrounded by the company of angels, and of the glorious appearance of his only-begotten Son, who shall be attended by their innumerable shining ranks when He comes to judgment; and from that solemn protestation of St. Paul, which presumes on their presence in the court of God in heaven, to say nothing of the passages which make them joint-witnesses with men of what is going on amongst us on earth. Can a mind imbued with the spirit of Scripture forego all contemplation of such beings? Can it do otherwise than seek to conform its feelings and notions to that which is so manifestly presented to it? A very few examples will be sufficient to show the practical substance of this spirit.

'Surely our notions of the majesty, might, and love of God are exceedingly exalted, when we contemplate Him, not in solitary grandeur, (for so even the disciples of Epicurus might contemplate Him,) but surrounded with worshipping crowds of beings whom He has placed so much nearer to Him in regions of unspotted holiness and everlasting life: and our song of thanksgiving and praise has no slight accession of joyful theme from the consideration that their golden ranks shall be re-enforced from the bands of saintly men upon earth, and that among them lies a place for ourselves, if we shall have been found faithful to our earthly ministry. Oh what a warm glow pervades all our social feelings, when we put ourselves in this spirit in the city of the living God, the New Jerusalem; and joining ourselves there to the innumerable company of angels, realize to our hearts the sense of that commandment of glorifying the Son, given in the words, "Let all the angels of God worship him!" What good courage swells our heart when we are assured, not only in the abstract, of God's help, but also practically, in a manner most agreeable to our nature, by being certified that He has appointed these his heavenly servants for ministry to the needs of the heirs of salvation! Verily it is not good to accustom our minds to view God exclusively in his loneliness, any more than to contemplate ourselves in our individuality; and why should men who so freely speak of departed saints standing before his throne, be so unwilling to speak of the angels which are there also?'—Pp. 346—348.

We wish we had space for introducing here some passages from Bishop Bull's sermons 'On the Existence of Angels, and their Nature.' The subject is not one on which a person who only thought of Bishop Bull as a controversialist, and acute and learned critic, would expect beforehand to see his feeling so elicited. Yet there is intense feeling and deep poetry in his thoughts about the angelic order: —and not the less, for the stern sobriety and gravity with which that poetical feeling is expressed. We perceive in his tone that high and sage-like simplicity which only an undoubting faith can attain to: he thinks of the angels not as though it were a subject for him to be imaginative upon; they are as certain and real beings to his faith as the inhabitants of this lower world are to his eyes: he has no vivid and rich colouring, and he is not eloquent, and he does not expatiate: he has only his real and sober belief in the matter to express, and only seeks to express it in suitable words.

To go to another point. It is curious to observe how almost every school has something of its own choice to make up for its defective side, whatever that may be. The school, which we are concerned with now, which so neglects the doctrines of the visible Church, and of our Lord's body, and of the resurrection of the body, and of the day of Judgment, and of the existence of Angels; which puts out of its sight all the great visible manifestations, either present or prospective, of God's presence which Catholic doctrine teaches, has its own peculiar and favourite spiritual imagery, if we may call it so, in some portions of prophecy which it singles out from the general field of Scripture, and dwells on with exceeding earnestness. Unfulfilled prophecy in general, indeed, is a favourite subject with this school: and that perhaps on the principle just mentioned, that the instinctive bias in our nature toward the supernatural demands some vent; and will, if it has no supernaturalism in a Church system and Church doctrines to satisfy it, find some other supernaturalism elsewhere to do so. The region of unfulfilled prophecy supplies one. There the mind of the religionist sees the hand of God working in this lower world; the mysteries of providence come before him tangibly; and this earth becomes the theatre where living and palpable Divine power is acting. In interpreting prophecy, in giving meanings of his own to current events and anticipating future ones, the 'spiritualist' enjoys the sensation of the supernatural in a favourite self-chosen way. Not that we would for a moment say that the interpretation of prophecy, and attention to passing events for this purpose, and the look forward to the future, are not in themselves quite right and legitimate: but it is the way in which such tones of thought are pursued, which makes the difference. Even a Scriptural subject may be taken up in a dreamy unreal way, and prophecy may be looked into with too much of the relish of carnal curiosity. And the pleasure taken in charting out the future, forming prospective chronologies, arranging eras, and anticipating earthly commotions and changes, may be indulged in weakly and morbidly. However, there is the element of the supernatural in it; and so far it furnishes a genial vent to the instinctive yearning for the supernatural in the human mind; and a specially opportune one to those who have debarred themselves, by their system, from the ever-present ordinary supernaturalism which the Catholic system and doctrines contain.

But in this field of prophetical interpretation, one great period is especially prominent, and attracts the eager anticipator's eye. It is the period which embraces the coming of Antichrist, and the millennium. The bias to the former subject is accounted for by other considerations than the general ones we have just given; it receives a peculiar interest from its bearing on the Roman controversy. But the doctrine of the millennium, an equally favourite subject with many, has not this connexion to make it so much insisted on: and seems to owe its place in this class of religionists to the general longing just mentioned, for some or other form of the mystical, and the desiderium of some or other field of supernatural imagery, as a picture before the mind. The various views and theories respecting the millennium constitute the poetry of the puritanical school. And Mr. Evans comments upon the suitableness of such a kind of poetry to the character of the school. Catholic poetry is practical, and puts a living present system before men; but this instead puts a picture of the future before men. Nothing practical is to be inferred from it. The interpreter of prophecy does little more than gratify fancy and exercise private judgment. But we will quote Mr. Evans—

> ‘But even as to the future, which is his favourite tense, in which, as we have seen, he naturally delights to expatiate, the spiritualist chooses his particular path. Some remarkable animals there are, which instead of pursuing their prey, attract it towards them. So the spiritualist deals with his loved food of the future. He draws it to his own centre by investing it with such forms as reduce it to the nearest accordance with those facts which especially concern his prejudices; then he proceeds to swallow it with insatiable greediness.
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> ‘Amid all the grand assemblage which he thus draws round him, prophetic characters, priests, and kings, and antichrists, he himself unwittingly stands the central figure, and regulates the whole arrangement of the group. From his natural neglect of the past, he is unable to see the relative magnitudes of events, and of course gives an overwhelming importance to those of his own period: and therefore in announcing, on his own interpretation, those fulfilments which are reserved for the mouth of the Holy Spirit of God to declare, he fits prophecy into the most incongruous moulds of the past and present. An event or personage of striking importance is explained by something absurdly paltry, as the two witnesses in the Revelation by two obscure sects, and the four quarters of the heavens, supposed by him in the four beasts, by such trifles as the native places or accidental services of four Roman emperors. There is, moreover, the verbal juggle which confounds government with form of government, and makes a distinguishing mark of the Roman Empire seven constitutions, some of which are comparatively trifling, and almost momentary modifications of the original. Not indeed that we cannot but be struck with many apparent fulfilments of that train of prophecy which commences with the pilgrimage of the Christian Church upon earth, and ends with its settlement in heaven, and that we may not and should not take warning or comfort from them, and thence look onward in hopeful confidence to the end. But what good purpose is answered by endeavouring to set them all in exact parallel with the train of past history, and bringing them out of their misty indistinctness, which so deeply impresses the heart with awful expectation, into a particularity which may satisfy a vulgar curiosity? Surely we are to be kept under the discipline of suspense, and not to run riot in the indulgence of speculation. We are to wait God's good time, when the Holy Spirit who gave the revelation shall make it all clear, a line of light from one end to the other of the train; and not to substitute our own, which can have but the authority of our own spirit.
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> ‘Perhaps nothing can show the hasty hand with which Bp. Newton and others have thus endeavoured to pull prophecy back to fulfilments of their own invention, than answering them according to their own system of forced and fanciful resemblances. Let us suppose a Papist to take up the exposition of Rev. xvii. with the same bias against Protestantism as such interpreters have shown againt Popery, and to lay it down that England was the beast. He might say, with as much plausibility as they make out most of their story, that her maritime situation and source of her power are most appropriately prefigured by his rising out of the sea. That the number seven has ever most marvellously prevailed in her government. Thus there was the Heptarchy, and since the Conquest she has had seven dynasties, (I.) Norman, (II.) Plantagenet, (III.) Lancasterian, (IV.) Yorkist, (V.) Tudor, (VI.) Stuart, (VII.) Hanoverian. That Red has also always been the military colour of England. That the woman is the Church of England, which was the creature of a woman, Elizabeth herself the

daughter of a harlot, who cruelly persecuted the Catholics. Her fine dress, her cup, her blasphemies, represent her wealth, her commerce, and the heresies both of herself and her sectaries. That in her sex there is also no doubt an allusion to the remarkable peculiarity of succession to the English throne. The Plantagenets, the Tudors, the Stuarts, the Hanoverians, all succeeding through the female line, and a fresh dynasty coming on after the same rule: and that the ten horns are England, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, all formerly independent kingdoms, and her possessions in the Mediterranean, in North America, in the West Indies, in Australia, in South Africa, in the East Indies. How easily are such adaptations manufactured, and how readily can we expose our folly when we are so audacious and unwise as to assume a prerogative of the Holy Spirit of God! And yet such shadowy pictures have been vindicated for truth with as much tenacity as if they were points of doctrine and articles of faith; and men have even borne contradiction in the latter more patiently than in the former. Thus prophecy is degraded to the condition of a handmaid to party, and factious watchwords are supplied from its oracles: thus it must come into discredit, and sink into neglect from being found to fail in the immediate applications which the selfishness and self-importance of the spiritualist is so constantly making of its predictions.

'But why should we be surprised that he who is peculiarly tempted to make a continual future of the present and postpone his duties, should make a continual present of the future, and indulge in hasty anticipation of prophecy? or that he who is so inclined to turn the facts of the sacred history into types and figures, should turn the types and figures, of prophecy into facts? or that with such assumption he should denounce as carnal all who object to his interpretation?

'Thus does the spiritualist fare in his attachment to his individual centre. He divests himself of the proper means of evidence of Scripture and its canon, and encumbers himself with a dead weight of self-interpreted prophecy.'—Pp. 226—230.

We enter now upon the more practical parts of Mr. Evans's treatise, and turn to some of the applications of the principle of his book, which he discovers in our working religious system and proceedings, public and private. And first, with respect to the visibility of the Church, and attention to the 'ministry of the body' in that department,—he introduces some practical remarks; and notices the secrecy with which our ordinations are conducted.

'It does seem most impolitic, as well as improper, that the consecration of a bishop, who should be the most conspicuous officer in the diocese, should be conducted as it is. We should reasonably expect him to be produced before his assembled people in the cathedral of his diocese, where peer and artisan, citizen and rustic, may join in the prayer for their future spiritual father, and bear witness to his receiving the seal of his awful commission at the hands of the primate, (who would not then have among them that most dangerous thing in these working days, a mere name,) and of the well-known persons (as under such a system they would soon become) of the bishops of the neighbouring dioceses. That day would be a day to be remembered ever after with a revival of solemn feeling and warm affection by himself and by his flock. What a stirring appeal is made to his heart by the review of the crowd of his expectant flock!—what a stroke of sense of responsibility comes from the glance of each eager face as it is directed upon him!—what a feeling of consolation and love from their devotional looks and attitudes, as they pray for him!—what a suitable introduction does he experience to his communication with them! And on the part of the flock, what an interest is excited in his office!—what a home-feeling towards his person. They have witnessed his birth, as it were, in their own country, and not received him as dropped among them from the clouds. When we take pride and interest in a person, we are glad to be able to say, I was present at his christening, or election to some office. Would it not, then, add much to our satisfaction, in expressing our regard for our bishop, to be able to say, "I was present at his consecration?" And even if but an idle curiosity to witness this provincial coronation had been the means which qualified us for this boast, yet the feeling after the sight might be very different from that before it, interested now as it was curious then, definite now as it was vague then, spiritual now as it was natural then. And though there should be lurking at bottom some little vanity in the thought of having contributed in some degree by our own presence to the ceremony, has not this very much to do with love in every case? Such harmless pride so far from being selfish, is rather the extending of self outwardly, than bringing things to self inwardly, and stands at the bottom of the ladder on which we mount up to glorying in God. And the more love is entwined with our little daily affections, so much the warmer it is, and more lasting.

'And now behold the contrast. The bishop is consecrated in a private chapel, where, instead of seeing the crowd of his own flock, he sees but a knot of formal officials, to which are added a few curious strangers, perhaps one or two from his diocese, who, however, have by no means obtained their difficult admission on that plea; and thus the ceremony proceeds amid all the deadness of officiality, and idleness of curiosity. How very few, indeed, even of the clergy, have witnessed the consecration of any bishop whatever, to say nothing of that of their own! He comes to the chapter, which professes to have elected him, with a certificate that he is bishop; to the clergy upon an understanding which it is not safe, were it reasonable, to question; to the laity upon a report which proves to be a fact at the first confirmation that he holds.

'And as if this had not been enough to render the character of our ministry all but invisible to the public eye, nearly one half of the ordinations of priests and deacons have, until almost lately, been held in the metropolis, far out of sight and sympathy of their flocks. When the candidate returns from the cathedral, he, in many instances, brings back with him eye-witnesses. And, indeed, it would be a great point gained if the churchwardens, or some recognized deputation from the parish, were present at the ordination to deaconship and priesthood of such as are appointed to its charge. But when he returns from London, the seat of civil government and Babylon of the kingdom, certainly any thing but its Jerusalem, such curiosity as is raised is by no means likely to be directed to the desirable object; and he comes into the parish with about as clear apprehension in very many minds of the power which has sent him, as they have about the office which sent them their excise-officer, or the board which has qualified their surgeon.

'Until this point of visibility be more considered, it is vain to hope for a prevalent and just understanding of the nature of our threefold ministry. A public recognition will but follow a public inauguration: and as long as the Church shall shrink from public observation in any department whatsoever, still more in that where she should come forward with the most open exhibition, challenge notice with the most public spectacle that she can show, she must expect coldness and misapprehension, if not suspicion and dislike.' When so little is seen of consecrations and ordinations, little can be the stress laid upon their necessity; and we cannot wonder that so many should be content to accept of a ministry which not only does not pretend to them, but even scouts them.'—Pp. 279—282.

The 'inaccessibility of bishops' is another point which Mr. Evans comments on, as connected with the 'defect in the Church's visibility at the present day.'

'The bishop must not give occasion to the complaint, that he remains behind a veil, invisible to his people, like an eastern sultan. It must not be said of him, with any appearance of truth, that he is brought into the presence of his people and clergy on a few and grand occasions, like a consecrated image on a day of festival, with all pomp and state, carried in procession through the streets from the sanctuary of the heathen temple. His publicity must quash at once these and all other murmurs which have been vented, from time to time, in different countries, and often with too good reason, against the inaccessibility of the bishop, both to his clergy and to his people. He is the greater light in the firmament of the Church; and surely it is contrary to nature that the greater light should be the more seldom seen, and that men should complain that they receive less heat from it. He is in the body of Christ on earth, which is his Church, the highest bodily representative of Christ's spiritual presence among us, requiring higher gifts for his higher place, called upon for a brighter example from a more lofty hill. Should he be the most exact representative of his bodily absence? Head as he is of the Church visible on earth, he must purposely retire from view, only as the top of the mountain amid the clouds of heaven, for wrapping himself in heavenly meditation, and soaring aloft out of sight amid the incense of devout prayer.'—Pp. 283, 284.

As things now are, he observes with regret,—

'The bishop is almost absorbed from public sight in the office where such business as he can conduct is carried on; and at the very moment that he is hard at work in the severest drudgery of his duty, his remoteness from the daily scene where the eye of the laity is familiar with spiritual work, operates most injuriously to the influence of his station. Is it not, alas! but too true, that nothing which comes forth under the distinct patronage of the bench of Bishops is ever popular? How can it be otherwise till the office is popular, by meeting the public eye in the throng of continual and public ministration? And how can we but extend, in much self-reproach, much indulgence to our separatists, when through this growing deficiency in her staff of Bishops our Church-government more and more presents the outward form of Congregationalism; and her episcopate, with its widening sphere and limited matter, receding further and further from definite spot and visible practice into distant and occasional ministration, assumes the appearance of the interference of that state which appoints its members? Hence each order of the Church is prevented from its full and healthy development, and there is consequently a want of union and hearty co-operation. The episcopate prevented even from proper diocesan intercourse, to say nothing of brotherly and social, with the presbytery, appears to its feelings at least, even in spite of its convictions, too external to it, more like a splendid crown now and then to be put upon the head for show, than a head always set upon the body, directing of necessity every motion; more like a Gnostic pleroma of happy Æons, with whom the communication is far more contemplative than practical, than a company of overseers under whose superior co-operation the presbyters are working'—Pp. 291—293.

To turn now to a general feature in the individual temper of the present day. Mr. Evans shows how the neglect of the principle he insists on appears here. He says, people who neglect the 'ministry of the body,' and undervalue all bodily associations, show the effects of this neglect in this way. They are not good, sound workers. That is, they do not like real hard work in their own proper appointed sphere. They do not realize any particular call upon them to work in the place which their bodies are in. They regard that as too definite, material, and fleshly a consideration to be attended to. 'The eyes of a fool are in the ends of the earth,' Solomon tells us; and we need not of course say, that the word 'fool' here does not mean what the common opprobrious epithet means as we use it; but has reference to large and general defects of character, more of the moral than intellectual kind, which meet us in undisciplined human nature. How thoroughly and how universally do we see the business of human life more or less impeded and interfered with by this aim at ubiquity? How deep does it lie in human nature? Witness the extraordinary difficulty of that which would otherwise appear not a very hard matter; the difficulty we mean of simple attention even to the plainest subjects which are before us. The fact of its *being* before us, seems to invest the business which *is* before us with a sort of repulsive power; and the humblest subject-matter resists inspection, with that active force which the rule of contrary so peculiarly supplies. *Ruimus per vetitum nefas:* that a matter has the legitimate claims of time and place, stands in its way; we forthwith begin to think of something, the consideration of which would do equally well at any point in the next ten years; or which, perhaps, might, without any fatal result, dispense with consideration altogether even for the whole span of human life. The instant there is a book which *ought* to be read, a person who *ought* to be written to, a call that *ought* to be made, a fact that *ought* to be examined, the indefinite wish arises of doing all other things in the world except that particular one. It is not the abstract feeling of duty to which the mind is averse, but to duty then and there. Vicinity is invidious; presence is tiresome. There is an authority in obvious palpable and near claims of duty which the rebellious principle in our nature seems instinctively to dislike. And yet this is the constitution of things under which we live; for the duty must necessarily be present before we can do it, and the present moment of time which brings it to us, is the moment in which we must do it: if the present moment passes and leaves it undone, the next moment is then the present one presenting it to be done just as the preceding one did; and so on till it is done. We are creatures here of time and place; and duty has to be done at some particular time or other, and comes before us in the shape of some actual solid claims, arising from the situation in which we are, and our own appointed sphere.

Here then Mr. Evans's memento, respecting man's having a body, and consequently having locality and definite tangible position, comes in. It says, do not grasp at the attribute of pure intelligence, that of not being in time and place. You have things to do *now* and *here*, *i. e.* where you are. Do not, because a plain task offers itself upon the spot, instantly begin to think of all the distant possible things that there are to be done in the world. Be local. It is no reproach to be local. It is part of your nature to be so. The fact of your having a body gives you a place either here or there: and it is part of the due 'ministry of the body' to remember that necessary result of having it.

> 'He that is wise enough to understand his exact position, and therefore well content with the limited range which God has assigned him, will cheerfully own his interest in the general proposition that a body cannot act but where it is. A man of superior intellect may, from a commanding station, set the whole world of mankind in motion; but he cannot do it without the material machinery of communicating to other bodies. . . . . . To maintain, therefore, the proper sphere assigned us in the body, is the counsel both of religion and of common sense. And if we look, as we should, with a continual and definite prospect upon the body in the world to come, we must know that, as body, it must even there have its limits, and that the transgression of these would form a second rebellion and fall. But as we have God's promise that that shall not be, must there not be something in us to fit us to inherit that promise? Have we not a vital discipline to learn in this body, that we may be perfect in the lesson of knowing and acquiescing in the limits appointed to us, and neither stopping short of their mark, nor of going beyond it? And, therefore, to work within them up to their full extent, with the proper instruments, with the due use of all our knowledge, human and divine, in the spirit of faithfulness, thankfulness, and love, in singleness of eye to the one great object, and to our part assigned to us, is the grand practical duty of life. If we neglect this, in our fruitless aspirations after the privileges of disembodied spirits, then we shall become far too high-minded for the homely business of seeing to the things which should be done within the doors of the flesh; and instead of being good and able workmen there, shall be mere tattlers and busybodies about the things without, in which the master of the house has given us no concern whatever.
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> 'Men are indeed compelled to make the body the starting-place of their operations; even as in the first transgression, Adam was obliged to stretch forth his hand to grasp the spiritual prize of the knowledge of good and evil. But in true following of his transgression, they thenceforward endeavour to escape from its trammels as quickly and as utterly as they can. And, what wonder that there should ensue, not only so many tossings and overwhelmings of the moral principle, but also so many miserable shipwrecks of the faith in Christ, when men lose sight of the proper limits of the body, as the sailor of the shore, and launch out into a perilous undirected voyage through the boundless expanse of spirit.'—Pp. 190—193.

Again:

'The work of his station will always be drudgery to the spiritualist. It is a severe task to the indolence, the vanity, the love of novelty and notoriety which are generated by his speculative flights; and, therefore, that part of the building which was assigned to him in the edification of the glorious temple of the Lord's body is neglected. Its architecture was too familiar, perhaps only a plain course of stone, while he would be at pointing a pinnacle; and the labour too mechanical, perhaps only laying a stone, when he would be carving one. He, therefore, abandons his work to set up for himself, and builds a castle in the air, a true modern architect's castle, fantastic, incongruous, uninhabitable, and found to be in every body's way. But even this soon makes way for some other fabric of the fashion of the day, equally unsubstantial, equally absurd; and the builder is succeeded by other builders equally vain, equally giddy, equally babbling the dialect of Babel, equally at home abroad, and abroad at home, and carnalizing the spirit by the proud attempt to spiritualize the body.'—P. 204.

'Such an unsettled state of affectation of vague and vaga-'bond spirituality, is, of course,' Mr. Evans concludes, 'incon-'sistent with any proper attention in a man to the duties of his 'charge.' Our author does not, however, deny, what it would be absurd to do, that some men may have legitimate calls to larger spheres of labour, and may take them when they offer.

'Men who view the future much more soberly and approach it much more regularly, cannot but see beyond the boundaries of their present sphere of duty a still higher charge with a still wider range; and they naturally conceive that if they were posted in it, they would have more effectual means of being useful in the concerns both of God and man. And who can blame such aspirations? who will not, on the contrary, commend them, provided that they proceed upon the notion of attaining that sphere by the contact of the enlargement of their present, through the faithful fulfilment, and therefore regularly widening extent, of its duties? Thus they pursue the course appointed, not only by God in his general laws for the government of mankind, but also by our Lord Himself in his Gospel for the attainment of high and heavenly ministry: "To him that hath shall more be given."

'But what a different case is this from that which now so commonly prevails, when a man, having excited his ambition by a future prospect, proportioned in brilliancy to the tawdriness of his self-conceit, leaves the duties of his proper sphere unfulfilled to interfere with those of another, setting himself up as a bishop over other men's affairs, and is thus at once unprofitable in the post assigned to him, and a hindrance in that which has been assigned to another. The proper duty of his post is too palpable for him, too much matter-of-fact and of common-place. He finds it too material, too much of a confinement to his enlarged and spiritualized mind; and that duty which clearly calls upon him for exertion on the spot, is idly and capriciously forsaken for some imaginary occasion of usefulness, just as the doll is thrown out of the window by the child that cries for the moon. And to come to the melancholy conclusion of the absurdity, after having run about the country on his self-elected apostleship, and intruded with his own will on the duties of those who were posted by the will of God, after the work of disunion and confusion which his ambition and vanity have wrought, he looks complacently and confidently forward to the welcome of "Well done, thou good and faithful servant." It never for a moment enters into a mind so fully prepossessed with the notion of its own merits, that there is another and very different salutation for those who have prophesied in the Lord's name, but whom He never knew.'—Pp. 200—202.

There is another subject which, in connexion with man's local and bodily nature and life, so necessarily conversant with particulars and details, *τὰ ἔσχατα* or facts, we are not sorry to see Mr. Evans touch on; and that is the subject of sermons. A sermon is an important and characteristic occasion for the employment of either of the two lines—for attention to, or an inattention to, the circumstances of our nature on this head. It may take the vague abstract generalizing line on the one hand, or may go into the details and realities of life and feeling on the other; it may bring Christian doctrine to bear upon practice, or it may only expatiate indefinitely upon the naked doctrine. The preacher often in this latter case chooses some especially recondite doctrine, which he isolates from all the ordinary ones, and from the whole Christian system, and dwells with inexhaustible verbosity upon the shadowy oblique fragment.

> 'Similarly the higher and more recondite doctrines, which are laid up in the magazine of theology, as powerful artillery for extraordinary occasions, and require both might and skill to handle without danger to self, are brought like light weapons into the daily fight. The doctrines of predestination, election, free-will, and the like, reserved by the Church for her defence in confessions and creeds and articles, are employed by individuals for the most common purposes; and that which was to appear but now and then when occasion called, as a corrective, is continually presented as a positive instrument, without the least delicacy or caution.'—Pp. 136, 137.

We sympathize deeply with Mr. Evans's feelings. Of all the mysterious and unaccountable issues of the human mind which the world has yet seen, none has surpassed the Calvinistic sermon. It is a wonder, a *μέγα θαῦμα*. We have heard many of them, and can speak from experience. It is marvellous, we say, to hear an address to members of the human species, which speaks neither to the feelings nor to the understanding of man. The phraseology of pure Calvinistic oratory has about as much consanguinity with the ethical part of man's nature, as a proposition of Euclid; and no more. There are no human feelings that correspond to it. It equally fails in its address to the understanding; because there is nothing to understand in it. To endeavour to understand it, would be the application of a faculty to a wholly incongenial subject-matter. It would be like trying to see the air, or handle a smell. The words are not meant to be understood; they repel the attempt with an almost iron ferocity; the human mind stands outside of them, a passive spectator of their involutions, whirls, and rotations, as if it were gazing idly upon the movements of some dark and unintelligible machinery. Under what category indeed a composition comes, which has no concern either with the feeling or with the rational part of man's nature, it would be difficult to say; but the nearest description of it appears to be given in a verse of Job, where the question is put, whether it is the part of a wise man to 'fill his belly with the east wind?' We listen, but really the very act of listening is like pulling hard at a rope, with no weight at the end of it. All the issues from the preacher's mouth are so many rolling evaporations, which coil a few times like smoke out of a chimney, and are lost in vacancy. We sound for the bottom but there is none; we feel for the substance but encounter no resisting force, and conclude, from these symptoms of nonentity, that nothing exists. A rolling interminable phraseology about the state of the elect, their privileges, their hopes, their comforts, goes round and round in an endless eddy. But anything about the elect and their state, other than that they are the elect and have that state, and are comfortable and assured in it, and the like, we listen for in vain. The words only reflect each other, and never grow into substance or meaning; word is like word, and phrase like phrase, but the mind only discerns an abstract similitude, it nowhere appearing what the original thing and substance is which all this language is illustrating. The 'saints,' the 'elect,' the 'spiritual,' the 'renewed,' are all phantom formations, and the impersonations of words; they show no life; they are without moral being and substance; they are without human character and soul: they are not exemplars, for they are not persons; we cannot wish to be like them, or to imitate them, or to be in their state; they are as removed from our ethical nature, as the signs in algebra. If there were indeed but the faintest, the remotest gleam of a reality at starting, of something, we mean, allied to our substantial nature, and cognizable by our moral perceptions; there would be an element of instruction, edification, and consolation, amid this chaos of verbiage. But alas! that one original atom of sense is wanting. Nay, and would that the effusion were even simply nonsense; but it is something far worse; for it has not the repose of vacancy; it is nothing struggling to be something, and entirely failing.

Not to dwell, however, longer on the extreme case of a broad unchastized Calvinist discourse, there are many lesser degrees of the love of abstraction to be observed in ordinary sermon writing. Calvinism specially carries preachers in this direction; but do not sermons in general, without entering on the question of their particular doctrinal views, show far too much of that bias which Mr. Evans writes against—the bias to vague generalization? They go round and round some general doctrinal statement, and seem as if they never would have done with it. It seems to be thought taking a liberty with the subject to descend for a moment from the large and generalizing ground; as if particulars were of the nature of profane things, and as if to allude to any definite feeling or habit, or any tangible part of men's ordinary conduct and behaviour; to do anything in short which would make people attend, and feel that they and their minds were really spoken to, and recognise in the words of the preacher their own thoughts, and know that a blot was hit;—as if to come thus into contact with the solid details of human conduct and human nature were a familiarity and a levity. A stiff technicality and etiquette blocks up the pastor's access to his flock in his public addresses to them; and he is debarred from speaking his mind. Custom dictates his sermon to him; puts a certain set of statements into his mouth; and moulds the whole composition into its established shape, with a division of the text into three parts, and a twofold exhortation at the end, addressed to two divisions of his hearers; not one of whom individually knows to which division he belongs. Custom conducts him up the pulpit stairs, and custom hands him down again, and orders the whole proceeding from first to last.

There are some natural reasons, perhaps, to be assigned for this exceeding dulness of ordinary sermons. We do not allude to the want of high intellectual power: the average of preachers do not of course possess this, any more than the average of lawyers or members of any profession do; but that is not a reason for sermons being dull: on the contrary, many a man of average abilities can preach so as really to engage and excite the attention of a congregation. The natural reason we allude to, is one which prevents many a man of even very considerable mind (the element of good feeling in him we of course take for granted) from making a good sermon. It is, that he does not put his mind into his sermon. He does not look upon a sermon, in the first instance, as a species of communication which he is to be natural in. Persons have their different forms and channels of expression to which they take more than others; and the same substance of mind will be at home in one kind of expression and not in another. How common it is, for example, to see men most able in conversation, but who cannot write. Round a table they are easy and flowing, and their mind finds a full and free expression of itself in the conversational channel. But put a pen in their hands, and they are instantly stiff and artificial; their mind does not come out; it is locked up, because it has not its own mode of expressing itself; and the natural and vivid talker begins immediately to prose. And, *vice versâ*, take a man who is very ready with his pen, and plant him in the thick of a conversation: he will often make a poor figure; he will want the peculiar readiness which cuts in at the proper juncture, and seizes the proper point of attack or defence; he will be awkward, and will be long in coming to the point, and not know in what order to bring out his thoughts. The reason is, that the pen, and not the tongue, is his instrument. Nature, says the poet, has given horns to bulls and hoofs to horses; and so one mind has one, and another, another channel of expression congenial to it. And what is true of such general channels of thought as these, is true also of particular forms of composition: one mind will throw itself into one, and another into another. Give many a man of thought and feeling a sermon to write, and it will never occur to him that he is really to express himself in it: and with the best intentions, and every wish to do people good, his discourse will be a husk, because he does not, in the first instance, associate the idea of sense, feeling, and life, with that form of pastoral communication.

There is another cause, akin to the one we have mentioned, for the over-bias to generalization which we see in sermons; and that is, the fear in persons that they will have nothing to say as soon as they leave the general. This fear is quite a mistaken one, for the opposite is just the truth; but it is a very common and a very early imbibed one. Witness the theme of the schoolboy: under what an apprehension he appears to labour that the truth which he is asserting absolutely closes and terminates with its general ground; that there is nothing beyond that. He devoutly believes in the absolute incarceration of truth in general formulæ; he clings to the general statement with the desperation of a drowning man clinging to his one plank at sea. Generalization is his *terra firma*; he is too wise to be enticed beyond it for an instant; he attaches vagueness, hollowness, and misery to the mere idea of extension; he sees nothing but shoreless chaos and barrenness encompassing the one insulated bit of land, the one summary sentence with which his composition begins, and which he only repeats in different words afterwards.

'Quocunque aspicias nihil est nisi pontus et aer.'

Catch him, indeed, venturing a step beyond the one spot, which is to him truths solid, atomic, whole—beginning, middle, and end all included. The young essayist, we say, is mortally afraid that there will be nothing whatever to say, as soon as ever the general truth has been enunciated. There is something of the same apprehension mingling with the efforts of many who write sermons. They are afraid to venture off the general ground; they think there will be nothing to say as soon as that is left; they regard the generalization as the large field, the particulars as the small and narrow one. This is a fallacy. It is the very contrary which is true. The general is the narrow ground; particulars are the large one. So far from a person having reason to be afraid that there will be nothing to say when the general ground is left, on the contrary it is then especially that the subject widens and expands. On the field of particulars, the real richness and largeness of it lies. The generalization keeps you to a mere heading, and a vertex where you cannot move or open out. Large in its logical capacity, it is a mere point in itself. The particulars are the substance of a subject.

We have mentioned these as natural mistakes, which persons often proceed upon, in writing sermons as well as other things. But whatever the causes may be, and however excusable they may be, the fact loudly demands attention, that ordinary modern sermons are the most dull, heavy, and lifeless compositions that are heard or read. We should not speak thus strongly, if we did not feel certain that we were expressing the unanimous feeling of persons who think at all of such subjects. Let nobody take offence; we have already assigned reasons for the fact, which do not touch the individual capacities and merits of those who preach; and which throw the blame upon custom and established ideas more than upon any other cause. The truth must be plainly stated; an English sermon is a bye-word for dulness. It sets the standard on this head. When any other composition is dull, we instinctively ask ourselves —is it as dull as a sermon? We measure heaviness and dryness in general by their approach to the heaviness and dryness of a sermon. Such a fact is a most serious evil, and a positive grievance. A sermon is a part of the service of the Church; it lasts half an hour, and very often three quarters; persons sit and listen to it. But what do they hear? In nine cases out of ten do they ever hear anything more than some general summary outlines of the Gospel scheme, repeated Sunday after Sunday, with only that difference of words, which hardly affects at all the identity of impression in the hearer's mind? Sunday after Sunday, the dull stream of generalization goes on; large, general, vague exhortation passes over people's heads, without touching them, In the dearth of anything apprehensible, definite, and actual, their attention wanders; or they go to sleep. The unassisted, unarrested mind, thrown back upon its own looseness and vacuity, cannot sustain the effort of continued attention to that which has not the only true correlative of attention—reality. Poor human nature exclaims,—Give me something to attend to, and I will attend; but I really cannot attend to nothing! I cannot meet that which does not meet me; or strain when there is nothing to strain at. There is some consideration due to the appeal. An ordinary modern sermon of a particular class may almost be described as a non-recipient of attention. It requires just the very hardest effort which attention can make; that, namely, of continuing to perform all its functions, without an object to meet them, and going through its share of a reciprocal action alone. We do not mean to say, of course, that a hearer will not be benefited by any sermon—not containing false doctrine—that he listens to; and that, if he can listen attentively for three quarters of an hour, to a series of vague generalizations, he will not be the better for his task. But such attention is not to be counted on except in the most conscientious minds; and very rarely in them. To many it is all but a physical impossibility to sustain it. We know in such cases George Herbert says—

'God takes a text, and preacheth patience;'

and certainly whether a person can attend to a sermon or not, he should be patient under it, and so get good out of it in this way. At the same time it is obvious, that this is not *the* particular way in which sermons were meant to be useful; and that the natural and constitutional wants of human hearers have an imperative claim on the consideration of those who demand week after week their attention.

In making these remarks we are not unforgetful of a manifest improvement which has arisen in some quarters, in this department of the clergyman's work; nor ungrateful to some deep and earnest minds whose volumes have come from time to time before us; minds whose superior reality has innovated upon the established mould of the sermon, and imparted relief and refreshment to the wearied listener, amid the overwhelming accumulation of negative, formal, vague, dull, and unprofitable matter which besieges him on all sides. When we see new examples set, there are hopes of improvement; and many signs around us seem to show, that the clerical mind is in some degree rising to a sense of its responsibilities on this head; and that a movement has begun toward greater reality, life, and definiteness in preaching. Still these signs of a rising new style do not diminish, but rather magnify, by the contrast, the oppressive emptiness of the, as yet, established one; and only make us, amid hopes for the future, more painfully alive to the evils of the present.

But to come back to our author;—it is time we should take leave of the subject of Mr. Evans's work, and its various ramifications, doctrinal and practical. We will only repeat, in conclusion, what we said at first, that he has done good service in putting the subject before men's minds, and in following it out with that unity of aim, and largeness of illustration, with which he has. Without saying that we agree in every opinion which the writer may have incidentally expressed in his treatise, we must repeat that the main idea on which the whole rests, and by which the whole is penetrated, is a most sacred, true, important one; and the lesson it gives, a most seasonable one for these times. Mr. Evans is not without his faults as a writer; he hits off happy, lively, and clear expressions, and he does so often; but his main course of argument and description would be improved by more binding and cement; and sentence after sentence is apt to expand too freely and loosely. Still his meaning is on the whole solid and clear; we are never far from his main idea, and always feel ourselves under the instruction of an earnest and genuine writer, who has written a book for the most solid but rare reason, that he really had something to say. He sees a plain principle neglected: he reminds men of it. He does not mince his words: he speaks out. He uses free, strong, severe language in commenting on many established errors and abuses: but he always comments like a Christian, and his tone always shows a thinking and philosophical mind.

Art. VIII.—*Tancred; or, the New Crusade. By* B. Disraeli, M.P. *Author of 'Coningsby,' 'Sybil,' etc.* 3 vols. London: Colburn. 1847.

In the good old days, before the birth of constitutional governments, when the peasantry had nothing to do but to till their lord's land in peace, and follow him to the field in war—when the burghers cherished no higher aim than the acquisition of a dearly-bought and ill-observed charter of protection—when there were no artizans to starve, and no factories to feed and famish alternately the overflowing towns,—there was little need of state craft. The king and the barons, if their power was pretty equally balanced, did each one what they liked, without troubling themselves about any thing so impracticable as a general consent; or, if mutual concessions were necessary, or mutual co-operation desirable, they met together, and held a 'Talk'—a Parliament—and amicably or powerfully, as the case might be, they arranged the affairs of the nation to their satisfaction. Gradually more and more classes found their way into the Parliament, and the business grew more complicated; but when at length an exterior motion, a 'pressure from without,' was perceived, it was at once evident that the machine of government had acquired a fresh wheel, or a new clog. The legislature was no longer absolutely supreme; it was necessary to ascertain the dispositions of the people. Kings and cabinets were hampered in the introduction of important measures, not only by the necessity of bullying a Parliament, but by the more delicate task of influencing a nation. But for this purpose the old machinery was inadequate; new engines were required to meet the new difficulty. Queen Bess and her sagacious council first hit upon the happy expedient of 'tuning the pulpits.' The clergy were the natural channel of communication between court and people; and as soon as a measure had been arranged at the council board, the next thing was to promulgate it in the churches. No doubt the instrument was well selected for the time, and the results highly satisfactory to her Majesty; but as years wore on, and policies altered, and dynasties were changed, its usefulness became impaired. Perhaps the people thought it indecorous; perhaps the Government found it inefficient or unmanageable. Whatever was the cause, the old instrument was, in time, supplanted by a new one; first proclamations and petitions, then pamphlets and newspapers, supplied the bridge of connexion. The Quarterly and Edinburgh succeeded to the influence of lectures, fasts, and prophesyings; the sermon at Paul's Cross yielded to the 'feeler' in the *Times*. But even these have proved insufficient for the wants, or unsatisfying to the tastes, of our prolific and capricious age. The political Review has greatly declined in influence since the days when cabinet ministers were wont to disseminate or disguise their sentiments in its pages; and even the Newspaper does not tell upon every section of our diversified population. Science, and morals, and religion, have for some time past been dished up for the public taste in a piquant seasoning of tale and ornament; and the demand for amusement has at length been made and admitted in the field of amateur politics. The 'article' was voted dull, and the 'leader' curt; the one required too long, the other too frequent, a stretch of attention. There was evidently an opening for the Political Novel.

To Mr. Disraeli belongs the credit of the first successful speculation in the virgin market. Endowed with considerable power for composition, apt in illustration, happy in expression, more versed in English history than at least the majority of his readers, and himself an actor of some repute in the scenes which he describes, he enjoys qualifications well adapted to the line he has chosen. But above all, he possesses two very essential elements of success—an unqualified adoption of party, and a clear and decided theory. Whatever may have been the early slips, which his pertinacious antagonist, Mr. Roebuck, resuscitates from time to time in the House of Commons, Mr. Disraeli, during all the time that he has been known to the world in print, has been a most energetic Tory. His earliest political writings (if we are right in attributing to him the 'Letters of Runnymede,' which assailed Lord Melbourne's ministry, man by man, with all the acrimony, and something of the vigour of a Junius) exhibit him full launched upon the tide of party. Commendation and censure, unsparing and unreserved, are heaped on friends and foes with all the eagerness of a combatant engaged in earnest battle. The commendation was destined soon to evaporate; the censure, more congenial to his character, has never flagged, though its range has been somewhat enlarged and modified. It is in personal attack that Mr. Disraeli is pre-eminently great. The specious reasoning, the keenly-edged sarcasm, the indignant appeal, give point and energy to a philippic, which would be withering and crushing, if it were based on truth, and supported by character. Originally directed against the Whig leaders, it has more recently fallen on his quondam chief, Sir Robert Peel: and the glowing eulogium of the conservative leader in the Letters of Runnymede throws out in bold relief the picturesque description in one of his later speeches of 'a great orator, thumping a green table, before a red box.' But however his personal fealty may have varied, there is an ingenious harmony about his theoretical course, which can only be appreciated by a more definite explanation of his political ideas; which we will accordingly endeavour to exhibit.

In our modern political life, amongst the crash of newly-created interests, and the infusion of fresh elements, our old party names are fast disappearing. Whig and Tory are almost acknowledged to belong to a past era; while even the recent progeny of Conservative, Liberal, and Radical, the dragon's teeth of our reformed constitution, have well nigh hewed themselves in pieces. At least we should feel that the simple enunciation of the party-name would now give but little satisfaction on the hustings. The candidates for the coming Parliament will have to stand a fire of questions, on all manner of particular topics; and to evince their boldness by a categorical answer, or their skill by an adroit evasion. How will they sigh for those simpler days, when, to proclaim themselves Whig or Tory was enough to procure the suffrages of an enlightened constituency! How far more easy and respectable, they will think, to follow quietly in the ranks of a well-drilled party, than to fight each man, like Harry Smith in The Fair Maid of Perth, 'for his hand.' In this universal confusion, this *mêlée* of combatants, where the eye grows dizzy with the endeavour to track the multitudinous courses of the individual units, it is quite refreshing to meet with such positive grouping, and such distinct theory as Mr. Disraeli is ready to produce. He perseveringly adheres to the old names of Whig and Tory, though he seems obliged to admit that the latter race is very nearly extinct; he himself presenting a last lingering specimen of it to a degenerate age. But we need not, therefore, fear from him the reiteration of worn-out phrases, or the disinterment of buried arguments. No; the names are old: but his exposition invests them with all the charms of novelty.

People in general have, probably, not troubled themselves to analyse very exactly their notions on these subjects. They held it as a sort of innate idea that the Tories toasted 'Church and 'King,' rejoiced in rotten boroughs and the House of Peers, gloried in the Duke of Wellington, or sighed over the golden days of Mr. Pitt; while the Whigs were supposed to occupy their natural place in opposition, as the friends of the people, the enemies of the government and taxation, and the upholders of the rights of man in general. Probably the local associations of a blue or yellow riband, occupy a more prominent place in the foreground of the picture than any other less material, though more important, feature. All who are secretly conscious of such vague thoughts, will feel grateful to Mr. Disraeli for a theory too simple to be forgotten, too lucid to be misstated, and too complete to be ever at fault. Like a warrior ready armed, it starts forth to meet every attack.

The Tories then, so runs the formula, are the supporters of our national institutions; the Whigs are ever aiming at a Venetian oligarchy. The announcement is somewhat startling, at least as regards the latter clause, for we are willing enough to admit the former; but it is no unconsidered assertion, no chance arrow of party warfare, but a digested and consistent theory, which we must therefore endeavour to exhibit more at length.

The dynasty of the Plantagenets was the reign of the Aristocracy of England; the aristocracy perished in the wars of the Roses, and the despotism of the Tudors followed. Nourished by the plunder of the Reformation, a new aristocracy arose to combat the Crown, and by the reign of the first Charles had pretty well recovered all their former powers. Not satisfied, however, with this moderate victory, they aspired to reduce the throne to an entire subservience, and reign alone in the absolute oligarchy of a pure Whig government. For this purpose they raised the popular storm, but they could not allay the tempest; the instruments were too strong for their wielders, and, shattered beneath the fury of the Commons and the despotism of the Protectorate, they were fain to acquiesce in the renewed powers of the restored Monarchy. Taught by adversity, they employed the Crown for their next essay, and hoped to establish a Venetian oligarchy on the groundwork of the elective sovereignty of William III. But here again, their first efforts were unsuccessful; William, a man of calculating foresight and independent vigour, refused to be a Doge, and though he could not rule by sheer power, contrived to maintain his fair preponderance by adjusting with a nice hand the balance of party. But the Whigs persevered, and were at length rewarded with the smiles of fortune. George I. and George II. consented to be constitutional Doges, and the spirit of Whiggism triumphed. George III. fought hard against them and shook them off. They made a false step in uniting themselves with the French Revolution, from which it cost them nearly half a century to recover, before they ventured to make another successful push for office, on the cry of Parliamentary Reform.

This is the history of Whiggism according to Mr. Disraeli. It has identified itself now with the People, now with the Crown; of old, the ally of the Puritan, more recently, the dependent of the Papist: but in every case, hiding the same mind beneath a varied form, and aiming consistently at the one high mark of a Venetian oligarchy. It is somewhat amusing to see the quiet reversal of the tables, by which the popular party of the day is thus calmly transformed into the oligarchical; but indications are not wanting to invest it with a fair amount of verisimilitude. Read Harrington and Algernon Sidney, says our author, and you will see how deeply the minds of the Whig leaders were imbued with the model of Venice: it was no unconscious imitation on which they acted, but with a definite purpose of converting the English Sovereign into a Doge, the Cabinet into a Council of Ten, and the Parliament into a Grand Assembly of Nobles; or, to take an illustration from another source—into a Curiata Comitia. It is true that the Oceana and the 'Discourses Concerning Government,' abound in commendations of Venice, and illustrations from its polity; but we doubt whether this direct and conscious application of it can be proved from them. However, it is not our business to defend the Whigs; they may fight their own battle with Mr. Disraeli on this score. His theory is more plausibly supported by more modern facts. The small knot of leading Whig families, their high descent, their personal exclusiveness, haughty almost to a proverb, their unbroken hereditary principles,—all indicate the genuine materials of a close oligarchy. And the famous 'finality' declaration of Lord John Russell, lends an air of probability to Mr. Disraeli's account of the Reform Bill, which he considers to have been introduced for no larger purpose than that of obtaining a Whig majority in the House of Commons; a thing, as matters then stood, utterly impracticable under the old arrangement. The Whig majority was obtained, and what could the nation want more? The Reform Act was to be 'final.'

The Whigs desired an oligarchy; but the constitution of England was not oligarchical. Hence arose a systematic hostility against the great institutions of the country. Church, King, Parliament, a local administration, were so many obstacles in the way of a central government conducted by a few noble families. England has become great, says Mr. Disraeli (and here, at least, we cordially agree with him), by her Institutions. In them we have no theoretic figments, no system exact and accurate on paper, which falls in ruins, when the tempest rises, and the rough winds of heaven blow against it; but a vast, irregular, and seemingly inconsistent pile, which has grown together by the slow accumulation of centuries, amid the wants of successive generations. These, whatever else they lack, have at least the element of permanence; they are rooted in the soil. With these all innovators have a natural and internecine warfare. A deadly blow, according to Mr. Disraeli's view, was dealt upon a portion of this time-honoured constitution, by the introduction of the principle of Representation with its easily-derived inference, that the House of Commons is the House of the People. The people, he says—that vast congeries of individuals, united by so many bonds of interest and necessity—by the combined influences of organization, climate, time, and history—can only be viewed in masses as a combination of Estates. It is vain to refer to the natural rights of man: a nation is essentially artificial. There is the estate of the Lords Spiritual, the estate of the Lords Temporal, and the estate of the Commons. The two former estates meet in their chamber; the latter, too numerous to allow of the collection of all its members, meets by its representatives. But the latter has no more right to arrogate to itself the proud title of the 'nation,' than either of the other two. The Commons are as much a privileged order as the Lords. For besides these three estates, and more numerous perhaps than all together, is the estate of the Peasantry. And yet this estate is entirely, and rightly, excluded from the legislature. Rightly, if we conceive of the nation as of a body corporate, ruled by a privileged portion of itself; most wrongly, if we speak of the legislature as the representation of the voice of the whole nation. For if Parliament be the representation of the nation, why require any qualification for a vote? On what plea can universal suffrage be refused, if the right of a people to legislate for themselves be once conceded? It is because the estate of the Commons is a privileged order, that we exact certain qualifications as the test of membership, or the condition of admission to that estate. Not the whole nation, but the estates of the Lords and Commons govern England. 'It is quite impossible,' we quote from a work, which, though it does not bear Disraeli's name, we do not think he would repudiate—the 'Spirit of Whiggism;' 'it is 'quite impossible that a whole people can be a branch of a 'legislature. If a whole people have the power of making 'laws, it is folly to suppose that they will allow an assembly of '300 or 400 individuals, or a solitary being on a throne, to 'thwart their sovereign will and pleasure. But I deny that a 'people can govern itself. Self-government is a contradiction 'in terms. Whatever form a government may assume, power 'must be exercised by a minority of numbers.'

That there is much of sound and useful truth in these views, few of our readers will be disposed to deny; and it is not surprising that their author should be found to have gradually assumed a hostile attitude to the leaders of the Conservative party. His theoretical views will, at any rate, bear him consistently through a change, which may have been accelerated by more practical motives. We extract from 'Coningsby' a passage which may serve as a commentary on his famous denunciation of 'the Great Conservative Party,' as 'an Organized Hypocrisy.'

'The Tamworth Manifesto of 1834 was an attempt to construct a party without principles; its basis therefore was, necessarily, latitudinarianism; and its inevitable consequence has been political infidelity.

'At an epoch of political perplexity and social alarm, the confederation was convenient, and was calculated, by aggregation, to encourage the timid and confused. But when the perturbation was a little subsided, and men began to inquire why they were banded together, the difficulty of defining their purpose proved that the league, however respectable, was not a party. The leaders indeed might profit by their eminent position to obtain power for their individual gratification, but it was impossible to secure their followers that which, after all, must be the great recompense of a political party, the putting in practice of their opinions; for they had none.

'There was, indeed, a considerable shouting about what they called Conservative principles; but the awkward question naturally arose, what will you conserve? The prerogatives of the Crown, provided they are not exercised; the independence of the House of Lords, provided it is not asserted; the Ecclesiastical estate, provided it is regulated by a commission of laymen. Everything, in short, that is established, as long as it is a phrase and not a fact.

'In the meantime, while forms and phrases are religiously cherished in order to make the semblance of a creed, the rule of practice is to bend to the passion or combination of the hour. Conservativism assumes, in theory, that everything established should be maintained; but adopts, in practice, that everything that is established is indefensible. To reconcile this theory and this practice, they produce what they call the "best bargain;" some arrangement which has no principle and no purpose, except to obtain a temporary pause of agitation, until the mind of the Conservatives, without a guide and without an aim, distracted, tempted, and bewildered, is prepared for another arrangement, equally statesmanlike with the preceding one.

'Conservativism was an attempt to carry on affairs by substituting the fulfilment of the duties of office for the performance of the functions of government; and to maintain this negative system by the mere influence of property, reputable private conduct, and what are called good connexions. Conservativism discards Prescription, shrinks from Principle, disavows Progress; having rejected all respect for Antiquity, it offers no redress for the Present, and makes no preparation for the Future. It is obvious that for a time, under favourable circumstances, such a confederation might succeed; but it is equally clear that, on the arrival of one of those critical conjunctures that will periodically occur in all states, and which such an unimpassioned system is even calculated ultimately to create, all power of resistance will be wanting; the barren curse of political infidelity will paralyse all action; and the Conservative constitution will be discovered to be a *caput mortuum*.'—*Coningsby*, vol. i. pp. 210—213.

These were the views which first found a distinct and popular enunciation in 'Coningsby' and 'Sybil;' and, aided as they were by great power of description, amusing incident, and malicious satire, it is no wonder that they instantly gained a considerable reputation, and doubtless exercised no little influence. Their author had skilfully and adroitly seized the topic on which minds were beginning to feel unsettled, and struck a note which many felt to be the expression of their own vague sentiments. Another new feature contributed to increase their interest; namely, their bold and unscrupulous personality.

While even in the fictitious names the initiated profess to trace living characters, the exoteric public are attracted by elaborate and graphic delineations of the leading men of the day, invested with their proper attributes of name and feature. The Duke of Wellington, Lord John Russell, and Sir Robert Peel, frequently occur in his pages; their motives are discussed, their characters painted, their intentions conjectured, without the slightest attempt at concealment or disguise. We select as a specimen the following historical sketch (for such it may be termed) of Sir Robert Peel, partly as a literary curiosity in living biography, partly as a commentary on the vigorous assistance afforded by Mr. Disraeli to Lord George Bentinck in his recent attack on the minister on the painful subject of Canning's death:

'We have seen that at an early period of his career, Mr. Peel withdrew from official life. His course had been one of unbroken prosperity; the hero of the University had become the favourite of the House of Commons. His retreat, therefore, was not prompted by chagrin. Nor need it have been suggested by a calculating ambition, for the ordinary course of events was fast bearing to him all to which man could aspire. One might rather suppose, that he had already gained sufficient experience, perhaps in his Irish Secretaryship, to make him pause in that career of superficial success which education and custom had hitherto chalked out for him, rather than the creative energies of his own mind. A thoughtful intellect may have already detected elements in our social system which required a finer observation, and a more unbroken study, than the gyves and trammels of office would permit. He may have discovered that the representation of the University, looked upon in those days as the blue ribbon of the House of Commons, was a sufficient fetter without unnecessarily adding to its restraint. He may have wished to reserve himself for a happier occasion, and a more progressive period. He may have felt the strong necessity of arresting himself in his rapid career of felicitous routine, to survey his position in calmness, and to comprehend the stirring age that was approaching.

'For that he could not but be conscious that the education which he had consummated, however ornate and refined, was not sufficient. That age of economical statesmanship which Lord Shelburne had predicted in 1787, when he demolished in the House of Lords Bishop Watson and the balance of trade; which Mr. Pitt had comprehended, and for which he was preparing the nation when the French Revolution diverted the public mind into a stronger and more turbulent current; was again impending, while the intervening history of the country had been prolific in events which had aggravated the necessity of investigating the sources of the wealth of nations. The time had arrived when parliamentary pre-eminence could no longer be achieved or maintained by gorgeous abstractions borrowed from Burke, shallow systems purloined from De Lolme, adorned with Horatian points, or varied with Virgilian passages. It was to be an age of abstruse disquisition, that required a compact and sinewy intellect, nurtured in a class of learning not yet honoured in Colleges, and which might arrive at conclusions conflicting with predominant prejudices.

'Adopting this view of the position of Mr. Peel, strengthened as it is by his early withdrawal for a while from the direction of public affairs, it may be not only a charitable, but a true estimate of the motives which influenced him in his conduct towards Mr. Canning, to conclude that he was not guided in that transaction by the disingenuous rivalry usually imputed to him. His statement in Parliament of the determining circumstances of his conduct, coupled with his subsequent and almost immediate policy, may perhaps always leave this a painful and ambiguous passage in his career; but in passing judgment on public men, it behoves us ever to take large and extended views of their conduct; and previous incidents will often satisfactorily explain subsequent events, which, without their illustrating aid, are involved in misapprehension, or mystery.

'It would seem, therefore, that Sir Robert Peel from an early period meditated his emancipation from the political confederacy in which he was implicated, and that he has been continually baffled in this project. He broke loose from Lord Liverpool; he retired from Mr. Canning. Forced again into becoming the subordinate leader of the weakest government in parliamentary annals, he believed he had at length achieved his emancipation, when he declared to his late colleagues after the overthrow of 1830, that he would never again accept a secondary position in office. But the Duke of Wellington was too old a tactician to lose so valuable an ally. So his Grace declared after the Reform Bill was passed, as its inevitable result, that thenceforth the Prime Minister must be a member of the House of Commons; and this aphorism, cited as usual by the Duke's parasites as demonstration of his supreme sagacity, was a graceful mode of resigning the pre-eminence which had been productive of such great party disasters. It is remarkable that the party who devised and passed the Reform Bill, and who governed the nation in consequence for ten years, never once had their Prime Minister in the House of Commons; but that does not signify; the Duke's maxim is still quoted as an oracle almost equal in prescience to his famous query, How the King's Government was to be carried on? a question to which his Grace by this time has contrived to give a tolerably practical answer.

'Sir Robert Peel, who had escaped from Lord Liverpool, escaped from Mr. Canning, escaped even from the Duke of Wellington in 1832, was at length caught in 1834; the victim of ceaseless intriguers, who neither comprehended his position, nor that of their country.'—*Coningsby*, vol. i. pp. 170—175.

With these attractions of style and matter, it was natural that the announcement of a new novel 'by the author of Coningsby, and Sybil,' should create a considerable sensation. The selection of those two names from the author's other works seemed to warrant the expectation of another political novel, but the name afforded no clue to its particular bearings. Coningsby had turned mainly on the theory of Whiggism and Conservativism; Sybil had been directed principally on the social evils of the relations between rich and poor, the labouring man and his employer. It is true that these names afforded no indication of the line of the work; but something might have been gathered by a discerning guesser from their second titles of 'The New 'Generation,' and 'The Two Nations.' Here, however, we were quite at fault. If 'Tancred' afforded no hint, 'The New 'Crusade' opened an unlimited field of perplexity. Was it a crusade against Protection, or against Free-trade? A crusade against the Peers or the Ministers? Against the Church or the Agriculturists? It would have seemed an unlikely guess, that we were about to be presented with a genuine tale of Palestine, a quasi-religious novel, a new crusade on the model of the old.

'Tancred' does not rest in the political world, which formed the scene of the former novels. It passes through it indeed; the same characters, the same modes of thought are re-produced; but English politics, parliaments and cabinets, and parties are no longer the engrossing subjects. Yet, though an unexpected, it is by no means an unconsequential, follower of Coningsby and Sybil. Hints which there gleamed only now and then, are here worked up into the substance of a book; theories which there occupied a few casual pages, here become the groundwork of the plot. The importance of Race on the affairs of mankind was a doctrine occasionally inculcated in Coningsby, and dwelt upon with further emphasis in the 'Two Nations,' the rich and the poor, the Saxon and the Norman, of Sybil. The superiority of the Hebrew race to all others was exemplified in the person of Sidonia, and in his startling catalogue of Jewish financiers, opera-singers, and marshals of the empire. These two points are the key-notes of Tancred. That our brief description may not be unintelligible, we will illustrate the first position by a speech of Sidonia—a great Hebrew capitalist, who figures in Tancred no less prominently than in Coningsby.

'"Yes, but what is progressive development?" said Sidonia; "and what are the faculties of man? If development be progressive, how do you account for the state of Italy? One will tell you it is superstition, indulgences, and the Lady of Loretto; yet three centuries ago, when all these influences were much more powerful, Italy was the soul of Europe. The less prejudiced—a Puseyite, for example, like our friend Vavasour—will assure us that the state of Italy has nothing to do with the spirit of its religion, but that it is entirely an affair of commerce; a revolution of commerce has convulsed its destinies. I cannot forget that the world was once conquered by Italians, who had no commerce. Has the development of Western Asia been progressive? It is a land of tombs and ruins. Is China progressive, the most ancient and numerous of existing societies? Is Europe itself progressive? Is Spain a tithe as great as she was? Is Germany as great as when she invented printing; as she was under the rule of Charles the Fifth? France herself laments her relative inferiority to the past. But England flourishes. Is it what you call civilization that makes England flourish? Is it the universal development of the faculties of man that has rendered an island, almost unknown to the ancients, the arbiter of the world? Clearly not. It is her inhabitants that have done this; it is an affair of race. A Saxon race, protected by an insular position, has stamped its diligent and methodic character on the century. And when a superior race, with a superior idea to work and order, advances, its state will be progressive, and we shall perhaps follow the example of the desolate countries. All is race; there is no other truth."

'"Because it includes all others?" said Lord Henry.

'"You have said it."'—Vol. i. pp. 302—303.

And again, in the following passage, we have the same idea under a different illustration. Art, as well as power and prosperity, is the prerogative of Race. The Greek alone can produce the Grecian beauty.

'Tancred entered the temple, the last refuge of the Olympian mind. It was race that produced these inimitable forms, the idealized reflex of their own peculiar organization. Their principles of art, practised by a different race, do not produce the same results. Yet we shut our eyes to the great truth into which all truths merge, and we call upon the Pict or the Sarmatian to produce the forms of Phidias and Praxiteles.'—Vol. iii. p. 242.

The idea is certainly not altogether new, even if we had not read Mr. Disraeli's previous works. The distinction of races, the characteristic physical features, and varying mental capacities of Hebrew, Negro, Teuton or Celt, are too real and too obvious to escape observation. But our author's application of the doctrine is not, we apprehend, so commonly received. Even the readers of Coningsby, in the high praise of the Caucasian race, saw only, we suspect, a laudation of their own Anglo-Saxon origin,—a sop to the English Demas. They were, perhaps, scarcely prepared to turn their eyes to Syria and Arabia, as the source of all good, the fountain of modern regeneration no less than of ancient revelation. Such, however, is the case, if we are to trust Mr. Disraeli; this, it would appear, is not merely his theory, but his religion. He is a believer in race, rather than in creed, in place rather than in person; a local and ethnological religionist. Neither Christian, Jewish, nor Mahometan, his views may be better described as Syrian and Arabian. Whatever may have issued from those quarters is constituted by that circumstance a revelation. These are the sole lands in which the Creator has condescended to reveal Himself to His creatures, these the only races in whose language He has deigned to speak. To them the Voice of Inspiration has been granted; from them have issued, at successive epochs, the ideas which were to mould the world; from them, in this age of growing mammon and waning faith, is to be even now expected the fresh impulse which shall renovate the decaying world. It is not for the sons of Fronguestan, the children of yesterday, who still roamed wild savages, in their uncleared forests, when the cities of the East were culminating in their meridian glory, it is not for them to lead and animate the world. The lands that produced Jerusalem and Damascus, Nineveh, and Babylon, and Antioch; the pastures in which Sheikh Abraham fed his flocks, the deserts where Moses legislated, the city in which rests the Holy Sepulchre, these are the scenes from which the new Regenerator may arise. Once already, so our author seems to intimate, there has issued from these wilds a divine voice in the person of Mahomet; it may be that other prophets are still waiting their destined birth. From time to time, in the lapse of ages, have the myriads of Asia been poured forth upon astonished Europe: and if we are now apt to fancy those climes exhausted, and that the spirit of action and of power has passed westwards, it is but the dream of an ephemeral race, who, in their vanity, measure the duration of time by the brief hour of their own existence. Vain are all our schemes of improvement and reorganization; if the world is to arise again as in its youth, it must be by a voice from Asia; and that voice, unless we misunderstand our author, must be the voice of a new revelation. For he appears to think, unless we do him great wrong, that Christianity, as well as Europe, is used up. Perhaps the following conversation between Tancred and the Emir Fakredeen will convey his views on this subject more distinctly than can be effected through the medium of our paraphrase:—

'"See now," said Tancred, with unusual animation, "I find no charm in conquering the world to establish a dynasty—a dynasty like every thing else wears out—indeed, it does not last as long as most things; it has a precipitate tendency to decay. There are reasons; we will not now dwell on them. One should conquer the world not to enthrone a man, but an idea—for ideas exist for ever. But what idea? There is the touchstone of all philosophy! Amid the wreck of creeds, the crash of empires, French revolutions, English reforms, Catholicism in agony, and Protestantism in convulsions; discordant Europe demands the key-note, which none can sound. If Asia be in decay, Europe is in confusion. Your repose may be death, but our life is anarchy! . . . .

'"*I am an Arab only in religion*," said Tancred, "but the consciousness of creed sustains me. I know well, though born in a distant and northern isle, that the Creator of the world speaks with man only in this land: and that is why I am here."

'The young Emir threw an earnest glance at his companion, whose countenance, though grave, was calm. "Then you have faith?" said Fakredeen inquiringly. "I have passive faith," said Tancred. "I know that there is a Deity who has revealed his will at intervals during different ages; but of his present purpose I feel ignorant, and therefore I have not active faith; I know not what to do, and should be reduced to a mere spiritual slothfulness, had I not resolved to struggle with this fearful necessity, and so embarked in this great pilgrimage which has so strangely brought us together."

'"But you have your sacred books to consult?" said Fakredeen.

'"There were sacred books when Jehovah conferred with Solomon; there was a still greater number of sacred books when Jehovah inspired the prophets; the sacred writings were yet more voluminous, when the Creator ordained that there should be for human edification a completely new series of inspired literature. Nearly two thousand years have passed since the last of those works appeared. It is a greater interval than elapsed between the writings of Malachi, and the writings of Matthew."

'"The prior of the Maronite convent at Mar Hanna, has often urged on me, as conclusive evidence of the falseness of Mahomet's mission, that our Lord Jesus declared that after him 'many false prophets should arise,' and warned his followers."

'"There spoke the Prince of Israel," said Tancred, "not the universal Redeemer. He warned his tribe against the advent of false Messiahs—no more. Far from terminating, by his coming, the direct communication between God and man, his appearance was only the herald of a relation between the Creator and his creatures, more fine, more permanent, and more express. The inspiring and consoling influence of the Paraclete only commenced with the ascension of the Divine Son. In this fact, perhaps, may be found a sufficient reason why no written expression of the celestial will has subsequently appeared. But, instead of foreclosing my desire for express communication, it would, on the contrary, be a circumstance to authorize it."

'"Then *how do you know that Mahomet was not inspired?*" said Fakredeen.

'"*Far be it from me to impugn the divine commission of any of the seed of Abraham,*" replied Tancred. "There are doctors of our church who recognise the sacred office of Mahomet, though they hold it to be what divine commissions, with the great exception, have ever been, limited, and local."

'"God has never spoken to a European?" said Fakredeen, inquiringly.

'"Never."

'"But you are a European."

'"And your inference is just," said Tancred in an agitated voice, and with a changing countenance. "It is one that has for some time haunted my soul. In England, when I prayed in vain for enlightenment, I at last induced myself to believe that the Supreme Being would not deign to reveal his will unless in the land which his presence had rendered holy; but since I have been a dweller within its borders, and poured forth my passionate prayers at all its holy places, and received no sign, the desolating thought has sometimes come over my spirit, that there is a qualification of blood as well as of locality for this communion, and that the favoured votary must not only kneel in the Holy Land, but be of the holy race!"'—Vol. ii. pp. 182—187.

We feel that we ought to crave pardon of our readers for the introduction of such solemn topics in a place where, perhaps, their minds were little prepared to meet them; but the fault must be thrown back upon the author. This intermingling of sacred and profane, of human and divine, is indeed no light objection to the whole book. The most awful subjects that can engage our attention are continually projected from the midst of ordinary incidents and conversations, with an abrupt indifference that jars harshly upon the religious feeling. Without perhaps positive, or at least, manifest, irreverence in their actual treatment, they are yet approached with a careless familiarity, which betrays, through all the cloud of rhetorical declamation, the absence of real appreciation of their truth and importance. Thus the divine appellations, the names and titles of our Lord, and that holy Name of the elder Covenant, which the chosen people sensitively shrank from uttering, are scattered over these pages with a careless frequency. In the same irreligious spirit, Tancred is represented as receiving—will our readers credit it?—a new Revelation on Mount Sinai. Even if the orthodoxy of these volumes were less questionable than it is, we should still protest against this introduction of eternal Truth into the realms of Fable—this attempt to make religion play her part upon the boards of fiction. Such works as the Paradise Lost, the Messiah, the Death of Abel, the Sacred Dramas, contain the seeds of much evil in the indistinctness with which they cover the boundaries, and divide the certain from the probable, the invented from the revealed. But it is far worse, when the homage is doubtful in its very intention. It is a hazardous thing to offer unholy fire, or endeavour to prop the ark with an impure hand.

But it is time to present our readers with a sketch of the story of Tancred, which is certainly not deficient in the usual points which give interest and animation to a novel. Tancred, Marquis of Montacute, the only son of the Duke of Bellamont, is introduced to us on the great festival of his twenty-first birth-day, which is celebrated with a profuse magnificence, that recalls to our memory (as we cannot but think the writer intended it should do) certain festivities of a similar nature which about two years ago rose into general notoriety, on the doubtful distinction of a 'leader' in the *Times*. However, we are not aware that the likeness thus indicated extends to the character of Tancred; we suspect no living member of the aristocracy has sat for the portrait. Educated with an anxious care at home, and scarcely trusted under a vigilant superintendence to complete his course at Christ Church, Tancred has nevertheless contrived to form his opinions and mould his mind in solitude and independence; so that when the Duke proposes to him to enter the House of Commons, he is startled by the sudden exhibition of sentiments, possessing at least the charm of novelty for his Grace's ear.

> '"You have proposed to me to-day," continued Lord Montacute, after a momentary pause, "to enter public life. I do not shrink from its duties. On the contrary, from the position in which I am born, still more from the impulse of my nature, I am desirous to fulfil them. I have meditated on them, I may say, even for years. But I cannot find that it is part of my duty to maintain the order of things—for I will not call it system—which at present prevails in our country. It seems to me that it cannot last; as nothing can endure, or ought to endure, that is not founded upon principle; and its principle I have not discovered. In nothing, whether it be religion, or government, or manners, —sacred, or political, or social life,—do I find faith; and if there be no faith, how can there be duty? Is there such a thing as religious truth? Is there such a thing as political right? Is there such a thing as social propriety? Are these facts, or are they mere phrases? And if they be facts, where are they likely to be found in England? Is truth in our Church? Why, then, do you support dissent? Who has the right to govern? The monarch? You have robbed him of his prerogative. The aristocracy? You confess to me that we exist by sufferance. The people? They themselves tell you that they are nullities. Every session of that Parliament in which you wish to introduce me, the method by which power is distributed is called in question, altered, patched up, and again impugned. As for our morals, tell me—is charity the supreme virtue or the greatest of errors? Our social system ought to depend on a clear conception of this point. Our morals differ in different counties, in different towns, in different streets, even in different acts of Parliament. What is moral in London is immoral in Montacute; what is crime among the multitude is only vice among the few."'—Vol. i. pp. 98—100.

The remedy to these social evils, the clue to these mysteries, he proposes to his astonished father to seek in the Holy Land.

> '"Yes, sir, the Holy Sepulchre," repeated Lord Montacute, and now speak-

ing with his accustomed repose. "When I remember that the Creator, since light sprang out of darkness, has deigned to reveal himself to his creature only in one land; that in that land he assumed a manly form, and met a human death; I feel persuaded that the country sanctified by such intercourse and such events, must be endowed with marvellous and peculiar qualities, which man may not in all ages be competent to penetrate, but which, nevertheless, at all times exercise an irresistible influence upon his destiny. It is these qualities that many times drew Europe to Asia during the middle centuries. Our castle has before this sent forth a De Montacute to Palestine."

'For three days and three nights he knelt at the tomb of his Redeemer. Six centuries and more have elapsed since that great enterprise. It is time to restore and renovate our communications with the Most High. I, too, would kneel at that tomb; I, too, surrounded by the holy hills and sacred groves of Jerusalem, would relieve my spirit from the bale that bows it down; would lift up my voice to Heaven, and ask, what is DUTY, and what is FAITH?—What ought I to DO, and what ought I to BELIEVE?'—Vol. i. p. 110.

Tancred's parents are obliged to yield a reluctant assent to the determined will of their son; but a journey to Jerusalem fairly requires some time for preparation, and they trust in the interval to devise some expedient to change or frustrate his intentions. As a preliminary measure, the Duchess insists on sending him to converse with a Bishop; less, we suspect, for any other purpose, than to give our author an opportunity of sketching the character of an eminent living prelate with all the epigrammatic brilliance of his unrivalled, because utterly unscrupulous, style. The conference fails of its object; the Bishop opposes to Tancred's yearnings after an angelic communication the prospect of a new see at Manchester, and finding him impracticable, satisfies himself with pronouncing him a visionary. Baffled in this cherished scheme, the Duchess is induced to launch her son in the fashionable world, from which she had hitherto studiously withheld him: even balls and club-houses are less dangerous in her eyes than Syria and Jerusalem. And here we are once more among the scenes and persons of the former novels; Coningsby, Sybil, and Tancred all meet round the dinner-table of Sidonia; but, as is generally the case with these re-productions, they have lost the freshness of their original appearance, and produce nothing but disappointment. Altogether, this portion is the least effective part of the work. Ultimately, the Duchess' scheme proves ineffectual, though it seemed twice to be on the point of success. Two ladies successively threw in the way of Tancred's intended expedition the impediment of incipient love. The spell of the former was broken by a conversation on the 'Vestiges of Creation;' the chains of the latter fell off on the fatal discovery that she dealt largely in 'scrip.' The first of these two incidents is so characteristic of Disraeli's method of fixing a topic of the day, that we think the reader will like to see it entire.

'After making herself very agreeable, Lady Constance took up a book which was at hand, and said, "Do you know this?" And Tancred, opening a volume which he had never seen, and then turning to its title-page, found it was "The Revelations of Chaos," a startling work just published, and of which a rumour had reached him.

'"No," he replied; "I have not seen it."

'"I will lend it you, if you like: it is one of those books one must read. It explains everything, and is written in a very agreeable style."

'"It explains everything!" said Tancred. "It must indeed be a very remarkable book!"

'"I think it will just suit you," said Lady Constance. "Do you know, I thought so several times while I was reading it."

'"To judge from the title, the subject is rather obscure," said Tancred.

'"No longer so," said Lady Constance. "It is treated scientifically: everything is explained by geology and astronomy, and in that way. It shows you exactly how a star is formed; nothing can be so pretty! A cluster of vapour—the cream of the milky way—a sort of celestial cheese—churned into light—you must read it, 'tis charming."

'"Nobody ever saw a star formed," said Tancred.

'"Perhaps not. You must read the 'Revelations;' it is all explained. But what is most interesting is, the way in which man has been developed. You know all is development. The principle is perpetually going on. First, there was nothing; then there was something: then—I forget the next—I think there were shells, then fishes; then we came—let me see—did we come next? Never mind that; we came at last. And the next change there will be something very superior to us—something with wings. Ah! that's it; we were fishes, and I believe we shall be crows. But you must read it."

'"I do not believe I ever was a fish," said Tancred.

'"Oh! but it is all proved: you must not argue on my rapid sketch; read the book. It is impossible to contradict anything in it. You understand it is all science; it is not like those books in which one says one thing and another the contrary, and both may be wrong. Everything is proved—by geology, you know. You see exactly how everything is made; how many worlds there have been; how long they lasted; what went before, what comes next. We are a link in the chain, as inferior animals were that preceded us: we in turn shall be inferior; all that will remain of us will be some relics in a new red sandstone. This is development. We had fins—we may have wings."'—Vol. i. p. 224—226.

The criticism is graphic and just, and reminds us of a similar passage in 'Coningsby,' where Mr. Rigby recommends Mr. Wordy's 'History of the late War,' in twenty volumes, written to prove that Providence was on the side of the Tories—a work, whose prototype it is not difficult to conjecture. Under our author's hands, the novel is assuming very much the form of the old satire, or older comedy. Men and measures, books and actions, whatever engages for the time the attention of the public,—all are made to find their place in its pages, either in undisguised simplicity, or covered only with the faintest affectation of a decent concealment. Hiding grave opinions beneath a serious comicality, it passes on all that occurs a judgment which is likely to penetrate the further from its seeming lightness.

Breaking loose from the snares which threatened to detain him, Tancred at length sets out on his pilgrimage, armed with the following letters of introduction and credit from the all-powerful Sidonia.

> '*To Alonzo Lara, Spanish Prior, at the Convent of Terra Santa at Jerusalem.*
>
> 'Most Holy Father,—The youth who will deliver to you this is a pilgrim, who aspires to penetrate the great Asian mystery. Be to him what you were to me; and may the God of Sinai, in whom we all believe, guard over you, and prosper his enterprise. SIDONIA.'
>
> '*To Adam Besso, at Jerusalem.*
>
> 'My good Adam,—If the youth who bears this require advances, let him have as much gold as would make the right-hand lion on the first step of the throne of Solomon the king; and if he want more, let him have as much as would form the lion that is on the left; and so on, through every stair of the royal seat. For all which will be responsible to you the child of Israel, who among the Gentiles is called SIDONIA.'
>
> —Vol. i. p. 337.

Arrived at Jerusalem, he perplexes the natives by the unwonted phenomenon of an Englishman and a Protestant passing a night in prayer before the Holy Sepulchre; and on the following days he wanders forth to visit Gethsemane.

> 'The sun had been declining for some hours, the glare of the earth had subsided, the fervour of the air was allayed. A caravan came winding round the hills, with many camels, and persons in rich, bright, Syrian dresses; a congregation that had assembled at the church of the Ascension on Mount Olivet had broken up, and the side of the hill was studded with brilliant and picturesque groups; the standard of the Crescent floated on the tower of David; there was the clang of Turkish music, and the governor of the city, with a numerous cavalcade, might be discerned on Mount Moriah, caracoling without the walls; a procession of women bearing classic vases on their heads, who had been fetching the waters of Siloah from the well of Job, came up the valley of Jehoshaphat, to wind their way to the gate of Stephen and enter Jerusalem by the street of Calvary.
>
> 'Tancred came forth from the garden of Gethsemane, his face was flushed with the rapt stillness of pious ecstacy; hours had vanished during his passionate reverie, and he stared upon the declining sun.
>
> 'The path to the right leads to Bethany. The force of association brought back the last words that he had heard from a human voice. And can he sleep without seeing Bethany? He mounts the path. What a landscape surrounds him as he moves! What need for nature to be fair in a scene like this, where not a spot is visible that is not heroic or sacred, consecrated or memorable; not a rock that is not the cave of prophets; not a valley that is not the valley of heaven-anointed kings; not a mountain that is not the mountain of God!
>
> 'Before him is a living, a yet breathing and existing city, which Assyrian monarchs came down to besiege, which the chariots of Pharaohs encompassed, which Roman emperors have personally assailed, for which Saladin and Cœur de Lion, the Desert and Christendom, Asia and Europe, struggled in rival chivalry —a city which Mahomet sighed to rule, and over which the Creator alike of Assyrian kings and Egyptian Pharaohs and Roman Cæsars, the framer alike of the Desert and of Christendom, poured forth the full effusion of his divinely

> human sorrow. What need of cascade and of cataract, the deep green turf, the foliage of the fairest trees, the impenetrable forest, the abounding river, mountains of glaciered crest, the voice of birds, the bounding forms of beauteous animals, all sights and sounds of material loveliness that might become the delicate ruins of some archaic theatre, or the lingering fanes of some forgotten faith! They would not be observed as the eye seized on Sion and Calvary; the gates of Bethlehem and Damascus; the hill of Titus; the mosque of Mahomet and the tomb of Christ. The view of Jerusalem is the history of the world; it is more, it is the history of earth and of heaven.'—Vol. ii. p 33—35.

We shrink from the irreverent boldness which can introduce these awful topics to decorate a sentence or turn a period; but it would be difficult to deny this extract the praise of a well-managed composition; and the sentiment of the last paragraph is both true and beautiful.

As he leaves the village of Bethany, Tancred is tempted by an open portal to stray into a garden, where he encounters the lady, who, according to all the rules of romance, is bound to fill that niche in the story, which has, as yet, been vacant. Eva, the daughter of Besso, the Rose of Sharon, though she lives only in the glories of her nation, is nevertheless disposed to listen and discourse most learnedly on the mutual relations of Jew and Christian. But Eva is betrothed to her cousin Hillel; and the interview at Bethany does not ripen into a declared love till the close of the third volume, which mercilessly abandons the lovers in the crisis of their fate, and leaves the unhappy reader to the anticipation of three more volumes to complete the tale.

On a hint from Alonzo Lara, Tancred, unsatisfied at Jerusalem, resolves to seek Mount Sinai; but his journey is doomed to be interrupted by the schemes of a personage who plays a conspicuous part throughout the two last volumes. Fakredeen, an Emir of the house of Shehaab, a princely family of Lebanon, had the misfortune, while yet an infant, to lose his father in a civil broil. Brought up in the household of Besso, and ever retaining a sincere, though somewhat whimsical, affection for his foster-father and sister, he nevertheless soon left the quiet home of the merchant to engage in a ceaseless whirl of intrigue for the recovery of the political importance attaching to his house. His character is well conceived and admirably sustained. Full of quick feelings and good impulses, but without one atom of constancy, or one dash of principle, and with an imaginative and inventive faculty absolutely overflowing with expedients, he makes and mars the most elaborate schemes with a rapidity perfectly astonishing, and an unconscious roguery that spares neither friend nor foe, while the innocent openness with which he discloses all his plans disarms all anger. His political aspirations allow Mr. Disraeli the opportunity of expatiating in a favourite field, that of our foreign, and, more particularly, our Eastern policy. In the days when his oratory was directed against the Melbourne government, no antagonist was more often singled out by him than Lord Palmerston, no topic more pertinaciously urged than the Syrian war of 1839. Now, however, that his political animosity is directed into another channel, he is content to pass over the policy of that war in silence, while he bestows the highest praise on the ability with which it was planned and effected. Fakredeen's intricate combinations at home, and elaborate mystifications of the foreign powers, are sketched out with great piquancy. The Emir's greatest triumph and keenest enjoyment consists in perplexing Aberdeen and Guizot with contradictory reports, or deceiving them with unblushing falsehoods. His teeming brain, ever fertile in resources, appears to be about equally useful in getting him into scrapes, and helping him out of them. The following is a sample of the extent of his political information, and the universality of his schemes. It is the close of the conversation with Tancred, from which we have already given an extract.

'"I'll tell you," said the Emir, springing from his divan, and flinging the tube of his nargilly to the other end of the tent; "the game is in our hands, if we have energy. There is a combination which would entirely change the whole face of the world, and bring back empire to the East. Though you are not the brother of the Queen of the English, you are nevertheless a great English prince, and the Queen will listen to what you say; especially if you talk to her as you talk to me, and say such fine things in such a beautiful voice. Nobody ever opened my mind like you. You will magnetize the Queen as you have magnetized me. Go back to England and arrange this. You see—gloze it over as they may—one thing is clear, it is finished with England. There are three things which alone must destroy it. Primo, O'Connell appropriating to himself the revenues of half of her majesty's dominions. Secondo, the cottons—the world begins to get a little disgusted with those cottons; naturally, everybody prefers silk. I am sure that the Lebanon in time could supply the whole world with silk, if it were properly administered. Thirdly, steam; with this steam your great ships have become a respectable Noah's ark. The game is up; Louis Philippe can take Windsor Castle whenever he pleases, as you took Acre, with the wind in his teeth. It is all over, then. Now, see a *coup d'état* that saves all. You must perform the Portuguese scheme on a great scale; quit a petty and exhausted position for a vast and prolific empire. Let the Queen of the English collect a great fleet, let her stow away all her treasure, bullion, gold plate, and precious arms; be accompanied by all her court and chief people, and transfer the seat of her empire from London to Delhi. There she will find an immense empire ready made, a first-rate army, and a large revenue. In the mean time I will arrange with Mehemet Ali. He shall have Bagdad and Mesopotamia, and pour the Bedoueen cavalry into Persia. I will take care of Syria and Asia Minor. The only way to manage the Affghans is by Persia and by the Arabs. We will acknowledge the Empress of India as our suzerain, and secure for her the Levantine coast. If she like, she shall have Alexandria as she now has Malta: it could be arranged. Your Queen is young: she has an *avenir*. Aberdeen and Sir Peel will never give her this advice; their habits are formed. They are too old, too *rusés*. But you see! the greatest empire that ever existed; besides which she gets rid of the embarrassment of her Chambers! And quite practicable; for the only difficult part, the conquest of India, which baffled Alexander, is all done." '—Vol. ii. p. 187—190.

This ambitious and intriguing personage, at the time of Tancred's arrival in the Holy Land, happens to be in want of a few piastres, to pay for the purchase and convoy of sundry muskets, for the use of his friends of the Mountain. Was it to be expected that he should neglect so obvious an occasion of providing them, as the journey to Sinai of an English noble, with an unlimited letter of credit on Adam Besso? If he were only captured by a Bedoueen tribe, his ransom might be fixed at any sum that the Emir's wants might suggest. The Great Sheikh of the children of Rechab, the father-in-law of Besso, is persuaded to undertake the office. But Fakredeen has no sooner secured his captive, than he is himself captivated by the gentle manner and lofty wisdom of his new acquaintance. Possessed as strongly by his new impulse, as by his former plans, his only object now is to procure his friend's release; but the Great Sheikh has no notion of giving up his share of the ransom. However he consents to allow Tancred to proceed on parole on his pilgrimage to Sinai; and there in a trance, by night, the long-expected communication is vouchsafed. Certainly whatever other merits Mr. Disraeli may possess, he does not rise to the conception of a Divine message; the address of 'the angel of Arabia, the guardian spirit of that land which 'governs the world,' is verbose and rhetorical. After enlarging, in language, which, to speak charitably, borders on the profane, on the universal supremacy of Arabian principles under their 'last development,' in Christianity, he delivers the new mission in a vein of proper oracular obscurity.

'The eternal principles that controlled barbarian vigour can alone cope with morbid civilization. The equality of man can only be accomplished by the sovereignty of God. The longing for fraternity can never be satisfied but under the sway of a common father. The relations between Jehovah and his creatures can be neither too numerous nor too near. In the increased distance between God and man, have grown up all those developments that have made life mournful. Cease then to seek in a vain philosophy the solution of the social problem that perplexes you. Announce the sublime and solacing doctrine of theocratic equality. Fear not, faint not, falter not. Obey the impulse of thine own spirit, and find a ready instrument in every human being.'—Vol. ii. p. 245.

The prosecution of this lucid and promising injunction is deferred by a fever, from which our hero is very opportunely recovered by Eva's skill in leechcraft, and by the negotiations necessary to induce the Great Sheikh to forego his prey. However this is at length accomplished, and Tancred accompanies his new friend Fakredeen to his mountain castle of Canobia, to recruit his health by the fresh breezes of Lebanon, and discuss and arrange his plans for the conquest of the world on Arabian principles, of theocratic equality. As a preliminary step, it is necessary to unite the discordant tribes of Lebanon in one grand confederacy; for the Christian Maronites and Pagan Druses, the two chief races of the mountain, have been accustomed to entertain for one another the full proverbial hatred of neighbourhood. With this view the Emir holds a grand hunting-party, which is described with the graphic vividness of which Disraeli is so perfect a master. In the course of the feast, Tancred discovers that there is yet another tribe to be conciliated, the Ansarey, who hold the northern passes of Lebanon, and who appear to be enveloped in a mystery which neither Druse nor Maronite can unfold. Their origin, their race, their religion are all unknown; and they guard their secret so jealously that no stranger has been known to enter their country. All obstacles, however, vanish before the determined will of Tancred; he obtains an audience of the Queen of the Ansarey, and has the satisfaction of promulgating his divine mission at her hitherto inhospitable court. We will give the interview entire, that the reader may have the benefit of Tancred's commentary on the somewhat obscure text of his desert vision:—

' "Princes," said the queen, "you are welcome to Gindaries, where nobody ever comes. For we are people who wish neither to see nor to be seen. We are not like other people, nor do we envy other people. I wish not for the ships of the Queen of the English, and my subjects are content to live as their fathers lived before them. Our mountains are wild and barren; our vales require for their cultivation unceasing toil. We have no gold or silver, no jewels; neither have we silk. But we have some beautiful and consoling thoughts, and more than thoughts, which are shared by all of us and open to all of us, and which only we can value or comprehend. When Darkush, who dwells at Damascus, and was the servant of my father, sent to us the ever-faithful messenger, and said that there were princes who wished to confer with us, he knew well it was vain to send here men who would talk of the English and the Egyptians, of the Porte, and of the nations of Franguestan. These things to us are like the rind of fruit. Neither do we care for cottons, nor for things which are sought for in the cities of the plains, and it may be, noble Emir, cherished also in the mountains of Lebanon. This is not Lebanon, but the mountains of the Ansarey, who are, as they have ever been, before the name of Turk or English was known in Syria, and who will remain as they are, unless that happens which may never happen, but which is too beautiful not to believe may arrive. Therefore I speak to you with frankness, princes, of strange countries; Darkush, the servant of my father, and also mine, told me, by the ever-faithful messenger, that it was not of these things, which are to us like water spilt on sand, that you wished to confer, but that there were things to be said which ought to be uttered. Therefore it is, I sent back the faithful messenger, saying, Send then these princes to Gindaries, since their talk is not of things which come and go, making a noise on the coasts and in the cities of the plains, and then passing away. These we infinitely despise; but the words of truth uttered in the spirit of friendship will last, if they be grave, and on matters which authorize journeys made by princes to visit queens."

'Her majesty ceased, and looked at Keferinis, who bowed profound approbation. Tancred and Fakredeen also exchanged glances, but the Emir waved his hand, signifying his wish that Tancred should reply, who, after a moment's hesitation, with an air of great deference, thus ventured to express himself.

' "It seems to me and to my friend, the Prince of the Lebanon, that we have listened to the words of wisdom. They are in every respect just. We know not ourselves Darkush, but he was rightly informed when he apprised your majesty that it was not upon ordinary topics, either political or commercial, that we desired to visit Gindaries. Nor was it out of such curiosity as animates travellers. For we are not travellers, but men who have a purpose which we wish to execute. The world, that, since its creation, has owned the spiritual supremacy of Asia, which is but natural, since Asia is the only portion of the world which the Creator of that world has deigned to visit, and in which he has ever conferred with man, is unhappily losing its faith in those ideas and convictions that hitherto have governed the human race. We think, therefore, the time has arrived when Asia should make one of its periodical and appointed efforts to re-assert that supremacy. But though we are acting, as we believe, under a divine impulse, it is our duty to select the most fitting human agents to accomplish a celestial mission. We have thought, therefore, that it should devolve on Syria and Arabia, countries in which our God has ever dwelt, and with which He has been from the earliest days in direct and regular communication, to undertake the solemn task. Two races of men alike free, one inhabiting the desert, the other the mountains, untainted by any of the vices of the plains, and the virgin vigour of their intelligence not dwarfed by the conventional superstitions of towns and cities—one prepared at once to supply an unrivalled cavalry, the other an army ready equipped of intrepid foot-soldiers—appear to us to be indicated as the natural and united conquerors of the world. We wish to conquer that world, with angels at our head, in order that we may establish the happiness of man by a divine dominion, and, crushing the political atheism that is now desolating existence, utterly extinguish the grovelling tyranny of self-government." '—Vol. iii. p. 161—165.

After this magnificent annunciation, we leave the reader to imagine Tancred's vexation at the discovery that the Queen of the Ansarey rules over a nation, not of Arabians, nor Jews, nor even Mahometans, but of pure, old, classical Pagans. Driven from Antioch by the advance of Christianity, the gods of the Greeks took refuge, it seems, in the mountains; and the statues of Phœbus, Apollo, and Olympian Jove, enshrined in the caverns of the Ansarey, receive the homage of the Queen Astarte. This is not a very promising opening for the New Crusade; and its prospects are still further darkened by the sudden conversion of Tancred's friend, Fakredeen, to idolatry, under the auspices of the beautiful Queen. Beyond this opening scene we are not as yet allowed to penetrate. After a series of intrigues, terminating with a great battle, Tancred retraces his steps to the Holy City, and the garden of Bethany; where his declaration of love to Eva is interrupted by the sudden announcement of the arrival of the Duke and Duchess of Bellamont at Jerusalem; with which startling piece of intelligence the volume abruptly closes. The ulterior fortunes of the New Crusade, the more full development of its principles, the narrative or prophecy of its success or failure, are left in Tartarean gloom, without even the promise of a future explanation; unless, indeed, the doctrine of final causes may warrant us in arguing the intended existence of three more volumes from the manifest imperfection of the three before us.

But if the future of the New Crusade is still unrevealed, this first disclosure of it is not without its moral. It stands in singular opposition with the fact, that, in his capacity of the representative of the New Generation, Mr. Disraeli has sometimes appeared as the advocate and exponent of the Church, and has been occasionally in political connexion with some who are undeniably devoted to her. But the Church acknowledges no friends; she seeks only for loyal sons. The present work will have shown that Mr. Disraeli can scarcely rest his claim to that title upon his creed; whether his practice would more justly secure it to him, it is not our province to determine. And this fusion of practical independence with theoretic Churchmanship is not wholly without countenance in the present day: it cannot safely be overlooked as an individual idiosyncrasy. His historical religionism carries the thoughts almost involuntarily to the French and German schools. It is not now the fashion to produce either grave argument or light ridicule against our holy religion; its enemies first treat it as a fact, and then explain it. Like Guizot or Michelet, the author of Tancred appears to regard the Catholic Church as a great historical phenomenon, highly useful and beneficial in its season; but like other historical ideas, limited in its operation by time and place, and superseded or ignored by the lapse of ages. It has been a great phenomenon, springing from a past state of things, and preparing the way for another stage in the history of man. And with this view of its relative position, he seems to adopt something of the Straussian, or of Salvador's, method in the explanation of its historical facts. The children of Israel, we are told, (vol. ii. p. 121,) 'were originally a tribe of Arabia Petræa. Under the guidance of sheikhs of great ability, they emerged from their stony wilderness, and settled on the Syrian border. But they could not maintain themselves against the disciplined nations of Palestine, and they fell back to their desert, which they found intolerable. Like some of the Bedoueen tribes of modern times in the rocky wastes contiguous to the Red Sea, they were unable to resist the temptations of the Egyptian cities; they left their free but distressful wilderness, and became Fellaheen.' It is difficult to recognise in this sketch the Scriptural narratives of Abraham and Joseph. And again, there is not much harmony between the phraseology of Scripture, and the language in which we are told that the Egyptian slavery 'was not to 'be long borne by a race whose chiefs in the early ages had 'been favoured by Jehovah . . . . . . Their fiery imaginations 'brooded over the great traditions of their tribe, and at length 'there arose among them one of those men whose existence is 'an epoch in the history of human nature: a great creative 'spirit and organizing mind, in whom the faculties of conception 'and of action are equally balanced and possessed in the highest 'degree; in every respect a man of the complete Caucasian 'model, and almost as perfect as Adam when he was just 'finished and placed in Eden.' The reader will require to be reminded that this language relates to the 'man Moses,' 'slow 'in speech,' a reluctant agent in the Divine Hand, and 'very 'meek, above all the men which were upon the face of the 'earth;' and that he is speaking of the race, of whom it is writ- en, 'Not for thy righteousness, or for the uprightness of thine heart, dost thou go to possess their land. . . . . Understand, herefore, that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this good land possess it for thy righteousness; for thou art a stiff-necked eople' (Deut. ix. 5, 6). Texts like these, and they are nume- s, stand in curious opposition to the theory of natural excel- ce which Mr. Disraeli would fain assign to the Hebrew race. eir greatness surely lies rather in their destiny than in their ysical organization: they were 'a chosen generation, a peculiar people;' they were entrusted with the 'Divine oracles;' an awful nour, guarded by a fearful penalty. Our readers will ubtless thank us for recalling their thoughts, in conclusion, to me lines, which give, as we think, a more true, and not less olemn, view of the position of the Jews:—

'O piteous race!
Fearful to look upon:
Once standing in high place,
Heaven's eldest son.
O aged, blind,
Unvenerable! as thou flittest by,
I liken thee to him in pagan song,
In thy gaunt majesty,
The vagrant king, of haughty-purposed mind,
Whom prayer nor plague could bend;
Wronged, at the cost of him who did the wrong,
Accursed himself, but in his cursing strong,
And honoured in his end.'

NOTICES.

'TENTATIVA Theologica, Episcopal Rights and Ultra-montane Usurpations. By Father Antonio Pereira de Figueredo, Priest and Doctor, of Lisbon. Translated from the original Portuguese, with Notes and some additional matter, by the Rev. E. H. Landon, M.A., author of a Manual of Councils. London, (Masters,) 1847.'

We think the translation of this work is good service done to the Church of England at the present time. Within the last two years a considerable number of persons have left our communion for that of Rome, and, in so doing, have accepted without hesitation or misgiving the full ultra-montane system, as it is at present developed in an almost pure spiritual monarchy. Such of them as have published reasons for their departure from us certainly do not show that they have even considered the question, whether this spiritual monarchy was borne witness to by the Church Universal in its golden ages. They have received *upon credit* the most enormous system of centralized power which exists in the world. It is well, then, to bring before English Churchmen the fact, that, independent of the continual witness of the Eastern Church, there has not been wanting, in the bosom of the Roman Communion itself, a line of theologians, who, with gigantic learning and unwearied patience, have pointed out the successive usurpations of the Roman See. The true line to take in the Roman controversy is the historic line, the line of plain fact; not jealously to deny the real power and pre-eminence of the Roman See in the ancient Church systems, but to point out the grounds on which that power rested, to define and limit its extent, and to exhibit other Sees in the possession of similar power. This has been done by the old Gallican school, and the English student may find in their volumes a most solid defence of the present position of his own communion as to the question of schism. For the same reason the present volume of the great Portuguese theologian, Pereira, is well worthy of his attention. A dispute between the civil power in Portugal and the Roman See led Pereira to consider an important practical question: from what power, namely, dispensations for marriage were to emanate while communion with Rome was absolutely suspended by the sovereign. These dispensations, from being formerly under the control of each several Bishop in his diocese, or, in the last appeal, of the metropolitan with his provincial council, had been gradually drawn, like all other influential matters, under the sole power of the central Bishop. If the central Bishop, then, could not be approached, what was to ensue? Was society to be thrown into inextricable confusion on the one hand, or did Rome, on the other, possess a power which could compel to absolute submission the opposing party, whatever might be the merits of the case between them? It is evident that the point could only be solved by a full statement of episcopal rights in relation to the first Bishop's controlling power and privileges. Accordingly Pereira has laid down ten principles, which he successively illustrates with a vast body of early and mediæval learning. The first of these principles will give their general drift. It runs:—'The episcopal 'jurisdiction considered in itself, that is, in its institution by Christ, 'and apart from any law, use, or reservation to the contrary, is a jurisdic'tion absolute and unlimited in respect to each diocese.'—P. 31. It may be here sufficient to state that Pereira's principles go far beyond the particular occasion to which they relate; and, with especial reference to the English Churchman, that they are sufficient to cover the actual position in which he finds himself. It is a comfort at least to reflect that the dominion of Rome, even within her own communion, has not been established—if it be yet finally established—without the continued remonstrance and earnest protest, supported by all the force that tradition and antiquity can give to any cause, of the most learned and pious of her own children from Gerson to Bossuet and Pereira.

Mr. Neale has prefixed a useful and interesting introduction to this work, sketching the circumstances of Pereira's life, and those which led to this publication, which, he says, excited the greatest interest in Europe, and was publicly burnt at Rome. He also notes the remarkable similarity between this book and that lately published by Mr. Allies, as to the distinction between the primacy and supremacy of Rome. Mr. Neale's own words may serve to wind up this brief notice of a book which will well repay the labour of perusal. 'In conclusion, we would again express the hope with 'which we commenced, that these pages may, by God's grace, be useful 'in settling the doubts which any may entertain as to the catholicity of 'our Spiritual Mother, from the fact, that she is not in visible communion 'with the See of Rome. Other points of equal importance remain to be 'urged against her: imputed heresy in her formularies, allowed heresy 'among her sons, violated discipline, Donatist intolerance, alliance with 'Protestant heretics: but these must be met on their own separate 'grounds.'

'Protestant Thoughts in Rhyme.' By Baptist W. Noel, M.A. (Nisbet.) We have here an illustration of the force of example. The present is a poetical age. It has its few first-class poets; it has its many *minores poetæ*, whose productions, though not perhaps of the highest rank, have still real rank, as poetry. It is compared to the Elizabethan age in this respect. It exhibits an obvious development of the poetical faculty, the diffusion of a gift. Upon a view of this general fact, it has occurred to Mr. Baptist Noel to put 'thoughts into rhyme.' He has said to himself: here are persons all around me, young and old, writing poetry; their poetry tells; why should not I write poetry? I will write poetry. I will begin immediately. He has accordingly, with this resolution, drawn his chair to his table, taken pen in hand, applied it to the paper before him, and written long, absolute —yes, absolute—doggrel. We are guilty of no severity here, but that of simple, sober description. No ordinary critic can for one moment doubt what that is, which Mr. Noel has written.

And now for a moral. The force of example sometimes operates unhappily, as an ancient fable testifies. Persons should know what they can do, and what they cannot. *Non omnia possumus omnes:* it is no discredit to Mr. Noel that he cannot write poetry: he had never, we believe, versified until this occasion, and nobody blamed him for it. Why he should have considered himself called upon to make this demonstration, we cannot discern. If a person has not a particular gift, there is no necessity for his proving, for all men's satisfaction, his want of it. This is just what that character, so often named in the book of Proverbs, does. Let Mr. Noel be thankful for those talents which he has, and learn humility from his undeniable want of others. The human mind has indefinite cravings indeed after all kinds of powers, resources, gifts. Men wish to be orators; wish to be generals; wish to be statesmen. The power of wishing is infinite. But this power does not place a person in sufficient connexion with a gift, to warrant a display; and Mr. Noel may be quite assured that he will never enjoy any nearer connexion than this one, with the gift of poetry.

'A Thousand Lines now first offered to the World we live in,' (Hatchard,) show poetical thought, but want finish.

'The World and its Creator; or, the Message of God and the History of Man.' By F. A. Head. (Rivingtons.) Of this paraphrase of the Book of Genesis, intermixed with reflections and explanations, we cannot say much more than that it is written in an orthodox spirit.

Mr. E. H. Thompson and Mr. Renouf have published answers to Mr. Allies. We observe, Mr. T. postpones the regular separation of East and West to the year 1520. In Mr. Renouf's pamphlet this passage occurs:—'There is 'but *one* class of persons who will deny that conscientious piety was infi'nitely more characteristic of the Puritans than of their High Church oppo'nents; and that, in the absence of all other forms of religion, it were 'better to cast one's lot with Baxter, John Bunyan, and the "pilgrim 'fathers," than either with the cavaliers or the court divines of that false'hearted sovereign, whom short-sighted devotion has styled a Martyr.'

1. 'Steepleton; or, High Church and Low Church.' By a Clergyman. (Longman.) 2. 'Trevor; a Tale for the Times.' (Longman.) 3. 'From Oxford to Rome, and how it fared with some who lately made the Journey.' By a Companion Traveller. (Longman.) A sort of *forma tricorporis umbræ*, which Lord Lindsey's canon of triplicity as well as common consent and a common publisher bracket together: and to one party in the arrangement a very fortunate incident it is, that they are so accidentally connected; we mean to the 'Clergyman' author—alas! that it should be so—of 'Steepleton.' Fortunate in that it has secured to his unhappy production a sort of attention which, under other circumstances, any decent person would have been ashamed to attach to it. Personal without point—mean and uninteresting although full of what are meant to be sketches of individual character—libellous and lying, and at the same time a miracle of dulness: such is Steepleton. And if it be thought that personal acquaintance with the estimable individual who is a chief subject of the pitiable author's disappointed spite has biassed our judgment, it may be enough to mention as an instance of his wit, that in speaking of the ancient Church music, he calls it 'The Grig-oround-style,' p. 291; and that his chief jests are spent upon the Church's Sacraments. 'The malice of one who designed to succeed in his living being withal assistant,' (Fell's Life of Hammond,) we are almost thankful to the secret fomenter and instigator of the East Farleigh controversy, for gibbetting himself as he has done as the author of Steepleton.—We owe something like an apology to the authors of the other two works,

for associating them in this unpleasant companionship. Trevor is cleverly written; sometimes it reminds us of 'Hawkstone,' at least in assembling upon one character all the fiendish wickedness which a one-sided literature has accredited to a diffused system. But if we are to have the pruriency of Michelet transferred to the individualized hero of a novel, we think the 'Wandering Jew' superior in talent and not inferior in purpose to the present work. The writer of Trevor would have us believe—or otherwise his tale is valueless—that there are Clergymen—actually reconciled to the Church of Rome—who still continue to officiate at English altars, 'under a dispensation,' and are in the habit of scourging themselves in private to atone for their public dissimulation. This is the mode of controversy adopted by those who rest their allegiance to the Church of England upon its 'parliamentary' Establishmentarianism.—'From Oxford to Rome' is written in what assumes to be a higher tone and a different spirit: it purports to be the confessions of a perplexed and truth-loving mind, which has sought refuge in Rome from the higher motives which in various ways are announced as having influenced the recent seceders; and as having found no rest, but additional disquietude there. An awfully interesting subject, and one which is sure to attract attention, because it falls in not only with vague hints but with probable anticipations. The only question which suggests itself—Is it true? Are there facts upon which to found this fearful anatomy of a shipwrecked spirit? The preface, in solemn and even affecting language, avers the truth of what the book details. If so—and we have a right to say the same of 'Hawkstone,' which puts forth similar claims—these books should not be anonymous: the facts, if facts they be, should not appear in this form: they involve the deepest and holiest considerations: such facts bear a tremendous value if rightly and truthfully brought before us: they are worse than useless at present; they tend only to exasperate and disquiet. Either, therefore, 'From Oxford to Rome' is a most valuable, or a very wicked, work. Valuable it cannot be, we repeat, in its present shape, whatever importance it may hereafter acquire when authenticated with names, facts, and documents; wicked it is, if it is only a clever literary trifling with the feelings, only a book-making speculation, and if it only adopts a probable religious course as the vehicle of an attempt at eloquent but fictitious self-dissection. Even Defoe's power cannot reconcile us to the moral value of a fictitious autobiography. The unseen things of the conscience are always a questionable subject for mere literature; but the heartless fictions of Rousseau and Godwin, in the way of sham 'confessions,' are doubly reprehensible when connected, as their general principle is in this case, with religious struggles; and most of all when applied to the state of things in which thousands of the most earnest of the present day, by no choice of their own, find themselves. To tell readers, as the author of 'Lucretia' does, that he writes but upon facts—simple severe facts—and then to give no proof that they are facts, is productive not only of no ethical good, but of immense harm. These things only show, as extreme instances happily do, that the religious novel, and we are far from underrating the actual good which has in some cases accrued from it, has had its day. 'From Oxford to Rome' will persuade all good men to relinquish this doubtful weapon. For ourselves—and it is but an individual opinion—we incline against the genuineness of this book; it is only trifles which can be at present taken as evidence either way, and under this impression we should say that no person really bearing the character which the title-page claims, would use the phrase 'Sabbath duties,' p. 100. Again—though in itself a spirited sketch, and one which would pass well enough with those who did *not* know the man—the language put into the mouth of the most distinguished of the late seceders conveys a very different impression from that which must be present to all who, in however slight degree, ever had his personal acquaintance. And it is not without its significance that the prayer *Deus cui proprium est* is not in the *Ordo commendationis animæ* at all—that the prayer *absolve quæsumus*, which is said over Eustace before his death, is ordered in the Roman Ritual only *in die depositionis defuncti*. While with respect to the prayer, 'We recommend,' &c., in which the phrases occur, 'Although he has sinned . . . . he has had a zeal for Thy honour,' &c., nothing at all like it occurs in any service of the Roman Ritual.

Since our article on Church Music was written, we have received 'Short Anthems or Introits suited to the course of the ecclesiastical year; the music selected and adapted from ancient sources, and harmonized for voice or organ; by C. C. Spencer.' This publication will sustain the character which Mr. Spencer has gained by his recent work on the Church modes, and will we think be found very useful in 'places where they sing,' but where, nevertheless, the more elaborate figured music of the Church cannot easily be performed. And even in choirs of higher proficiency, these anthems may well be performed in addition to others; for, with all their antique simplicity, they will be found exceedingly grand and solemn; while their adaptation to the services of each day is not their least recommendation.

The subject of Church Music reminds us to mention a little work on the Psalter, recently published by the Rev. H. Formby,—'The Catholic Christian's Guide to the right use of Psalmody,' &c. (Richardson, Derby.) The preface informs us that 'the substance of the work was written when its author was still a clergyman of the Established Church,' and its character will be sufficiently understood by the table of contents, which tells us that the work treats of—the 'Psalter as speaking in the person of David—of Jesus Christ—of the Church—of the Christian Soul—of the Psalter as a Manual of Private Devotion—as the Song Book of the Kingdom of Christ—its figurative language—of Christ the King—of the Church and Kingdom of Christ—of the Church's enemies and her warfare—of the final rest of the good, and the final misery of the bad.' There is an introductory chapter on the 'True Christian use of Music,' in which Mr. Formby leaves far in the distance all previous advocates of 'Plain Song.' He pleads, in fact, with the utmost sincerity for its *exclusive* use, to the entire abandonment of all figured music, even of the most severe and solemn kind. Alas! for the labours of Morales and Palestrina! not to speak of the more favoured music of the present Roman Church;—infinite, indeed, in its distance from the character of the plain chant,—and the Masses of Haydn and Mozart. We should be curious to see a review of the book before us by the writer of the series of papers on Church Music which have lately appeared in the 'Tablet.' We augur good however from so universal a stir and debate on this all-important subject. Our readers are of course aware, from the article in our present Number, and that on Ritual Music in a previous one, that we advocate the use alike of Plain Song and of figured music—*each in their proper place*—and both in their purest and grandest form. Mr. Formby has thrown his work into a Catechetical form—not at all to its advantage. It is significant that this is the only work by a 'recent convert' on anything like a practical subject; and this too was written in our own communion.

'A few words from the Master of a Family to his Household,' (Rivingtons,) is a good specimen of the practical working of Church principles in a single family. What we need is this systematic, business-like religion.

We are glad to find the 'Ecclesiastical Almanack' (Leslie) continued. It is the best.

A third and complete volume of 'Sharpe's London Magazine' has just reached us. To appreciate the healthy and vigorous tone of this most useful miscellany, which we find is planning improvements in the illustrations, it is only needful to compare it with its rivals, the 'People's' and 'Howitt's Journals.' Never was so frightful a revelation of the principles of the 'friends of the people' as in the recent squabble between the respective conductors of these works. The meanness of William and Mary Howitt, the shocking principles of their Journal, openly devoted to the wildest doctrines of Chartism and Deism, and the imbecility of Saunders, the victim of the Quaker couple, forms a whole which renders this affair very instructive and almost important. We recommend our readers, on many accounts, to procure the documents. Sharpe retains his variety, and we think consolidates, as he goes on; and this, we hear, with great, and certainly well-deserved, success.

We are glad to see another edition of Mr. Monro's Allegory, 'The Dark River,' (Burns,) as well as some corrections which have been made in it; especially one toward the end. Mr. Monro's allegory, though containing, critically speaking, not a few irregularities and departures from the allegorical model, has still the great praise of leaving a very strong and living idea upon a reader's mind.

The excellent series, "Instrumenta Ecclesiastica,' (Van Voorst,) is finished: and a beautiful and useful volume it makes, which we recommend unconditionally.—From the same publisher, we have received Professor Ansted's 'The Ancient World; or, Picturesque Sketches of Creation.' The author's name is, we believe, a sufficient guarantee of its scientific value, we mention it rather as a beautifully illustrated book, and a very curious specimen of the revival of ancient binding. Mr. Van Voorst's publications are always the first in their class.

Mr. Hawkins has published one number of what promises to be an extremely useful collection, 'Annals of the Colonial Church,' (S. P. C. K.) The Diocese of Fredericton is his first subject: and it is illustrated by the same sort of documents which in his 'Historical Notices of the Church in America,' brought out the practical, yet hidden, working character which so honourably marked our early Colonial Missions.

'The Anglo-Catholic Library' has brought up all its arrears most faithfully. 'Johnson' and the first volume of 'Hammond' have appeared; both, especially the latter, very skilfully edited. We find—a matter which honourably distinguishes this collection—that so far from being behind hand in their publications, the Committee are actually in advance upon the subscribers; the thirty-four volumes published equalling, in the aggregate number of pages promised, viz. 400 pages per volume, as much as thirty-seven volumes of 410 pages each. This fact should be borne in mind by those who, somewhat discreditably, seem to feel it a duty to keep their contributions in arrears.

Subjoined to our present number is an appeal on behalf of the Restoration of S. Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin. Founded by an Englishman, and presided over by Englishmen in succession up to the Reformation, and the especial care of Laud and Strafford, this undertaking recommends itself to English liberality; and as we have seen the beautiful designs prepared by Mr. Carpenter, we can speak in unqualified commendation of the artist and skill which will be employed on the works.

To preach intelligibly to children, and at the same time intelligently, is a great difficulty. It requires peculiar gifts: for quick at everything, children are especially quick at detecting effort and condescension in what many clever enough people think the right thing to do—to come down to their level. A miserable delusion: for in truth, how few are they who can ascend to the holiness of a child's level? how few who can *teach* a child? This fault we think that Mr. Kennaway of Brighton, because he treats children with reverence, has avoided in a volume of 'Sermons to the Young' (Rivingtons). They are simple, yet real and interesting; partly because he has often illustrated the Scripture biography: which is by far the best mode of sermons for the young, and this of course because children are more susceptible of the force of particulars than of general and abstract truisms. Mr. Kennaway's use of the Sacred Name—'you remember what Jesus said'—'Jesus is your real friend'—is to many (to ourselves we own) distressing. We altogether acquit Mr. Kennaway of any approach to irreverence: but he will at once see that the systematic use of the name, and the equally systematic disuse of 'Our Lord,' is significant.

Of Sermons, we have to mention;—Two volumes of 'Parochial Sermons,' by the late Dr. D'Oyley (Rivingtons); One volume, by Mr. Wheeler, of Shoreham (Folthorp); Three volumes, 'Female Characters of Holy Writ,' by Mr. Hugh Hughes (Hamilton and Adams); 'Parish Sermons,' by Mr. Harvey Goodwin (Deightons); 'Plain Sermons,—a Second Series,' by the late Mr. Blencowe (Bell): and of Single Discourses;—one by Mr. Dodsworth, at New Shoreham, 'Connexion between outward and inward Worship' (Folthorp); one by Dr. Morris, of Elstree, 'God our justifier through faith made perfect by works' (Whittaker); one 'On Famine,' by Mr. Charles Vansittart (Burns); and one on the same subject, by Mr. Martineau, (the Unitarian,) of Liverpool (Chapman).

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